3. § 37. The Essence of Sin.
§ 37. The Essence of Sin.
. The question concerning the essence of sin is not identical with that concerning its beginning, for only in the development does it become fully manifest what lies hidden in a principle. But yet in the first sin sin itself is already active and in it therefore also already to some extent knowable. Concerning the character and nature of the first sin, of which angels and men made themselves guilty, however, there is difference. The opinion that the sin of the angels began with lust has already been refuted earlier, vol. II 436. Much more probable is it, with a view to the nature of the temptation in Gen. 3:5 and Mt. 4:3, 6, 9 and the admonition 1 Tim. 3:6, not to become puffed up and thus to fall into the same judgment as the devil, that the first sin of the angels consisted in pride; but too little has nevertheless been revealed of their fall for us to be able to speak here with absolute certainty; others therefore also thought of lying, Joh. 8:44, envy,
Wijsh. 2:24, or another sin, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 157. According to the Roman Catholics the first sin in man also consisted in pride,
Bellarminus, de amiss. grat. et statu pecc. III c. 4, who appeals to Sir. 10:13,
14, Tob. 4:13, Rom. 5:19, August., de Gen. ad litt. XI 30. Enchir. 45. de civ.
XIV 13. [73] Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 163 etc. These proofs are not strong; Sirach and Tobias speak only of pride in general, Paul calls the first sin precisely disobedience, and church fathers and scholastics, when they call the first sin pride, chiefly combat the view that makes it consist in sensual lust. The Protestants, however, usually let the sin in Eve already begin with doubt and unbelief, which were then followed by pride and covetousness,
Luther on Gen. 3. Gerhard, Loci IX c. 2. Calv. Inst. II 1, 4. Zanchius, Op.
IV 30. Synopsis pur. theol. XIV 9 sq. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2. M. Vitringa II 267. Yet it was rightly remarked by Tertullianus, adv. Jud. 2 and Augustine, Enchir. 45, that the first sin already enclosed many kinds of sins in itself and in principle was a transgression of all commandments; it was, after all, disobedience to God, doubt, unbelief, self-exaltation, pride, murder, theft, covetousness etc.; and correspondingly there were also various thoughts, affections, desires, movements awakened in man; understanding and will, soul and body took part in it. It was a conscious and free act, ἁμαρτια, παραβασις, παραπτωμα, παρακοη in the proper sense,
Rom. 5:12v. Although tempted, the first men were nevertheless not brought to a fall as innocent children, without knowing better. They transgressed
God's command with consciousness and freedom; they knew and willed what they did. Excuses are not in place here. The circumstances under which the first sin was committed by angels and men do not serve for extenuation but increase the guilt. It was committed against God's express and clear command; by a man who had been created after God's image; in a matter of very slight significance, which scarcely demanded any self-denial; and perhaps a short time after the command had been received. It has become the source of all unrighteousness and abominations, of all disasters
and misfortunes, of all sickness and death, which since then have been committed and suffered in the world. Hinc illae lacrimae! The sin of Adam cannot be a trifle; it must have been a principial reversal of all relations, a revolution, whereby the creature detached itself from and set itself over against God, a rebellion, a fall in the most proper sense, which was decisive for the whole world and led it in a direction and on a path, away from God, toward godlessness and the [74] ruin, ineffabiliter grande peccatum, Aug.
Op. imp. c. Jul. I 165. Thus seriously was the first sin conceived in the Christian church and theology, August. de civ. XIV 11-15. XXI 12. Enchir.
26. 27. 45. Thomas, S. Th. II 2 qu. 163 art. 3. Conc. Trid. V 1. Bellarminus. de am. gr. et st. pecc. III c. 8-10. Scheeben, Dogm. II 594. Ned. Gel. art. 14.
Heid. Cat. qu. 7. 9. Mastricht, Theol. IV 1, 15. Marck, Hist. Parad. III 2, 10 etc.
2. The many names which Holy Scripture uses for sin indicate its dreadful character and its many-sided development. ַחָּטאת is called sin as an act that misses its goal and consists in deviation from the right way; ָעֶול or ָעֹון designates it as bending, crookedness, perversity, as deviation from the good direction; ֶּפ ַׁשע makes it known as transgression of the set boundaries, as breach of the covenant relationship to God, as apostasy and rebellion;
ְׁשָגָגה as a wrong deed that has happened unintentionally, by mistake; ֶר ַׁשע as a godless acting and walking, deviating from the law, culpable. Further, it is characterized by ָאָׁשם as guilt, by ָעֶול as vanity, by ָׁשְוא as falsehood, by ְנָבָלה as folly, by ַרע as an evil, malum, etc. The Greek words are especially ἁμαρτια, ἁμαρτημα, ἀδικια, ἀπειθεια, ἀποστασια, παραβασις, παρακοη, παραπτωμα, ὀφειλημα, ἀνομια, παρανομια; they speak for themselves and describe sin as deviation, injustice, disobedience, transgression, apostasy, lawlessness, guilt; and moreover the sinful power in man is also indicated
by σαρξ, ψυχικος and παλαιος ἀνθρωπος and in the world by κοσμος. The Latin peccatum is of uncertain derivation; the Dutch word zonde, which probably is connected with the Latin sons, i.e. nocens, Müller, Sünde I 114 f., has in Christian usage become a thoroughly religious concept; it denotes a transgression, not of a human, but of a divine law; places man in relation, not to his fellow men, to society and state, but to God, the heavenly Judge; is therefore also not loved in many circles and is then preferably replaced by moral evil etc. By far the most of these names make sin known as a deviation, transgression of the law. Scripture always conceives sin [75] as ἀνομια, 1 Joh. 3:4; its standard is the law of God. This law also had in different times a different form. Adam was in a wholly special case; no one can sin after him in the likeness of his transgression, Rom. 5:14. From Adam to Moses there was no positive law proclaimed by God. The objection can therefore be made that if there is no law, there can also be no transgression, sin and death, Rom. 5:13, 4:15. In Rom. 5:12v. Paul gives no other answer to that than that through the one transgression of Adam sin as a power entered into the world and ruled all and thus death passed through to all men. The transgression of Adam has constituted all as sinners and subjected all to death. This influence of Adam's transgression does not exclude but includes that all men themselves also personally are sinners.
For precisely because through the one transgression of Adam sin began to rule in the world of men and all consequently were themselves also personally sinners, therefore death also passed through to all. Paul says no more in Rom. 5:12v. That was there, in that connection, sufficient. But from elsewhere this answer can be elucidated and supplemented. If from Adam to Moses there has been sin and death, Rom. 5:13, 14, then there must also have existed a law, indeed no positive one, which with audible voice was
proclaimed by God as in paradise and on Sinai, but nevertheless a law, which also then bound men personally and rendered them guilty. Paul also says that clearly in Rom. 2:12-16. The Gentiles do not have the Mosaic law, but they nevertheless sin and perish ἀνομως, because they are a law to themselves and their conscience itself accuses them. There is a revelation of God in nature both of religious and ethical content, which is sufficient to take away all excuse, Rom. 2:18v., 1 Cor. 1:21. While God, however, let the Gentiles walk in their own ways, He made His laws and ordinances known to Israel in a clear way. And this law is now for Israel the standard of all moral action. In recent times this has indeed been contested, Stade, Gesch. des Volkes Israel I 1887 S. 507 f. Clemen, Chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 21 f. It is thought that חטא originally only meant: to be in the wrong or to be placed in the wrong over against a more powerful one, Ex. 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon.
18:14; that it [76] thereafter indicated an acting in conflict with the custom of the people, Gen. 19:7v., 34:7, Jos. 7:15, Richt. 19:23, 20:6, 2 Sam. 13:12,
21:1-14, and that only gradually did it denote an ethical transgression of the law of God. Through the prophets, indeed, Ihvh first received an ethical character; while His wrath earlier often flared up without there being any guilt on the part of man, 2 Sam. 16:10 and one thus could become a sinner without knowing or willing it, Num. 22:34, 1 Sam. 14:43 f., now Ihvh could only be angry over sin; this consisted from now on truly in aberratio a lege divina. This opinion, however, is contradicted by the facts. Even if חטא in the first-mentioned three places should have the broader meaning of suffering injustice in a juridical sense, without there being mention of ethical guilt, then that would still prove nothing for the thesis that this was the oldest and original concept of sin among Israel. The word properly means to miss, Richt. 20:16, and thus alongside the ethical it can also have
had the broader meaning of: to suffer injustice, to be placed in the wrong.
