8. § 8. Principles in Religion.

8. § 8. Principles in Religion.

§ 8. Principles in Religion.

A. Essence of religion.

. Just as science, religion also has its principia. In order to get to know these, it is first of all necessary to determine the essence of religion, especially also in distinction from science and art. The name religion gives little light. Cicero, de nat. deor. 2, 28, derives the word from relegere, to reread, to go over once more, to observe carefully, and thereby designates religion as a continual and zealous observing of all that pertains to the veneration of the gods, cf. de invent. 2, 22 and 53. Lactantius, Instit. divin.

4, 28, explains it from religare and thus understands by religion the bond that binds man to God. A third derivation, from relinquere, occurs in Gellius, Noct. Att. 4, 9, and indicates that all that belongs to religion, on account of its holiness, is set apart from the unholy. Augustine, de civ. Dei

10, 4, once connects it with re-eligere: in religion we choose God, whom

we had lost through sin, again back as the source of our salvation. J. C.

Leidenroth, Neue Jahrb. für Philologie und Pädagogik von Seebode, Jahn und Klotz 1834 S. 455, on that ground assumes that the three verba diligere, negligere and intelligere have a different perfectum than lego and its composita, a lost stem ligere, sanscr. lok, gr. λευσσειν, duitsch lugen, eng. look, cf. lucere, with the meaning of seeing; diligere would then mean to look upon with love, negligere not to see, intelligere to see into; and from that would then also religere, to look back, and religio, the looking around with fear, cf. respectus, have come. The derivation from religare, relinquere, re-eligere runs up against grammatical objection and also does not explain the peculiar meanings that religio possesses in Latin. Between the derivation of Cicero and of Leidenroth the dispute has not yet been decided; but materially both agree in this, that religio designates religion as an attitude of shy fear toward the Deity and as an anxiously-scrupulous observance, flowing from that, of what the cultus of the gods demands. Cf. the verse line in Figulus (Gellius, Noct. Att. 4, 9): religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas, H. [172] Voigt, Fundamentaldogmatik. Gotha, Perthes

1874 S. 9 f. F. A. B. Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. Freiburg, Mohr, 1889 S.

83. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 52 v. The word is thus absolutely not suitable to render the full content of the Christian religion. But usage and the derivation of Lactantius, which found general acceptance, have

Christianized the word. The Vulgate adopted it at Hand. 26:5, Jak. 1:27. The word has passed into all European languages, and has also in our language, alongside godsdienst, vroomheid (from the goth. fruma, lat. primus, stepping to the foreground, virtuous, brave, e.g. Stat. Vert. Gen. 42:11, etc.), godsvrucht, godzaligheid, obtained and retained civic right.

2. Holy Scripture gives no definition and also possesses no general concept to designate the phenomenon of religion. It has separate words for its objective and its subjective side. The religio objectiva is identical with the revelation of God, and consists in the covenant, ְבִרית, which God gave to Israel, and which therefore in the full sense may be called a divine institution, διαθηκη, Exod. 20:1 v., 34:10 v., 27 v.; Jes. 54:10, etc. The ordinances in that covenant, which Israel must observe, together form the content of the ּתֹוָרה, instruction, doctrine, law, lawbook of the Lord, and are designated by very different names. They are called ְּדָבִרים words Num.

12:6; Ps. 33:4, etc., ִמצֹות commandments, Gen. 26:5; Ex. 15:26, etc., ִפּקּוִדים commands, Ps. 119:4, 5, 15, etc.; ֻחִּקים statutes, decisions, Ex. 15:26; Lev.

25:18; Ps. 89:32; Job 28:26, etc.; ִמ ְׁש ָּפִטים lawsuit, judicial decision, Num.

36:13; Ps. 19:10, etc.; ְּדָרִכים‎, ‏ֳאָרחֹות ways, paths, Deut. 5:33; Job 21:14; Ps.

