12. § 12. Properties of Scripture.

12. § 12. Properties of Scripture.

§ 12. Properties of Scripture.

A. The properties of Scripture in general.

. The doctrine of the affectiones of Holy Scripture has developed entirely out of the struggle against Rome and Anabaptism. In the confession of the inspiration and authority of Scripture there was agreement, but otherwise there was in the locus de S. Scr. a great difference between Rome and the Reformation. The relation in which Rome had placed Scripture and church to one another was in the Reformation changed in principle. With the church fathers and scholastics, Scripture, at least in theory, still stood far above church and tradition; it rested in itself, was αὐτοπιστος and for church and theology the norma normans. Augustine said, scriptura canonica certis suis terminis continetur, in Harnack, D. G. II 85, and reasons Conf. 6,5, 11,3 thus, as if the truth of Holy Scripture depends only on itself. Bonaventure, de sept. don. n. 37-43, cited in the

Breviloquium ed. Freiburg 1881 p. 370, declares: ecclesia enim fundata est super eloquia Sacrae Scripturae, quae si deficiant, deficit intellectus........

Cum enim ecclesia fundata sit in Sacra Scriptura, qui nescit eam, nescit ecclesiam regere. More such testimonies are cited by Gerhard, Loci theol. I cap. 3 § 45, 46 from Salvianus, Biel, Cajetanus, Hosius, Valentia etc.

Canisius says in his Summa doctrinae christ., in cap. de praeceptis ecclesiae § 16: Proinde sicut scripturae propter testimonium Divini Spiritus in illa loquentis credimus, adhaeremus ac tribuimus maximam auctoritatem, sic ecclesiae fidem, reverentiam obedientiamque debemus. And also

Bellarmine, de Verbo Dei, lib. 1 cap. 2 still declares: Sacris Scripturis, quae propheticis et apostolicis litteris continentur, nihil est notius, nihil certius, ut stultissimum esse necesse sit qui illis fidem habendam esse negat. All were of the opinion that Scripture could sufficiently be proved as truth from and through itself; it does not depend on the church, but conversely the church on it; the church with its tradition may be regula fidei, but fundamentum fidei it is not yet. That is Scripture alone.

But the church with its office and tradition began at Rome, the longer the more, to assume an independent position and to acquire authority [364] alongside Holy Scripture. The relation of the two was at first not more precisely defined, but nevertheless soon demanded a better regulation. And when the church continually increased in power and self-sufficiency, the authority was the longer the more transferred from Scripture to the church.

Various moments in history indicate the process through which the church raised itself from the position under, to that alongside, and finally also to that above Scripture. The question, which of the two, Scripture or the church, had precedence, was clearly and consciously posed for the first time in the time of the reforming councils. Despite the contradiction of Gerson,

d'Ailly, and especially of Nicolaas van Clémange, Herz.2 3:247 it was decided in favor of the church. Trent has sanctioned this over against the Reformation. In the struggle against Gallicanism the question was further specified, and in the Vaticanum 1870 it has been so resolved, that the church was declared infallible. The subject of this infallibility, however, is not the ecclesia audiens, nor the ecclesia docens, nor also the collective bishops, assembled in council, but specifically the pope. And this one again not as a private person, nor also as bishop of Rome or patriarch of the West but as Supreme Shepherd of the whole church. He possesses this infallibility indeed as head of the church and not apart from her, but he nevertheless does not possess it through and with her, but above and in distinction from her. Even bishops and councils have a share in the infallibility, not separated from, but only in unity with and submission to the pope. He stands above all, and alone makes the church, tradition, the councils, the canons infallible. Councils without the pope can err and have erred, Bellarminus, de Conc. et Eccl. II c. 10-11. The whole church, both docens and audiens, is only infallible una cum et sub Romano pontifice,

Jansen, Theol. I 506. Therewith the whole relation of church and Scripture is reversed. The church, or more concretely the pope, precedes and stands above Scripture. Ubi papa, ibi ecclesia, Jansen, I 511. The infallibility of the pope makes that of the church, the bishops and councils and likewise that of Scripture unnecessary.

2. From this Roman conception of the relationship of Scripture and church all the differences proceed which in the doctrine of [365] Scripture exist between Rome and the Reformation. They concern chiefly the necessity of Holy Scripture, the apocrypha of the O. Test., the editio

Vulgata, the Bible prohibition, the interpretation of Scripture and tradition.

Formally the reversal in the relationship of Scripture and church comes out most clearly in this, that the more recent Roman theologians treat the doctrine of the church in the pars formalis of dogmatics. The church belongs to the principia fidei. As Scripture in the Reformation, so is the church, the magisterium, or properly the pope the formal principle, the fundamentum fidei in Romanism, Jansen, I 829.

Over against this the Reformers placed the doctrine of the properties of Scripture. It bore entirely a polemical character, but for that very reason it also stood, in the main, fixed from the beginning, Heppe, Dogm. d. deutschen Prot. I 207-257. Gradually it was also incorporated more or less systematically and methodically into dogmatics, not yet with Zwingli,

Calvin, Melanchthon, etc., but nevertheless already with Musculus, Loci Comm. 1567 p. 374 sq. Zanchius, de S. Script. Op. VIII 319 sq. Polanus,

Synt. Theol. 17 sq. Junius, Theses Theol. Op. I 1594 sq. etc., and in the Lutheran church with Gerhard, Quenstedt, Calovius, Hollaz, etc. But in the treatment there was difference. Sometimes all manner of historical and critical material was discussed in it; dogmatics took up almost the whole

"Introduction," the canonica generalis and specialis, into itself. Also the number and the division of the properties were stated unequally. Authority, usefulness, necessity, truth, clarity, sufficiency, origin, division, content, apocrypha, council, church, tradition, editio authentica, translations, interpretation, proofs, testimonium Sp. Si., all this and much more was brought up in the doctrine of Scripture and of its properties. Little by little there came more delimitation of the material. Calovius and Quenstedt distinguished between affectiones primariae and secundariae; to the former belonged the auctoritas, veritas, perfectio, perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas, judicialis potestas and efficacia, and under the latter

were reckoned the necessitas, integritas, puritas, authentia and legendi omnibus concessa licentia. Still simpler was the order followed many times: auctoritas, necessitas, perfectio seu sufficientia, perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas and efficacia, Hase, Hutterus Rediv. § 43 f. Schmid,

Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 27 f. Herzog2 2, [366] 365 f. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 9 f. Voigt, Fundamentaldogm. S. 644 f. But even so there is still simplification to be made. The historical, critical, archaeological material etc. does not belong in dogmatics, but in the bibliological disciplines of theology. The authentia, integritas, puritas etc. therefore cannot be treated fully in dogmatics; they are mentioned there only insofar as the doctrine of Scripture also offers some data for its condition. The veritas, after inspiration and authority, no longer needs a separate argument, and would thereby rather be weakened than strengthened. The efficacia finds its place in the doctrine of the media gratiae. Thus only the auctoritas, necessitas, perfectio and perspicuitas remain. Among these there is still this distinction, that the auctoritas is not a property that is coordinated with the others, for it is given of itself with the inspiration; the necessitas, perspicuitas and sufficientia, on the other hand, do not flow from the inspiration in the same sense. It is conceivable that an infallible Scripture had to be supplemented and explained by an infallible tradition. Rome does indeed acknowledge the authority of Scripture, but denies its other properties.

B. The authority of Scripture.

3. The authority of Scripture has at all times been acknowledged in the Christian church. Jesus and the apostles believed in the O. Test. as the word

of God and ascribed to it a divine authority. The Christian church was born and grew up under the authority of Scripture. What the apostles have written must be accepted as if Christ himself had written it, Aug. de cons. evang. I 35. And Calvin declares in his exposition of 2 Tim. 3:16, that we owe to Scripture eandem reverentiam as to God. That authority of Scripture stood firm in all churches and among all Christians until the previous century. In contrast, between Rome and the Reformation there arose a serious difference concerning the ground on which that authority rests.

Church fathers and scholastics still often taught the autopistia of Scripture, but the driving force of the Roman principle has more and more pushed the church before Scripture. The church, so runs the general Roman doctrine at present, precedes Scripture temporally and logically. [367] It existed earlier than Scripture, and does not owe its origin, existence, and authority to Scripture, but exists in and through itself, i.e. through Christ, or the H.

Spirit who dwells in it. Scripture, on the other hand, has precisely proceeded from the church and is now by it acknowledged, confirmed, preserved, interpreted, defended, etc. Scripture thus indeed needs the church, but the church does not need Scripture. Without church there is no Scripture, but without Scripture there is indeed a church. The church with the infallible tradition is the original and sufficient means to preserve and communicate revelation; the H. Scripture was added later, is in itself insufficient, but as support and confirmation of tradition is useful and good.

In fact, at Rome Scripture is made wholly dependent on the church. The authenticity, integrity, inspiration, canonicity, authority of Scripture is determined by the church. In that connection, however, this distinction is then made, that Scripture does not, quoad se, but quoad nos, wholly depend on the church. The church does not by its recognition make Scripture

inspired, canonical, genuine, etc., but it is nevertheless the only one that can know these properties of Scripture in an infallible manner. The selftestimony of Scripture, after all, does not make out that precisely these books of O. and N. T., and no others and no fewer, are inspired; nowhere does the H. Scripture give a catalogue of the books that belong to it; the texts that teach inspiration never cover the whole of Scripture, 2 Tim. 3:16 applies only to the O. Test.; moreover, an appeal for the inspiration of Scripture to Scripture itself is always still only a circular proof. The Protestants are therefore also mutually divided over the books that belong to Scripture; Luther's judgment concerning James differs from that of Calvin, etc. The proofs for Scripture derived from the church fathers, etc., are not firm and solid enough; they have as motiva credibilitatis great value, but they nevertheless give only probability, human and thus fallible certainty.

Only the church gives divine, infallible certainty, as Augustine then also said: ego vero Evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas, c. epist. Manich. cap. 5. c. Faustum l. 28. cap. 2,4,6.

The Protestants have therefore also been able to accept and acknowledge Scripture as God's word, because they received it from the hand of the church, Bellarminus, de Verbo Dei IV cap. 4. Perrone, Praelect. [368]

Theol. IX 71 sq. Heinrich, Dogm. I 775 f. Jansen, Theol. I 766 sq. The Vaticanum, sess. 3. cap. 2 acknowledged the books of the O. and N. T. as canonical, propterea quod Sp. So. inspirante conscripti Deum habent autorem atque ut tales ipsi ecclesiae traditi sunt. Guided by these thoughts,

Rome at Trent sess. 4 and in the Vatican sess. 3 cap. 2 established the canon, included in it, after the example of the Greek translation and the practice of the church fathers, also the apocrypha of the O. T., and moreover

declared the editio Vulgata to be the authentic text, so that this has decisive authority in church and theology.

4. Over against this Roman doctrine the Reformation set the autopisty of Scripture, Calvijn, Inst. I c. 7. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 p. 8 sq. Polanus,

Synt. I c. 23-30. Zanchius, de S. Scriptura, Op. VIII 332-353. Junius, Theses Theol. c. 3-5. Synopsis pur. theol. disp. 2 § 29 sq. Gerhard, Loci theol. I c. 3. etc. With this difference, the question did not run about this, whether the church did not have a calling to fulfil over against Scripture. It was generally conceded that the church is of great significance for Scripture. Its testimony is of great weight and a motivum credibilitatis. The church of the first centuries possesses in its testimonies a strong support for Scripture. For every human being the church is the guide to Scripture. In this sense the word of Augustine is and remains true, that he was moved by the church to believe Scripture. Protestant theologians, Calv. Inst. I 7, 3.

Polanus, Synt. p. 30. Turretinus, de S. Scr. auctoritate, disp. 3 § 13 s.

Gerhard, Loci theol. I c. 3 § 51 have weakened this word of Augustine, by letting it apply only to the past, to the origin of faith. But the reasoning of Augustine t. a. p. is clear. He places his Manichaean opponent before this dilemma: you must either say to me: believe the catholic, but these precisely warn me to believe you, or do not believe the catholic, but then you also cannot appeal to the gospel over against me, quia ipsi Evangelio, catholicis praedicantibus, credidi. The church is indeed for Augustine a motive of faith, of which he here makes use over against the Manichaean.

But there is a difference between motive and the final ground of faith. How he sees in the church a motive of faith [369], he elsewhere, C. Faustum lib.

32 c. 19, himself clarifies when he says: cur non potius evangelicae autoritati, tam fundatae, tam stabilitae, tanta gloria diffamatae atque ab

apostolorum temporibus usque ad nostra tempora per successiones certissimas commendatae, non te subdis? Cf. de util. cred. c. 14. The church with her dignity, her power, her hierarchy etc. has always made a deep impression on Augustine. She continually moved him to faith, she supported and strengthened him in doubt and struggle, she was the firm hand that always again led him to Scripture. But thereby Augustine does not mean to say that the authority of Scripture depends on the church, that she is the last and deepest ground of his faith. Elsewhere he says clearly that Holy Scripture has authority through itself and must be believed for its own sake, Clausen, Augustinus S. Scr. interpres 1827 p. 125. Dorner,

Augustinus, Berlin 1873 S. 237 f. Reuter, Augustinische Studien, Gotha 1887 S. 348 f. Schmidt, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. VI 235 f. Hase, Protest.