But even that is not yet the case in Ex. 5:16, 1 Kon. 1:21, 2 Kon. 18:14. In Ex. 5:16 the Israelites simply say to Pharaoh: we get no straw and yet must make bricks, and if we do not make them, we are nevertheless beaten and we get the blame, ְָוָחָטאת ַעֶּמ. In 1 Kon. 1:21 Bathsheba says to David: if you do not decide and Adonijah becomes king, then we, Bathsheba and Solomon, will soon be the guilty ones, who are killed by Adonijah because we do not acknowledge him. And in fact we are nevertheless right, on the ground of your oath v. 17. In 2 Kon. 18:14 Hezekiah makes a confession of guilt, which is wrung from him in distress and which he himself later does not acknowledge. Further, it is indeed a fact that the custom of the people everywhere counts as a standard of moral action, but this is absolutely not in conflict with the fact that nevertheless the law of God in the last instance is the norma of good and evil. Jos. 7:15 teaches how both, the transgressing of the covenant and the doing of a folly in Israel, can coincide. The custom of the people is in itself as little in conflict with God's law as the conscience, which is also a subordinate, subjective norma of the moral life; always it is and remains, also in the most Christian society, a norma normata; and also in Israel the custom of the people, e. g. of [77] hospitality, is not destroyed by the law but indeed acknowledged and sanctified. Only, where it comes into conflict, it must yield to the law of God. That now in fact the customs of the people in Israel always agreed with God's law or were purified by it, no one asserts, any more than that the conscience of Christians is already fully conformed to God's law. Many deeds of the saints in O. and N. T., of Noah, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Rachel,
David, Peter etc. are therefore also decidedly to be condemned and not, because they were believers, to be excused with the Rabbis. The essence of
sin is in the end not determined by what under Israel, in the congregation, is or is not customary, but by the law of God. And this is the standpoint that Holy Scripture always takes. Sin may be great or small, it is always only therefore sin, because it goes against God and His law, Gen. 13:13, 20:6,
39:9, Ex. 10:16, 32:33, 1 Sam. 7:6, 14:33, 2 Sam. 12:13, Ps. 51:6, Jes.
42:24, Jer. 14:7, 20 etc. It always comes down to the Lord's will and word and law, to His rights and statutes, to His commandments and ordinances; to know and to serve God is the all-embracing calling of Israel, and by that it is tested by the prophets. And likewise it is in the N. T. Jesus sets no one less than God Himself as example, Mt. 5:48, and judges everything according to His law, Mt. 19:17-19, Mk. 10:17-19, Luk. 18:18-20. This is for Him the content of law and prophets, and He maintains it fully, without taking anything away from it, Mt. 5:17-19, 23v., 6:16v., 21:12v., 23:3, 23,
24:20 and judges precisely from that standpoint the human ordinances, Mt.
5:20v, 15:2v., Mk. 2:23v., 7:8, 13 etc. In Mt. 7:12 he therefore sets forth no new ethical principle but gives nothing other than a practical interpretation of the commandment of love of neighbor. The Mosaic law has indeed in Christ reached its goal and its end, Rom. 10:4, Gal. 3:24, and the believer is free from it and stands in grace, Rom. 6:14, 7:4, 10:4, Gal. 2:19, 3:15v.,
5:18, but this freedom nevertheless does not abolish the law but confirms it, Rom. 3:31; its requirement is precisely fulfilled in him who walks according to the Spirit, Rom. 8:4. For that Spirit renews us and teaches us to examine and know and do what God's will is, Rom. 12:2, Ef. 5:10, Phil.
1:10. That will is knowable from the O. Test., Rom. 13:8-10, 15:4, 1 Cor.
[78] 1:31, 10:11, 14:34, 2 Cor. 9:9, 10:17, Gal. 5:14, is revealed in Christ, 1 Cor. 11:1, 2 Cor. 3:18, 8:9, 10:1, Phil. 2:5, 1 Thess. 1:6, 4:2, 1 Thess. 2:21, and also finds resonance in one's own conscience, 1 Cor. 8:7, 10:25, 2 Cor.
1:12; it is written in the heart of believers, Hebr. 8:10, 10:9. Everywhere in Scripture the essence of sin is ἀνομια, 1 Joh. 3:4, deviation from the will of God, revealed to Adam or Moses or Christ or to the congregation by the Holy Spirit. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 20-42. Schultz, Altt,
Theol.4 659 f. Smend, Altt. Religionsgesch. 106 f. 119 f. 192 f. etc.
3. By this doctrine of Scripture the conception of sin in Christian theology was determined. On the one hand, therefore, that opinion could not be accepted which sought the essence of sin in some substance and therefore reduced it to a principle of wrath in God (Böhme), or to an evil power alongside God (Mani), or to some kind of matter, such as the ὑλη, the σαρξ
(Plato, the Jews, Flacius, etc.). And on the other hand, the theory was also to be rejected, that sin consisted in a not-yet-being, that it belonged to the necessary oppositions in life and was by nature proper to the finite man, developing himself, striving after perfection (Spinoza, Hegel etc.), cf. above p. 45v. Over against this, Christian theology from the beginning maintained that sin was no substance. There has never been any difference or conflict about this. Petavius adduces numerous Church Fathers, who all teach the same in this respect. Here too no doubt or hesitation was possible. If sin were a substance, there would be a being that did not have God as author, or God would also be its cause. Sin therefore had to be conceived and defined as οὐτε ὀν οὐτε ἐν τοις ουσιν, as an ἐλλειψις, στερησις, ἀναχωρησις του ἀγαθου, as ἀσθενεια, ἀσυμμετρια, just as blindness is a deprivation of sight, Athan. c. Gent. 3 sq. Greg. Nyss., Catech. c. 5. Dionysius, de div. nom. c. 4. Damasc., de fide orthod. II c. 30. In the West Augustine in particular brought this privative character of sin to light and maintained it over against the Manicheans, cf. Nirschl, Ursprung und Wesen des Bösen nach der Lehre des H. Aug. Regensburg 1854. All being is in itself good.
Omnis natura, [79] in quantum natura est, bona est. Evil therefore can only be in the good, non potest esse ullum malum nisi in aliquo bono, quia non potest esse nisi in aliqua natura. It is even nulla natura, but amissio, privatio, corruptio boni, vitium, defectus naturae; bonum minui, malum est. de civ. XI 17. 22. Enchir. 11-13 c. Jul. I c. 3. etc. It therefore also has no causa efficiens, but only deficiens, de civ. XII 7. 9. And likewise by the scholastics, by the Roman, Luth. and Reformed theologians the concept of sin in the metaphysical sense was reduced to that of privatio, cf.
Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 34 and 35 and comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura, etc., further Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 48. 49. c. Gent. III 7 sq. Bonav., Brevil III 1. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. I c. 1. II c. 18. V c. 1. Becanus,
Theol. schol. II 1 tract. 1 cap. 5 qu. 1. Melanchton, Loc. de peccato.
Gerhard, Loc. X c. 1. Quenstedt, Theol. II p. 50. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 501.
Buddeus, Inst. theol. p. 546. Zanchius, Op. IV 6 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p.
335. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 p. 199. Hoornbeek, Theol. practica IV c. 1.
Turretinus, Theol. El. loc. IX etc.
On the other hand, however, it is clear that sin is not sufficiently described by the concept privatio. For it is not a mere lack, not a purely non-being; but it is an active and destructive principle, a dissolving, devastating power.
Scripture speaks of it mostly in a very positive sense as transgression, perversity, disobedience, lawlessness, etc., and ascribes to it the activity of bearing witness, ruling, moving, devising, fighting, etc. Various theologians have therefore also rejected the distinction between materia and forma in sin. They appealed, e.g., to the fact that blasphemy against God, idolatry, hatred against God, etc. as acts were sinful and could never assume a good forma, and they therefore preferred to define sin as an entitas quaedam realis ac positiva, as a reale quid, Cajetanus in Becanus t. a. p. Theol.
Wirceb. VII 15. Vitringa Sr., Observ. Sacr. VI c. 15. 16. M. Vitringa, II 288290 and furthermore also Arminius, Op. 1629 p. 730. Limborch, Theol. Chr.
V 4. 2. Strauss, Gl. II 360 f. Müller, Sünde I 396-409. Shedd, Dogm. Theol.
I 371. For a correct understanding, however, let the following be noted here.
