9. § 9. General Revelation.
§ 9. General Revelation.
A. Concept of revelation.
. Religion, investigated in its essence and origin, itself leads on to the concept of revelation. The history of religions makes this concept known to us as the necessary correlate of all religion. The philosophy of religion can no longer pass this concept by in silence. But the manner in which revelation is conceived in theology and philosophy is not always in agreement with that concept itself. The concept revelation brings with it a certain content, which must be acknowledged in its truth, in order still to be able to continue speaking of revelation. It may not be used as a flag that covers a false cargo. In the first place revelation is a thoroughly religious concept; not philosophy, but religion, not reason but history puts it into our hands. To scholarship and philosophy, therefore, the right must be denied to determine this concept a priori and then to make the historical and religious
phenomena, which are brought together under the name of revelation, fit it exactly. It speaks for itself that philosophical systems such as pantheism and materialism cannot acknowledge this concept in its right. In these systems there is no place for revelation. Both are, by virtue of their principle, incapable of appraising revelation and thus also religion, with which it is inseparably connected, at its true value. If God does not exist and, according to Feuerbach's saying, Wesen des Christenthums, 2e Aufl.
401, the secret of theology is anthropology, then religion and revelation are thereby judged of themselves and are nothing but a hallucination of the human spirit. And likewise pantheism, by the nature of the case, cannot ascribe any reality to revelation. If God and man are one in substance, a relation of man to God, such as comes about in religion, is no longer possible. Religion is then at most the coming to self-consciousness of God in man, the return of the Absolute to itself in human consciousness.
Revelation can here be nothing else than a name for religion in man, viewed from its objective side. Thus, e.g., Ed. von Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie
II 71, 75 u. s. w., says that revelation objectively and faith subjectively are one and the same act, conceived from the divine and from the human side.
An external, objective revelation then does not exist. Revelation is nothing but the indwelling and working of God in every human being. Leaving aside now the question whether in this too a truth is not enclosed and whether objective revelation must not be completed subjectively in illumination, it is nevertheless clear that revelation according to the idea which religion and the history of religions make known to us is hereby entirely lost. Religion, after all, is always a relation of man to a Divine person, whose objective and real existence for religious consciousness is raised above all doubt. As soon as man begins to doubt the distinct and
independent existence of the object of his veneration, it is over with his religion. This relation of man to God in religion is of an ethical nature
(above p. 193). Religion is not a physical or metaphysical communion of God and man, as is so often said. It does not consist in an essential unity, a unio or communio physica of man with God. It is not a substance of man, and does not constitute his being, his essentia. Religion precisely always presupposes that God and man, though related, are nevertheless distinct.
And it itself then consists, not in a relation of God to man, for God has no religion, but in a relation of man to God. This relation is of course not physical, metaphysical, realis, but ethical, moral in nature. It consists in this that man knows God and loves Him and lives for Him, Denzinger, Vier
Bücher von der religiösen Erkenntniss, Würzburg 1856 I S. 1-10. Hoekstra, wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 57 v. 64. Religion does indeed presuppose that God and man stand in kinship and in a good sense also in communion with one another, but is itself nevertheless not twobut one-sided. However intimately religion and revelation may also cohere with one another, they are nevertheless two; they are not two sides of one and the same thing, but essentially and materially different from one another. Just as the eye and the light, the ear and the tone, the logos in us and the logos outside us are related and yet distinct; so it is also with religion and revelation. It is in the religious domain as on every other terrain. We come naked into the world and bring nothing with us. We receive all our nourishment, both in a spiritual and in a natural sense, from outside. And also in religion the content comes to us from outside through revelation.
2. Revelation, as this concept is handed to us by religion and is here still taken in the widest sense, is all action which proceeds from God, in order to bring man and keep him in that peculiar relation to Him which is designated
by the name of religion. In this connection it is, in the first place, always and everywhere a matter of conceiving this revelation as an action, as a deed on God's side. God never does anything unconsciously; He does everything with thought and has in everything a purpose. Revelation is never an unconscious emanation, an involuntary shining-through of God in His works; but always a conscious, free, active making Himself known to man. Religion and revelation both, by their nature, rest on the foundation of theism, i.e. on the faith that God and man exist not separated but indeed distinct. Strongly expressed, revelation always has as presupposition that there are two worlds, a supernatural and a natural, a heavenly and an earthly. And now revelation is every operation which proceeds from that other invisible world into this visible world, in order to make man mindful of the things that are above. The ways and forms under which God reveals
Himself can be different, just as the one man can make himself known to the other in different ways. God can reveal Himself directly [218] and immediately; and in doing so He can make use of ordinary or extraordinary means. These forms are in a certain sense of subordinate, because of instrumental, significance. But always revelation, whether it comes to us in an ordinary or an unusual way, is a deed on God's side. Whoever understands it thus is in principle a supranaturalist, whether he accepts the possibility of the miracle or not. The question of naturalism and supranaturalism is not first decided with the so-called supernatural revelation, but is in fact already decided here at the entrance, with the concept of revelation in the general sense. Deism is untenable. There is only a choice between theism and pantheism (materialism). Pantheism has no revelation and therefore no religion either. Theism is of itself supranaturalistic, not in the historical meaning of that word, but in this
sense, that it recognizes an ordo supra hanc naturam and assumes an operation of that world in this. Religion, revelation, supranaturalism, theism stand and fall with one another. The purpose of revelation is no other than to awaken and to cultivate religion in man. Everything that intends this and is serviceable to it is revelation in the proper sense. Revelation coincides with all the works of God in nature and grace. It comprises the whole creation and re-creation. All that is and happens is for the pious a means to lead him up to God. The usual definitions, that revelation would consist in communication of doctrine or of life etc., already appear here to be far too narrow. In His revelation God is concerned to place man in a religious relation to Him. Religion, however, comprises the whole man with all his faculties and powers. In revelation God approaches the whole man, in order to win him wholly for His service of love. Yes, revelation cannot have as its purpose to place the individual man in a religious relation to God.
Humanity is one whole. It is the object of God's love. Revelation therefore has as its final goal to make humanity itself as one whole into a kingdom, into a people of God. Revelation is not an isolated fact that stands by itself in history. It is a system of deeds of God, beginning with creation, ending in the new heaven and the new earth. It is instruction, [219] education, guidance, government, renewal, forgiveness etc., it is all that together.
Revelation is all that God does, in order to re-create humanity into His image and likeness.