Polemik 5te Aufl. Leipzig 1891 S. 81. Harnack D. G. III 70 f.

The church has and retains for every believer, right up to his death, a rich and deep pedagogical significance. The cloud of witnesses that lies around us can strengthen and encourage us in the struggle. But this is quite something different from the authority of Scripture being dependent on the church. Rome does not even dare to express this openly. The Vatican

Council nevertheless also recognized the books of the O. and N. T. as canonical for this reason too, propterea quod Spiritu S inspirante conscripti

Deum autorem habent and as such have been handed down to the church.

And the Roman theologians make a distinction between the authority of Scripture quoad se and quoad nos. But that distinction cannot apply here.

For if the church is the final and deepest ground why I believe in Scripture, then that church, and not Scripture, is αὐτοπιστος. And now one of two:

Scripture contains a testimony, a doctrine about itself, about its inspiration and authority, and then the church does nothing but accept and confirm that

testimony; or Scripture itself does not teach such an inspiration and authority, and then the dogma of the church about Scripture is judged for the Protestant. The Roman theologians therefore also find themselves in no small contradiction. On the one hand they attempt, in the doctrine of Scripture, to demonstrate its inspiration and authority from itself [370]; and on the other hand, having arrived at the doctrine of the church, they endeavor to weaken those proofs and to show that only the testimony of the church gives an incontrovertible certainty. If, on the contrary, the authority quoad se depends on Scripture itself, then it is also quoad nos, the final ground of our faith. The church can only acknowledge what is; it cannot make what is not. The accusation that in that way a circular reasoning is made and Scripture is proved with Scripture itself, can be thrown back upon Rome itself, since it proves the church with Scripture and Scripture with the church. If Rome remarks against that, that in the first case it uses Scripture not as God's word but as human, credible and reliable testimony, then the Protestant theologian can also adopt this remark: first, from Scripture as reliable testimony, the inspiration is derived and thereafter, with this,

Scripture as God's word is proved. But much more significant is this, that in every field of science, and thus also in theology, the principia stand firm by themselves. The truth of a principium cannot be demonstrated, but only recognized. Principium creditur propter se, non propter aliud. Principii principium haberi non potest nec quaeri debet, Gerhard, Loc. theol. I cap. 3.

Zanchius, Op. VIII 339 sq. Polanus, Synt. I cap. 23 sq. Turret. Theol. El. loc. 2 qu. 6. Trelcatius, Schol. et method. loc. comm. S. Theol. Institutio

1651 p. 26.

Scripture itself therefore also clearly teaches that not the church but the word of God, written or unwritten, is αὐτοπιστος. The church has at all

times been bound to that word of God, insofar as it was there and in that form in which it existed. Israel receives the law on Horeb, Jesus and the apostles submit themselves to the O. T. Scripture, the Christian church from the beginning is bound to the spoken and written word of the apostles. The word of God is the foundation of the church, Deut. 4:1; Jes. 8:20; Ezech.

20:19; Luk. 16:29; Joh. 5:39; Ef. 2:20; 2 Tim. 3:14; 2 Petr. 1:19 etc. The church can indeed bear witness to the word, but the word stands above her.

She can grant no one faith in the word of God in the heart. That the word of God alone can do, by itself and the power of the H. Spirit, Jer. 23:29; Mk.

4:28; Luk. 8:11; Rom. 1:16; Hebr. 4:12; 1 Petr. 1:23. And already by that alone it appears that the [371] church stands beneath Scripture. Therefore the church and the believers can come to know the inspiration, authority, canonicity of Scripture from itself, but they can never proclaim and establish these on their own authority. The Reformation preferred some uncertainty to a certainty that was obtained only by an arbitrary decision of the church. For Scripture indeed nowhere gives a catalogue of the books that it contains. Concerning some books there has been in the oldest

Christian church and also later a difference of opinion. The text does not possess that integritas, which also Luth. and Reformed theologians so gladly wished. But nevertheless the Reformation maintained the autopisty of Scripture over against the claims of Rome, made the church subordinate to the word of God, and thereby saved the freedom of the Christian.

5. Alongside this difference between Rome and the Reformation concerning the ground of the authority of Scripture, there arose in the seventeenth century within the Protestant churches themselves yet another important struggle about the nature of that authority. On this point there was agreement, that Scripture, because it had God as its author, possessed an

auctoritas divina. More precisely this authority was defined by the fact that Scripture had to be believed and obeyed by all, and was the only rule of faith and life. This definition, however, of itself led to the distinction of an auctoritas historica and an auctoritas normativa. For the revelation of God is given in the form of a history; it has passed through different times. By no means everything that is recorded in Scripture has normative authority for our faith and life. Much of what has been commanded and instituted by God, or prescribed and ordained by prophets and apostles, no longer concerns us directly and related to persons living earlier. The command to Abraham to sacrifice his son; the order to Israel to kill all Canaanites; the ceremonial and civil laws that were valid in the days of the O. T.; the determinations of the synod at Jerusalem and so much more are certainly, as history, still useful for teaching and admonition, but can and may no longer be followed by us. And not only that, but revelation in its description has recorded not only the good works of the saints but also the evil deeds of the ungodly [372]. Thus there occur in Scripture, more than once, words and actions which, though presented as historically true, are not presented as normative; so far is it from the case that these may be a rule for our faith and life, that they must rather be rejected and disapproved. Also the sins of the saints, of an Abraham, Moses, Job, Jeremiah, Peter etc., are communicated for warning, not for imitation. And finally, with many persons, with the patriarchs, Deborah, the judges, the kings, the friends of Job, Hannah, Agur, the mother of Lemuel, the poets of some psalms, such as the imprecatory psalms ps. 73:13, 14, 77:7-9, 116:11, and further with Zechariah, Simeon, Mary, Stephen etc., the question can be raised whether their words are inspired only formally, as regards their recording, or also materially, as regards their content. Voetius judged that many of these

persons, such as Job and his friends, cannot be reckoned among the prophets and maintained this opinion over against Maresius, Voetius, Disp.

I 31, 40-44. V 634-640. Maresius, Theologus paradoxus p. 83-87, and further Maccovius, Loci Comm. p. 31-32, Cloppenburg, de canone theol. disp. 3 Op. II 18-23. Witsius, Misc. Sacra I 316-318. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. I 131-134. Carpzovius, Critica S. Vet. Test. I c. 2 § 3. This question did indeed have no further consequences, but was nevertheless in many respects important. It first brought clearly to consciousness that there is a distinction between word of God in a formal sense and word of God in a material sense, and compelled reflection on the relation in which both stand to one another. Now that relation was very certainly conceived by most of the above-mentioned theologians all too dualistically. The auctoritas historiae and the historia normae cannot be separated in Scripture in so abstract a manner. The formal and the material meaning of the expression word of God are far too closely connected. Even in the lying words of Satan and the evil deeds of the ungodly God has something to say to us. Scripture is not only useful for teaching but also for warning and admonition. It instructs and corrects us, both by deterring and by inciting, both by shaming and by comforting. But by that distinction it was indeed made clear that Scripture cannot and may not be conceived as a lawbook full of articles. An appeal to a text outside the context is not enough for a [373] dogma. The revelation, laid down in Scripture, is a historical and organic whole. Thus it wants to be read and explained. And therefore the dogma, which comes to us with authority and wants to be a rule for our faith and life, must be grounded on the whole organism of Scripture and derived from it. The authority of Scripture is different from that of a state law.

6. The nature and ground of the authority of Scripture, however, have been brought into discussion especially in more recent theology. In earlier times the authority of Holy Scripture rested on its inspiration and was thereby self-evidently given. But when inspiration was abandoned, the authority of Scripture was no longer maintainable. This was indeed attempted in all manner of ways, but one saw oneself compelled to conceive both the grounds and the character of the authority of Holy Scripture in an entirely different way. The authority of Scripture, insofar as it was still acknowledged, was then based on the fact that it is the authentic document of revelation; expresses the Christian idea most purely, just as water is also purest at the source; is the fulfilment of the Old Testament idea of salvation, and contains Christian doctrine completely, even if only in germ, within itself; and is the beginning and continual renewal of the Christian spirit in the congregation. These and similar considerations for the authority of Scripture can be found among theologians of the most diverse directions, such as in Scholten, L. H. K. I 78 v. Saussaye, mijne theol. van Ch. d. l. S.

53 v. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 129 f. Rothe, Zur Dogm. S. 166 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 193 f. Biedermann, Dogm. § 193 f. Schweizer, Christl. Gl. I S.

178 f. Hofmann, Weiss. u. Erf. III 98 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 5 f. 9 f. enz. Yet all these grounds are not firm enough to bear an authority such as religion requires. They may be taken into consideration as motiva credibilitatis, but as grounds they are untenable. For, in the first place, by the distinction between revelation and its document, between the word of God and Scripture, they in fact render the authority of Scripture wholly illusory. For if not Scripture as a whole, but only the word of God in it, the religious-ethical, the revelation or whatever one wishes to call it, has authority, then each person has to determine for himself what that word of

God in Scripture is, and each determines this at pleasure. The centre of gravity is transferred from the [374] object to the subject; Scripture does not criticise man, but he judges Scripture; the authority of Scripture depends on human good pleasure; it exists only insofar as one wishes to acknowledge it, and is thus wholly destroyed. But even if all these grounds could vindicate some authority for Scripture, it would nevertheless be no other than a purely historical authority. And this is insufficient in religion. Here we do not have enough with a historical, i.e. human and fallible authority.

Because religion touches our salvation and is connected with our eternal interests, we can in it make do with nothing less than a divine authority. We must not only know that Scripture is the historical document for our knowledge of Christianity and that it contains and reproduces the original

Christian ideas most purely; but in religion we must know that Scripture is the word and the truth of God. Without this certainty there is no comfort in life and in dying. And not only does every Christian have need of this certainty, but the church itself as an institute cannot dispense with this assurance. For if a preacher lacks the conviction of the divine truth of the word that he proclaims, his preaching loses all authority and influence and power. If he has no divine message to bring, who then gives him the right to appear before people of like movements as he? Who gives him freedom to place himself above them in the pulpit, to occupy them with the highest interests of soul and life and even to announce to them an eternal weal or an eternal woe? Who dares and who can do that, other than he who has a word of God to proclaim? The Christian faith and Christian preaching both demand a divine authority on which they rest. Titubabit fides, si divinarum scripturarum vacillat auctoritas, Aug. de doctr. christ. I 37.

Therefore it also cannot meet with approval when the nature of the authority of Scripture is described as moral. Lessing already began with that when he said that something is not true because it stands in the Bible, but that it stands in the Bible because it is true. Since his sigh for deliverance from the authority of the letter and from the paper pope, believing on authority has in all sorts of ways been made ridiculous. Christian theologians have allowed themselves to be influenced thereby [375] and have modified or contested belief in authority. Doedes e.g., Inl. tot de leer van God, 1880 bl. 29-40 wants to know nothing of believing on authority and speaks only any longer of moral authority in religion. Saussaye, mijne

Theol. van Ch. d. l. S. 53 v. declares that there is no other than moral authority and that the moral is wholly authority. Intellectual authority does not exist, but moral authority is morality, religion itself. One does not believe the truth on authority, but the truth has authority, i. i. has the right that one obey it. This representation, however, suffers from confusion of concepts. The truth has authority, most certainly; no one who denies it. But the question is precisely, what in the religious domain truth is and where it is to be found. To this only a twofold answer is possible. Either on the one side: what truth is, or if one will, who Christ is, that the apostles tell us, that Scripture tells us; or on the other side: this is decided by one's own judgment, by the reason or the conscience of each human being for himself.

In the latter case there is no authority and no authority of Scripture any more; it is wholly and entirely subjected to the criticism of the subject. Then it also helps nothing, to say with Rothe, Zur Dogm. 287, that the Bible is the completely sufficient instrument, in order to arrive at a pure knowledge of God's revelation. For every objective standard is lacking, according to which in Scripture that revelation can be assessed and found. There is

indeed only one ground on which the authority of Scripture can rest, and that is its inspiration. If this falls, then it is also done with the authority of Scripture. It then contains only human writings, which as such cannot assert a single title to be norma for our faith and life. And with Scripture, for the Protestant all authority in religion falls. All attempts, then still again to find some authority or other back, e.g. in the person of Christ, in the church, in religious experience, in reason or conscience, end in disappointment,

Stanton, The place of authority in matters of religious belief, London Longmans 1891. James Martineau, The seat of authority in religion,

London Longmans 1891. C. A. Briggs, The authority of H. Scriptures.

Inaugural address, 4 ed. New-York Scribner, 1892. L. Monod, Le problème de l'autorité, Paris Fischbacher 1892. E. Doumergue, L'autorité en matière de foi, Lausanne Payot 1892. E. Ménégoz, [376] L'autorité de Dieu, réflexions sur l'autorité en matière de foi. Paris Fischbacher 1892. G.