1o. When most Christian theologians conceived of sin as privatio, [80] they thereby had first of all the refutation of Manichaeism in view. Insofar their opinion is also entirely correct and to be accepted without reservation. Sin is not a substance, neither spiritual nor material, for then it would have God as its cause, or God would not be the Creator of all things. 2o. Also the essence of sin itself forbids thinking of it as a substance. For sin is not a physical but an ethical phenomenon. It is a state and an act of the will and has its cause in this; it is not given with creation but arose after creation through disobedience. It therefore cannot be a materia, which existed eternally or was created in time by God, but has reality only as deformation of what is; insofar it can even be called an οὐκ ὀν, a nihilum. 3o. By that it is by no means meant that sin is a nihil negativum. Rather, the pantheistic conception of sin as a pure negation, as a not-yet-being, as a necessary moment in the development of a finite and limited being, as a delusion of thought, has at all times been opposed by Christian theology as decisively as possible. Sin was no mera negatio but a privatio. The difference between the two consists in this, that negation indicates only lack (carere), privation, on the other hand, indicates defect (egere); that a stone does not see is a negation, that a human being does not see is a privation, because seeing belongs to the qualities of a human being. Sin is a deprivation of that moral perfection which the human being ought to possess. 4o. The definition of sin as privatio therefore does not in the least exclude that it also, considered from another side, is an actio. It is no οὐσια, substantia, res, but indeed in
its deprivation of the good an ἐνεργεια, just as the limping of the lame man is not a not-walking but a wrong walking. Augustine, who repeatedly describes sin as a privatio, therefore calls it a transgressio legis, de cons. Ev.
II c. 4, voluntas retinendi vel consequendi quod justitia vetat, de duab. an. c.
Man. I. c. 11. Retract. I 11, a deficere, which includes a tendere, deficere autem non jam nihil est sed ad nihilum tendere, c. Secund. Man. c. 11, inclinatio ab eo quod magis est ad id, quod minus est, ib. c. 12, cf. de lib. arb. I 16 II 19, and then gives this definition of sin: peccatum est factum vel dictum vel concupitum aliquid contra aeternam legem; [81] lex vero aeterna est ratio divina vel voluntas Dei, ordinem naturalem conservari jubens, perturbari vetans, c. Faust. Man. XXII 27. This definition was later adopted by all, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 135. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 71 art. 6; sin is no mera or pura privatio sed actus debito ordine privatus, ib. qu. 72 art. 1 ad 2. qu. 75 art. 1 ad 1, a privatio cum positiva qualitute et actione, an actuosa privatio, Zanchius, Op. IV p. 1 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 3.
Heidegger, Corp. Theol. X 8. Bucanus, Inst. Theol. XV 7. Synopsis pur. theol. XVI 4-9 etc.
4. On the basis of Holy Scripture and in accordance with the confession of the Christian faith, the essence of sin can therefore be more precisely described and elucidated in the following manner. 1o. Since sin is not a physical or metaphysical but an ethical antithesis of the good, it has no proper, independent existence, existing independently of the being of things. Whoever regards sin as a substance may indeed seem deeply penetrated by its power and significance, but in fact weakens it, transfers it from the ethical to the physical domain, and makes the struggle between good and evil into a wrestling between light and darkness, spirit and matter, a good and an evil God, which never ends and makes all redemption from
sin impossible. Therefore it is of the highest importance to regard sin always as an ethical phenomenon. The punishments and consequences of sin certainly also extend over the physical domain, but sin itself is and remains of an ethical nature. Then it also can have no proper principle and no independent existence; it arose after and exists only through and by the good. Evil is indeed dependent on the good, but not conversely. Τῳ μεν γαρ ἐσθλῳ ἐγχωρει κακῳ γενεσθαι, Plato, Protag. p. 344. Το βελτιον και το τιμιωτερον προτερον εἰναι τῃ φυσει δοκει, Arist., Categ. c. 9. Good (true) is the index of itself and of evil (false). The good has been the cause of evil by free choice, and remains its substrate. Fallen angels and human beings are and remain as creatures good, and exist from moment to moment only through and in and unto God. And just as in its origin and in its being, so sin also in its works and struggles remains dependent on the good. It is able only [82] to do something with and by means of the powers and gifts that have been bestowed by God. Satan is therefore rightly called the simia Dei; if God establishes a church, he builds a chapel; over against a true one, he awakens a false prophet; over against the Christ he sets the antichrist. Even a band of robbers can exist only if it respects justice within its own circle. A liar adorns himself with the appearance of truth. A sinner pursues evil sub ratione boni. Satan appears as an angel of light. Sin is always doomed, in its operation and appearance, in spite of itself to borrow from virtue. It lies under the unbreakable fatality, that, striving after the destruction of all good, it simultaneously also works toward its own death. It is a parasite of the good. 2o. Although sin thus by virtue of its nature strives toward nonbeing, it nevertheless has no power over being itself. It cannot create; it also cannot destroy. Through sin, therefore, neither the essence of the angels, nor that of human beings, nor that of nature has been changed. They are
essentially the same creatures before and after the fall, with the same substance, the same faculties, the same powers. Before and after the fall, the human being has soul and body, intellect and will, affections and passions.
What has changed is not the substance, the materia, but the forma, in which it appears, the direction in which it works. With the same power of love with which the human being originally loved God, he now loves the creature. The same intellect with which he formerly contemplated the things that are above him now makes him, with admirable acuteness and profundity, honor the lie as truth. With the same freedom with which he once served God, he now serves the world. Substantially nothing has been taken away from the human being by sin and nothing has been brought into him. It is the same human being, but now walking, not toward God, but away from God, toward destruction. Peccatum non est essentia aliqua sed defectus et corruptela, qua scilicet corrumpitur modus, species et ordo,
Bonaventura, Brevil. III 1. 3o. Also the loss of the image of God and the breaking of the covenant of works is not in conflict with this conception of sin. The image of God, after all, although not a donum superadditum and belonging to the human being by nature, was not a substantia but an accidens; i.e. the human being, as he was created, was so constituted that his nature of itself, [83] without supernatural grace, yet not without God's good providence, brought along and manifested knowledge and holiness and righteousness, which were the principal content of the image of God.
When the human being, however, fell, he lost nothing substantial, not even a faculty and no power, but because sin has damaged the forma of his whole nature, of all his faculties and powers, all these now work in such a way that they no longer produce the knowledge of God and righteousness but precisely the opposite. The human being therefore by the fall did not merely
lose an insubstantial addition to his nature, a donum superadditum, while otherwise his nature remained intact; he also did not become a devil, who, incapable of re-creation, can never again display the traits of the image of God; but while he has remained essentially and substantially the same, i.e. human, and has retained all human constituent parts, faculties, and powers, the forma of all these, the nature and character, the disposition and direction, has been so changed that they now, instead of God's will, fulfill the law of the flesh. The image has been changed into a caricature. And likewise the foedus operum has been broken, insofar as by the works of the law no flesh can any longer be justified, Rom. 3:20, Gal. 3:2, but it is so little destroyed and abolished that the law of that foedus operum still obliges every human being to absolute obedience, that it has been taken up and perfectly fulfilled in the covenant of grace by Christ, and now remains for believers still a rule of gratitude. 4o. Abstracting from the good substrate by which sin is borne and to which it clings, it therefore can never be described otherwise than as privatio boni. One should, however, well consider that then sin is spoken of abstractive and metaphysice. And thus described, it has no being, it is no substance, but a nihil, nothing positive but only something privative; whoever wished to conceive it otherwise would thereby, in a Manichaean sense, make evil independent and eternal and set over against the summum bonum a summum malum. The abovementioned objection, raised against the definition of sin as privatio, therefore actually rests on misunderstanding. Abstractive and metaphysice sin is a privatio and on a Christian standpoint it cannot and may not be conceived otherwise. But concretive it occurs in no other way than as a wrong forma of a definite state or act and makes that state or that act itself sinful, just as a disease, without being a substance, nevertheless makes the
body sick. In concreto sin is therefore always in and on something that is substantially good. It may be difficult to distinguish in particular cases of sin between materia and forma, and much more difficult to separate them, just as at a given moment the heat of the stove cannot be separated. Yet, just as therefore the stove is not the heat itself, so the being or the act to which sin attaches itself is not to be identified with sin. Even in blasphemy the power needed to utter it and the language of which it makes use are in themselves good; what makes these and what makes all things wrong and sinful is the deformitas, the aberratio a lege divina. 5o. For the standard of sin is God's law alone. What sin is is in the last instance determined, not by the church (Rome) or the state (Hobbes), not by the independent moral law