B. General and special revelation.
3. Christian theology soon came to make in this revelation an important distinction. On the one hand, the connection and the agreement of the religion of the Christians and the religion of the Heathens, of theology and philosophy, could not be wholly denied; and on the other hand Christianity was nevertheless a proper, independent religion, in every respect different from that of the Heathens. Thus one was led to the distinction of the revelatio (religio, theologia) naturalis and supernaturalis. In substance it is already found among the oldest church fathers. Justin Martyr speaks of an ἀνθρωπειος διδασκαλια, which is obtained through το ἐμφυτον παντι γενει ἀνθρωπων σπερμα του λογου and of a γνωσις και θεωρια, which becomes our share only through Christ, Apol. II 8, 10, 13. Tertullian has a separate treatise de testimonio animae, and speaks of a knowledge of God from the works of creation, and of another more complete one through men, filled with God's Spirit, Apolog. II c. 18. Irenaeus speaks repeatedly in the same sense, adv. haer. II c. 6, 9, 28. III 25. IV 6. Augustine acknowledges a revelation of God in nature, de Gen. ad. litt. 4, 32, de civ. Dei 8, 11 sq. 19, 1 etc. but places alongside the ratio the auctoritas, the fides, c. Acad. 3,20 de util. cred. 11, which alone leads to the true knowledge of God, Conf. 5,5,
7,26, de civ. 10,29. With Damascenus, de fide orthod. I. c. 1 sq. this distinction already bears all the character of a dogma. Also the later division of the theologia naturalis into insita and acquisita is already to be found among the oldest ecclesiastical writers. Tertullian appeals to the inward testimony of the soul and to the contemplation of God's works. Augustine says expressly that God can be known from the visible things, de Gen. ad. litt. 4,32 but points especially to self-consciousness and self-knowledge as the way to eternal truth, de vera relig. 72, de mag. 38, de trin. 4,1.
Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 1 and 3, already clearly places the inborn and
the acquired knowledge [220] of God alongside each other. Not so soon were the boundaries between both kinds of revelation demarcated. For a long time one still attempted to prove the Christian dogmata from nature and reason. Augustine attempted the Trinity, de trin. lib. 9-15, Anselm in his
Cur deus homo the incarnation and satisfaction, Albertus Magnus, cf.
Stöckl, Philos. des M. A. II. 384 f., and Thomas, S. c. Gent. II. 15 sq. to prove creation aposteriori. The furthest in this was Raymund de Sabunde, who in his Liber naturae sive creaturarum, later wrongly called Theologia naturalis (ed. of J. Sighart, Solisbaci, 1852 without the prologue, which was condemned in 1595) tried to build up the whole Christian doctrine of faith out of the nature of man, without help of Scripture and tradition and with avoidance of the scholastic method. But this rational argumentation was nevertheless only a help, which came afterward; the dogmata stood fixed apriori on the ground of revelation; adjuvantur in fide invisibilium per ea, quae facta sunt, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 3, 6. cf. 2, 1. Moreover, the knowledge which could be obtained from nature was limited to some articuli mixti, which concentrated around the three concepts God, virtue, and immortality, Thomas, S. c. Gent. Lib. 1-3. The distinction between the theol. naturalis and supernaturalis, however, was in scholasticism stretched ever more tightly and passed over into an absolute opposition. Through natural revelation there was of God and divine matters some strict scientific knowledge to be obtained, Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 1 art. 5, cf.
Bellarminus, Controv. IV p. 277 sq. Thomas is so firmly convinced of this, that he raises the question whether in that case the acceptance of these truths known from nature does not then lose all its merit. Believing is after all only meritorious if it is not knowing but an accepting as true on authority, an act of the intellect ex motu voluntatis motae per gratiam, ib. II
2 qu. 2 art. 9. The answer to that question is that knowing indeed diminishes the ratio fidei; but that nevertheless in the believer the ratio caritatis always remains, i.e. the disposition to accept the known also always again on God's authority as true, ib. II 2 qu. 2 art. 10; and this disposition, to believe the articuli mixti on authority, remains, because of special circumstances (see presently under No 7), also always [221] necessary. To this knowledge from nature and reason there has now by supernatural revelation been added the knowledge of the mysteria, but this rests exclusively on authority and is and remains from the beginning to the end a matter of faith. The mysteries of Christianity belong to an order which not for an accidental reason, through sin, but which by its nature for every man, also for the sinless man, yes even for the angels, is in the proper sense supernatural and therefore can never be known otherwise than by revelation. With special revelation this peculiar Roman doctrine comes up for further discussion. But here it may already be remarked that knowing and believing, ratio and auctoritas, natural and supernatural revelation stand with Rome dualistically alongside each other. Rome thus on the one hand acknowledges the right of rationalism on the terrain of natural revelation and condemns the excessive supranaturalism that in the articuli mixti also deems no knowledge possible except through revelation. And on the other hand it upholds supranaturalism on the terrain of the mysteries as strictly as possible and condemns all rationalism that apriori or aposteriori in the dogmata seeks to escape authority and faith and tries to make them pass over into knowing. It rejects both Tertullian and Origen and condemns both the traditionalism of de
Bonald and the rationalism of Hermes (above p. 94 f). The Roman church confesses, according to the Vaticanum, sess. III Const. Dogm. de fide cath. cap. 2, Deum.... naturali humanae rationis lumine e rebus creatis certo
cognosci posse, but that it has pleased God, alia, eaque supernaturali via, se ipsum ac aeterna voluntatis decreta humano generi revelare.
4. The Reformation adopted this distinction between revelatio naturalis and supernaturalis and yet in principle gave it a wholly different meaning.
To be sure, the Reformers assumed a revelation of God in nature. But man was by sin so darkened in his understanding, that he also could not rightly know and understand this revelation. There was therefore a twofold necessity, viz. that God should again include in the special revelation those truths which in themselves are knowable from nature; and that man, in order again to notice God in nature, first had to be illumined by God's
Spirit. In order to understand the general revelation of God in nature, [222] objectively the special revelation in Holy Scripture was necessary, which for that reason was compared by Calvin to a pair of spectacles, and subjectively man had need of the eye of faith, in order to behold God also in the works of his hands. Equally important was the modification introduced by the Reformation in the conception of supernatural revelation. This was not in the first place supernatural because it an sich belonged to another order and went beyond the understanding also of sinless man and of the angels; but it was supernatural especially because it far surpassed the thoughts and wishes of sinful, fallen man, as will later be shown. With the Reformers the theologia naturalis thus lost its rational independence. It was not treated separately but incorporated into the Christian doctrine of faith,
Zwingli, Comm. de vera et falsa relig. Op. ed. Schuler et Schulthess III 156 sq. Calvin, Inst. I c. 1-5. Polanus, Synt. Theol. I cap. 10. Martyr, Loci
Comm. loc. 2 etc. But there were various causes which held back this Reformation principle in its development and full application. There was excessus, overstrain, on the one side. Anabaptism wholly rejected the ordo
naturalis and attempted in a revolutionary way to found a kingdom of heaven on earth. The Socinians rejected the theologia naturalis wholly and entirely, and derived all knowledge of God from revelation, Catech. Racov. qu. 46-49. Fock, Der Socin. 307 f. Luther, through his combating of the scholastic doctrine, naturalia mansisse integra, went so far that he forbade
Aristotle, reason, philosophy in theologicis any right to speak and called the Vernunft in religious matters stock-, starr-und gar blind, Köstlin, Luthers
Theologie II 287 f. Luthardt, Ethik Luthers, 14 f. Strauss, Glaubenslehre I 311 f. The strict Lutherans followed the Master; and the Formula
Concordiae, although recognizing that humana ratio seu intellectus naturalis hominis obscuram aliquam notitiae illius scintillulam reliquam habet, quod sit Deus, et particulam aliquam legis tenet, II Pars. Sol. Decl. II. de lib. arb.,
J. T. Müller, Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K. 5e Aufl. 1882 S. 589, nevertheless lays the emphasis so one-sidedly on the darkness and the impotence of the natural man in matters of religion, that the coherence and the connection of the special with the general revelation is wholly [223] broken; man is in rebus spiritualibus et ad conversionem aut regenerationem nothing more than a lapis, truncus aut limus, ib. with Müller S. 594.