25:4; etc.; ִמ ְׁש ָמרֹות laws that are to be kept, Gen. 26:5; Lev. 18:30, etc. The many expressions indicate how in Israel's religion the objective, the ordinance of God, stands in the foreground. To that religio objectiva there now corresponds subjectively the ִיְרַאת יהוה, the fear of the Lord. This expresses the inner disposition of the pious Israelite toward the holy laws which have been prescribed to him by God to be observed. But this fear is nevertheless essentially distinct from the anxious timidity which originally lies enclosed in the Latin word religio. This is evident from the fact that this fear of the Lord passes over [173] into and is connected with all kinds of other religious dispositions, such as believing ֶהֱא ִמין Gen. 15:6; Jes. 7:9;

Hab. 2:4; trusting ָּבַטח Ps. 26:1, 37:3, 5; taking refuge ָחָסה Ps. 5:12, 37:40; leaning ְָסמּו, clinging fast 2 ָּדַבק Kon. 18:6; hoping ִקָּוה, expecting ִחָּכה, yes even loving God ָח ַׁשק Ex. 20:6; Deut. 6:5; Ps. 91:14. The rights of the Lord do not remain as an object of terror and fear standing outside and above the

Israelite, but become an object of his love. He ponders them with his understanding and practices them with his will. They are his delight the whole day. In the New Testament we encounter in substance the same conception. But now God gives his revelation not in a series of laws, but in the person of Christ. This one is the way and the truth, Joh. 14:6. The ὁδος του κυριου Hand. 18:25, 19:9, 23, 22:4; the διδαχη or διδασκαλια Mt. 7:28,

22:33; Joh. 7:16, 17; Hd. 2:42; Rom. 6:17; 1 Tim. 1:10, 4:6, 16, 6:1, 3; 2 Tim. 4:2, 3; Tit. 1:9, 2:1, 7, 10; the εὐαγγελιον Mk. 1:1, 14, 15, etc.; the λογος του θεου Mt. 13:19; Mk. 2:2, 4:14 v.; 2 Cor. 9:19, etc. all concentrate around Christ and are nothing other than explication of his person and work. Correspondingly, then, the subjective disposition also changes. The ordinary Greek words were not suitable to render this in its proper character. Δεισιδαιμονια is used by Festus of the Jewish Hd. 25:19, and the adjective by Paul of the heathen religion Hd. 17:22. Θεοσεβεια occurs only once 1 Tim. 2:10. Εὐσεβεια indicates holy reverence for God; it is in meaning related to the Latin pietas, and thus expresses a disposition such as is also present in children toward their parents etc.; this word occurs several times in the N. T., especially in the Pastoral Epistles; what the εὐσεβεια properly is and ought to be has first been revealed in the Gospel 1 Tim.

3:16. Fear also has not wholly departed from the religio subjectiva in the N.

T. Luk. 18:2; Hd. 9:31; 2 Cor. 5:11, 7:1; Rom. 3:18; Ef. 5:21; Phil. 2:12; 1 Petr. 1:17, 3:2, 3:15, but it nevertheless occurs much more rarely as a description of the religious disposition; in most passages it has reference to particular events, e.g. God's judgment, and has been replaced by love Rom.

8:15, 1 Joh. 4:18. The [174] ordinary word for the religio subjectiva in the N. T. is πιστις. To the glad message of forgiveness and of salvation in Christ there corresponds on man's side faith, which is a childlike trust in God's

grace and therefore also immediately works love in our heart. Πιστις and ἀγαπη are the fundamental dispositions of Christian piety. The words λατρεια Rom. 9:4, 12:1; Hebr. 9:1, 6 and θρησκεια Hd. 26:5; Col. 2:18; Jak.

1:27 designate the cultus which is rendered to God from the principle of faith. J. Köstlin, Die Religion in N. T. Stud. u. Kr. 1888 S. 7-102. Nitzsch t. a. p. 85.