(Grotius) or the autonomous I (Kant), not by humanity (Comte) or the social instincts (Darwin), but solely and only by the law of God. The concept sin expresses this clearly and is therefore avoided by all who know no higher standard for moral evil than a human one. God is also the only one who has absolute authority over us and can bind and obligate us in the conscience. Now He gave many laws for the different creatures, laws for sun and moon, heaven and earth, plant and animal, human being and angel; and, as far as the human being is concerned, again different laws for his bodily, spiritual, intellectual, aesthetic life, etc., also proper laws for his moral life. More precisely, it is now this moral law which is the standard of all sin. Transgression of all other laws, logical, aesthetic, social, political, ecclesiastical, etc., is only then and insofar sin as it directly or indirectly includes a transgression of the moral law, of the command of God. This moral law, which was implanted in the human being at his creation, continues to work after the fall in his conscience, was proclaimed by God on Sinai, and also remains for believers a rule of life, is the source of
knowledge of sin, Rom. 3:20, 4:14, 5:20, 7:7. Indeed, very certainly the Christian faith is necessary in order to learn to know sin rightly, and indeed in the [85] gospel, as by way of contrast, the nature and the magnitude of sin is made manifest, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. § 112 5. Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers. III2 384 f. Kaftan. Wesen der chr. Relig. 250, but all that nevertheless does nothing to alter the fact that not the gospel but the law is the Erkenntnissgrund of sin. In that moral law God comes to us not only as Father with fatherly admonitions and chastisements, but, as the categorical imperative testifies in everyone, also as Lawgiver and Judge with commands and punishments. Although not coercive like the logical and not unbreakable like the laws of nature, the moral law in majesty surpasses all others; it addresses itself to the will, breathes in freedom, demands fulfillment out of love; and yet it turns to all human beings without distinction, comes to them in all circumstances, extends over their words and deeds not only but also over their state, knows of no yielding and of no excusing, speaks inexorably, categorically, with sovereign authority and avenges each of its transgressions in strict punishment. It is a decretum
Numinis, revelation of God's will, expression of his being. 6o. From this character of the moral law it follows that sin can dwell only in a rational creature. Irrational nature can suffer under the consequences of sin, but sin occurs only in a being endowed with intellect and will. More precisely, the will is the proper subject, το δεικτικον, of sin. The moral law is precisely the law for the will of the creature; the moral good is of such a nature that it can be realized only by the will. What absolutely and decisively proceeds outside any influence of the will can be no sin. In that sense Augustine rightly said: adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium, de vera relig. 14. But this word is
susceptible to misunderstanding. And when the Pelagians made use of it as proof that sin can never exist otherwise than in an act of will, Augustine later gave it such an explanation that sins of ignorance, of concupiscence, and original sin were not excluded by it, Retract. I 13; and elsewhere he expressly says that the law also forbids the motus concupiscentiae involuntarios, de spir. et lit. c. 36. de nupt. I 17. 23. c. Jul. IV c. 2. VI c. 8. de civ. XIV 10. In accordance with that, many scholastics still taught that sin indeed had in the will its ultimate cause [86] and thus in that sense always had its seat in the will, but then nevertheless not in voluntate sicut in subjecto sed sicut in causa, Thomas, Sent. II dist. 24 qu. 3 art. 2 ad 2. S.
Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 2. II 2 qu. 10 art. 2; sin therefore can also have its seat in the sensualitas, even if it is then only a peccatum veniale, Lombardus,
Sent. II dist. 24, 8. Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 74 art. 3. Bonaventura, Brevil. III c. 8 Sent. II dist. 24 pars. 2 art. 2 qu. 2. But various reasons gradually brought about a modification in this doctrine. The concupiscentia was an unclear concept; it could be understood equally in bonam as in malam partem, since many natural desires that arise of themselves in us, such as e.g. of the hungry person for food, are nevertheless no sin;
Augustine therefore spoke of the concupiscentia sometimes in such a way that it was no sin and could not harm, if only it was not consented to in conflict with the law, c. Jul. VI 5. de Gen. c. Manich. II 14 etc. Further, scholasticism gradually began to distinguish between motus primo-primi, secundo-primi and plane deliberati, i.e. between such thoughts and desires as rise in us before all consent of the will, wholly involuntarily, and are no sin at all; such as against which the will does indeed resist but by which it is overcome and which are venial sins; and such as in which the will consciously and fully consents and which are mortal sins. And in addition
there came still that original sin was increasingly conceived more weakly and was regarded as wholly annulled by baptism; what remained, the concupiscentia, was itself no sin but could only become an occasion for sinning. Thus Rome also determined that guilt and stain of original sin are wholly taken away by baptism, that the concupiscentia indeed remains but does not harm those who do not consent to it, and can only be called sin, quia ex peccato est et ad peccatum inclinat, Trid. V 5, and further Cat. Rom.
II 2, 7. Becanus, Theol. schol. II 1519 p. 145-150. Sylvius, Comm. in totam primam sec. S. Thomae, ed. 4 II p. 336 sq. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. I 1. V 520. Daelman, Theol. II 1759 p. 174 sq. Dens, Theol. I 1828 p. 314 sq. Kleutgen, Theol. d. Vorz. II 644. The Reformation opposed this and asserted that also impure thoughts and desires that rise in us before and without our will are sin; by that it did not mean that all desiring in a psychological and philosophical sense was sin, but that the concupiscentia in Scriptural and theological meaning made us guilty before God. And in this it undoubtedly was right. For certainly sin began with a conscious and free act of will. But that first sinful act has not passed by us without trace; it has corrupted the whole human nature and left a state that in all respects is in conflict with the law of God. Although sin thus arose through the will, it now in fact does exist outside the will and has its seat also in all other faculties and powers of the human being, in soul and body, in lower and higher cognitive and appetitive faculty, Gen. 6:3, 8:21, Ex. 20:17, Ps. 19:13,
51:7, Jer. 17:9, Mt. 5:28, Mk. 7:21, Rom. 7:7, 15-17, 8:7, Gal. 5:7 etc. Sine voluntate non potest esse peccatum, quia sine voluntate non potest existere ut sit; sine autem voluntate potest esse, quia sine voluntate potest manere quod existit, Aug. in Dorner, Augustinus 129. Lutheran and Reformed theologians therefore usually contested the proposition that all peccatum
was voluntarium. By that, however, they by no means meant that there could also be sin that proceeded wholly and absolutely outside the faculty of will. It only depends on forming a correct conception of the nature and operation of the will. The will, namely, is absolutely not the whole appetitive faculty, but of that only a particular power and activity, cf. my
Beginselen der Psychologie 1897 p. 166v. The will in this narrower sense precedes only actual sins, as Jas. 1:15 speaks of them, but absolutely not state-sins and involuntary sins. If the voluntarium in this sense were a necessary element of sin, not only would all impure thoughts and desires cease to be sin, but with the slogan tout comprendre serait tout pardonner almost all actual sins would also be excusable. In order to be able to maintain the innocence of the concupiscentia, Bellarminus already came to the explanation: non omne quod repugnat legi peccatum est, the motus involuntarii are indeed in conflict with the law but nevertheless no sins, de amiss. gr. et st. pecc. V 10. But even if it is the case that the voluntarium in this narrow sense does not always constitute the concept of sin, nevertheless the state-sins and the involuntary sins do not therefore proceed wholly outside the will; there is not only a voluntas antecedens, but also a voluntas concomitans, [88] consequens, approbans; the will later approves in a stronger or weaker degree the sinfulness of our nature, of our thoughts, and takes pleasure in it. And also when later the will, instructed by reason, resists it, or the regenerate can testify with Paul that he does not will the evil that he does, then thereby certainly the degree of sin is diminished, but the nature of sin is not determined. For this has its standard only in God's law; Paul calls what he does not will but nevertheless in fact does indeed sin, and assents to the law that it is good. Yet even then, even the sin that is committed without being willed does not proceed wholly outside the will.
For very certainly Paul can say: I no longer do it but the sin that dwells in me, and thus make an antithesis between his reborn I and his unreborn flesh, but Augustine has rightly already explained these words thus: etsi concupiscentiae non consentio, etsi post concupiscentias meas non eo, tamen adhuc concupisco et utique etiam in ipsa parte ego sum. Non enim ego alius in mente et alius in carne. Sed quid igitur ipse ego? Quia ego in mente, ego in carne. Non enim duae naturae contrariae sed ex utroque unus homo, quia unus deus a quo factus est homo, de verbis apost. serm. 5. For it is not another being that in the flesh does the sin, and another that nevertheless does not will it. But it is in both cases the same human being, who on the one hand in the concupiscentia in an impure way chases after the forbidden and yet on the other hand in the deepest of his will turns away from it and fights against it. And therefore, because the human being, even the regenerate, as long as he is in the flesh, always in weaker or stronger measure still desires the forbidden, even if it is the case that with his will in the narrower sense he goes against it, therefore it can be said that all sin is nevertheless in the deepest ground voluntary. There is no one and nothing that compels the sinner to serve sin. Sin does not have its seat outside him but in him and has directed his thinking and desiring in its direction. It is his sin, insofar as he has made it his own by means of his various faculties and powers. Cf. Melanchton, Apol. Conf. art. 2. Loci C. de peccato. Form.