The reaction against it could not fail to come. In Anabaptism and Socinianism the excessive supernaturalism turned into rationalism. Luther was compelled, because he could not after all deny all insight and judgment to reason, to make a sharp distinction between the spiritual and the worldly, the heavenly and the earthly, the eternal and the temporal, Köstlin, Luthers
Theol. II 244 f. And in his footsteps the Luth. theologians made a distinction between duo hemisphaeria, quorum unum inferius, alterum superius; in earthly things reason is still free and capable of much good,
here it is to a certain extent independent and independent of faith, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 192 f. Calvin too, although by his doctrine of the gratia communis in a much more favorable condition than Luther, nevertheless did not always get beyond the old dualistic antithesis of the revelatio naturalis and supernaturalis, Inst. II, 2, 12, 13. Reason thereby again received some authority alongside faith. It seemed that it did not always have to be led by faith, but was free and independent in a domain, be it ever so small and insignificant. With this right granted to it, at least not seriously contested, it has made gains; gradually it has extended its power.
First in civil matters, then in science, soon in philosophy, and finally also in theology it raises itself alongside and over against faith. Alsted published a Theol. naturalis separately in 1615, and counted as its content some seven dogmata: deus est, super omnia diligendus, honeste vivendum est, quod tibi non vis fieri alteri ne feceris, suum cuique tribuendum est, nemo laedendus est, plus est in bono communi positum quam in particulari, cf. Praecognita
1623 p. 37-114. Many Reformed theologians followed this example, especially when the philosophy of Cartesius gained influence, Doedes, Inl. tot de leer van God, 2e dr. 1880 bl. 200 v. Through English deism and German rationalism the theologia naturalis or rationalis increased so much in power and esteem that it rejected the theologia revelata as wholly unnecessary. Herbert of Cherbury 1581-1648, gave to the religio naturalis five articles as its content: esse deum summum, coli debere, virtutem pietatemque [224] esse praecipuas partes cultus divini, dolendum esse ob peccata ab iisque resipiscendum, dari ex bonitate justitiaque divina praemium vel poenam tum in hac vita tum post hanc vitam, Lechler, Gesch. des engl. Deismus 42. But after it had banished the theologia revelata, it in its turn has itself also been judged. Kant argued in his critique of pure
reason that it is limited to sensibly perceptible phenomena and can penetrate neither to the supersensible nor to the supernatural. The history of religions showed that no single religion had enough with the revelatio naturalis, that nowhere did a religio naturalis exist and that all religions were positive.
And the criticism of Scripture undermined the revelatio supernaturalis and erased the boundaries between it and the revelatio naturalis. The conviction thereby became general that, in order to obtain any knowledge of God, another way than that of reason and of scientific demonstration had to be taken, namely that of faith or of moral experience or of imagination. The theologia and religio naturalis, and therewith also the revelatio naturalis, lost its value. The proofs for God's existence, the soul, immortality were abandoned and banished from dogmatics. Pierson, Eene levensbeschouwing
83, even said that instruction in the theol. naturalis at the state universities was a misapplication of the country's monies. Nevertheless it has in the law on higher education been included again under the name of history of the doctrine concerning God and of philosophy of religion. Prof. Doedes rejected it in his Encyclopaedie bl. 190 v., but nevertheless in fact treated it again in his Inleiding tot de leer van God, 2e dr. 1880 and De Leer van God
1871. Everything points to it, as will be shown in the locus de Deo, that the proofs for God's existence are again rising in value. The good thought that lies in the old theologia naturalis is gradually being recognized better again.
5. Scripture does indeed know the concept of a fixed order of nature, but in revelation it nevertheless makes no distinction between the natural and the supernatural. It uses for both the same words, e.g. גלה, φανερουν and ἀποκαλυπτειν also for the revelatio naturalis Job 12:22, 33:16, 36:10; Rom.
1:18, [225] 19. Nösgen, Beweis des Glaubens, Nov. 1890 S. 416-417 therefore objects wrongly, to give to the revelation of God in nature already
the name of revelation. Properly speaking, from the standpoint of Scripture all revelation, also that in nature, is supernatural. The word itself also includes nothing concerning the manner in which something becomes manifest, but only says that something which was hidden comes to light. In the religious sphere it indicates that God possesses a life of his own, independent, distinct from nature, and can now from his hiddenness in one way or another come into view before the eye of rational creatures. Of revelation can therefore in the proper sense speak only he who recognizes the supranatural, an ordo supra hanc naturam; and everyone who uses the word in this sense is in principle a supranaturalist, even if he assumes only a revelation in a natural way. The distinction of revelatio naturalis and supernaturalis is not derived from the action of God, which expresses itself in the one and in the other revelation, but from the manner in which that revelation takes place, namely per or praeter hanc naturam. In origin all revelation is supranatural. God always works Joh. 5:17. That working of God outwardly began with creation. Creation is the first revelation of God, beginning and foundation of all subsequent revelation. The biblical concept of revelation is rooted in that of creation, Oehler, Theol. des A. T. 1882 S.
21. Through creation God first stepped outward for creatures and revealed himself to creatures. When God creates the world through his Word and makes it living through his Spirit, then therein the basic lines of all subsequent revelations are already drawn. But to creation providence immediately attaches itself. This too is an almighty and omnipresent power and deed of God. All that is and happens is a work of God in the proper sense, and for the pious a revelation of his virtues and perfections. Thus
Scripture views nature and history. Creation, preservation, and government are one mighty, continuing revelation of God. No nature poetry has
surpassed or equaled that of Israel, Pierson, Geestel. Voorouders I Israel bl.
389 v. Everything in nature speaks to the pious of God. The heavens declare God's glory, the firmament his hands' work. God's voice is upon the great waters. That voice breaks the cedars, resounds [226] in the thunder, bellows in the storm wind. The light is his garment, the heaven his curtain, the clouds his chariot. His breath creates and renews the earth. He sends rain and gives sunshine over righteous and unrighteous. Foliage and grass, rain and drought, fruitful and unfruitful years and all things do not come to the believer by chance but from God's fatherly hand. The view of nature and history of Scripture is religious and therefore also supranatural.