Godet, Vinet et l'autorité en matière de foi, Revue de théol. et de philos.

Mars 1893 p. 173-191. They prove only that a religion without authority cannot exist. Religion is essentially distinguished from science. It has its own certainty; not such a one that rests on insight, but that consists in faith, in trust. And this religious faith and trust can only rest in God and in his word. In religion a testimonium humanum and a fides humana are insufficient; here we have need of a testimony of God, on which we can rely in life and death. Inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in Te!

Rightly, then, Harnack also says, D. G. III 73, es hat in der Welt keinen starken religiösen Glauben gegeben, der nicht an irgend einem entscheidenden Punkt sich auf eine äussere Autorität berufen hätte. Nur in den blassen Ausführungen der Religionsphilosophen oder in den polemischen Entwürfen protestantischer Theologen wird ein Glaube

construirt, der seine Gewissheit lediglich den eigenen inneren Momenten entnimmt. Cf. also P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, Zekerheid en twijfel

1893 bl. 138 v. The right and the value of authority in religion is gradually being recognized again.

7. But, even if religion can suffice with a divine authority alone, the nature of that authority still needs to be investigated more closely. Authority is in general the power of someone who has something to say; the right to have a say in one matter or another, hence in Middle Dutch geweld, power,

Woordenboek der Ned. Taal s. v. Of authority there can be mention only between unequals; it always expresses a relation of a superior to his inferior, of a higher to his lower. Because among human beings there is no equality but all kinds of distinction exist, there can among them be mention of authority. And because that inequality is so great and so manifold, authority among human beings occupies a very broad place. It is even the foundation of the entire human society. Whoever undermines it, labours at the destruction of society. Foolish and dangerous, therefore, is it to place believing on authority in a ridiculous light. Augustine already asked: Si quod nescitur credendum non est, quomodo serviant parentibus liberi eosque [377] mutua pietate diligant, quos parentes suos esse non credant....... Multa possunt afferri quibus ostendatur, nihil omnino humanae societatis incolume remanere, si nihil credere statuerimus, quod non possumus tenere perceptum, de util. cred. 12. In every domain we live by authority. Under authority we are born and brought up in family, society, and state. Parents have authority over their children, the master over his pupils, the government over its subjects. In all these cases the authority is clear. It expresses a power that by right accrues to someone over another. It therefore comes forward with commands and laws, demands obedience and

submission, and in case of revolt even has a right of coercion and punishment. But we extend this concept of authority further and apply it also in science and art. Here too there is distinction of gift, and the relation of superiors and inferiors, of magistri and discipuli, arises. There are men who through their genial disposition and diligent labour have acquired mastery in one field or another, and who therefore can speak with authority in this domain. From the discoveries of these magistri the inferiors, the laymen, live and learn. Yes, because of the tremendous expansion of science, even the most excellent can be magister only in a very small domain; in all the rest he is discipulus and must trust in the research of others. This authority in science and art, however, bears another character than that of parents, teachers, and government; it is not juridical, but ethical in nature; it cannot and may not compel, it has no right of punishment. The persons who here appear with authority may be ever so distinguished and weighty; their testimony counts only insofar as they can adduce grounds for it. The authority here thus does not rest ultimately in the persons, so that an ipse dixit would be conclusive, but rests in the proofs on which their assertion is based. And because all human beings received some understanding and judgment, blind faith is here impermissible and the striving after an independent insight, insofar as necessary and possible, a duty. In history too this is the case. The knowledge of history rests actually entirely on authority, on testimonies of others; but these testimonies need not be believed blindly, but may and must be seriously examined, so that as far as possible one's own insight may come into its right. In one [378] word, in scientiis tantum valet auctoritas humana, quantum rationes.

This concept of authority we finally also find again in religion and theology. Here authority is not needed in a lesser degree but in a much

higher measure than in family and society, in science and art. Here it is a vital necessity. Without authority and faith religion and theology cannot exist for a moment. But authority here bears an entirely distinctive character. It must of course be an auctoritas divina. And already thereby it is distinguished from authority in society and state, in science and art. From the latter it differs especially in this respect, that in science and art one's own insight may judge and decide. But with a divina auctoritas this is not in place. When God has spoken, all doubt is over. The divina auctoritas is therefore not to be called moral, at least not in the sense in which we speak of the moral ascendancy of a person, for religion is not a relation of an inferior to his superior, but of a creature to his Creator, of a subject to his

Sovereign, of a child to his Father. God has the right to command man and to demand unconditional obedience from him. His authority rests in his being, not in the rationes. In so far the authority of God and of his word agrees with that of the government in the state and of the father in the family. And there is nothing degrading in it and nothing that in any way whatsoever detracts from man's freedom, if he listens childlike to the word of God and obeys it. To believe God on his word, i.e. on authority, is just as little in conflict with man's dignity as it dishonours a child to rely with unlimited trust on the word of his father. And so far is it from the Christian's gradually outgrowing this authority, Schweizer, Christl. Glaub. I 186 f., that he precisely the longer the more, with denial of all his own wisdom, comes to believe God on his word. The believer never on this earth rises above the standpoint of faith and of authority. In proportion as he increases in faith, he clings the more firmly to the authority of God in his word. But on the other side there is nevertheless also a great difference between the authority of God in religion and that of a father in his family

and of a government in the state. A father [379] compels his child if need be and brings it by punishment to submission; and the government does not bear the sword in vain. Compulsion is inseparable from the authority of the earthly government. But God does not compel. His revelation is a revelation of grace. And in that he comes to man not with commands and demands, with compulsion and with punishment, but with the invitation, with the admonition, with the entreaty, to let himself be reconciled with him. God could appear as Sovereign over against man. He will one day as Judge judge all who have been disobedient to the gospel of his Son. But in Christ he descends to us, becomes like us in all things, deals with us as rational and moral beings; then yet again, encountering hostility and unbelief, to resume his sovereignty, to carry out his counsel and to prepare glory for himself out of all creature. The authority with which God appears in religion is thus entirely of its own kind. It is not human but divine. It is sovereign and yet works in a moral way. It does not compel, and yet knows how to maintain itself. It is absolute and yet is resisted. It invites and entreats, and yet is invincible.

And such is also the authority of Scripture. As the word of God it stands high above all authority of men in state and society, in science and art.

Before it all else must yield. For one must obey God more than men. All other authority is limited within its sphere and is valid only on its own terrain. But the authority of Scripture extends over the whole human being and over the whole of humanity. It stands above understanding and will, above heart and conscience; it is not to be compared with any other authority. Its authority is absolute, because it is divine. It has the right to be believed and obeyed by everyone at all times. In majesty it far surpasses all other power. But it calls no one to help, in order to bring itself to

recognition and dominion. It does not need the strong arm of the government. It does not require the support of the church. It does not call upon the sword and the inquisition. It does not wish to rule by coercion or violence. It wishes free and willing recognition. And therefore it itself brings that about, in a moral way, through the working of the H. Spirit.

Scripture watches over its own authority. Therefore formerly one also spoke of an [380] auctoritas causativa of Scripture, qua Scriptura assensum credendorum in intellectu hominis generat et confirmat, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. § 8.

C. The necessity of Scripture.

8. In the authority of Scripture there is great agreement among the Christian churches, but in the three other, now following, properties there is important difference. Rome, on account of the relation which it assumes between Scripture and church, can neither see nor acknowledge the necessitas S.

Scripturae. With Rome the church is αὐτοπιστος, self-sufficient, living out of and through the H. Spirit; it has the truth and preserves it faithfully and purely through the infallible teaching office of the pope. Scripture, on the other hand, having proceeded from the church, may be useful and good as norma, but it is not principium of the truth. It is not necessary ad esse ecclesiae. The church properly does not have Scripture, but Scripture, for its authority, supplementation, interpretation, etc., does have need of the church. The grounds for this doctrine are derived from the fact that the church before Moses and the first Christian congregation had no Scripture, and that many believers under the O. and also still under the N. Test. have

never possessed and read Scripture but lived solely and only from tradition, Bellarminus, de verbo Dei IV c. 4. Heinrich, Dogm. I 735 f. Liebermann,

Instit. theol. 1857 I p. 449 sq. Dieringer, Lehrb. der kath. Dogm. 4e Aufl.

633. Gutberlet, Lehrb. der Apol. III 1894 S. 221 f. Jansen. Prael. theol. I 786 sq. etc.

But not only does Rome in that way combat the necessity of Holy Scripture; all kinds of mystical movements have also weakened and failed to recognize the significance of Scripture for church and theology.

Gnosticism rejected not only the O. T. but applied the allegorical method to the N. T. and thereby attempted to bring its system into agreement with Scripture. The sensible forms and historical facts have only symbolic significance; they are a clothing, which is necessary for people of a lower standpoint, but for the more highly developed, the πνευματικοι, falls away.

Scripture is not a source of truth, but only a means to raise oneself to the higher standpoint of gnosis, Herzog2 5, 209 f. Harnack, D. G. I 214 f. In the [381] Montanism a new revelation appeared, which supplemented and improved that in the N. T. Montanism, especially in its moderate form in Tertullian, on the one hand wished to be nothing new and to maintain the authority of Scripture in full; and yet it greeted in Montanus a prophet, in whom the Paraclete promised by Jesus, the last and highest revelation, had appeared. Scripture in that way had to yield to the new prophecy, which was proclaimed by Montanus, Harnack, D. G. I 353 f. Herzog2 10, 258 f. The church did indeed condemn these movements, and the church fathers combated this spiritualism. Augustine wrote against it in the prologue to his book de doctrina christiana; but yet Augustine also assumed that the pious, especially the monks, could be equipped with so great a measure of faith, hope, and love, that they could dispense with Scripture for themselves and

could live without it in solitude, de doctr. christ. I c. 39. Spiritualism kept recurring, and reacted against the constricting power of church and tradition. Various sects, the Cathars, Amalric of Bena, Joachim v. Floris, the brothers and sisters of the free spirit and later the Libertines in Geneva, considered that after the period of the Father and of the Son that of the Holy

Spirit had arrived, in which all lived by the Spirit and no longer needed the external means of Scripture and church, Kurtz, Lehrb. der Kirchengesch. §

108, 116. Reuter, Gesch. der relig. Aufklärung im M. A. II 198 f. Herzog2 2, 677. 6, 786. 8, 652 f. Hahn, Gesch. der Ketzer im M. A. II 420 f. III 72 f.

Gieseler, Kirchengeschichte, II, 2, 1826 S. 437 f. Hagenbach, Kirchengesch. in Vorlesungen II 1886 S. 480 f. Mysticism, which flourished in the Middle

Ages in France and Germany, sought by means of asceticism, meditation, and contemplation to attain a communion with God which could dispense with Scripture. Scripture was indeed necessary by way of a ladder in order to climb to this height, but became superfluous when the unity with God, the visio Dei, had been attained, Herzog1 12, 427 f. Harnack, D. G. III 374 f. The Anabaptists in particular exalted the inward word at the expense of the outward. Already in 1521 the contrast was made between Scripture and Spirit, and this contrast has become a permanent characteristic of Anabaptism, Sepp, Kerkhist. Stud. 12. Holy Scripture is not the true word of God, but only a testimony and [382] description; the genuine, true word is that which is spoken by the Holy Spirit in our hearts. The Bible is only a book with letters; Bible is Babel, full of confusion; it cannot work faith in hearts, only the Spirit teaches us the true word. And if that Spirit instructs us, then we can also dispense with Scripture; it is a temporary aid but not necessary for the spiritual man, A. Hegler, Geist u. Schrift bei Sebastian

Franck, Freiburg 1892. J. H. Maronier, Het inwendig woord, Amst. 1890.

Vigouroux, Les livres saints et la critique rationaliste, 3e ed. I 435-453.

Hans Denck already identified that inward word with natural reason, and pointed to many contradictions in Scripture. Ludwig Hetzer considered

Scripture not at all necessary. Knipperdolling demanded at Munster that Holy Scripture had to be abolished and that one should live only according to nature and spirit, Herz.2 10, 362. Mysticism turned into rationalism. We see the same phenomenon later in the Anabaptist and independent sects in England, in the time of Cromwell, among the Quakers and in Pietism. The elevation of the inward above the outward word always led to identification of the instruction of the Spirit with the natural light of reason and conscience, and thus to complete rejection of revelation and Scripture. No one has therefore more sharply contested the necessity of Scripture than

Lessing in his Axiomata against Goeze. He too distinguishes between letter and spirit, Bible and religion, theology and religion, the Christian religion and the religion of Jesus, and now says that the latter existed and can exist independently of the former. Religion was, after all, there before the Bible was. Christianity was there before evangelists and apostles wrote. The religion taught by them can continue to exist even if all their writings were lost. Religion is not true because evangelists and apostles taught it, but they taught it because it is true. Their writings may and must therefore be explained according to the inward truth of religion. An attack on the Bible is not yet an attack on religion. Luther has delivered us from the yoke of tradition; who will deliver us from the still much more unbearable yoke of the letter?