Conc. II 1. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 6 en 11. Quenstedt, Theol. II 60. 92. 139.
Hollaz p. 501. 525. Calvijn, Iust. II 1. III 3. IV 15, 10. 11. Zanchius, Op. IV 56 sq. Beza, Tract. II 345. [89] Polanus, Synt. p. 336, Martyr, L. C. 70.
Turretinus, Theol. El. IX qu. 2. XI qu. 21. Mastricht IV 2, 22. Burmannus, Synopsis II 7, 9. C. Vitringa, Observ. Sacr. I 563. M. Vitringa II 293. Moor
III 132. Many Comm. on Ex. 20:17, Rom. 7:7, Gal. 5:16, Heid. Cat, Q. 113
etc. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 131. 202. Müller, Sünde I5 251 f. My Beginselen der Psychol. 145-148. Thus it finally appears 7o that sin is an incomprehensible riddle. We do not know whence it is, nor what it is. It is there and has no right of existence. It exists and no one explains its origin. It itself came into the world without motive and yet has become the motive for all thinking and acting of human beings. It is, abstractly considered, nothing but a privation and yet in concreto a power that rules all and everything. It has no proper, independent principle and yet is a principle that devastates the whole creation. It lives from the good and combats it unto destruction. It is nothing and has nothing and can do nothing without the beings and powers which God has created, and yet organizes all these to the revolt against Him. It combats with what is God's all that is God's. It is the will of the weak, finite creature in resistance against the Creator; dependence, in enmity against the Independent One and itself chasing after independence; the becoming that has no permanence in struggle with the eternally Being; the greatest contradiction, tolerated by God in his creation and by Him, in the way of right and righteousness, used as an instrument for his glory. Cf. Further on the essence of sin: Tholuck, Die Lehre v. d.
Sünde u. vom Versöhner8 1862. Müller, Sünde5 1867. Weiszäcker, Zu der Lehre v. Wesen der Sünde, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1856 S. 131-195. Krabbe, Die
Lehre v. d. Sünde u. v. Tode 1836. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 143 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III. Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk I3 181 f. Dorner, Gl. II 4 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I2 417 f. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 287 f.
Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I Die biblische Lehre 1897. Walther, Das Wesen der Sünde, Neue Kirchl. Zeits. April 1898 S. 284-325 enz.
5. Although sin is always one in principle and essence and always consists in ἀνομια, there are in its manifestations and operations very different
degrees. First of all there is a great distinction [90] between diabolical and human sin. In the Old Test. we do not yet find a developed demonology.
That in Gen. 3 an evil, spiritual power appears, we know only first from the N. T.; the ְׂש ִעיִרם, Lev. 17:7, 2 Chron. 11:15, Jes. 13:21, 34:14, ֵׁש ִדים, Deut.
32:17, Ps. 106:27, ִליִלית, Jes. 34:14, and ֲעלּוָקה. Spr. 30:15 certainly are not to be regarded as elements of revelation; and that with ֲעָזאֵזל, Lev. 16, one must think of an evil spirit, is unprovable. Of evil spirits there is mention only in 1 Sam. 16:14-23 and 1 Kon. 22:19v., and of Satan in Job 1, 1 Chr.
21:1, Zach. 3. The separation between good and evil angels has not yet been completed; the evil spirit still goes out from God, Satan still finds himself among the sons of God; only gradually does the antithesis become sharper.
The word satan means adversary and can in itself have a good sense; it occurs of human opponents, 1 Sam. 29:4, 1 Kon. 5:4, 11:14, 23:25, of hindrances on the way, 2 Sam. 19:23, of a human accuser, Ps. 109:6, 20, 29, even of the Malak Ihvh, who steps in Balaam's way, Num. 22:22, 32. But yet Satan in the O. T. is already thought of as a being that stands hostile over against God and his people. And when revelation is completed and Christ comes, to break the works of the devil, then also the βαθη του σατανα become manifest. The N. Test. makes known to us a βασιλεια, Mt.
12:26, Mk. 3:24, Luk. 11:17, 18, of evil spirits, which forms the antithesis of Christ and his kingdom. At the head stands Satan, called by different names, διαβολος, σατανας, ἐχθρος, Mt. 13:39, Luk. 10:19, κατηγωρ, Op.
12:10, βελιαρ (syr. for βελιαλ, worthlessness), πονηρος, Mt. 13:19, Ef. 6:16, 2 Thess. 3:3, 1 Joh. 2:13, 14, 3:12, 5:18, βεελζεβουλ (lit. lord of the dwelling, but probably arisen from βεελζεβουβ, fly-god, art. Herzog3 2,
514) Mt. 10:25, ἀρχων των δαιμονιων, Mt. 9:34, ἀρχων της ἐζουσιας του ἀερος, Ef. 2:2, ἀρχων του κοσμου, Joh. 12:31, ὁ θεος του αἰωνος τουτου, 2
Cor. 4:4, ὁ δρακων ὁ μεγας, ὁ οφις ὁ ἀρχαιος, Op. 12:9, 20:2 etc. And under him stand many δαιμονια, δαιμονες, πνευματα πονηρα, ἀκαθαρτα, πνευματικα της πονηριας, which again are distinguished into all kinds of classes and ranks, 1 Cor. 15:21, Ef. 6:12, Col. 2:15, Jud. 6, also in wickedness the one still surpassing the other, Mt. 12:45, Luk. 11:26, [91] and together are Satan's ἀγγελοι, Mt. 25:41, 2 Cor. 12:7, Op. 12:7, 9. Cf.
Hofmann, Schriftbeweis 12 418 f. Sander, Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom Teufel 1858. Oehler, Theol. des A. T. § 200. Knenen, G. v. I. II 256v. Hahn,
Theol. des N. T. § 128 f. Schwartzkopff, Der Teufelsund Daemonenglaube Jesu, Zeits. f. Theol. u. Kirche von Gottschick, VII 1897 S. 289-330.
Holtzmann, Neut. Theol. I 53 f. 167. II 238 f. etc. Weser, Die verschiedenen Auffassungen vom Teufel im N. T., Stud. u. Krit. 1882 S. 284 f. Everling,
Die paulin. Angelologie und Daemonologie, Göttingen 1888. Even if there is thus among them still some difference in strength and wickedness, all together they are nevertheless presented as thoroughly corrupt. They are always and everywhere the opponents of God, the disturbers of his kingdom, the combatants of Christ, the seducers of men, the accusers of God's children; they live in sin as in their element. Never do they occur as an object of God's love, although they are his creatures; Christ has not assumed their nature; an object of our love, of our intercession they may not be; for them there is no hope of restoration and preservation.
There is in the being and concept of the devils something completely incomprehensible. Wir können des absolute böse Wesen immer nur unter der Bedingung denken, dass wir entweder an der absoluten Bosheit oder an der wahren Existenz etwas fehlen lassen, C. J. Nitzsch, Syst. d. chr. Lehr §
116. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 337. Absolutely evil they cannot be, for they are creatures of God and thus as such good; and yet they are only the
object of God's hatred and of his eternal wrath. Because of this incomprehensibility of the nature of the devils many have denied their existence, and have regarded them as souls of deceased human beings or as personifications of our evil sins or as impersonal principles of evil, Bekker,
Betov. Werelt II c. 20v. Semler, de daemoniacis 1760. Schleiermacher, Chr.
Gl. § 44. 45. Schelling, Werke II 4 S. 241 f. Rothe, Ethik § 503. Martensen, Dogm. § 99 f. Mallet, art. Teufel in Herzog. Strauss, Chr. Gl. II 1 f.