For Scripture, even religion and supernatural revelation hang most closely together. It relates such a revelation not only after, but also already before the fall. The relation of God and man in the status integritatis is depicted as a personal intercourse. God speaks to man Gen. 1:28-30, gives him a command which he could not know by nature Gen 2:16 and adds, as it were with his own hand, the woman to him as a help, Gen. 2 vs. 22. Also the foedus operum is not in that sense a foedus naturae, that it arises of itself from man's natural disposition, but is a fruit of supernatural revelation. And because the foedus operum now is nothing other than the form of religion in the man created after God's image who had not yet obtained the highest, it can be said that Scripture cannot think of pure religion without revelatio supernaturalis. The supernatural does not conflict with man's nature, nor with the nature of the creatures; it belongs, so to speak, to the essence of man. Man is the image of God and akin to God, and through religion he stands to God in a direct relation. The nature of this relation includes that God reveals himself to the man created after his image both objectively and subjectively. There is no religion without tradition, dogma, cultus; and all
these are interwoven with the concept of revelation. All religions are therefore also positive and rest not only on natural but always also on actual or supposed supernatural revelation. And all men by nature acknowledge the supranatural. Naturalism is, like atheism, an invention of philosophy, but it has no support in human nature. So long as religion will belong to the essence of man, man will also be and remain a supranaturalist. Every believer, of whatever direction, he may be a naturalist with his head, he is nevertheless a supranaturalist with his heart. Whoever [227] wants to ban the supranatural from religion, thus from prayer, from the exercise of communion with God, kills religion itself. For religion presupposes actual kinship and communion with God and is with heart and soul supranaturalistic. It is inseparable from the faith that God stands supra naturam and that He can do with it according to his good pleasure, that He makes the order of nature subservient to the moral order, the kingdoms of the world to the kingdom of heaven, the physis to the ethos. Therefore it has rightly been said that the prayer for a pure heart is just as supranaturalistic as that for a healthy body (Pierson). The theist, who wants truly to be a theist and yet combats supernatural revelation, is by this denial still absolutely not done with it. He must either go back to deism or pantheism, or he must go forward and also accept the possibility of supernatural revelation. There is no religio naturalis. The rationalistic trilogy is untenable. The only true antithesis of the recognition of the supranatural is therefore not rationalistic deism, but naturalism, i.e. the belief that there exists no other higher power than that which is present in the present order of nature and reveals itself. But then all right also falls away to believe in the triumph of the good, in the final victory of the kingdom of God, in the power of the moral world-order. For the good, the true, the moral world-
order, the kingdom of God are matters which in themselves have no power to realize themselves. The hope that men will bring them to dominion and will yield to the power of truth is disappointed every day by experience.
Only then is their triumph assured, if God is a personal, almighty being and can lead the whole creation, in spite of all resistance, toward the goal intended by Him. Religion, morality, the recognition of a destiny for humanity and world, the faith in the victory of the good, the theistic worldview, the faith in a personal God are all inseparably connected with supranaturalism. The idea of God and of religion involves that of revelation.
Pierson, Gods wondermacht en ons geestelijk leven 1867 bl. 10 v. 36 v.
James Orr, The christian view of God and the world, Edinb. 1893 p. 60 etc.
91 etc. Cf. Rauwenhoff, Wijsbeg. v. d. godsd. 530 v. [228] 6. Supernatural revelation, however, must not be identified with immediate revelation. The distinction between mediate and immediate revelation has each time been taken in different senses. Formerly every revelation was called immediate which came to the recipient himself without an intermediary; and mediate that which was transmitted to others through angels or men, Witsius, Misc. Sacra I. 16. Insofar, then, as revelation to prophets and apostles came mostly personally, whereas to us it comes only through their writings, the former could be set over against the latter as revelatio immediata against revelatio mediata. Among the rationalistic and modern theologians these designations have often received a wholly different sense, and thereby have increased the confusion in the conception of revelation, Rothe, zur Dogm. 55 f. 64 f. Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. 163 f. In the strict sense there is no immediate revelation, neither in nature nor in grace. God always makes use of a means, whether taken from the creatures or freely chosen, through which He reveals himself to
men. By signs and symbols He makes them feel his presence; by deeds He proclaims to them his virtues; by speech and language He makes known to them his will and thought. Even where He reveals himself inwardly by his
Spirit in consciousness, this revelation nevertheless always takes place organically and thus by a mediate way. The distance between Creator and creature is far too great for man to be able to perceive God directly. Finitum non est capax infiniti. Whether in the status gloriae there will be a visio Dei per essentiam can be investigated only later. But in this dispensation all revelation is mediate. As God is and speaks in himself, He can be beheld or understood by no creature. Revelation is therefore always an act of grace; in it God descends to his creature, which is made after his image. All revelation is anthropomorphism, is a certain incarnation of God. It always takes place in certain forms, in definite modi. In the revelatio naturalis his divine and eternal thoughts are laid down in the creatures in a creaturely manner, so that they can be understood by man thinking. And in the revelatio supernaturalis He binds himself to space and time, assumes human language and speech, and makes use of creaturely [229] means, Gen. 1:28,
2:16 v., 21 v., 3:8 v. And through these media man perceived and understood God just as well and just as clearly as now the pious man perceives the speech of God in the whole of nature. As little impossible and deceptive as the revelation of God in nature and history is for the believer, so also is the supernatural revelation, in which God makes use of unusual means, but for which He also in a special way opens the eyes. Natural and supernatural revelation therefore, according to the teaching of Scripture, go together in the status integritatis. They are not an antithesis but complement one another. They are both mediate and bound to definite forms and means.
They both rest on the thought that God in grace stoops down to man and
becomes conformed to him. And they both have these modi, that God makes his presence felt, his voice heard, his works beheld. By appearance, word, and deed God from the beginning made himself manifest to men.
Remarkable now is the fact that the sin which enters into the world through the first man brings about no change in the fact itself of revelation.
God continues to reveal himself; He does not withdraw. First of all, throughout the whole of Scripture a revelatio naturalis is taught to us. God's revelation began in creation and continues in the preservation and government of all things. He reveals himself in the nature around us; displays therein his eternal power and divinity, and in blessings and judgment proves in turn his goodness and his wrath, Job 36, 37. Ps. 29,
33:5, 65, 67:7, 90, 104, 107, 145, 147. Jes. 59:17-19. Mt. 5:45. Rom: 1:18.
Hd. 14:16. He reveals himself in the history of peoples and persons Deut.
32:8. Ps. 33:10, 67:5, 115:16. Spr. 8:15, 16. Hd. 17:26. Rom. 13:1. He also reveals himself in the heart and conscience of every human being Job 32:8,
33:4. Spr. 20:27. Joh. 1:3-5, 9, 10. Rom. 2:14, 15, 8:16. This revelation of God is general, in itself perceptible and intelligible for every human being.
Nature and history are the book of God's omnipotence and wisdom, of his goodness and righteousness. All peoples have acknowledged this revelation to a certain extent. Even idolatry presupposes that in the creatures God's δυναμις and θειοτης are revealed. Philosophers, natural scientists and [230] historians have many times spoken in a striking way of this revelation of God, e.g. Xenophon, Memor. I 4, 5. Cicero, de nat. deor. II 2, de divinat. II 72. Zöckler, Gottes Zeugen im Reich der Natur, 2 Th. Gütersloh 1881. By Christian theology this general revelation has at all times been uniformly accepted and defended, Iren. adv. haer. II 6. Tertull. de testim. animae, adv.
Marc. I 10. August, de civ. Dei 8:9 sq. 19:1, de trin. 4:20 etc. Joh. Damasc.
de fide orthod. I c. 1 and 3. Thomas, S. c. Gent. lib. 1-3. S. Theol. I qu. 2 etc., cf. further H. Denzinger, Vier Bücher von der relig. Erk. II S. 27-45. In particular, by the Reformed theologians this general revelation was maintained and highly valued, Calv. Inst. I c. 4 and cf. further Schweizer,
Gl. der ev. K. I 241 f. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 1 f. Scholten, Leer der Herv. Kerk I4 304-326. Doedes, Inleiding tot de leer van God 2e dr. bl.