9. These thoughts about the non-necessity of Scripture have in more recent theology been introduced especially through Schleiermacher. [383]

In his Glaubenslehre § 128, 129 he says that faith in Christ does not rest on

the authority of Scripture, but precedes the faith of Scripture and precisely causes us to bestow a special esteem on that Scripture. Among the first

Christians faith in Christ did not arise from Holy Scripture, and thus it cannot arise from it in our case either; for in their case and ours faith must have the same ground. Scripture is therefore not a source of religion, but indeed norma; it is the first member in the series of Christian writings, it stands closest to the source, i.e. the revelation in Christ, and thus had little danger of taking up impure constituent elements into itself. But all the writings of the evangelists and apostles, just like all subsequent Christian writings, have proceeded from one and the same Spirit, the Gemeingeist of the Christian church. The church is not built on Scripture, but Scripture has proceeded from the church. Through Schleiermacher these thoughts have become the common property of more recent theology. They seem so true and to speak so self-evidently, that no thought is given to any doubt or criticism. With almost all theologians one can find the representation that the church existed before Scripture and thus can also exist independently of it. The church rests in itself, it lives out of itself, i.e. out of the Spirit who dwells in it. Holy Scripture, in the beginning, in the freshness of its youth having proceeded from it, is indeed norma but no source. The source is the personal, living Christ, who dwells in the congregation; dogmatics is description of life, explication of the religious consciousness of the congregation, and in that has as guideline Scripture, which has interpreted that life of the congregation first and most clearly. The church is thus actually the Verfasserin der Bibel, and the Bible is the Reflex der

Gemeinde, Lange, Philos. Dogm. § 77. Rothe, Zur Dogm. 333 f. Frank, Syst. der chr. Gewissheit II 57 f. Philippi, Kirchl. Glaub. I3 190 f. Hofstede

de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 71 v. 97 v. Saussaye, mijne Theol. van d. l. S. 49 v. Gunning en de la Saussaye Jr. Het ethisch beginsel der theol. 34, enz.

All these ideas, of Rome, Anabaptism, mysticism, rationalism, of Lessing, Schleiermacher, etc., are most closely related to one another.

Schleiermacher in particular, by his reversal of the relation between Scripture and church, has offered Rome a powerful support. All agree in this, [384] that Scripture is not necessary but at most useful, and that the church can also exist from and through itself. The difference lies only in this, that Rome seeks the ground and the possibility for this continued existence of the Christian religion in the instituted church, i.e. in the infallible pope, Schleiermacher c. s. in the congregation as organism, i.e. in the religious community, and mysticism and rationalism in the religious individuals. All seek the continued existence of the church in the guidance of the H. Spirit, in the indwelling of Christ, but this has with Rome its organ in the pope, with Schleiermacher in the organism of the congregation, with Anabaptism in every believer head for head. It is easy to see that Rome here occupies the strongest position. For certainly, there is a guidance of the H.

Spirit in the congregation, Christ has risen from the dead, lives in heaven and dwells and works in his church on earth. There is a mystical union between Christ and his body. The word alone is insufficient, the principium externum also demands a principium internum. Protestantism knew all this very well and confessed it from the heart. But the question was this, whether the church for the conscious life of religion was bound to the word, to Scripture, or not. Religion is, after all, not only a matter of the heart, the feeling, the will, but also of the head. God must also be served and loved with the understanding. For the conscious life, therefore, the church must have a source from which it draws the truth. Now Rome, with its infallible

pope, can assert that Scripture is not necessary. The infallibility of the church indeed makes Scripture superfluous. But Protestantism has no infallible organ, neither in the institute nor in the organism nor in the individual members of the congregation. When it denies the necessity of Scripture, it weakens itself, strengthens Rome, and loses the truth, which is an indispensable element of religion. Therefore the Reformation insisted so strongly on the necessity of Holy Scripture. Scripture was the δος μοι που στω of the Reformation. It succeeded because, over against the authority of church, councils, and pope, it could set the authority of God's holy word.

Whoever abandons this standpoint of the Reformation works unconsciously at the building up of Rome. For if not Scripture but the church is necessary for knowledge of religious truth, then this becomes the indispensable [385] medium gratiae. The word loses its central place and retains only a preparatory, pedagogical significance. Scripture may be useful and good; necessary it is not, neither for the church as a whole nor for the believers in particular.

10. Although the Reformation thus sought its strength against Rome in Scripture and maintained its necessity, it nevertheless did not thereby deny that the church for centuries before Moses had existed without Scripture. It is also true that the church of the N. T. was founded by the preaching of the apostles and for a long time existed without a New-Testament canon.

Furthermore, the congregation is still always nourished and planted in the heathen world by the proclamation of the gospel. The books of the O. and N. T. have further arisen gradually; they were, before the art of printing, disseminated in small number; many believers in earlier and later time have died without ever having read and examined Scripture, and even now religious life seeks satisfaction for its needs not only in Scripture but at least

equally in all manner of edifying literature. All this can be acknowledged wholeheartedly, without thereby in the least doing any injustice to the necessity of Scripture. Indeed, God, if it had pleased Him, could very certainly have preserved the church in the truth in yet another way than by means of a written word. The necessity of Scripture is not absolute but ex hypothesi beneplacentiae Dei.

But thus understood, this necessity is nevertheless raised above all doubt.

Man has at all times lived only by the word that proceeds from the mouth of God, Mt. 4:4. The word of God has from the beginning been the seed of the church. Most certainly the church existed before Moses without Scripture.

But there was nevertheless a verbum ἀγραφον, before it became the ἐγγραφον. The church has never lived out of itself and rested in itself, but always by the word of God. Rome does not teach this either, but assumes a tradition that infallibly preserves the word of God. But this does indeed need to be stated over against those who allow revelation to consist only in life, in an inpouring of divine powers, in the awakening of religious emotions. The church may therefore be older than the written, but it is nevertheless younger than the spoken word, Zanchius, Op. VIII [386] 343 sq. Polanus, Synt. theol. I c. 15. Synopsis pur. theol., disp. 2. Gerhard, Loci theol. I cap. 1 § 5 sq. The common assertion that the church of the N. T. existed for a long time without Scripture must also be properly understood.

It is true that the canon of the N. T. writings was first generally recognized in the second half of the second century. But the Christian congregations had from the beginning the Old Testament. They have been founded by the spoken word of the apostles. Very soon many congregations came into possession of apostolic writings, which were also given to others for reading, soon served for reading aloud in the churches and very soon were

disseminated. It speaks for itself that, as long as the apostles lived and visited the congregations, no distinction was yet made between their spoken and written word; tradition and Scripture were, as it were, still one. But when the first period was past and the distance from the apostles became greater, the writings of the apostles rose in significance, and their necessity gradually increased. Indeed the necessitas S. Scripturae is also not a stable but an ever growing property. Scripture was not always in its entirety necessary for the whole church. Scripture has arisen and been completed gradually. As revelation progressed, it also increased in extent. Each period of the church had enough with that portion of Scripture that then existed, just as it had enough with the revelation that had occurred up to that point.

Scripture, like revelation, is an organic whole that has grown; in the seed the plant was included, in the germ the fruit was included. Both, revelation and Scripture, kept equal pace with the state of the church and conversely.

Therefore no conclusion can be drawn from the earlier conditions of the church for the present. Let the church before Moses have been without Scripture, let the church before the completion of revelation never have been in possession of the whole Scripture; from that nothing follows for that dispensation of the church in which we live, in which revelation has ended and Scripture has been completed. For this dispensation Scripture is not only useful and good, but also decidedly necessary ad esse ecclesiae.

11. Scripture, however, is the only adequate means to preserve the spoken word unadulterated and to make it the property of all [387] people. Vox audita perit, littera scripta manet. The shortness of life, the unfaithfulness of memory, the cunning of the heart, and all kinds of other dangers that threaten the purity of tradition, make the recording of the spoken word absolutely necessary for preservation and dissemination. With the word of

revelation this applies in an even heightened degree. For the gospel is not according to man, it stands in direct opposition to his thoughts and desires, it stands as divine truth over against his lie. Moreover, revelation is not intended for one generation and for one time, but is destined for all peoples and centuries. It must complete its course through the whole of humanity and until the end of times. The truth is one, Christianity is

Universalreligion. How can this destination of the word of revelation be attained otherwise than by its being recorded and written down? The church cannot perform this service of the word. Nowhere is its infallibility promised. Always it is referred in Scripture to the objective word, to the law and the testimony. Properly speaking, even Rome itself does not assert that.

The church i.e. the assembly of believers is not infallible in Rome, nor is the assembly of bishops, but only the pope. The declaration of the pope's infallibility is a proof for the Reformation thesis of the unreliability of tradition, of the fallibility of the church, and even of the necessity of Scripture. For this declaration of infallibility implies that the truth of the word of revelation is not preserved or cannot be preserved by the church as an assembly of believers, since this too is still subject to error, but that it can only be explained from a special assistance of the H. Spirit, in which, according to Roman assertion, the pope shares. Rome and the Reformation thus agree in this, that the word of revelation in and for the church can remain purely preserved only through the institution of the apostolate, i.e. through inspiration. And the dispute runs only about this, whether that apostolate has ceased or is continued in the pope. On the other hand, the assertion of the Vermittelungstheologie is wholly untenable, that Scripture has proceeded from the church and that it thus properly is the Verfasserin der Bibel. One can assert that only if one fails to recognize the proper office

of the prophets and apostles, identifies inspiration with regeneration [388] and wholly and entirely detaches Scripture from revelation. According to the doctrine of Scripture, however, inspiration is a special act of the H.

Spirit, a special gift to prophets and apostles, by which they have been able to hand down the word of God purely and unadulterated to the church of all centuries. Scripture has thus not proceeded from the church, but has been given to the church by a special activity of the H. Spirit in the prophets and apostles. Scripture belongs also to the revelation which has been bestowed by God upon his people. In this Rome and the Reformation are in agreement. But the Reformation maintains over against Rome, that that special activity of the H. Spirit has now ceased, i.e. that the apostolate no longer exists and is not continued in the pope. The apostles have set down their testimony concerning Christ fully and purely in the H. Scriptures.

Through these they have made the revelation of God the property of humanity. Scripture is the word of God that has completely entered into the world. It makes that word general and eternal, wrests it away from error and lie, from forgetfulness and perishability. In proportion as humanity becomes greater, life shorter, memory weaker, science more extensive, error more serious and the lie more brazen, the necessitas S. Scripturae increases. In every domain writing and the press gain in significance. The art of printing was a giant step toward heaven and toward hell. In this course of development the H. Scripture also shares. Its necessity comes to light ever more clearly. It is disseminated and made into common property as never before. Into hundreds of languages it is translated. It comes under everyone's eye and into everyone's hand. More and more it appears to be the suitable means to bring the truth to the knowledge of all people. That alongside this the religious literature remains for many the principal

nourishment for their spiritual life, proves nothing against the necessity of the H. Scripture. For all Christian truth is nevertheless drawn directly or indirectly from it. The derived brook also receives the water from the spring. It is an untenable assertion that even now something of Christian truth would come to us outside and without the H. Scripture. In the first century such a thing was possible, but now the streams of tradition and Scripture have long since flowed together and the first has long since been absorbed into the second. [389] Rome can maintain this only through its doctrine of the continuation of the apostolate and the infallibility of the pope. But for a Protestant this is impossible. The Christian character of the truth can be demonstrated solely and only by the fact that it is rooted with all its fibers in the H. Scripture. There is no knowledge of Christ except from Scripture, no communion with Him except through communion in the word of the apostles. Cf. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 1 sq. Zanchius, Op. VIII 343 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. I c. 15. Synopsis pur. theol., disp. 2.

Turretinus, Theol. El. loc. 2, qu. 1-3. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 25, 26 enz.

12. Even if the necessity of Scripture is acknowledged, there can nevertheless still be difference of opinion about the duration of that necessity. Even he who is of the opinion that Scripture has had its time often readily agrees that it, in its time, has been of great significance for the education of men and peoples. But in all manner of ways the duration of that necessity has been limited. Gnosticism acknowledged its necessity for the ψυχικοι but contested it for the πνευματικοι. Mysticism did indeed deem

Scripture necessary at the standpoint of cogitation and meditation, but no longer at that of contemplation and visio Dei. The rationalism of Lessing and Kant assigned to revelation, Scripture, the statutory Religion a

pedagogical place, in order that thereby the dominion of the Vernunftreligion might be prepared. Likewise Hegel judged that the form of intuition in religion was necessary for the people, but that the philosopher with his concepts no longer had any need of it. And time and again one hears it expressed that religion is good for the mass in order to keep them in check, but that the developed and the civilized are far exalted above that.

There lies in this conception an unmistakable and glorious truth.