Biedermann, Dogm. 614 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 521-524 enz. But the reality of Satan and his angels has been placed beyond doubt by Scripture; of accommodation there is not the least to be thought; Jesus has, in a very weighty point of religion, wholly and entirely erred, or it is thus, as He has said. And [92] the doctrine of Satan is for the whole Christian doctrine also far from indifferent. It is of value over against Manichaeism, for Satan is not an original being but a fallen angel; over against Pelagianism, for Satan has by one decision of the will become wholly and entirely corrupted; over against the conception of sin as weakness and sensuality, for Satan is a high, glorious, rich spirit; over against the opinion that sin is a passing moment in development, for Satan remains Satan and is never restored; over against the lowering of man to a devil, for Satan has fallen of himself, man was seduced by him, is not unschuldig but also not urschuldig; over against the conception of the atonement as an ethical process, for Christ has come to break the works of the devil. Faith in Satan's existence is not an element of saving faith in Christ; but it nevertheless is connected with it. There lies truth in the: nullus diabolus, nullus redemptor! If there were no sin, there would be no redeemer, and the seriousness of sin comes out precisely most clearly in the doctrine of Satan. From everything that Scripture testifies concerning the angels, it nevertheless appears that the moral life in them
bears another character than in human beings. Human beings are, in every domain and thus also in the moral, subject to development; they are born small, in knowledge, strength, virtue or vice, and gradually grow up in all these. But thus it is not with the angels. They have all been created at the same time with one another and mature; those who remained standing were at once confirmed in the good, and they who fell were immediately hardened and perfected in evil. Satan was not seduced, but he brought forth the lie, the sin out of himself, Joh. 8:44, and in that has at once become hardened. The nature of his sin is such that he is no longer susceptible to any repentance; of a moral consciousness, of a conscience there is in him no question; he lives from hatred. Der eigentlich satanische Charakter besteht in einem Hass alles dessen, was über ihm und bloss weil es über ihm ist
(Baader). Sin also in the devils is no materia but forma; there is no summum malum, as there is a summum bonum; but the forma of sin has become so one with the angelic nature that no separation is any longer possible. It is indeed all too bold to assert that the fallen angels are also for God's omnipotence [93] irredeemable; and it is better to rest here in God's good pleasure, Voetius, Disp. I 920. Turret., Th. El. IX 5, 8. Heidegger,
Corp. Th. VIII 49. Moor II 414. But yet it appears sufficiently that that good pleasure is no arbitrariness. Here on earth there is already among human beings a sin that is unforgivable, viz. the blasphemy against the H. Geest; with death, i.e. with that peculiar dispensation in which we live here on earth, the forgiveness of all sins ceases; the nature of sin cuts off, in the case of the fallen angels, the way of redemption. To which then is added that the angels are not one race. Human beings could fall and have fallen in one; and they can be saved and are saved in one. But the devils have not fallen in one, not in another, but each for himself and head for head; there was
among them no foedus operum, and therefore there is also for no foedus gratiae place. The satanic sin is thus, with all agreement, nevertheless in origin, nature, consequences a wholly other than the human. It bears an absolute character; Satan is the highest revelation of evil. Therefore he is in Scripture named with such mighty, lofty names as prince of the world, god of this age, etc. But therefore also the victory over Satan is the complete triumph of sin. God has in Satan given it every opportunity to show what it is and can do. The highest and best, the noblest and greatest in God's creation it has made subservient to itself. And yet it appears at last, in the struggle of power against right, to be powerless. Es ist der Charakter des
Bösen, dass es immer mit Energie anfängt und mit Schwäche aufhört (Baader). Sin is not, it wants to be; it has no true reality and never attains to that; it is lie in its origin and lie in its end. And therefore Satan at last, with all his power, is subservient to God's glorification. Luzifer ist, kann man sagen, durch die Probe inne geworden, dass nichts wahrhaft ist als Gott.
Darum ist Luzifer so gut ein Beweis Gottes als ein Engel. Wenn der Gute beweist, dass Gott ist, so beweist der Böse, dass nur Gott ist (Baader). Cf.
Augustinus, de civ. XI en XII. Anselmus, de casu diaboli. Lombardus, Sent.
II dist. 2-7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 63. 64. Petavius, de Angelis l. III.
Gerhard, Loc. V c. 4. sect. 10 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. I 450 sq. Zanchius, Op.
III 167-216. Voetius, Disp. I 906 sq. Daub, [94] Judas Ischarioth, Heidelb.
1816. 1818. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 251 f. Lange, Dogm. II 559 f. Dorner II 188 f. Oosterzee § 76. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 428.
6. Apart from between the devilish and the human sins, there is also again great distinction among the latter. The Stoa, Novatian, Seb. Franck, Deurhof and others have wrongly denied this, M. Vitringa II 377. Indeed, in principle sin and virtue are indivisible; whoever has one has them all and
whoever lacks one lacks them all; between good and evil there is no gradual transition, someone agrees with the law of God or not: and the law of God is an organism which, if one of its commandments is transgressed, is violated in its entirety, for God, who gave the commandment that was transgressed, is the author of all the other commandments, Jak. 2:10, cf.
Vinet, L'unité de la loi, in his Nouvelles études évangéliques. Rothe, Theol.
Ethik § 730. 731. But for that reason not all sins are equal. The different names, in use for sin, already point to that. In the offering of Cain and Abel in Gen. 4 it comes out that the disposition is of more value than the gift. The law, given to Israel, does indeed contain all kinds of ceremonial commandments, but throughout the whole O. T. ethical action nevertheless stands far above the cultic and liturgical; faith is reckoned for righteousness,
Gen. 15:6, obedience is better than offering, 1 Sam. 15:22, Am. 2:6, 5:14, 21v., Hos. 4:1v., 12:7, Mich. 6:6, 8, Jes. 1:11v., 5:8v., Jer. 7:3, 22:3, Ezech.
16:49, 18:5v., Zach. 7:5v., Mal. 3:5 etc., cf. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d.
Sünde I 70. When after the exile Pharisaism arises and reverses this relation, Jesus and the apostles return again to law and prophets, Mt. 5-7,
19:18v., Mk. 7:21v., Rom. 1:29v., 1 Cor. 5:10v., 6:9v., 2 Cor. 12:20v., Gal.
5:19v., etc. The law itself moreover makes a distinction between sins ִּב ְׁשָגָגה, which are committed without evil intent, out of ignorance or weakness, do not break the covenant and can be atoned for within the covenant, and sins
ְבָיד ָרָמה, which are committed with awareness and deliberately, place the perpetrator outside the covenant and make him worthy of death, Lev. 4, 5,
22:14, Num. 15:22v., 35:11v., Jos. 20:3, 9. Scripture never abandons the objective standpoint, which seeks the standard of sin only in the law of God. But [95] nevertheless the guilt of the transgression is still smaller or greater, according as the commandment was violated with weaker or
stronger awareness and will. On the one hand Stade, Gesch. des Volkes Israel I 512 f, wrongly infers from Gen. 12:17, 20:3. 26:10, Num. 22:34, 1
Sam. 14:24v., 36v., that to ancient Israel the distinction between conscious and unconscious transgressions was unknown and one thus could become guilty wholly outside his knowing and willing; for all these passages hold the ignorance to be a selbstverschuldete or speak of no guilt. But on the other hand it is nevertheless also not true, dass Sünde im Allgemeinen nur ist, sofern auch ein Bewusstsein derselben ist, Schleiermacher, Chr. Gl. 68,
2. Sin does indeed presuppose some knowledge of the law; a human being without the least moral sense would be not accountable but would also cease to be human, Rom. 2:14, 15; and sin does indeed usually go together with some consciousness of guilt, but nevertheless the standard of sin is not the consciousness of guilt but the law of God. There are sins which are hidden not only from others, but also from ourselves, Job 11:4v., Ps. 19:13,
90:8, or are only later recognized and confessed as guilt, Ps. 25:7, 51:7.
Ignorance is also often itself sin, and the consciousness of guilt weakens, the longer sin is served, Am. 2:11, Hos. 4:6, Mich. 3:1, 6:8, Spr. 24:12,
Pred. 4:17. Therefore the subjective consciousness of guilt cannot determine the character of sin. Although ignorance thus can never make the sin itself good, it nevertheless often, when it is not willful, serves as an excuse. Paul says that he formerly was a blasphemer, persecutor and oppressor, but adds that mercy was shown to him because he did it ignorantly, 1 Tim. 1:13. And thus Holy Scripture speaks repeatedly of the sins of the Jews and of the Gentiles, as done in ignorance, Luk. 23:34, Hd.
3:17-19, 13:27, 17:30, Ef. 4:18, Hebr. 5:2, 1 Petr. 1:14, 2:25. Thereby those sins are indeed not stripped of their guilty character, as Ritschl, Rechtf. u.
Vers.2 II 38. 241-246. III 350-354 seems to think; for Rom. 1-3, 5:12v., Ef.