107-252.
But according to Scripture this general revelation is not, in the strict sense, natural only, but it also contains supernatural elements. The revelation which takes place immediately after the fall bears a supranatural character, Gen. 3:8 v., and by tradition becomes the property of humanity.
The original knowledge and service of God remains preserved for a long time in a more or less pure condition. To Cain grace is granted for right: he even becomes the father of a lineage that makes a beginning with culture,
Gen. 4. The covenant which after the flood is established with Noah and in him with the whole new humanity is a covenant of nature and yet no longer natural, but the fruit of unmerited supernatural grace, Gen. 8:21, 22. 9:1-17.
More than once Scripture speaks of miracles which God has wrought before the eyes of the heathen, in Egypt, Canaan, Babel, etc., and of supernatural revelations which have fallen to the lot of non-Israelites, Gen. 20, 30, 40,
41. Richt. 7. Dan. 2:4 etc. An operation of supernatural powers in the heathen world is a priori neither impossible nor even improbable. There can be truth in the appeal to revelations, which is common to all religions. And conversely, not everything that belongs to the domain of special grace is, in the strict sense, supernatural. Entire periods pass in the history of Israel, many days and years in the life of Jesus, and likewise in the life of the apostles, [231] in which no supernatural revelation takes place and which
nevertheless form an important part in the historia revelationis. When Jesus proclaims the gospel to the poor, this is of no less weight than when He heals the sick and raises the dead. His dying, which seems natural, is of no less significance than His supernatural birth. Therefore the distinction of natural and supernatural revelation is not identical with that of general and special. For the designation of the twofold revelation which underlies the heathen religions and the religion of Scripture, the latter distinction is to be preferred above the former.
C. Insufficiency of general revelation.
7. This revelatio generalis is, however, for various reasons insufficient. In this all Christian theologians are unanimous. Irenaeus adv. haeres. 2, 28 argues, over against the Gnostics, the limitation of human knowledge.
Justinus Martyr, Dial. c. Tryph., introduction, Tertullianus, de an. c. 1.
Lactantius, Instit. div. 3, 1. 4, 1. Arnobius, adv. nat. I, 38. II, 6. depict the weakness of reason in very strong colours. Augustinus does not deny that there is also among the Heathen some truth, with which the Christians can make their profit, the doctr. chr. 2, 60. But philosophy is not the true way to salvation. It can teach only few and only little, the trin. 13, 12. de civ. 12,
20. de util. cred. 10, 24. It does indeed know the goal, but not the way that leads to the goal, Conf. 5, 5. 7, 26. de civ. 10, 29. Often it leads onto a wrong path and holds down the truth in unrighteousness, the trin. 13, 24, it does not seek it in a pious manner, Conf. 5, 4, it lacks the love that is necessary for knowledge of the truth, de civ. 9, 20, it is hindered by its own superbia in the knowledge of the truth, for only humilitas is the way to life,
de civ. 2, 7. Therefore there is still another way to the truth necessary, namely the auctoritas, de vera relig. c. 24. de mor. eccl. 1, 2. Thomas S.
Theol. I qu. 1 art. 1. S. c. Gent. I, 4. argues the necessity of revelation even for the articuli mixti known by reason. The Roman church has clearly expressed the insufficientia of theol. nat. in the preface of the Catech.
Romanus, and in [232] 't Vaticanum sess. 3 cap. 2 de revelatione, and can.
2, 2-4. And the Protest. theologians judged concerning this insufficientia of general revelation no differently, Calv. Inst. I. 5 § 11 sq. and cap. 6.
Heidegger, Corpus Theol. I § 9-13. Trigland, Antapologia cap. 17. Owen, Θεολογουμενα I cap. 6. Turret. Theol. Elenct. I qu. 4. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. I 61 39. The sufficiency of general revelation and of the religio naturalis built upon it was in earlier time taught only by the Pelagians, who assumed a threefold way to salvation, namely the lex naturae, lex Mosis and lex Christi. There were also in the Christian church always some theologians who judged more favourably concerning the Heathen and also believed in the possibility of their salvation, such as Justinus, Clemens Alex. Erasmus, Zwingli etc. cf. Vossius, Historia Pelag.
1655 p. 383 sq. But with these this belief rested for the most part not on the doctrine of the sufficiency of general revelation, but on the supposition that God also with his special grace worked among the Heathen, whether then in or after this life. In contrast, the complete sufficiency of general revelation and of natural religion was taught in the 18th century by the deists and rationalists, such as Cherbury, Tindal, Collins, Rousseau, Kant etc. Litt. bij
Lechler, Gesch. des engl. Deïsmus 1841 and art. Deïsmus in Herzog2.
Bretschneider, System. Entw. aller in der Dogm. vork. Begriffe 1841 S. 35 f. Clarisse, Encycl. 1835 p. 405 sq. Doedes, Inleiding tot de Leer van God
1880 bl. 197 v.
On the insufficiency of general revelation there can hardly be any doubt.
In the first place it appears from the fact that this revelation at most provides us with some knowledge of God's existence and of some of his attributes, such as goodness and righteousness; but it leaves us absolutely unacquainted with the person of Christ, who alone is the way to the Father,
Mt. 11:27. Joh. 14:6, 17:3. Hd. 4:12. General revelation is therefore insufficient for man as a sinner; it knows of no grace and forgiveness; many a time it is even a revelation of wrath, Rom. 1:20. Grace and forgiveness, which must be the essence of religion, is an act of good pleasure, not of nature and necessity. General revelation can at most make some truths known, but brings no facts, no history, and thus changes nothing in being. It enlightens consciousness [233] somewhat and restrains sin, but it does not recreate the nature of man and world. It can instill fear, but no trust and love, Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 66, 218. In the second place the knowledge which general revelation can provide is not only slight and insufficient, but it is also uncertain, always mixed with error, and for by far the most people unattainable. The history of philosophy has been a history of systems that demolish one another; and among the Greeks it ended in skepticism, in the Middle Ages in nominalism, and now in agnosticism. The truths most necessary for religion, existence and being of God, origin and destiny of man and world, sin and forgiveness, reward and punishment have in turn been taught and contested. In philosophy no sufficient certainty is to be obtained about all these questions. Cicero, Tusc. 1,5 therefore rightly asks: ex philosophis nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare, multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? But even if some thinkers arrived at some true and pure knowledge, it was still mixed with all kinds of error. Every philosophical system has its gaps and defects. Plato,
whose system according to Augustine, de civ. 8,5 is most closely related to Christianity, defends the exposing of weak children, pederasty, community of women, etc. Even in morality there is great difference and uncertainty; vérité en deça des Pyrenées, erreur au delà (Pascal). Nescio quomodo nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum, Cic. de divin. 2,58. And even if the philosophers had been in possession of the most beautiful and purest doctrine, they would nevertheless have lacked the authority to secure it an entrance among the people. Often therefore in the practice of life they themselves again align with popular belief and popular customs; or they withdraw from the people in loftiness with an Odi profanum vulgus et arceo. Their mutual strife and the contrast between their doctrine and life weakened their influence. And even if all this had not been the case, then the doctrine of the philosophers would nevertheless never have been able to become or remain the religion of the people, because in matters of religion an intellectual clericalism and a scientific hierarchy is intolerable. Therefore Thomas was completely right when he said that even in those [234] truths which general revelation makes known to us, revelation and authority are still needed, because that knowledge is suitable only for few, would require too long a time of investigation and even then would remain imperfect and uncertain, S. Theol. I qu. 1 art. 1, II 2 qu. 2 art.