3. Holy Scripture therefore gives no description of the essence of religion, as it, according to the modern conception, underlies all religions. But it delineates and describes as religion only that relation between God and man, which has been regulated and determined by God himself. Likewise, earlier theology, in determining the essence of religion, always proceeded from the religio vera. And this method still recommends itself by its correctness. It can only be contested by those who think that the categories of true and false do not apply to the religions, because no knowledge of the supernatural is possible, and that therefore the representations have absolutely nothing to do with the religious disposition. This indifferentism, however, as will appear later, is untenable; knowing too is an essential element of religion. Assuming for the moment that there is a knowledge of the supernatural and that there exists a religio vera; then no single objection is conceivable to deriving from it the definition for the essence of religion and to using this as a standard in the assessment of the other religions. No single religion can have anything against being tested by the pure concept of religion. The false is known only by the genuine, and the lie is discovered by the truth. In no single domain is a correct judgment and valuation of things possible without a fixed, positive standard. Thus it is in law, morality, aesthetics, and thus it is also in religion. The study of

religions presupposes that we at least know somewhat what religion is.

Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 184.

Following the example of Holy Scripture, in the investigation [175] into the essence of religion we have to distinguish between its objective and its subjective side. This distinction is obvious and is present in every religion.

The religio objectiva takes precedence. All people find it at their birth; they grow up in it just as in family, society, church, state, etc. These are all objective institutions and powers, which do not arise arbitrarily out of and by man, but which receive him at his birth, form and educate him, and even against his will continue to govern him his whole life long. It is in conflict with history and with psychology, to proceed, in determining the essence of religion, from the religio subjectiva and then in the different religions to see nothing but changing forms and indifferent expressions of its life. In that way daily experience is misrecognized, the power of the religio objectiva denied, and every relation of object and subject reversed in a revolutionary way. Very certainly the religio objectiva also has its origin, which must be sought out and explained. But all religions whose origin is known to some extent show us that they have arisen in connection with what already existed, and stand in the closest relation with the whole historical milieu.

There is not a single religion that is a pure expression of the religious disposition and can be explained from that alone. The religio subjectiva modifies and reshapes the existing religious representations and usages and often animates them with a new life. But it does not create; it itself always and everywhere arises under the influence and operation of the existing religions. Founders of religions therefore do not exist in the proper sense.

The religio objectiva is the hearth of the religio subjectiva, Hoekstra, Wijsg.

Godsd. I. 123. To that is added that all religions wish to be regarded, not as

expression and form of a religious disposition but as fruit of revelation.

They do not derive their origin from man but from God. Whether one may let this appeal to revelation count or not; the fact speaks too strongly and is too general for it not to have to be explained. It indicates that the concept of religion is inseparably connected with that of revelation. There is no religion without revelation. Revelation is the foundation and the origin of all religion. It is therefore not permitted to the man of science, already a priori to eliminate [176] this concept of revelation and in the religions to see nothing but forms of one and the same essence, expressions of one and the same religious disposition. Holy Scripture also derives the religio objectiva from revelation. God, having formerly spoken many times and in many ways to the fathers through the prophets, has in these last days spoken to us through the Son, Hebr. 1:1. Moreover, it also lies in the nature of the case that revelation and religion are most closely connected. God alone can determine the manner in which He wishes to be served by men. Hominum non est, instituere et formare Dei cultum, sed traditum a Deo recipere et custodire, Conf. Helv. II art. 19. According to the teaching of Holy

Scripture God has done that partly through nature, partly through his Word.

The religio objectiva thus coincides with the thora, taken in the broadest sense, i.e. with all that instruction of the Lord which comes to us from law and gospel, word and fact, history and prophecy. It is the main content of Holy Scripture and the material of dogmatics. The religio objectiva is nothing other than the manner in which God himself has determined that He wishes to be served and honored. Formally all religions agree. But the agreement extends still further. All religions are composed of some constituent parts that constantly recur. In the first place there is in every religion a tradition concerning its divine origin; every religion appeals to

revelation; that is the historical, the positive element, the element of tradition. Next there is in every religion a certain doctrine, in which God reveals to man that knowledge which is indispensable to his service; this is designated with the word dogma. Further, every religion also contains certain laws, which prescribe to man what he has to do and to refrain from in order to be able to live in communion with God; that is the moral teaching, which every religion brings with it. And finally there are in every religion also a greater or smaller number of ceremonies, i.e. of solemn forms and usages, which also outwardly express, accompany, and strengthen the communion of man with God: that is the cultic or liturgical constituent in religion. In the different religions the mutual relation of these constituent parts is very different; in some there is much dogma and little cultus and conversely; in others there is a rich tradition and a small number of moral prescriptions, etc. [177] But in all religions all four elements are present. The religio vera as well, laid down in Holy Scripture, has its history and dogma, its morality and its cultus, F. A. B. Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev.