4:17-19, Col. 3:5-7, 1 Cor. 15:9, 1 Tim. 1:13, 15 etc. teach otherwise. But nevertheless these sins, done in ignorance, are thereby distinguished from sins that have arisen from hardening; the ignorance offers a ground of plea for forgiveness. And just as sins differ in degree and [96] measure, according as they are committed out of ignorance and weakness or out of intent and malice, so they are also distinguished according to the object against which they are directed: sins against the first table are heavier than against the second, Mt. 22:37, 38; according to the subject that commits them: the more richly someone is endowed with gifts, the guilt of his transgression increases, Mt. 11:21, Luk. 12:47, 48, Joh. 9:41, 15:22, 24; according to the circumstances under which they are committed: he who steals out of poverty sins less heavily than he who does it out of greed, Spr.
6:30, Jes. 26:10; according to the degree to which someone yields to sin: he who commits adultery with thought and word stands guilty but aggravates his judgment if he completes the sin in deed, Mt. 5:28. There is also in sin a development, there is a law of sin. A particular sin comes gradually into being through suggestio, delectatio, consensus, operatio; in suggestione peccati semen est, in delectatione fit nutrimentum, in consensu perfectio,
Gregorius M., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II 24, 8. Bonav., Brevil. III 8. And thus sin also develops gradually with a person, in a household and family, with a society and people, and also in the whole of humanity. Sin is indeed not in itself so rich that it can assume so many forms, for it is no independent principle and is metaphysically nothing but privatio boni. But as in its origin, so it also exists in its development only in and through the good. It connects itself with the endless richness of the created, devastates all that exists, fights with the whole world as its instrument against God and his holy law, and thereby assumes all those different forms and shapes which
all together give it the character of a well-governed kingdom, of an organism animated by one principle, of a κοσμος, standing under the guidance of the ἀρχων του κοσμου, den θεος του αἰωνος.
Since sin in its essence is privatio, neither a principium dividendi nor also a divisio can be derived from it itself. Privatio receives its species from the form to which it is opposed. The earlier dogmatics and ethics therefore did indeed speak of the character of the first sin, but otherwise made no effort to trace out a so-called principle of sin and to reduce all transgressions of the moral law to it. Only in later times has one attempted to establish such a principle, and has sought it in turn [97] in sensuousness, Schleiermacher,
Chr. Gl. § 66 e. a. or in selfishness, Müller, Sünde I5 178. Tholuck, Sünde8 18. 98. Vilmar, Moral I 136. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III2 3. Lange, art.
Selbstsucht in Herzog and further Thomasius, Kahnis, Frank, Zöckler etc., or also in both, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 461. Lipsius, Dogm. § 480. Indeed, human sins also for the most part display the character of sensuousness or selfishness, of fleshly lust or spiritual pride, of weakness or wickedness; sometimes sin seems to consist in the dominion of matter over the spirit, sometimes also in a misuse of freedom, in revolt against God's ordinances.
But yet it has succeeded neither for Rothe, to explain selfishness from sensuousness, nor also for J. Müller with his praeëxistentianism, to explain sensuousness from selfishness, cf. Dorner, Gl. II 90-98. And that is also easy to understand. Metaphysically and abstractly sin cannot be otherwise and cannot be more closely defined than as privatio boni; then it has no principle of its own, no real existence; it exists only on the good. The forms which it assumes it derives from the good, in which it dwells and which it corrupts. It will therefore differ in appearance according as to the creatures in which it is seated. Although always privatio boni, it bears in angels and
men and even in each of these again a particular character. And since man by nature is neither only a sensuous nor only a spiritual being but always both together, therefore all sin in him will also display this character. No single sin of man is exclusively sensuousness or exclusively selfishness.
Just as with the first sin in Adam, there are in every sin various sides to be noticed, even if it is also the case that usually the one is more striking than the other. Every sin in man is aversio a Deo, disobedience, revolt, anarchy, anomie and at the same time, since he never has enough in himself, conversio ad creaturam, idolatry, pride, selfishness, sensuousness etc.,
Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 42 art. 3 qu. 2. And since the creatures to which man can turn are so many, therefore sin in him can also assume so many forms. There are as many kinds of sins as there are different commandments, duties, virtues, moral goods. Thomas divided the sins according to the objects to which they are directed, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 72 art.
[98] 1, Scotus according to the virtues to which they are opposed, Sent. II dist. 37 qu. 1, 9, cf. Liguori, Theol. mor. de pecc II. n. 32. And alongside that there still existed many other divisions, such as that into seven capital sins, superbia, avaritia, luxuria, via, gula, invidia, acedia (vox memorialis: saligia); according to the norma into sins against the different commandments of the law or into sins against God, the neighbour and ourselves; according to the instrument with which they are committed, into sins with thoughts, words and works, or into sins of the spirit and of the flesh, or in accordance with 1 Joh. 2:16 into peccata sentiendi, sciendi et dominandi, or into sins of weakness, ignorance and wickedness; according to the form into sins of omission and of commission, or into sins per se and per accidens; according to the adjuncta into hidden and public, reigning and not reigning, silent and crying sins etc., cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 42.
Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 72. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 5 sq. Ursinus, Tract. Theol.
202. Moor III 313. Mastricht, Theol. IV 3,10. Heidegger, Corpus Theol. X 61. Vilmar, Theol. Moral I 221. Zöckler, Das Lehrstück v. d. sieben
Hauptsünden, München 1893 etc.
Leaving further elaboration to ethics, we here discuss only the Roman distinction of sins into peccata mortalia and venialia. This has its origin in the practice of penance, cf. Pijper, Gesch. der boete en biecht in de Chr.
Kerk I 1891 bl. 306v., and in substance already occurs in Tertullian, de pudic. 2. 3. 19. adv. Marc. IV 9, and in Augustine, who spoke of peccata levia, brevia, minuta, minima, quotidiana, which still remain in believers,
Enchir. 44. 71. de civ. XXI 27. de nat. et gr. 39. de spir. et litt. 36. Worked out by scholasticism, Lombard and others on Sent. II dist. 42. Thomas, S.
Theol. II 1 qu. 88. 89, it was established by the church, Trid. VI c. 11 can.
27 XIV 5. Cat. Rom. II 5 qu. 40, and since then defended by all theologians with zeal against all opposition, Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 3 sq. Becanus,
Theol. Schol. II 1619 p. 117. Liguori, Theol. Mor., de pecc. n. 51 sq.
Busenbaum, Theol. mor., de pecc. qu. 31 sq. Antoine, Theol. Mor., de pecc. c. 2 etc. According to this distinction there are sins which cause the received grace to be lost and are worthy of death, and others, such as an idle word, an overly boisterous laugh, an involuntarily surging desire, agitation, [99] anger, a very small theft, etc., which do not cause grace to be lost, not so much contra as praeter legem, and are by nature pardonable. The distinction is grounded on the fact that Scripture speaks of different sins and punishments, Mt. 5:22, 7:3, 23:23, Luk. 6:41, 1 Cor. 3:12-15, sometimes connects death with sins, Rom. 1:32, 6:23, 1 Cor. 6:9, Gal. 5:21, 1 Joh.
3:14, and yet often continues to recognize believers as such, even though they stumble in many things, Spr. 24:16, Mt. 1:19, Luk. 1:6, Jak. 3:2, and
furthermore also on the consideration that there exist curable and incurable diseases and that there are small offenses which do not abolish friendship.
The Reformers rejected this distinction as in conflict with God's Word.
They did not deny that there were degrees in sins; and they also still retained the terms peccata mortalia and venialia, but they attached another meaning to them. The Lutherans had, to a certain extent, still to adopt the distinction, because believers could commit sins in which grace was preserved, and others in which it was lost, Luther in Köstlin, Luthers Theol.
II 472 f. Melanchthon, Loci Comm., de peccato. Gerhard, Loc. X c. 20, cf. also Bellarmine, de amiss. gr. I c. 4. But the Reformed went further and wanted to know nothing of the whole distinction. If they sometimes still used the words, they understood by them that all sins, except the blasphemy against the H. Spirit, can be forgiven by God's mercy and are in fact also forgiven to believers, but that they all in themselves are worthy of death,
Calvin, Inst. II 8, 58. III 2, 11. 4, 28. Antid. conc. Trid. VI 12. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 209. Gomarus, Theses theol. disp. 13. Moor III 308-312.
Turretinus, Theol. El. IX 4. Mastricht IV 3, 22. Pictet, Christ. Godg. VI 11.
Heppe, Dogm. 257. The Scripture passages on which the Romanists appeal for their distinction are therefore all without any probative force. Only Mt.