4. S. contra Gent. I, 4. In the third place the insufficiency of natural revelation is clearly demonstrated by the fact that no single people has been satisfied with the so-called religio naturalis. The general religion of the deists, the moralische Vernunftreligion of Kant, the pietas and obedientia of Spinoza, are all nothing but pure abstractions, which in reality have never existed. Even if the five articles of Herbert or the rationalistic trilogy of Kant had been completely certain and strictly scientifically provable, they
would still have been unfit for founding a religion, a church. For religion is something essentially different from science, it has another source and foundation. The eighteenth century could find pleasure in such truths of reason and vain abstractions. The nineteenth century with its historical sense soon saw that such a religio naturalis existed nowhere and also can exist nowhere. Now it is generally conceded that all religions are positive and rest on revelation, Schleiermacher, Glaub. § 10 Zusatz. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 4, 500. Id. Unterricht in der christl. Religion3 S. 20. Frank,
System der chr. Wahrheit. I2 512 f. Doedes, Encyclopaedie 190, 191. W.
Bender, Zur Geschichte der Emancipation der natürl. Theol., Jahrb. f. prot.
Theol. 1883 S. 5294-592. R. Rütschi, Die Lehre von der natürlichen Religion u. vom Naturrecht, Jahrb. f. prot. Theol. 1884 S. 1-48. Hoekstra,
Wijsg. Godsd. I 19 v.
D. Value of general revelation.
8. Therewith, however, general revelation has not lost its value and significance. In the first place it is of great significance for the heathen world. It is the firm and abiding foundation of the heathen religions. Holy
Scripture passes a strict judgment on Ethnicism and declares its origin from apostasy from the pure knowledge of God. Yet this knowledge, which was man's original possession, did still for some time [235] continue to have effects Gen. 4:3. 8:20, and the creation revealed God's eternal power and divinity, Rom. 1:20. But men, made foolish in their thoughts and darkened in their heart, though knowing God did not glorify Him as God or give thanks. In addition, the confusion of language and the dispersion of the
peoples Gen. 11 has certainly also been of great influence for the development of polytheism, Orig. c. Cels V. Aug. de civ. Dei 16:6.
Schelling, Einleitung in die philos. der Mythologie I 94 f. Delitzsch, Comm. op Gen. 11. Auberlen, De goddelijke openbaring I 187 v. Fabri, Die
Entstehung des Heidenthums und die Aufgabe der Heidenmission 1859.
Herzog2 12:108. The Hebr. ּגֹוי, the multitude bound together by descent and language, nation, alongside ַּגם the people bound together by unity of government, also points to this here. For ּגֹוִיים, ἐθνη is commonly used of the heathen peoples, and signifies not only peoples but also heathens; the word has a national but at the same time also an ethical-religious significance, just like the lat. pagani and our heathens. The unity of God and thus also the purity of religion was lost in the splitting of humanity into peoples. Each people received its own, national god. And when once the concept of the unity and the absoluteness of God had been lost, alongside that one national god other powers could gradually be acknowledged and worshipped as gods; the idea of the divine becomes impure and descends, the various powers of nature come to the foreground and rise in significance; the boundary between the divine and the creaturely is erased; and religion can even degenerate into animism and fetishism, into sorcery and magic. The character of the heathen religions therefore, according to Scripture, consists in idolatry. The heathen gods are idols, they do not exist, they are lie and vanity Jes. 41:29, 42:17, 46:1 v. Jer. 2:28. Ps. 106:28. Hd.
14:15, 19:26. Gal. 4:8. 1 Cor. 8:5. In those religions even a demonic power is at work Deut. 32:17. Ps. 106:28. 1 Cor. 10:20 v. Apoc. 9:20. The condition in which the heathen world, outside the revelation to Israel, outside Christ, finds itself, is described as darkness Jes. 9:1, 60:2. Luk.
1:79. Joh. 1:5. Ef. 4:18, as ignorance Hd. 17:30. 1 Petr 1:14. Rom 1:18 v.;
as imagined vain wisdom 1 Cor. 1:18 v., 2:6, 3:19 v.; as sin and unrighteousness Rom 1:24 v., 3:9 v. [236]
The heathen world is, in its origin, character, and destiny, an aweinspiring problem. In itself, the solution which Scripture gives of it is not only not absurd, but it even commends itself by its simplicity and its naturalness. Yet philosophy, both that of history and that of religions, has not been satisfied with that solution and has advanced another view, which stands in direct opposition to that of Scripture. Indeed, the glorification of the childlike condition of the peoples, as was customary in the previous century, now finds no assent any more. But the theory of evolution, which now serves for explanation, is equally in conflict with Scripture. Just as natural science attempts to derive the living from the lifeless, the organic from the inorganic, man from the animal, the conscious from the unconscious, the higher from the lower, so the science of religion of the more recent time seeks to explain religion from an earlier religionless condition and pure religion from the primitive forms of fetishism, animism, etc. D. Hume has already begun with that in his Natural history of religion.
With Hegel it fitted entirely into the framework of his pantheistic philosophy, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion 1832. And since then it has found ever more dissemination and defense, Buckle, History of civilization in England 1858. W. E. H. Lecky, History of the rise and influence of the spirit of rationalism in Europe 1865. E. B. Tylor,
Researches into the early history of mankind and the development of civilization 2d ed. 1870. Id. Primitive Culture 1872. Sir John Lubbock,
Prehistoric times as illustrated by ancient remains and the manners and customs of modern savages 1865. Id. The origin of civilization and the primitive condition of man 1870. H. Spencer, The principles of sociology
1876-'82. F. von Hellwald, Kulturgeschichte in ihrer natürlichen Entwicklung bis zur Gegenwart, 3e Aufl. 1883. O. Caspari, Die
Urgeschichte der Menschheit mit Rücksicht auf die natürliche Entwicklung des frühesten Geisteslebens 1873. G. Roskoff, Das Religionswesen der rohesten Natürvolker 1880. Ed. von Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie,
Leipzig. O. Pfleiderer, Religionsphilos. auf geschichtl. Grundlage, 2e Aufl.
1883-84. H. Siebeck, Lehrb. der Religionsphilosophie 1893. A. Reville, Prolégomènes de l'histoire des religions, Paris 1881. [237] C. P. Tiele, The place of the religion of the natural peoples in the history of religion 1873.
Id. On the laws of the development of religion, Theol. Tijdschr. 1874. Id.