Dogm. 1889 S. 101-108. H. Siebeck, Lehrb. der Religionsphilosophie, Freiburg, Mohr 1893 S. 263 f.

4. To that religio objectiva there corresponds in man the religio subjectiva.

Very common formerly was the description of religion as recta verum Deum cognoscendi et colendi ratio. It already occurs in Lactantius, Instit. div. 4,4, and has been retained down to this century. Yet it is not elevated above criticism. It says nothing concerning the subjective disposition, which is necessary for the serving of God; it does not indicate the connection that exists between the knowing and serving of God and simply places these alongside each other; and it makes no mention of the other elements that lie in religion. Scholasticism penetrated more deeply into the

matter and investigated the subjective disposition from which religion arises in man. Thomas reduces it to the virtues. These are divided by him into three kinds: virtutes intellectuales (sapientia, scientia, intellectus, etc), virtutes morales (the four cardinal virtues prudentia, justitia, fortitudo and temperantia), these two groups were borrowed from Aristotle. And to these were added as a third class the three supranatural or theological virtues faith, hope and love, Thomas, S. Theol. II 1 qu. 57, 58, 62. Religio is now by Thomas placed not under the virtutes theologicae but under the virtutes morales. For the theological virtues have this peculiarity, that they have

God as direct object; they ordinant nos ad Deum immediate et directe ut ad objectum, ib. II 1 qu. 62 art. 2; but in religion God is not objectum but finis, the proper object in religion is the cultus that is rendered to God. It is thus not a virtus theologica, which has God as object, but a virtus moralis, which is concerned circa ea, quae sunt ad finem; it ordinat hominem in Deum, non sicut in objectum, sed sicut in finem. Under the virtutes morales it is nevertheless the principal one, because it stands in the closest relation to Him who is the goal of all virtues, namely God, ib. II 2 qu. 81 art. 5, 6.

More precisely, religio is by Thomas reckoned among that virtus moralis which is called justitia. [178] He understands religio namely as that virtus, per quam homines Deo debitum cultum et reverentiam exhibent. Although in Jas. 1 v. 27 the visiting of orphans and widows etc. is also reckoned to religion, nevertheless religion in the proper and narrower sense is only a relation to God and never to men. And although everything must be done to the honor of God, the honor that is rendered to God in religion is nevertheless meant in a special sense and strictly speaking includes only that which has reference ad reverentiam Dei. It is thus one with the latreia,

S. Theol. II 2 qu. 81 art. 1-4. This definition of Thomas, which has been

adopted by very many, cf. C. R. Billuart, Summa S. Thomae — — sive Cursus Theologiae, Tom IV 1746 p. 5 sq. Petrus Dens, Theologia ad usum seminariorum IV p. 9 sq. P. Collet, Instit. Theol. moralis III p. 401 sq. etc., is however in the first place too narrow, because it describes only the cultus and thus coincides with latreia. The religio subjectiva is not only a service, a veneration, but first of all a disposition, which expresses itself in that service. Further, the distinction of virtutes morales and virtutes theologicae is too supranaturalistic and dualistic. There lies of course some truth in it, namely this, that also in fallen man there are still remnants of the image of God and moral virtues, even religion is not wholly eradicated. But the virtutes morales and also the religious disposition must be renewed and reborn, in order truly to be good. Thomas also recognizes, that the theological virtues, faith, hope, love causant actum religionis, quae operatur quaedam in ordine ad Deum, S. Th. II, 2 qu. 81 art. 5 ad 1, but they are nevertheless themselves excluded from religion; and while the virtutes intellectuales and morales are secundum naturam hominis, the virtutes theologicae are super naturam I, 2 qu. 62 art. 2. The Reformation has modified this conception of religion especially in a twofold respect. In the first place the theologians of the reformation make a better and clearer distinction between pietas as principle and cultus as actio of religion. And in the second place faith, hope and love are not placed as separate theological virtues alongside religion, but precisely as the principal acts of the cultus internus are included in religion itself. Religio, says Zwingli, Opera ed.