Revelation, Scripture, the church, the whole Christian religion indeed bears a temporal, preparatory and pedagogical character. Just as the Old

Testament oeconomie of the foedus gratiae has passed away, so also this dispensation of the covenant of grace, in which we live, will once belong to the past. When Christ has gathered his church and has presented it to the Father as a pure bride, He hands over the [390] kingdom to God. Moreover, the duality of grace and nature, of revelation and reason, of authority and freedom, of theology and philosophy cannot be of eternal duration. The highest in religion after all consists in this, that we serve God without compulsion and without fear, out of love alone, according to the utterance of our own nature. It is God himself in his revelation who is concerned with forming human beings in whom his image is again fully restored. He granted us not only his Son but also the H. Spirit, in order that he would regenerate us, would write his law in our heart and would make us fit for every good work. Regeneration, sonship, sanctification, glorification are the proofs that God educates his children to freedom, to a service of love that never grieves. In so far the above-mentioned conceptions can be called an anticipation of the future ideal. But they are nevertheless of a very dangerous tendency. They all proceed from a confusion between the dispensation of the present and that of the hereafter. Because the new

Jerusalem will no longer need sun and moon, both nevertheless remain necessary here on earth. Because we shall one day walk in sight, faith nevertheless remains indispensable in this dispensation. Although the militant and the triumphant church is one, there nevertheless remains a distinction in the condition and life of both. The boundary line may and can not be erased. The heavenly life we never bring here on earth. We walk by faith and not by sight. We now see through a mirror in a dark saying; only hereafter shall we see face to face and know, as we are known. The visio

Dei is reserved for heaven. Independent, self-sufficient we never become on this earth. We remain bound to the cosmos that surrounds us. The standpoint of authority can never be overcome here on earth.

But furthermore this doctrine of the temporal necessity of Scripture digs a deep chasm between the psychic and the pneumatic men, between the civilized and the mass, between the philosophers and the people. And such a chasm has in no respect any right to exist. If religion consisted in knowledge, then the learned would enjoy a privilege above the undeveloped. But religiously all men are equal; they have the same needs.

In Christ there is no distinction [391] of Greek and barbarian. Religion is one for all men, however different they may be in estate, rank, development, etc. for for religion, i.e. before the face of God, all those distinctions of rank and privileges are worthless, by which one among men excels above others. The separation between those two kinds of men therefore also testifies to a spiritual pride, which itself is in direct conflict with the essence of the Christian religion, with the humility, the lowliness, etc., which it demands. The publicans go before the Pharisees, and the least is in the kingdom of heaven the greatest.

Next, there would still be something to be said for this separation, if rationalism were right and revelation consisted in nothing but Vernunftwahrheiten. For then these, although provisionally known from revelation, could later be derived by thought from reason itself. But revelation has a wholly different content than a rational doctrine. It is history, has grace as its content, the person of Christ as its centre, the recreation of humanity as its goal. All this can never be found by thought or derived from reason. In order to know such a revelation, Scripture remains necessary at all times. Even a revelation of God to every human being head by head would not be able to bestow what now the revelation in Christ through Scripture offers to all human beings. The historical character of revelation, the fact and the idea of the incarnation, and the organic view of the human race require a Scripture, in which the revelation of God is laid down for the whole of humanity (cf. blz. 299). Therefore it can now also be decided, what on bl. 143 was still left undecided, whether namely revelation comes individually to each human being or is given to all through Scripture.

Just as one sun with its rays illuminates the whole earth, so Christ is the rising from on high, who appears to those who sit in darkness and shadow of death, and so the one and the same Scripture is the light on everyone's path and the lamp for everyone's foot. It is the word of God to the whole of humanity. History itself bears a powerful testimony for this necessity of Scripture. The highly spiritual mysticism has repeatedly turned over into the most vulgar rationalism; and the enthusiastic spiritualism has often ended in the coarsest materialism. [392] The necessitas S. Scripturae is proved negatively just as strongly from the movements that combat it, as positively from the churches that confess it.

D. The clarity of Scripture.

13. Another important property which the Reformation, over against Rome, ascribed to Scripture, was the perspicuitas. According to Rome, Scripture is obscure, Ps. 119:34, 68; Luk. 24:27; Hd. 8:30; 2 Petr. 3:16. Also in those matters which have reference to faith and life, it is not so clear that it can dispense with interpretation. For it treats of the deepest mysteries, of God, the Trinity, the incarnation, predestination, etc., and is even in the moral precepts e.g. Mt. 5:34, 40, 10:27; Luk. 12:33, 14:33 many times so unclear that misunderstanding and misconstrual has occurred at every moment in the christ. church. For a right understanding of Scripture, all manner of knowledge is also necessary of history, geography, chronology, archaeology, languages, etc., which is unattainable for the laity. The Protestants themselves therefore also write countless commentaries and, in the most important texts, diverge from one another in exegesis. Therefore an interpretation of Holy Scripture is necessary. This cannot be given by Scripture itself; Scripture cannot be its own interpreter. Already Plato,

Phaedrus p. 274 said that the letter is mishandled and cannot help itself, and that it needs the help of its father. It is mute and cannot give a decision in a dispute. It is like the law, according to which the judge renders judgment, but it is not law and judge at the same time. The learned Jesuit Jakob

Gretser made a deep impression at the religious colloquy at Regensburg 1601, when he spoke thus: Sumus in conspectu sacrae Scripturae et Spiritus

Sancti. Pronuntiet sententiam. Et si dicat: tu Gretsere male sentis, cecidisti causa tua, tu Jacobe Heilbrunnere vicisti; tunc ego statim transibo ad vestrum scamnum. Adsit, adsit, adsit et condemnet me! Thus there must be

an interpreter and a judge, who gives decision according to Scripture. If there is no such judge, then the interpretation becomes wholly subjective; each judges according to his pleasure and holds his own individual conception to be infallible. Every heretic has his letter. Everyone seeks, according to the well-known distich of Werenfels, [393] in Scripture precisely his dogmata. Scripture is delivered over to all manner of arbitrariness. Individualism, enthusiasm, rationalism, endless division is the outcome. And what is the worst, if there is no infallible interpretation, then there is also no absolute certainty of faith; the foundation on which the Christian's hope rests is then pious opinion, scientific insight, but no divine, infallible testimony. And so far is it from the case that someone can form for himself from Holy Scripture a personal conviction or doctrine, that also the Protestants in fact just as well as the Roman Catholics live from tradition and rely on the authority of church, synods, fathers, writers, etc.

Such an infallible, divine interpretation of Scripture has, however, been bestowed by God in his church. Not the dead, uncomprehended, obscure

Scripture, left to itself, but the church, the living, ever-present, always renewing itself by the Spirit, is the mediatrix of truth and the infallible interpreter of Holy Scripture. For everyone is the best interpreter of his own word. The true interpreter of Scripture is therefore the Holy Spirit, who is its author. And this one has his infallible organ in the church, or better still, in the pope. The church is, through tradition, in possession of the truth; it is led by that same Spirit who brought Scripture into being; it is akin to it; it alone can understand its sense; it is the pillar and ground of the truth. Thus it has also always been the practice. Moses, the priests, Christ, the apostles explained and decided for the congregation, Ex. 18; Deut. 17:9 v.; 2 Chr.

19:9 v.; Pred. 12:12; Hagg. 2:2; Mal. 2:7; Mt. 16:19, 18:17, 23:2; Luk.

22:32; Joh. 21:15 v.; Hd. 15:28; Gal. 2:2; 1 Cor. 12:8 v.; 2 Petr. 1:19; 1 Joh.

4:1, and popes and councils have followed that example. Therefore the Council of Trent in sess. 4 determined that no one may interpret Holy

Scripture contra eum sensum, quem tenuit et tenet sancta mater ecclesiae, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum Sanctarum, aut etiam contra unanimem consensum Patrum, and thereby bound exegesis not only negatively, as some Roman Catholics attempt to construe it, but very decidedly also positively. No one may give another exegesis than that which the church has given through her patres, councils, or popes. The professio fidei of Pius IV, in Denzinger, [394] Enchir. symb. et defin. n. 864 and the Vaticanum sess. 3 cap. 2 alin. 4 leave no doubt about this. But not only is, by this doctrine of the obscurity of Scripture, scientific exegesis subjected to the pope. Still more dependent and bound thereby is the layman. Scripture, on account of its obscurity, is not suitable reading for the laity. Without interpretation it is unintelligible for the people. Therefore the translating of Scripture into the vernacular and the reading of the Bible by the people, since the misuse that was made of it in the Middle Ages and later, has been more and more restricted by Rome. Reading of Scripture is not permitted to the laity except with permission of the ecclesiastical authority. The Protestant Bible societies have repeatedly been condemned by the Popes, and in the Encyclical of 8 Dec. 1864 placed on one and the same line with the socialist and communist associations, Denzinger, Enchir. n. 1566. And indeed the present pope in his Encyclical de studiis Sacrae

Scripturae recommends the study of Scripture, but not to the laity, Vincentius Lerinensis, Commonitorium cap. 3. Bellarminus, de verbo Dei, lib. III. M. Canus, Loci Theol. II cap. 6 sq. Perrone, Praelect. theol. IX 98

sq. Heinrich, Dogm. I 794 f. Möhler, Symbolik § 38 f. Jansen, Prael. theol. I 771 s. Herzog2 art. Bibellesen.

14. The doctrine of the perspicuitas S. Scr. has repeatedly been misunderstood and incorrectly represented, both by Protestants and by Roman Catholics. It does not imply that the matters and subjects of which Scripture treats are not mysteries, which far surpass the human understanding. Nor does it assert that Holy Scripture is clear in all its parts, so that no scientific exegesis would be necessary. And it likewise does not mean that Holy Scripture, also in the doctrine of salvation, is plain and clear for every human being without distinction. But it includes only this, that that truth, the knowledge of which is necessary for everyone unto salvation, is not on every page of Holy Scripture equally plain, but nevertheless throughout the whole of Scripture is presented in so simple and comprehensible a form, that someone, to whom the salvation of his soul is the concern, can easily, by his own reading and investigation, learn to know that truth from Scripture, without help and guidance of church and priest.

The way of salvation is there, not [395] as regards the matter but as regards the modus tradendi, clearly set down for the salvation-desiring reader. The πως may he not understand, the ὁτι is nevertheless clear, Zwingli, De claritate et certitudine verbi Dei, Op. ed. Schuler et Schulthess I 65 sq.

Luther bij Köstlin, Luthers Theol. 2e Ausg. 1883 II 58 f. Zanchius, de Scr.

Sacra, Op. Omnia VIII 407 sq. Chamier, Panstratia catholica 1626 Loc. 1

Lib. I cap. 13-32. Amesius, Bellarminus Enervatus. Amst. 1630, lib. 1 cap.

4 en 5. Turretinus, Theol. El. loc. 2 qu. 17. Trigland, Antapologia cap. 3.

Synopsis pur. Theol. disp. 5. Gerhard, Loci Theol. Loc. 1 cap. 20 sq.

Glassius, Philologia Sacra 1691 p. 186 sq.

Thus understood, perspicuitas is a property which Holy Scripture repeatedly predicates of itself. The thora has been given by God to all

Israel, and Moses conveys all the words of the Lord to the whole people.

The law and the word of the Lord is not far from any of them, but is a light on the path and a lamp for the foot, Deut. 30:11; Ps. 19:8, 9, 119:105, 130;

Spr. 6:23. The prophets address themselves, speaking and writing, to the whole people, Jes. 1:10 v., 5:3 v., 9:1, 40:1 v.; Jer. 2:4, 4:1, 10:1; Ezech. 3:1.

Jesus speaks openly to all the crowds, Mt. 5:1, 13:1, 2, 26:55, etc. and the apostles write to all the called saints, Rom. 1:7; 1 Cor. 1:2; 2 Cor. 1:1 etc., and themselves provide for the dissemination of their letters, Col. 4:16. The written word is recommended to all for examination, Joh. 5:39; Hd. 17:11 and is precisely written in order to bestow faith, patience, hope, consolation, doctrine, etc., Joh. 20:31; Rom. 15:4; 2 Tim. 3:16; 1 Joh. 1:1 v. Of a withholding of Scripture from the laity there is nowhere any mention. The believers are themselves of age and able to judge, 1 Cor. 2:15, 10:15; 1 Joh.

2:20; 1 Petr. 2:9. The words of God are entrusted to them, Rom. 3:2. The church fathers therefore also know nothing of the obscurity of Scripture in the later Roman sense. To be sure, they often speak of the depths and mysteries of Holy Scripture, cf. passages in Bellarm. de verbo Dei III c. 1.; but they just as often extol its clarity and simplicity. Thus Chrysostom says, hom. 3 de Lazaro, when he compares the writings of the prophets and apostles with those of the philosophers: Οἱ δε ἀποστολοι και οἱ προφηται τοὐναντιον ἁπαν ἐποιησαν· σαφη γαρ και δηλα τα παρ' αὐτων [396] κατεστησαν ἁπασιν, ἁτε κοινοι της οἰκουμενης ὀντες διδασκαλοι, ἱνα ἑκαστος και δι' ἑαυτου μανθανειν δυνηται ἐκ της ἀναγνωσεως μονης τα λεγομενα. And elsewhere, hom. 3 in 2 Thess. he says: παντα σαφη και εὐθεα τα παρα ταις θειαις γραφαις, παντα τα ἀναγκαια δηλα. Likewise we

read in Augustine, de doctr. chr. 2, 6: nothing is drawn from those obscurities which is not found said elsewhere most fully, and ibid. 9: in those things which are clearly handed down in the scriptures, all things are found which contain faith and morals of living. Also well known is the word of Gregory I, in which he compares Scripture to a fluvius planus et altus, in quo et agnus ambulet et elephas natet. Even now Roman theologians must still acknowledge that much in Holy Scripture is so clear that the believer can not only understand it, but also the unbeliever, rejecting the clear sense, is inexcusable, Heinrich, Dogm. I 819. The church fathers therefore also did not think of forbidding the reading of Scripture to the laity. On the contrary, they repeatedly urge examination of the Holy

Scriptures, and relate the blessing which they themselves received from the reading, Vigouroux, Les livres saints et la critique rationaliste, 3 ed. I 280 s.