5:22 offers some semblance of ground, but the intention of Jesus' word there is nevertheless entirely different from distinguishing light from heavy sins. Over against the ancients, namely, who said that only the sinful deed, the actual homicide, made one guilty and punishable before the local court,
Jesus says that not only the deed but already the first stirring of unlawful anger, even if it does not yet express itself in a word, [100] makes one guilty and punishable before that court; that when that anger expresses itself in a small, involuntary word, the sin is already so great that it must be dealt
with by the sanhedrin; and that when the anger expresses itself in a word of abuse, it is at once, without form of process, worthy of the hellish fire.
There is therefore so little question here of pardonable sins, that Jesus, precisely the reverse, regards the slightest sin as most punishable, as punishable as the ancients regarded the sinful deed, i.e. murder. Jesus equates the surging, unlawful anger with homicide; he says that the lightest sin is precisely already a very heavy sin, which deserves as great a punishment as, according to the ancients, homicide. What punishment this stirring of anger is worthy of in the hereafter, Jesus does not say with a word; but if that anger is accompanied by a word of abuse, then this sin is so great that at that very moment it is worthy of hellish punishment; no court is any longer needed to determine a punishment. Properly understood, this text is therefore rather an argument against than for the distinction of peccata mortalia and venialia. And so the whole of Scripture stands against this division. The law is an organic whole Jak. 2:10, whoever transgresses one commandment is in principle guilty of all; it must be fulfilled in its entirety, Mt. 5:17-19; it demands us wholly with the whole heart and understanding, with soul and body, Mt. 22:37; for it nothing is indifferent and small, cursed is he who does not continue in all that is written in the book of the law, that he do it, Deut. 27:26, Gal. 3:10; even the smallest and least transgressions of the law, such as a surging anger, an impure desire, a superfluous affirmation, an idle word, Mt. 5:22, 28, 37, 12:36, Ef. 5:4 are sin, in principle equal to sinful deeds, and thus as sin also ἀνομια, enmity against God. Considered according to the principle, there are no small and slight sins. Nullum peccatum contemnendum ut parvum, cum revera nullum sit parvum, quando Paulus de omni peccato generatim pronuntiaverit, stimulum mortis esse peccatum, Basilius in Gerhard t. a. p. When a sin, e.g.
an idle word, is set by itself and detached from its whole connection with the person, the circumstances, etc., the assertion seems excessively strict that it deserves eternal death. But it is precisely that abstract, atomistic view which, as in conflict with Scripture and with reality at the same time, was in principle rejected by [101] the Reformers. Sin is not a quantum which, isolated from the doer, can be counted on the fingers or weighed in the balance. The Roman distinction has in fact therefore led to all kinds of evil practices. Not only do the theologians not agree as to whether the venial sin offends God or not; whether it ought or ought not to be confessed; whether for its restoration actual repentance is really necessary or whether the performance of some meritorious work is sufficient. But all also acknowledge that the distinction, both in theory and practice, is very difficult and almost impossible to maintain. One must therefore take refuge in all kinds of subtle reasonings, which in the process cause the whole character of sin to be lost. Where reasonings fail, one counts up the opinions of the doctores and contents oneself with a smaller or greater degree of probability. Thus one arrives at an atomistic, casuistic, mechanical, materialistic estimation of sins and of satisfactions, and keeps souls continually in anxiety whether they may perhaps have committed a mortal sin, or brings them to frivolity and indifference, because the sins are mostly of a very light nature and very easily made good.
7. Only one sin is mentioned by Holy Scripture which is unforgivable in this and the coming life, namely, the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. In the O.T. there is no mention of it, although in the law no atoning sacrifice was instituted for the sins ְבָיד ָרָמה, because they annulled the law itself,
Hebr. 10:28. Jesus speaks of it first, Mt. 12:31, Mk. 3:28, Luk. 12:10. When He once completely healed a demoniac, who was also blind and mute, the
crowds were so astonished by this miracle that they acknowledged Jesus as the Son of David, as the Christ. But the Pharisees were thereby driven up to a pinnacle of hatred, which made them say, not only that He cast out demons by the devil, but that He himself also was possessed by the devil,
Mk. 3:22, βεελζεβουλ ἐχει. This accusation was prompted solely and only by hatred; it sprang forth from sheer, conscious, willed enmity. Jesus also shows that, Mt. 12:25-30; a kingdom divided against itself cannot stand,
Satan does not cast out himself, but the [102] casting out of Satan is a proof that the kingdom of God has come to them, Jesus casts out the devil by the Spirit of God. The contrast between Jesus and the Pharisees is here therefore strained to the utmost; they say that Jesus is possessed, performs his miracles by the devil, and establishes the kingdom of the devil. And Jesus declares that He is the Christ, that He casts out the devil by the Spirit of God and that He thus brings the kingdom of God to them. And in this connection, on this occasion, Jesus speaks of the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit as the unforgivable sin. Whether one now thinks that the Pharisees at that moment had committed this sin, or whether one thinks one must deny this, inter alia because the Holy Spirit had not yet been poured out then, Joh. 7:39, in any case the connection always makes it clear that the sin against the Holy Spirit must consist in a conscious, willful, deliberate blasphemy of the clearly recognized, and yet out of hatred and enmity ascribed to the devil, revelation of God's grace in Christ by the Holy Spirit.
The blasphemy against the Holy Spirit therefore does not consist in simple unbelief, nor in resisting and grieving the Holy Spirit in general, nor in the denial of the personality or deity of the Holy Spirit, nor in sinning against better knowledge and to the end, without more. It is also not a sin against the law alone, but specifically also against the gospel, and indeed against
the gospel in its clearest revelation. Much therefore precedes it: objectively a revelation of God's grace in Christ, the nearness of his kingdom, a powerful working of the Holy Spirit, and subjectively an illumination and conviction of the understanding, so vivid and powerful that one cannot deny the truth of God, that one must acknowledge it as divine. And then it itself does not consist in doubting or simply denying that truth, but in a denial that goes against the conviction of the understanding, against the illumination of the conscience, against the prompting of the heart; in a fully conscious, willful and deliberate ascribing of what is clearly recognized as God's work to the influence and working of Satan, i.e. in a decided blasphemy of the Holy Spirit, in a willful declaring that the Holy Spirit is the spirit from the abyss, that the truth is the lie, that Christ is Satan himself.
Its root is therefore the fully conscious, deliberate hatred against God and against what is recognized as divine; its essence is the [103] sinful in its highest manifestation, the completed, the consummated revolution, the placing of God in the place of Satan and of Satan in the place of God; its character is no longer human but demonic. Even if it is also the case that the devils do not commit this sin in this particular form, because God's grace has not appeared to them, Christ has not assumed their nature, the Holy
Spirit has not been poured out among them and the kingdom of God has not come to them; nevertheless the demonic sin bears the same character that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit displays among men. Therefore it is also unforgivable; God's grace is indeed not too small and too powerless for it; but there are also in the kingdom of sin laws and ordinances, which have been laid in it by God and are maintained by Him. And that law consists here with this sin in this, that it excludes all repentance, sears the conscience, utterly hardens and obdurates the sinner and in this way makes
his sin unforgivable. Apart from in the gospels, nowhere in Scripture is there mention of this sin in direct words. But this blasphemy against the Holy Spirit can be committed in different circumstances. And thus Hebr.
6:4-8, 10:25-29 cf. 12:15-17 says that those who have once been enlightened and have tasted the heavenly gift and have become partakers of the Holy Spirit and who then fall back to Judaism, trample and crucify and put to shame the Son of God, regard the blood of the N. T. as unclean and do insult to the Spirit of grace, that such cannot be brought again to repentance. And likewise 1 Joh. 5:16 testifies that there is a sin which necessarily by virtue of its nature leads to death without repentance, and for which John does not say, i.e. does not command, that one shall pray. The prayer, if not unlawful, is nevertheless fruitless. Probably John here, in connection with his whole epistle, thinks of the decided and willful denial of the Christ as the incarnate Son of God. In both these passages we therefore have to do with sins which harden man completely, and therefore are themselves unforgivable. In fact and in substance these coincide with the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For the astonishingly rich literature on this subject reference is made to Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 14 art. 1.
Comm. op Sent. II dist. 43. M. Vitringa II 378. Walch, Bibl. theol. [104] sel.
I 88. 254. Schaff, Die Sünde wider den H. Geist, Halle 1841. Muller, Sünde II 596 f. Clemen, Die chr. Lehre v. d. Sünde I 89-100.