Schuler et Schulthess, III 155 includes pietatem totam Christianorum, fidem, vitam, leges, ritus, sacramenta; it consists [179] in ea adhaesio, qua

(homo) Deo utpote summo bono inconcusse fidit eoque parentis loco utitur, ib. 175, it is animae deique connubium, ib. 180. With Calvin we encounter

three concepts: 1o the notitia, the knowledge of God, the awareness of his virtues; 2o this notitia is idoneus pietatis magister; it cultivates pietas, which consists in conjuncta cum amore Dei reverentia, quam beneficiorum ejus notitia conciliat; and 3o it is this pietas again, ex qua religio, in the sense of cultus, nascitur, Inst. I. 2, 1. Likewise Zanchius, Op. IV 263 sq. distinguishes between cultus, which indicates the actio externa vel interna, qua Deum veneramur and the religio or pietas, which is the virtus from which the cultus is born. Polanus says, Synt. Theol. 580 A, religio differs from cultus Dei, ut causa ab effectu. Religio or pietas is causa interna cultus

Dei. The cultus, fruit of pietas, is then, just as with the scholastics, distinguished into internus and externus; the former has as principal acts fides, fiducia, spes, adoratio, dilectio, invocatio, gratiarum actio, sacrificium, obedientia; and the cultus externus is again either moralis

(confession, prayer etc.) or ceremonialis (sacramenta, sacrificia, sacra).

Zanchius IV 410 sq. Ursinus, Catech. qu. 94-103 and the explication thereof, also Tract. Theol. 1584 I p. 283 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 32 F.

Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. Lib. 9 cap. 6-8. Id. Summa Controv. p. 7 sq.

Alsted, Theol. Catech. p. 5 sq. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. I. 44 sq. For the Luth. one may compare Calovius, Isag. ad S. Theol. 1652 p. 301 sq.

Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. Kirche 6e Aufl. S. 5 f. Hase, Hutterus Rediv.

Loc. 1 § 2. Herzog2 12:645.

5. The religio subjectiva is first of all a ἑξις, habitus, a certain disposition in man, which through the operation of the religio objectiva passes over into actus (cultus inen externus). Such a habitus exists in every man; semen religionis omnibus inditum est, Calv. Inst. I. 4, 1. But this habitus in fallen man is corrupted and, fertilized by a false and impure religio objectiva, also produces a cultus, which is idololatreia, ἐθελοθρησκεια. Therefore, for a

pure religion it is necessary that, in the first place, the religio objectiva coming to us from without make us know God again as He really is, and that, in the second place, the corrupted habitus religionis in man be reborn and renewed. In this sense the religio subjectiva is thus a virtus [180] infusa a Spiritu Sancto, Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. II p. 207, 213. Yet with this not enough has been said. Man has many virtues, both in his understanding and in his will. The peculiarity of that virtus which works in religion must therefore be indicated more precisely. Formerly one defined this virtus as pietas, reverentia, timor, fides etc., and so also nowadays as reverence, awe, fear, feeling of dependence. Yet all these definitions are not determinate enough; all these affections we have in greater or lesser degree also with respect to creatures. There must be an essential distinction between the cultus religiosus and the cultus civilis, between λατρεια and δουλεια, between the affections of fear, reverence, awe etc. as we cherish these toward God and toward creatures. That distinction can lie only in this, that in religion there comes into consideration the absoluta dignitas et potestas