Hist. of religion 1876 etc. However generally this doctrine of evolution may be accepted, in any case it has as yet no higher rank than that of a hypothesis. But it does not explain the phenomena. In natural science it still always runs up against the facts of life, consciousness, speech, language, will, etc. And in the science of religion the origin and the essence, the truth and the value of religion remain a protest against its submissions. That furthermore the natural peoples represent the original condition of humanity, that fetishism and animism are the oldest forms of religion, and that the first humans were like children or savages, are opinions that lack sufficient ground and therefore also meet with ever more contradiction.
Schelling, in his Philosophie der Mythologie und Offenbarung, assumed a relative monotheism as original. Max Müller acknowledges a so-called henotheism as primitive religion, Vorlesungen über Ursprung und
Entwicklung der Religion S. 292 f. Deutsche Rundschau Sept. 1878. Cf.
Rauwenhoff, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 95 v. 191 v. and Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd.
146 v. Also the opinion that the different religions are successive moments in one process of development is much less probable than that which holds
them to be degenerations of a kind, Kähler, Wiss. der chr. Lehre I 185. The doctrine of Scripture concerning the origin and the essence of Ethnicism is therefore still defended, more or less decisively, by Lüken, Die Einheit des
Menschengeschlechts und dessen Ausbreitung über die ganze Erde 1845.
Doedes, The application of the theory of development not to be recommended for the hist. of religion 1874. E. L. Fischer, Heidenthum und
Offenbarung 1878. Zöckler, Die Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen, Gütersloh 1879. Id. Art. Polytheismus in Herzog2. Lenormant, Les origines de l'histoire d'après la Bible et les traditions des peuples orientaux, 3 vol.
1880-84. Diestel, der Monoth. des Heidenthums, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.
1860 S. 669-759. A. Tholuck, Der sittliche Charakter des Heidenthums 3e Aufl., Werke VIII 1865 S. 1-91. J. N. Sepp, Das Heidenthum und dessen
Bedeutung für das Christenthum, 3 Theile Regensburg 1853. C. Pesch, God and [238] gods. A study in comparative science of religion. Freiburg 1890.
Formby-Krieg, Der Monotheïsmus der Offenbarung und das Heidenthum.
Mainz 1880. Ebrard, Apologetik, 2e Aufl. Gütersloh 1878-80. II 521 f.
Vigouroux, La Bible et les découvertes modernes en Palestine, en Egypte et en Assyrie, 4 vol. James Orr, The Christian view of God and the world,
Edinburgh, Elliot 1893 p. 141, 193, 431, 466, 501. S. H. Kellogg, The genesis and growth of religion, New-York and London 1892. Cf. Ch. de la
Saussaye, Lehrb. der Rel. gesch. S. 7 f. 23 f.
9. But, however strictly Scripture may judge concerning the character of paganism, precisely the general revelation which it teaches places us in a position and gives us the right to acknowledge all the elements of truth which are also present in the pagan religions. The study of religions formerly stood exclusively in the service of dogmatics and apologetics. The founders of religions, such as Mohammed, were simply regarded as
deceivers, enemies of God, accomplices of the devil. Cf. Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, De Islam. Gids 1886 II 239 v. But since those religions have become more accurately known, this explanation has proved untenable; it was in conflict both with history and with psychology. According to Holy
Scripture there is also among the pagans a revelation of God, an illumination of the Logos, an operation of God's Spirit, Gen. 6:17, 7:15. Ps.
33:6, 104:30, 139 vs. 2. Job 32:8. Eccl. 3:19. Prov. 8:22 v. Mal. 1:11, 14.
John 1:9. Rom.2:14. Gal. 4:1-3. Acts 14:16, 17; 17 vs. 22-30. Many church fathers, Just. Martyr, Apol. 1,47, Clemens Alex. Strom. I 7 et al. assumed an activity of the Logos in the pagan world. Augustine speaks repeatedly very unfavorably about the pagans, but nevertheless also acknowledges that they saw the truth in shadow, the civ. 19,1 de trin. 4.20, that the truth was not entirely hidden from them, the civ. 8:11 v. and that we therefore must make our profit from what is true in pagan philosophy and must appropriate it to ourselves, de doctr. chr. 2,60. Non usque adeo in anima humana imago Dei terrenorum affectuum labe detrita est, ut nulla in ea velut lineamenta extrema remanserint, unde merito dici possit, etiam in ipsa impietate vitae suae facere aliqua legis vel sapere, de spir. et. litt. [239] c. 27, 28. Also many who are not pure acknowledge much that is true, Retract. I c. 4.
Thomas says not only that man as a rational being, without supernatural grace, can know the veritates naturales, S. Theol. I 2 qu. 109 art. 1. but also testifies II 2 qu. 172 art. 6, that it is impossible esse aliquam cognitionem quae totaliter sit falsa, absque admixtione alicujus veritatis, and in that connection appeals to the words of Bede and Augustine: nulla falsa est doctrina, quae non aliquando aliqua vera falsis intermisceat. The Reformed were in an even better position through their doctrine of the gratia communis. By this they were on the one hand safeguarded against the error
of Pelagianism, which taught the sufficientia of theol. naturalis and connected salvation to the observance of the lex naturae; but on the other hand they could nevertheless acknowledge all that is true and beautiful and good that was also present in the pagan world. Science, art, moral, domestic, social life etc. were derived from that gratia communis and with gratitude acknowledged and praised, Calv. Inst. II, 2. § 12 v. II 3. § 3 v.
Zanchius, Opera VIII 646 sq. Wttewrongel, Christ. Huishoudinge I 288299. Witsius, Oec. foed. III 12. § 52. Id. Twist des Heeren met zijn wijngaart cap. 19. Turret, Theol. El. 10:5. Vossius, Hist. Pelag. 3:3. Pfanner,
Systema Theol. Gentilis cap. 22 § 33. Trigland, Antapologia cap. 17. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. IV 826-829. Cf. my address on De algemeene
Genade, Kampen 1894. Usually this operation of the gratia communis was indeed seen in moral and intellectual, social and political life, but less often in the religions. Then one spoke only of some religio naturalis, insita and acquisita, but the connection between these and the religions was not demonstrated. The religions were derived from deception or daemonic influences. But not only in science and art, in morality and law, but also in the religions there is an operation of God's Spirit and of his general grace to be observed. Calvin rightly spoke of a semen religionis, a sensus divinitatis,
Inst. I, 3, 1-3. I, 4, 1. II, 2, 18. For the founders of religions were not deceivers and not instruments of Satan, but men who, religiously disposed, had a calling to fulfill for their time and for their people, and have exercised a favorable influence on the life of the peoples. The various religions, however much also mixed with error, [240] have to a certain extent satisfied the religious needs and bestowed comfort in the sorrow of life. Not only cries of despair, but also tones of trust, hope, resignation, peace, submission, patience etc. come to us from the pagan world. All the elements
and forms which are essential to religion, concept of God, consciousness of guilt, need of redemption, sacrifice, priesthood, temple, cultus, prayer etc. occur in corrupted form but nevertheless thus also occur in the pagan religions. Even here and there there is no lack of unconscious predictions and striking expectations of a better and purer religion. Therefore
Christianity does not stand exclusively antithetically over against paganism; it is also its fulfillment. Christianity is the true but therefore also the highest and purest religion, it is the truth of all religions. What in Ethnicism is caricature, is here the living original. What there is appearance, is here essence. What is sought there, is to be found here. Christianity is the explanation of Ethnicism. Christ is the Promised One to Israel and the Desire of all pagans. Israel and the church are chosen for the benefit of humanity. In Abraham's seed all the families of the earth are blessed. See besides the above-mentioned works of Fabri, Sepp, Tholuck et al. also
Clemens Alex. Strom. 1, 1. 4, 5. 6, 8. Coh. ad gentes § 6. Orig. c. Cels. 4, 4.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 184. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. I 2. Beck, Einleitung in das Syst. der christl. Lehre 2e Aufl. 1870 S. 45 f. Saussaye in my Theol. van Prof. Dr. Ch. d. l. S. bl. 31 v. 46 v. 83 v. V. von Strauss und Torney, Das unbewusst Weissagende im vorchristl. Heidenthum (Zeitfr. des christl.