Gregory I still recommended the reading of Scripture to all laymen, Herzog2 2, 376. The restriction of Bible reading arose only when, since the twelfth century, various sects began to appeal to Scripture against the church. The opinion then gained entrance that the Bible reading of the laity was the principal source of heresy. In self-defense Rome then, more and more, taught the obscurity of Scripture and bound its reading to the permission of the ecclesiastical authority.

15. Indeed, the churches of the Reformation over against Rome have no more powerful weapon than Scripture. It deals the deadliest blows to ecclesiastical tradition and hierarchy. The doctrine of the perspicuitas S.

Scr. is one of the firmest bulwarks of the Reformation. It most certainly brings its serious dangers with it. Protestantism is hopelessly divided by it.

Individualism has developed at the expense of the sense of community. The free reading and investigation of Scripture is and is being misused in the

most shocking way by all kinds of parties and directions. But still the disadvantages do not outweigh the advantages [397]. For the denial of the clarity of Scripture entails the subjection of the layman to the priest, of the conscience to the church. With the perspicuitas S. Scr. falls the freedom of religion and conscience, of church and theology. It alone is able to maintain the freedom of the Christian man; it is origin and guarantee of the religious and also of the political freedoms, Stahl, Der Protest. als polit. Princip. 2e

Aufl. 1853. Saussaye, Het Protest. als politiek beginsel, Rott. 1871. Kuyper, Het Calvinisme, oorsprong en waarborg onzer constitutioneele vrijheden,

Amst. 1874. And a freedom that cannot be obtained and possessed otherwise than with the danger of licentiousness and arbitrariness, is always still to be preferred above a tyranny that suppresses all freedom. God himself, at the creation of man, chose this way of freedom, which brought with it the danger and in reality also the fact of sin, above that of forced submission. And still He follows in the government of world and church this royal way of freedom. That is precisely His honor, that He nevertheless through freedom reaches His goal, creates order out of disorder, light out of darkness, cosmos out of chaos. Both, Rome and the Reformation, agree in this, that the H. Spirit alone is the true interpreter of the word, Mt. 7:15,

16:17; Joh. 6:44, 10:3; 1 Cor. 2:12, 15, 10:15; Phil. 1:10, 3:13; Hebr. 5:14; 1 Joh. 4:1. But Rome thinks that the H. Spirit teaches infallibly only through the pope; the Reformation believes that the H. Spirit dwells in the heart of every believer; every child of God has the anointing of the Holy One. It therefore gives Scripture into everyone's hand, translates and disseminates it and uses in the church no other than the vernacular. Rome boasts of her unity, but this unity seems greater than it is. The splitting of the Reformation into a Lutheran and Reformed has its analogy in the schism of

the Greek and Latin church. Under the appearance of an external unity there is hidden in Rome an almost equally great internal division. The number of unbelievers and indifferent persons is not smaller in Roman countries than in Protestant. Rome has been no more able to stem the stream of unbelief than the churches of the Reformation. Already before the Reformation unbelief had spread in wide circles, e.g. in Italy. The Reformation did not call this forth [398], but rather checked it and roused Rome itself to vigilance and combat. Cartesius, the father of rationalism, was Roman. The German rationalists are counterbalanced by the French materialists;

Rousseau by Voltaire, Strauss by Renan. The Revolution has struck its deepest roots and borne its most bitter fruits in Roman countries.

Furthermore, it remains to be seen whether the number of parties, directions, and sects that repeatedly arise would not be just as great in Rome as in Protestantism, if Rome did not have the power and the courage to suppress every direction by censorship, ban, interdict, if need be by the sword. It is truly not thanks to Rome that so many flourishing Christian churches have arisen alongside her. Whatever shadow-sides the division of Protestantism also has, it nevertheless also proves that religious life here is a power that repeatedly creates new forms for itself and, amid all diversity, nevertheless also reveals a deeper unity again. And in any case,

Protestantism with its division is to be preferred above the dreadful superstition in which the people in the Greek and in the Roman church are becoming more and more entangled. Marian service, veneration of relics, image-worship, adoration of saints increasingly displace the service of the one, true God. Cf. Trede, Das Heidenthum in der römischen Kirche, Gotha,

Perthes, 4 Theile 1889-92.

16. Because of this perspicuitas, Scripture also has the facultas se ipsam interpretandi and is se supremus judex controversiarum, Synopsis pur. theol. disp. 5 § 20 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. Lib. I c. 45. Turret. Theol. El.

Loc. II qu. 20. Amesius, Bellarm. enervatus Lib. I c. 5. Cloppenburg, De Canone Theol. disp. 11-15. Op. II 64 sq. Moor, Comm. in Markii Comp. I 429 sq. Gerhard, Loci Theol. Loc. I c. 21, 22. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth.

K. 6e Aufl. S. 42 f. Scripture interprets itself, the obscure passages are explained by the clear, and the fundamental thoughts of Scripture as a whole serve to elucidate the parts. That was the interpretatio secundum analogiam fidei, which was also advocated by the Reformed. The Reformers too did not come to Scripture voraussetzungslos. They adopted the doctrine of Scripture, the apostolic creed, the decisions of the first councils almost without criticism. [399] They were not revolutionary and did not want to begin from the start, but protested only against the errors that had crept in. The Reformation was not the liberation of the natural man, but of the Christian man. There was therefore from the beginning among the Reformers an analogia fidei, in which they themselves stood, and according to which they interpreted Scripture. Under that analogia fidei they originally understood the sense derived from the clear passages of Holy Scripture itself, which was then later set down in the confessions,

Voetius Disp. V 9 sq. 419 sq. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. I 436. VI praefatio. Turret., Theol. El. I qu. 19. Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. I 217 f. Zöckler,

Handbuch I 663 f. Luz, Hermeneutik 154-176. In connection with that, the church also had a calling with respect to the interpretation of Holy

Scripture. By virtue of the potestas doctrinae, granted to her by Christ, and the gift of interpretation, bestowed on her by the Holy Spirit, 1 Cor. 14:3,

29; Rom. 12:6; Ef. 4:11 v. the church has the duty, not only to preserve

Scripture, but also to interpret and defend it, and to formulate the truth in her confession and to detect and resist errors. The church too is thus within her circle and on her terrain judex controversiarum, and has to test every opinion by and to judge it according to Holy Scripture. She need not be infallible for that, for the judge in the state too is indeed bound to the law, but is fallible in his pronouncements. And so it is also in the church.

Scripture is norma, the church is judge. But here too there is a higher appeal. Rome denies this and says that the pronouncement of the church is the last and highest. From it even an appeal to the divine judgment is no longer possible. She binds in the conscience. But the Reformation maintained that a church, however venerable, could nevertheless err. Her interpretation is not magisterialis, but ministerialis. She can bind in the conscience only insofar as someone acknowledges her as divine and infallible. Whether she indeed corresponds with God's word, no earthly power can determine, but each can determine only for himself, Synopsis pur. theol. 5, 25 sq. The church can then cast someone out as a heretic, but he stands and falls in the end his own lord. The simplest believer can and may, with Scripture in hand, if need be oppose an entire church, as Luther did against Rome. Only thus is the freedom of the Christian, and at the same time the sovereignty [400] of God, maintained. From Scripture there is no higher appeal. It is the highest court. No power or pronouncement stands above it. It is that which in the end, for each in his conscience, decides. And therefore it is judex supremus controversiarum.

E. The sufficiency of Scripture.

17. Finally, by the Reformation there was also confessed the perfectio or sufficientia S. Scripturae. The Roman church thinks that Scripture is imperfect in partibus and must be supplemented by tradition. It declared at Trent, sess. 4, that it traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo vel a Sp. So. dictatas et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu et reverentia suscipit et veneratur, and stated in the Vatic. sess. 3 cap. 2, that supernatural revelation is contained in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, quae ipsius Christi ore ab Apostolis acceptae, aut ab ipsis

Apostolis Spiritu Sancto dictante quasi per manus traditae ad nos usque pervenerant. The grounds which Rome adduces for this doctrine of tradition are various. First it is pointed out that the church before Moses was entirely without Scripture and that also after that time until today many believers live and die without ever reading or investigating Scripture. By far the most children of God live from tradition and know little or nothing of Scripture.

It would also be strange if this were different in the religious and ecclesiastical sphere than in every other domain. For, in law and custom, in art and science, in family and society tradition is the bearer and the nourisher of our life. Through it we are connected to the forefathers, take over their treasures and also leave them behind again to our children. The analogy already demands that there also be a tradition in the church; but this must here be so much more glorious and more certain than elsewhere, because Christ has given the Holy Spirit to his church and through him leads his congregation infallibly in all truth, Mt. 16:18, 28:20; Joh. 14:16. In addition there come still many statements of Scripture which acknowledge the right and the value of tradition, Joh. 16:12, 20:30, 21:25; Hd. 1:3; 1 Cor.

11:2, 23; 2 Thess. 2:14; 1 Tim. 6:20; 2 Joh. 12; 3 Joh. 13, 14. Jesus has

orally and through [401] his Spirit taught his disciples still many things, which have not been described by them but have been propagated from mouth to mouth. Church fathers, councils, popes have also recognized such an apostolic tradition from the beginning. In fact the church still always lives from and out of this oral, living tradition. Scripture alone is insufficient. For apart from the fact that by no means everything has been recorded, various writings of prophets and apostles have also been lost. The apostles did indeed receive a command to bear witness, but not to do that in writing. They came to writing only through the circumstances, necessitate quadam coacti; their writings are therefore also mostly occasional writings, and contain by no means everything that is needed for the doctrine and the life of the church. Thus we find in Scripture little or nothing of the baptism of women, the Sunday celebration, the episcopate, the sevenfold sacraments, purgatory, the immaculate conception of Mary, the salvation of many Heathens in the days of the O. T., the inspiration and canonicity of the various Bible books etc.; yes, even dogmata such as of the Trinity, the eternal generation, the procession of the H. G., infant baptism etc. are not literally and in so many words to be found in Scripture. In one word:

Scripture is useful, but tradition is necessary, Bellarminus, de Verbo Dei, lib. IV. Melchior Canus, Loci theol. lib. 3. Perrone, Praelect. Theol. IX 228 sq. Klee, Dogm. I 277 f. Heinrich, Dogm. Theol. II S. 1 f. Jansen, Praelect. theol. dogm. I 788 sq. Möhler, Symbolik § 38 f. Kleutgen, Theol. der

Vorzeit 2e Aufl. I 72 f. Dieringer, Dogm. § 126. Liebermann, Instit. theol. I p. 448 sq. For the Greek church, Kattenbusch, Confessionskunde I 292.

18. Over against this Roman doctrine of tradition the Reformation set that of the perfection and sufficiency of Holy Scripture. The good right of this combating of Rome has been set in a clear light by the development of the

concept of tradition itself. The first Christian congregations were, just as even now the congregations among the Heathen, founded by the preached word. The doctrine and usages which they had received from the apostles or their companions propagated itself for a considerable time from mouth to mouth and from generation to generation. This concept of tradition was clear; it designated the [402] doctrine and usages which had been received from the apostles and were preserved and propagated in the churches. But in proportion as the distance became greater which separated the churches from the apostolic time, it became more and more difficult to determine whether something was really of apostolic origin. The African church therefore protested against the exaggerated value which, especially in the second half against Gnosticism, was attached to this tradition. Tertullianus, de virg. vel. c. 1 said: Dominus noster veritatem se, non consuetudinem cognominavit. Likewise Cyprianus, Epist. 74 over against the tradition to which the bishop of Rome appealed, set the texts Jes. 29:13; Mt. 15:9; 1

Tim. 6:3-5 and said: consuetudo sine veritate vetustas erroris est. Christ has not called himself custom but the truth. The former must yield to this.