Dei and the absoluta subjectio on our side, Hoornbeek, Theol. pract. II 205 sq. Of creatures we are only in part dependent; we stand as creatures with them on an equal line; but God is a being on which we are absolutely dependent and which in every respect has the decision over our weal and our woe. Among the Heathen this absoluteness of God is indeed as it were distributed among many gods, but yet each god in his domain is endowed with such power that man for his happiness or unhappiness is absolutely dependent on him. It is especially Schleiermacher who in his Christ. Gl. § 4 defined religion as schlechthiniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl. Against this definition many objections have been raised, which are, inter alia, briefly reproduced by Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 70 v. Indeed this

definition in Schleiermacher has a sense which cannot be admitted. The dependence is by him conceived so pantheistically that it objectively has reference only to the world-whole and subjectively is limited to feeling. Yet there lies in Schleiermacher's definition an important element of truth.

What makes man into a religious being and drives him to religion is the consciousness that he stands to God in a relation which specifically differs from all other relations in which he is placed. This relation is so deep and tender, so rich and many-sided, that it can hardly be expressed by one concept. But certainly that of dependence is what comes into consideration for this the [181] first and the most. For in religion man feels himself in relation to a personal being who has his lot in every domain of life and for time and eternity in his hand. Therefore God in religion is not conceived exclusively as power; for also as Gracious, Merciful, Righteous, Holy etc.

God over against man nevertheless always stands as Sovereign, as Absolute, as God. And man over against Him always stands as creature; he is that over against no one and nothing else, he is that only over against God. And therefore this creaturely dependence is not the essence but yet the foundation of religion. Man, however, is not only creature, but also a rational and moral creature; his relation to God is therefore a wholly other one than that of angels and animals. The absolute dependence in which man stands to God therefore does not exclude freedom. He is dependent, but in another way than the other creatures; he is so and in that sense dependent, that he at the same time remains a rational and moral being, that he is akin to God, His offspring and His image. Absolutely dependent is he, so that the denial of this dependence never makes him free, and yet its recognition never degrades him into a slave. On the contrary, in the conscious, voluntary acceptance of this his dependence man comes to the highest

freedom. He becomes man in the same measure as he is a child of God.

Holy Scripture does not institute an investigation into the essence of the religio subjectiva, as it is still found in all men and under all religions. It would also be an unbegun work. For the religious disposition is in the manifold religions so different that at most a very general and vague concept can be indicated for it. Scripture, however, designates that religious disposition which the Christian feels toward God and His revelation with the name of faith. That is the central concept in the religio subjectiva of the Christian. Concerning the nature of that faith there has at all times been great difference in the Christian church. The religious life is so rich and deep that it can each time be considered from another side. But in faith there are nevertheless always these two elements enclosed, in the first place, that man over against God and His revelation is wholly receptive and absolutely dependent on God, and in the second place, that precisely by recognition of this [182] dependence he becomes partaker of forgiveness, of sonship, of salvation out of grace. Analogy of this religio subjectiva in Christianity there is certainly also in other religions, but only in the Christian religion is the subjective relation of man to God completely normal. Dependence and freedom are here reconciled with one another. The sovereignty of God remains here fully maintained and the kinship of man with God is nevertheless fully recognized. Man is the more religious and becomes the more conformed to the image of God, in proportion as he more deeply perceives and acknowledges his dependence. Therefore all virtues with respect to creatures can be exaggerated; but with respect to God no exaggeration is possible. One can never believe, trust, love Him etc. too much; never can faith expect too much, Voigt, Fundamentaldogmatik 65 f.

Aug. Dorner, Stud. u. Kr. 1883 S. 217 f. Kahnis, Die luth. Dogm. 2e Ausg.