Volkslebens VIII). Staudenmaier, Encycl. der theol. Wiss. 1835 § 428 v.
Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. 134 f. Kuyper, Encycl. III 445 v. 563 v.
10. But the revelatio generalis has significance not only for the heathen world, but also still in and for the Christian religion. Its value, however, does not lie in this, that it provides us with a theologia or religio naturalis, a moral rational faith, which would be sufficient in itself and could dispense with all that is positive in religion. Such a religio naturalis is found nowhere and is also not viable. [241] Nor is it the intention of the revelatio generalis
that the Christian should draw from it his first knowledge about God, world, and man, in order then later to supplement this with the knowledge of Christ. Ritschl and his followers present it as if the dogmatician in the loci de Deo and de homine took the material only from the revelatio generalis, and then for the following loci first went to draw the material from Holy
Scripture. The dogmatician would then first stand outside and before the Christian faith, and then with the later dogmas take his position within that faith, Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 4. But this has at least in the beginning not been the method of Reformation dogmatics. When the Christian confesses his faith in God the Father, the Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth, then that is in the full sense Christian faith. And the dogmatician does not first divest himself of this his faith, in order from the general revelation to compile a rational doctrine about God and man and later to supplement this with the revelation in Christ. But he draws his knowledge solely and only from the revelatio specialis, i.e. from Holy Scripture. This is his principium unicum. But he does not limit this special revelation to the person of Christ, as that is depicted in some parts of Scripture, e.g. in the Synopt. Gospels or only in the Sermon on the Mount. The whole revelation, which is summarized in Scripture, is a revelatio specialis, which comes to us in Christ. Christ is the center and content of that whole special revelation, which begins at Paradise and is completed in the Apocalypse.
The special revelation has now recognized and valued the general, and has even taken it over and, as it were, assimilated it. And so also does the Christian, so also the dogmatician. He stands in the Christian faith, in the revelatio specialis and from there also looks into nature and history. And now he discovers there traces of that same God, whom he in Christ came to know as his Father. Precisely as a Christian, through faith, he sees the
revelation of God in nature much better and more clearly than he could notice it earlier. The psychical man does not understand the speech of God in nature and history. He searches the entire universe, without finding God.
But the Christian, armed with the spectacles of Holy Scripture, R. de Sabunde, Theol. Natur. in den Prologus, Calvin, Inst. I 6, 1., [242] sees God in everything and everything in God. Therefore we encounter in Scripture a nature poetry and a view of history such as is found nowhere. The believer thus also finds his way rightly in the world with his Christian confession; he is no stranger in it, and sees there no other power ruling than that which he also in Christ invokes as his Father. Through that general revelation he feels at home in the world; it is God's fatherly hand, from which also in the natural order all things come to him.
In that general revelation he further has a firm ground, on which he can meet all non-Christians. He has the same foundation in common with them.
By his Christian faith he may occupy an isolated position, he may not be able to prove his convictions of faith to others; in the general revelation he nevertheless has a point of contact with all who bear the name of man. Just as the classical propaedeutic lays a common basis among all men of science, so general revelation holds all men together in spite of all difference of religion. Subjectively, in the believer the knowledge of God from nature is posterior to that from Holy Scripture. We are all born in a definite positive religion. Only the eye of faith sees God in creation; here too it holds, that only the pure in heart see God. But objectively, nature nevertheless precedes grace, the revelatio generalis precedes the revelatio specialis. Gratia praesupponit naturam. The denial that the religio and theologia naturalis is sufficient and has a proper, independent existence, detracts nothing from the fact that from creation, from nature and history,
from heart and conscience, a speech of God comes to every man. No one escapes the power of the revelatio generalis. Religion belongs to the essence of man. The idea and the existence of God, the spiritual independence and the eternal destiny of man, origin and goal of the world, the moral world-order and its final triumph are problems that leave the human spirit no rest. The metaphysical need cannot be suppressed.
Philosophy always seeks again to satisfy it. It is the revelatio generalis that keeps this need alive. It prevents man from debasing himself to an animal.
It binds him to the supersensible world. It [243] maintains in him the consciousness that he is created after God's image and finds no rest except in God. The revelatio generalis preserves humanity, in order that and until it is found and restored by Christ. Insofar the theologia naturalis was formerly rightly called a praeambula fidei, a divine preparation and education to Christianity. General revelation is the foundation on which the special raises itself.
And finally the rich significance of general revelation also comes to expression in this, that it holds nature and grace, creation and re-creation, the Welt der Wirklichkeit and the Welt der Werthe together in an indissoluble connection. Without general revelation the special loses its coherence with the whole cosmic being and life. Then the link is missing, which connects the realm of nature and the kingdom of heaven with one another. He who, with critical philosophy, denies the revelatio generalis, makes a futile effort to regain, by the way of practical Vernunft or of phantasy, what he lost. He has lost the point of support for his faith. The religious life stands detached alongside ordinary, human being; the image of God becomes a donum superadditum; religion, as with the Socinians, becomes foreign to human nature; Christianity becomes a sectarian
phenomenon and deprived of its catholicity; grace stands hostile over against nature. Consistent with this, then, is to assume, with the ethical moderns, a radical separation between the power of the good and the power of nature. Ethos and physis lie totally separated. The world of Wirklichkeit and that of Werthe have nothing to do with one another. In principle
Parsism, Manichaeism is renewed. In contrast, the revelatio generalis maintains the unity of nature and grace, of world and kingdom of God, of the natural and the moral order, of creation and re-creation, of physis and ethos, of virtue and happiness, of holiness and blessedness, and in all this the unity of the divine Being. It is one and the same God, who in general revelation leaves himself without witness to no one and who in special revelation makes himself known as a God of grace. General and special revelation thus work upon one another. Praemisit Deus naturam magistram, submissurus et prophetiam, quo facilius credas prophetiae discipulus naturae (Tertullianus). Natura praecedit gratiam, gratia [244] perficit naturam. Ratio perficitur a fide, fides supponit naturam. Cf. Hofstede de
Groot, Institutio theol. nat. ed. 4. 1861. Scholten, Leer der Herv. Kerk, 4e dr. I bl. 270 v. Kuyper, Nat. Godskennis, Uit het Woord III. Voigt, Fund. dogm. 172 f.