Therefore it became necessary to define tradition more precisely and to state its characteristics. Vincentius Lerinensis found in his Commonitorium cap. 2 the criteria of an apostolic tradition in this, that something ubique, semper et ab omnibus creditum est. Hoc est etenim vere proprieque catholicum. At first the mark of tradition thus consisted in this, that it was of apostolic origin. Now there is added to it, that something in that case may be regarded as of apostolic origin, if it is truly general, catholic. The apostolicitas becomes knowable by the universitas, antiquitas and consensio. The Tridentinum, the Vaticanum and also the theologians, in the definition of tradition, attach themselves to these criteria of Vincentius. But

in substance there is deviation; the consequence led further. It was not maintainable that something was apostolic only when it was really always, everywhere and by all believed. Of what doctrine or of what usage could such an absolute catholicity be demonstrated? The three criteria have thus gradually been weakened. The church may indeed not declare something new to be dogma and must hold to the tradition, but the preservation of that tradition is not to be thought mechanically as of a treasure in the field, but organically as Mary preserved and pondered the words of the shepherds in her heart, Heinrich, II 12. A truth can thus very well earlier not have been believed, or not generally believed; it is nevertheless infallible apostolic tradition, when it is now only generally believed. The two criteria antiquitas and universitas are thus not copulative but distributive [403] marks of tradition; they are not both together and at the same time necessary, one of the two is enough. In fact, thereby the antiquitas has been sacrificed to the universitas. But also this latter is again limited. The question arose, who the organ for the preservation and for the recognition of tradition was. The church in general could not be this. Möhler, Symbolik, 6e Aufl. 357, did indeed still identify tradition with das fortwährend in den Herzen der

Gläubigen lebende Wort, but this answer was thought much more Protestant than Roman. The task, to preserve and to determine the doctrine, could and might not be assigned to the church in general, i.e. to the laity. In the church a distinction is to be made between the ecclesia audiens and docens. Both do indeed belong together, and are imperishable, but the first possesses only an infallibilitas passiva, i.e. it is only infallible in its believing, in that it and so long as it remains in connection with the ecclesia docens. But also this latter is again not the proper organ of doctrine. Gallicanism, the Oldepiscopal clergy and the Old Catholics have remained standing here, and

ascribe infallibility to the bishops collectively. But this standpoint is untenable. When are those bishops infallible? Outside of, or only in, the council? If the latter, are they only infallible if they are unanimous, or is only the majority infallible? How great must this be? Is one vote of majority sufficient? Is the council without, and even over against, or only in agreement with the pope infallible? All questions with which Gallicanism was in serious embarrassment. The papal system therefore went a step further and ascribed infallibility to the pope. This primacy of the pope is the product of a development of many centuries, the consequence of a direction of mind which was already very early present in the church. Gradually the pope has been regarded as the infallible organ of divine truth and thus also of tradition. Bellarminus, de Verbo Dei, lib. 4 c. 9 included among the marks of tradition also this rule: id sine dubio credendum esse, ex apostolica traditione descendere, quod pro tali habetur in illis ecclesiis, ubi est integra et continuata successio ab Apostolis. Now there were, he says further, in antiquity many such churches besides Rome. At present, however, it is only left in Rome. And therefore ex testimonio hujus solius ecclesiae [404] a certain argument can be taken to prove Apostolic traditions. The church of Rome determines and decides what apostolic tradition is. Later theologians, especially among the Jesuits, have developed this further. And on 18 July 1870, in the fourth session of the Vatican council, infallibility was openly proclaimed as dogma. Now it is indeed certain that the pope in this his infallibility is not thought apart from the church, especially not from the ecclesia docens. Further, the symbols, decrees, liturgies, patres, doctores and the whole history of the church are so many monuments of tradition, to which the pope, in the determination of a dogma, attaches himself and with which he has to take account. But

nevertheless tradition is formally not identical with the content of all those monuments. Tradition is infallible; but what tradition is, is in the last instance decided only by the pope, with, without, or if need be against the church and the councils. The assessment whether and to what extent something semper, ubique et ab omnibus has been believed cannot rest with the church, neither with the ecclesia audiens nor with the ecclesia docens, but rests of itself only with the infallible pope. If the pope proclaims a dogma, then it is eo ipso apostolic tradition. The criterion of tradition has thus successively been sought, in apostolicity, in catholicity, in episcopal succession, in papal decision. Therewith the end has been reached. The infallible pope is the principium formale of Romanism. Roma locuta, res finita. Pope and church, pope and Christianity are one. Ubi Papa, ibi ecclesia, ibi religio Christiana, ibi Spiritus. From the pope there is no higher appeal, not even to God. Through the pope God himself speaks to humanity,

Perrone I 229, IX 279. Jansen I 804, 822 s. 829. Heinrich I 726 note, II 148 f. 537. Maistre, du Pape, Oeuvres Choisies de Joseph de Maistre III, Paris z. j. 71.

This outcome of the course of development of tradition demonstrates the falsity of the principle that was at work in it from the beginning. The infallibility of the pope can only later, in the doctrine of the church, be treated at length. But it is clear that the good and true element, for the sake of which in the first centuries it was a matter of maintaining tradition, has been entirely lost. Then it was a matter of preserving that which, by virtue of apostolic institution, was believed and customary in the congregations. It was self-evident that one [405] then attached great weight to tradition and did not yet see the indispensability and necessity of the apostolic writings.

But the mark of apostolicity, which then of itself was proper to tradition,

had to disappear when one became further removed from the apostolic time.

The relative independence of tradition alongside Scripture disappeared more and more. The streams of Scripture and tradition flowed together. And soon after the death of the apostles and their contemporaries it became impossible to demonstrate anything as of apostolic origin otherwise than by an appeal to the apostolic writings. Of no single dogma that the Roman church confesses outside of and without Scripture is the apostolic origin to be proven. The doctrine of tradition at Rome serves only to justify the deviations from Scripture and from the apostles. Veneration of Mary, the sevenfold number of sacraments, papal infallibility, etc., those are the dogmas which cannot do without tradition. At an ill-chosen hour apostolic tradition has been identified with ecclesiastical customs and with papal decisions. Tradition is at Rome die gemeine Superstition, das Heidenthum,

Harnack D. G. III 559 noot.

19. In fact, by this doctrine of tradition the Scripture is deprived of all its authority and power. The Roman Catholics predicate infallibility of both,

Scripture and tradition (pope), but acknowledge that there nevertheless exists a great distinction between the two. In both, indeed, the cause of infallibility is sought in a special, supernatural operation of the H. Spirit; for Rome understands very well that the infallibility of tradition cannot be derived from the believers as such, from the power and the spirit of Christianity, which dwells and works in the believers. For there occur in the church and among the believers many errors, which often prevail for a long time and carry many along. The infallibility of the pope is therefore, just as much as that of Scripture, explained from an extraordinary operation of the H. Spirit on the basis of Mt. 16:18, 28:20; Joh. 14:16 v., 15:26, 16:12 v.

Concil. Vatic. sess. 3. But there is nevertheless a distinction. The activity of

the H. Spirit in the apostles consisted in revelation and inspiration: that in the pope consists in assistance. The Vaticanum cap. 4 says: neque enim

Petri successoribus [406] Spiritus Sanctus promissus est, ut eo revelante novam doctrinam patefacerent, sed ut eo assistente, traditam per Apostolos revelationem seu fidei depositum sancte custodirent et fideliter exponerent.

Scripture is therefore the word of God in the proper sense, inspired, at least according to many theologians, even down to the singula verba; the decisions of councils and popes are words of the church, which purely reproduce the truth of God. Scripture is the word of God, tradition contains the word of God. Scripture preserves the words of the apostles in their original form, tradition reproduces the doctrine of the apostles only as regards the substance. The books of the prophets and apostles are often written without investigation, only from revelation; but with the assistentia divina, promised to the church, the persons are always themselves active, investigate, deliberate, judge, decide. With inspiration the activity of the Spirit was in the strict sense supranatural, but with assistance it often consists in a complex of cares of Providence, by which the church is preserved from error. And finally, inspiration in Scripture extends to all matters, also of history, chronology, etc., but by the assistance of the H. G. the pope is infallible only when he speaks ex cathedra, i.e. as Pastor and Doctor of Christendom, and when he doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa ecclesia tenendam definit. Scripture thus has at Rome still some praerogatives above tradition, Bellarminus, de Conciliis et Ecclesia, lib. 2 c.

12. Heinrich, I 726 f. II 220-245. Jansen, I 616.

But in fact tradition does great detriment to Scripture. In the first place Trent determines that Scripture and tradition must be venerated pari pietatis affectu et reverentia. Subsequently the inspiration of Holy Scripture is by

most Roman theologians conceived as an inspiratio realis, so that not the singula verba but the things have been inspired. Further, infallibility quoad formam and quoad substantiam are so closely connected the one with the other, that the boundary line between both cannot be drawn. Further, the pope in the strict sense is infallible only in matters of faith and life, but in order to be able to be this, he must also be so in the judgment concerning the sources of faith and in interpretation, i.e. in the determination of what

Scripture and tradition is, in the determination of the authority of the church fathers, of the councils etc.; in the judgment concerning the errors and heresies and even of the [407] facta dogmatica, in the prohibition of books, in matters of discipline, in approbation of orders, in canonization of saints etc. Heinrich, II 557 f. And even if the pope is not in all the other things in the strict sense infallible, his power and authority nevertheless also extends over all things, quae ad disciplinam et regimen ecclesiae pertinent, and this potestas is plena and suprema and extends over all pastores and fideles,

Conc. Vatic. cap. 3. Indeed by many Romanists it is demanded that the pope, in order to be able to exercise this spiritual sovereignty, must be a temporal prince; and it is asserted that he, if not directly, yet indirectly possesses the summa potestas disponendi de rebus temporalibus omnium christianorum, Bellarm. de Romano Pontifice lib. 5. de Maistre, du Pape, livre 2. Jansen. I 651 sq. The power and authority of the pope goes far beyond that of Scripture. He stands above it, judges concerning its content and its meaning and establishes auctoritate sua the dogmata of doctrine and life. Scripture may be the principal means to point out the agreement of contemporary doctrine and tradition with the doctrine of the apostles; it may contain much which otherwise would not be known so well; it may be a divine instruction of doctrine, which surpasses all others, Heinrich, I 732 f.;

it is nevertheless always for Rome only an aid, which is useful but not necessary. The church existed before Scripture, and the church contains not a part but the full truth, Scripture however contains only a portion of doctrine. Scripture does indeed have need of tradition, the confirmation of the pope, but tradition not of Holy Scripture. Tradition is not a supplement of Scripture, but Scripture is a supplement of tradition. Scripture alone is insufficient, but tradition alone is indeed sufficient. Scripture rests on the church, but the church rests in itself, Heinrich, I 730 f.

20. The development of tradition into papal infallibility and the necessarily resulting degradation of Scripture already in itself proves the good right of the Reformation to rise up against tradition. However, it did not leave it at attack alone, but set over against the doctrine of Rome that of the perfectio or sufficientia Scripturae, Luther in Köstlin, Luthers Theol. 2e

Ausg. 1883 II 56 f. 246 f. Gerhard, Loci theol. loc. I c. 18. 19. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. § 9. Calv. Inst. [408] IV c. 10. Polanus, Synt. Theol.

I c. 46. 47. Zanchius, Op. VIII col. 369 sq. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 p. 8 sq. 22 sq. Chamier, Panstratia Cathol. Loc. 1 lib. 8 en 9. Amesius,

Bellarminus enervatus, Lib. I c. 6. Turret., Theol. El. loc. 2 qu. 16. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. p. 11 f. Holtzmann, Kanon und Tradition, Ludwigsb.

1859. A. W. Dieckhoff, Schrift und Tradition, Rostock 1870. J. L. Jacobi, Die kirchl. Lehre von der Tradition u. h. Schrift, 1 Abth. Berlin 1847. P.

Tschackert, Evang. Polemik gegen die röm. Kirche, Gotha 1885 § 23 f. Id. art. Tradition in Herzog2. Hase, Protest. Polemik, 5te Aufl. Leipzig 1891 S.

77 f. Harnack, Dogm. Gesch. III 593 f. 623 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 104 etc.

This property of Holy Scripture too must be well understood. It is not thereby asserted that all that was spoken or written by the prophets, by Christ, and by the apostles has been included in Scripture; for many

prophetic and apostolic writings have been lost, Num. 21:14; Jos. 10:13; 1 Kon. 4:33; 1 Chron. 29:29; 2 Chron. 9:29, 12:15; 1 Cor. 5:9; Col. 4:16; Phil.

3:1, and Jesus and the apostles certainly spoke many more words and did signs than are described, Joh. 20:30; 1 Cor. 11:2, 14; 2 Thess. 2:5, 15, 3:6,

10; 2 Joh. 12; 3 Joh. 14 etc. Nor does this property imply that Holy Scripture contains all usages, ceremonies, provisions, and regulations which the church needs for her organization; but only that it contains the fidei articuli completely, the res necessariae ad salutem. And then this property also does not include that these articuli fidei are literally and with so many words, αὐτολεξει and totidem verbis, comprised in it, but only that they are contained in Scripture either explicite or implicite in such a way that, without the help of another source, they can be derived from it solely by comparative investigation and by reflection. And finally this perfectio S.