1874 I 81 f. Abr. des Amorie van der Hoeven Jr. Religion the essence of man, Leeuwarden, 1848 p. 38 v.

6. Subjective religio passes, through the operation of objective religio, from its habitual state into acts. These acts are inward or outward, and thus make a distinction between the cultus internus and externus. Religio and cultus relate to each other as cause and effect. Yet it is not meant by this that cultus is a free invention and expression of subjective religion. All ἐθελοθρησκεια is forbidden, Mt. 15:9. Mk. 7:7. Col. 2:23. Both the antinomistic Anabaptism and the nomistic Romanism are to be avoided here. God alone determines how He wills to be served. And the regeneration of the religio subjectiva corrupted by sin, of the habitus religionis, consists precisely in this, that believers receive a sincere desire to live in perfection not only according to some but according to all the commandments of God. It is their food to do the will of the Father. Jesus never spoke or did anything except that for which He had received a command from the Father. Therefore Scripture lays such strong emphasis on walking in God's commandments, on keeping His statutes, etc. And to that end God regenerates man, in order to bring him, who is averse to His service, again in the inmost of his being into agreement [183] with His will and law, laid down in the religio objectiva. The cultus internus comprises the acts of faith, trust, fear, love, prayer, thanksgiving, etc., and the cultus externus manifests itself in confession, prayer, song, ministry of the word and of the sacraments, vow, fasting, watching, etc. This is therefore partly moral, partly ceremonial; and can again be solitarius and socius. In the latter case it is private or public; the communal, public cultus is regulated in the church orders. In all these religious actions the consciousness of absolute dependence is the religious fundamental thought, the animating

element. Detached from that they become letter-service, lip-work, cold and dead formalism. But animated by that, they all acquire their specific religious character. Creatures too are object of our faith, of our hope, of our love, etc. What stamps all these actions as religious is that they place us in relation to a Person, on whom we, with all things, in an absolute sense and yet again in a particular way, i.e. as rational creatures, are dependent. The essence of religion can after all lie in nothing else than in this, that God precisely as God is glorified and thanked. Every religion that falls short in this, detracts from the honour of God and in that same measure also ceases to be genuinely religious. On the other hand, true religion consists in such a disposition of man, which on the one hand is rooted in the deep consciousness of his absolute dependence on God as Creator, Redeemer,

Sanctifier, etc., and on the other hand extends itself to walk in sincerity according to all God's statutes.

B. Seat of religion.

7. After the essence of religion has been investigated, the place must be determined which it occupies in man, in the midst of his faculties and functions. At the same time the relation then becomes clear in which religion stands to science, art, and morality. Already scholasticism posed the question whether the religio was a virtus intellectualis or moralis, and Thomas said the latter, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 81 art. 5. But only in more recent philosophy, especially after the religions of the peoples have become more widely known, has the essence of religion been made an object of [184] psychological and historical investigation. Lessing's Erziehung des

Menschengeschlechts 1780 and Herder's Ideen zur Philos. der Gesch. der Menschheit 1784 made a beginning with it. And since then the history and the philosophy of religions has become a favorite study. For the determination of the essence of religion, present-day research almost always proceeds from the religio subjectiva, and the right, the power, the value of the religio objectiva is almost generally denied. This is the result of a philosophical praemisse, that all religions are equal in essence and differ only in form. But this religious indifferentism is therefore untenable, because all religion necessarily includes a knowing and posits the reality of its object; as soon as, however, this is the case, a religion falls under the category of true and untrue. If religion were nothing but feeling and phantasy, it would also attach to its creations only an aesthetic value. But every religion is convinced of the reality and the truth of its objects (gods, prophets, holy places etc.), and without that faith is incapable of existence, cf. Dr. Bruining, Theol. Tijdschr. Nov. 1894 bl. 563 v. 598 v. In fact everyone also applies the category of true and untrue to the religions; the philosopher of religion does not believe in the truth of the gods of the peoples, even if he also values the religious disposition which in their veneration expresses itself many times. Further, the different religions themselves are by no means indifferent toward one another; they regard themselves and one another not as standing in a relation of lower and higher, but of true and false. The philosopher stands with his indifferentism pretty much alone. Frederick the Great may say: in meinem Reiche soll