Scr. is not to be understood as if Holy Scripture has always been the same quoad gradum. In the different times of the church, Scripture, up to its completion, was unequal in extent. But in every time that word of God, which existed unwritten or written, was also sufficient for that time. The Reformation too made a distinction between a verbum ἀγραφον and ἐγγραφον, Ned. geloofsbel. art. 3. But Rome accepts both alongside each other, and holds them to be species of one genus; [409] the Reformation sees in this distinction only one and the same word of God, which first existed for a time unwritten and was thereafter recorded. The dispute between Rome and the Reformation therefore runs only over this, whether now, after Scripture has been completed, there still exists alongside it another word of God in unwritten form, in other words whether the written word of God explicite or implicite contains all that which we need to know for our salvation, and thus is regula totalis et adaequata fidei et morum, or

whether alongside it in religion and theology still another principium cognoscendi must be assumed. But thus posed, this question seems hardly any longer susceptible of a twofold answer. The Roman church too acknowledges that Scripture is completed, that it forms an organic whole, that the canon is closed. However highly it also esteemed tradition, it has nevertheless in theory not yet ventured to place the decisions of the church on one line with Scripture. It still makes a distinction between verbum Dei and verbum ecclesiae. But how can the insufficiency of Scripture ever be taught, so long as one is in earnest with the verbum Dei? Church fathers did not think of it and clearly express the complete sufficiency of Holy

Scripture. Irenaeus, adv. haer. III praef. and cap. 1 says that we know the truth through the apostles, per quos Evangelium pervenit ad nos, quod quidem tunc praeconaverunt, postea vero per Dei voluntatem in Scripturis nobis tradiderunt fundamentum et columnam fidei nostrae futuram.

Tertullianus, adv. Hermog. c. 22, de carne Chr. c. 8 admires the plenitudo Scripturae, and rejects everything quod extra Scripturam is. Augustinus,

Sermo de Past. c. 11 testifies: quidquid inde audieritis, hoc vobis bene sapiat; quidquid extra est respuite. And likewise many others speak, cf. the places collected by Chamier, Panstratia Cathol. Loc. I lib. 8 cap. 10.

Alongside that they very certainly also acknowledge tradition, but they take up into it precisely an element that undermines their conviction of the sufficiency of Scripture and has ended in the later Roman doctrine of the insufficientia S. Scr. and of the sufficientia traditionis. Both, Scripture and tradition, are not to be maintained alongside each other; what is withheld from the one is bestowed upon the other. Tradition can only rise if and insofar as Scripture declines. It is therefore also very strange that Rome on the one hand holds Scripture to be completed and the canon to be [410]

closed, indeed even recognizes Scripture as the word of God; and yet regards that Scripture as insufficient and supplements it with tradition.

Many Roman theologians today rightly say that Scripture is the not necessary but at most useful supplement of tradition.

21. But this doctrine is in direct conflict with Scripture itself. Never is the church in O. and N. T. referred to anything other than the word of God, always at hand, whether written or unwritten. Only by that can man live spiritually. In the Scripture always present the church finds all that it needs.

The following Scriptures presuppose the preceding, attach themselves to them, and are built upon them. The prophets and psalmists presuppose the thora. Isaiah in chap. 8:20 calls all to the law and the testimony. The N. T. regards itself as fulfilment of the Old, and points back to nothing other than the existing Scripture. Still more strongly speaks the fact that everything that lies outside Scripture is excluded as decisively as possible. Traditions are rejected as commandments of men, Jes. 29:13; Mt. 15:4, 9; 1 Cor. 4:6.

The tradition, which arose in the days of the O. Test., has led the Jews to rejection of the Christ. Jesus sets over against it his I say unto you, Mt. 5 and precisely again, over against the Pharisees and scribes, joins himself to the law and the prophets. The apostles appeal only to the O. T. Scripture and never refer the churches to anything other than the word of God, which has been proclaimed by them. In so far as tradition in the first time wished to be nothing other than preservation of what had been personally taught and instituted by the apostles, it also as yet bore no dangerous character. But from that the Roman tradition has degenerated altogether. It is unprovable that there is still any doctrine or any usage originating from the apostles, except in so far as this can be demonstrated from their writings. The tradition at Rome, from which the mass, the Mariolatry, the papal

infallibility etc. has proceeded, is nothing but the sanction of the factual condition of the Roman church, the justification of the superstition that has forced its way in within it.

From the sufficiency of Holy Scripture there further also follows from the nature of the N. T. dispensation. Christ has become flesh and has [411] accomplished all the work. He is the last and highest revelation of God. He has declared the Father to us, Joh. 1:18, 17:4, 6. Through Him God has spoken to us in the last days, Hebr. 1:1. He is the highest, the only prophet.

Even the Vatic. Council cap. 4 acknowledges that the assistentia divina, bestowed upon the pope, did not consist in revelatio and in revelation of a new doctrine. And Rome attempts to demonstrate its dogmata, however new, yet always as much as possible from Holy Scripture, and to present them as development and explication of what is present in germ in Scripture, Lombardus, Sent. III dist. 25. Thomas S. Theol. II 2 qu. 1 art. 7. qu. 174 art. 6. Schwane, Dogmengeschichte I 2e Aufl. 1892 S. 7 f. Heinrich

II 23 f. But by that it entangles itself in no small difficulty. For either the dogmata are all, in the same sense as e.g. the Trinity, the two natures of Christ, etc., explication of moments that are contained in Scripture, and in that case tradition is unnecessary and Scripture sufficient; or they are indeed new dogmata, which have no support in Scripture, and then the assistentia divina of the pope is indeed essentially a revelatio and revelation of new doctrine. This latter may then still be denied theoretically, but in practice it is nevertheless accepted. Therefore the Roman theologians after the Reformation are in general more liberal than before that time in the acknowledgment that some dogmata are grounded only in tradition. And therefore arguments are now adduced for tradition which formerly were not, or at least not in that sense and to that extent, employed. Now the

insufficiency of Scripture and the right of tradition are proved from this, that prophetic and apostolic writings have been lost, that Christ did not teach everything to his apostles, that the apostles also orally commanded much to the congregations, etc. But that writings have been lost, and whether they were inspired (Bellarm. de verbo Dei IV c. 4) or not (August. de civ. 18, 38), is of no consequence. For the question is only whether the Scripture at hand contains all that which it is necessary to know for our salvation; and not whether it contains all that prophets and apostles have written, and Christ himself has spoken and done. Even if writings of prophets and apostles were still found, they would no longer be able to serve as Holy Scripture. And so it stands also with the [412] instruction of Jesus and the apostles. They have spoken and done more than is described to us. Knowledge thereof would be historically important; but is religiously unnecessary. We have enough in Scripture for our salvation, and have no other writing, even if it had come from Jesus himself, any longer necessary.

That was the doctrine of the Reformation. Quantitatively the revelation has been much richer and greater than Scripture has preserved for us, but qualitatively, substantially Holy Scripture is perfectly sufficient for our salvation. Rome therefore also cannot name any other dogmata than those of Mariolatry, the infallibility of the pope and the like, which have arisen from tradition apart from Scripture; but all those which have reference to God, man, Christ, salvation, etc. are, according to Rome as well, to be found in Scripture itself. What witnesses then do we still need. The Roman tradition serves only to prove the specifically Roman dogmata, but the Christian, the catholic dogmata are, according to Rome itself, all grounded in Scripture. This fact too shows that Scripture is sufficient, and that the nature of the N. T. dispensation brings about and requires this sufficientia S.

Scr. Christ has revealed everything fully either personally and orally or also through his Spirit to the apostles. Through their word we believe in Christ and have fellowship with God, Joh. 17:20; 1 Joh. 1:3. The H. Spirit reveals no new doctrine any more; He takes it all from Christ, Joh. 16:14. In Christ the revelation of God is completed. And likewise the word of salvation is perfectly comprehended in Scripture. It forms one whole; it itself makes the impression of an organism that has reached its full maturity. It ends where it begins. It is a circle that returns again into itself. It begins with creation; it ends with the re-creation of heaven and earth. The canon of O. and N. T. was first closed when all new Ansätze der heilshistorie were present,

Hofmann, Weissagung u. Erfüllung I 47. The H. Spirit has no other task in this dispensation than to apply the work of Christ and likewise to explain the word of Christ. He adds nothing new to either. The work of Christ does not need to be supplemented by the good works of believers; the word of Christ does not need to be supplemented by the tradition of the church;

Christ himself does not need to be succeeded and replaced [413] by the pope. The Roman doctrine of tradition is the denial of the perfect incarnation of God in Christ, of the all-sufficiency of his sacrifice, of the perfection of his word. The history of the Roman church shows us the slowly continuing process, how a false principle insinuates itself and at first still places itself under Christ and his word, then places itself alongside it, soon raises itself above it, in order to end in a complete replacement of Scripture by tradition, of Christ by the pope, of the congregation by the institute. The development is certainly not yet at an end. It seems an anomaly that the pope, who gradually raised himself above Scripture, church, council, tradition, is appointed by fallible men, even if they are cardinals. Who can better than he, who himself is infallible, designate his

successor? Thus it is quite possible that papal sovereignty in the future will prove incompatible with the power of the cardinals. In any case the path of the deification of man by Rome has not yet been run to the end.

22. Yet by this all the good and true is not denied, which lies enclosed in the doctrine of tradition. The word tradition has a broader sense still than that which is given to it by Rome. Rome understands by it a doctrine which has been handed down by the apostles, is preserved by the bishops, specifically by the pope, and is determined and proclaimed by him; but this conception proved untenable. Tradition, however, can also be understood of that entire religious life, thinking, feeling, acting, which is found in every religious community and finds its expression in all kinds of forms, morals, customs, usages, religious language and literature, confession and liturgy etc. In this sense there is tradition in every religion. Indeed the concept can be extended still further to all those rich and manifold bonds which connect the following generations to the preceding. In this sense no family, no lineage, no society, no people, no art, no science etc. can exist without tradition. Tradition is the means by which all treasures and goods of the forefathers are transferred to the present and the future. Over against the individualism and atomism of the former century, the Bonald, Lamennais

[414] and others and Bilderdijk among us have again placed the significance of the community, the authority, the language, the tradition etc. in the clearest light. Such a tradition there is very certainly also in religion and in the church. Already the universality points to it, that we are not dealing here with an accidental phenomenon. We find tradition not only in the Roman church but also among the Jews, the Mohammedans, the Buddhists etc. In the higher religions there is added yet another reason for the necessity of tradition. They are all bound to a holy scripture, which

arose in a definite time and in that sense comes, the longer the more, to stand further away from the now living generation. The Bible too is a book, written in long bygone centuries and under all kinds of historical circumstances. The different books of the Bible bear the character of the time in which they arose. However clear Scripture then may be in the doctrine of salvation and however much it is and remains the viva vox Dei, cf. above p. 305, it nevertheless requires for right understanding many times all kinds of historical, archaeological, geographical knowledge. The times have changed, and with the times the people, their life and thinking and feeling. Therefore a tradition is needed, in order to preserve the connection between Scripture and the religious life of this time. Tradition in a good sense is the interpretation and application of the eternal truth in the speech and the life of the present generation. A Scripture without such a tradition is impossible. Many sects in earlier and later time have indeed attempted this.

They wanted to know of nothing but the words and letters of Scripture; rejected all dogmatic terminology that was not used in Scripture; disapproved all theological training and science, and sometimes came to demand literal application of the civil laws under Israel and of the precepts of the Sermon on the Mount. But all these directions thereby condemned themselves to a certain ruin or at least to a languishing life. They place themselves outside society and lack all influence upon its people and its age. Scripture is not there to be learned by heart from without and parroted but to enter into the full rich human life and to form it, to guide it, and to bring it to independent activity in every domain. The Reformation therefore also placed itself on another standpoint. It did not reject all tradition as such, it was [415] reformation, no revolution. It did not attempt to create everything anew, but indeed to cleanse everything of error and abuse

according to the rule of God's word. Therefore it remained standing on the broad Christian foundation of the apostolic symbol and the first councils.

Therefore it was for a theological science, which interpreted the truth of Scripture in thought in the language of the present. The difference in the conception of tradition between Rome and the Reformation consists in this:

Rome wants a tradition which runs independently alongside Scripture, a traditio juxta Scripturam or rather still a Scriptura juxta traditionem. The Reformation recognizes only such a tradition as is grounded on and flows forth from Scripture, traditio e Scriptura fluens, Moor, Comm. in Marckii

Comp. I 351. Scripture was, according to the thought of the Reformation, an organic principle, from which the whole tradition, living on in preaching, confession, liturgy, cultus, theology, religious literature etc., grew up and is nourished; a pure spring of living water, from which all brooks and channels of religious life are fed and maintained. Such a tradition is grounded in Scripture itself. When Jesus has completed his work, He sends the H. Spirit, who indeed adds nothing new to revelation, but nevertheless leads the church into the truth, Joh. 16 vs. 12-15, until through all diversity it comes to the unity of faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, Ef. 3 vs. 18, 19, 4:13. In this sense there is a good, true, glorious tradition. It is the way along which the H. Spirit causes the truth of Scripture to pass over into the consciousness and life of the church. Scripture is, after all, only means, no end. The end is that the church, instructed from Scripture, freely and independently proclaim the virtues of Him who has called it out of darkness into his marvellous light. The verbum externum is instrument, the verbum internum is end. Scripture has reached its destination, when all shall be taught by the Lord and filled with the H. Spirit.

CHAPTER III. Internal Principle.

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