Jeder nach seiner Façon selig werden, the religions themselves think quite otherwise about it. And they cannot do otherwise; what the one posits, the other negates. They exclude one another, and cannot both be true. If Christ is the One Sent of the Father, then Mohammed is not. And finally religious

indifferentism still rests on the sinful thought that it is indifferent to God how He is served. It deprives Him of the right to determine the manner of his service. In any case it proceeds from the thought that God has not prescribed his service, thus from the a priori denial of revelation. The proposition that the religions agree in essence and differ in form, [185] is conversely much more correct; they differ in essence but agree in form. In addition, finally the remark must still be made that indifferentism in the matter of religion can extend more or less far. Syncretism holds the ecclesiastical, deism holds the Christian, modernism holds the religio objectiva, the morale indépendante holds all that is religious to be indifferent. In fact and objectively, however, nothing is indifferent, neither in nature, nor in the state, nor in science or art. Everything, even the least, has its definite place and significance in the whole. Man is indifferent only to what he does not know; what he knows is also of itself assessed and valued by him. God is indifferent to nothing, because he knows everything.

Cf. Lamennais, Essai sur l'indifférence en matière de religion, 9e éd. Paris 1835, especially tome premier, of which the introduction begins: le siècle le plus malade n'est pas celui qui se passionne pour l'erreur, mais le siècle qui néglige, qui dédaigne la vérité.

8. The general belief that the religions are different forms of one essence proceeds from the thought that the essence of religion lies not in the religio objectiva, but in the religio subjectiva. The former is indifferent; it is the latter, the religious disposition or mood, that matters. According to that disposition, therefore, investigation must be made, in order to determine the essence of religion. But where and how must that investigation take place?

Two methods present themselves, the historical and the psychological. The historical, advocated e.g. by Dr. A. Bruining, Wijsbeg. v. d. godsd. Theol.

Tijdschr. 1881 bl. 365 v. wishes to determine the essence of religion from historical research and comparative observation of the religious phenomena.

But this method is in fact impossible, because every investigation of the religions already presupposes a notion of religion; a comparative investigation of all religions is an impracticable labour; and in the religions precisely the religious disposition is most deeply hidden and almost escapes all observation. What do we still know of the mood and disposition that, in the different directions and churches within Christianity, underlies the religious phenomena! The psychological method, defended inter alia by.

Hugenholtz, Studiën op godsd. en zedek. gebied II 83 v. and [186] Rauwenhoff, Wijsbeg. v. d. godsdienst 41 v., wishes to explain the essence of religion psychologically and therefore demands that the practitioner of the science of religion be a religious person and as such observe and judge the religious phenomena. There is in itself nothing to be said against this. In the study of the religions to leave one's own religious consciousness out of account, as Dr. Bruining wishes, would be the same, according to the good remark of Dr. Hugenholtz, as to put out one's own eyes for fear of deception of sight. But then it may nevertheless be demanded that such an investigator of the religions bring with him not a false but a true and pure conception of religion; otherwise he tests all religions only by his own perhaps very erroneous representation and by that of his kindred spirits, e.g. by the modern conception of religion. If, however, the question stands thus, then between orthodox and moderns there is no longer any question of method, but only of the truth or untruth of the religious representation from which both proceed. And then the guarantee for the truth of the religious representation which the orthodox brings is at least as great as that for the modern conception of religion; for the former derives it from Holy

Scripture and is in agreement with the church of all centuries, and the latter is of short duration and valid only in a small circle of kindred spirits.

9. The philosophy of religion has now especially advanced three conceptions of the essence of religio (subjectiva). First, the intellectualistic, which posits the essence of religion in knowledge, and places its seat in the understanding. Gnosticism already said that the gnosis made blessed, that the agnitio was redemptio interioris hominis, Irenaeus adv. haer. I cap. 21.

This gnosticism has at all times found defenders in the Christian church, but has especially re-emerged in the more recent philosophy. Spinoza holds understanding and will to be unum et idem, Eth. II prop. 49, has the amor

Dei be born from the clear and distinct knowledge of man of himself and his affects, ib. V prop. 15, and calls this amor intellectualis, ib. prop. 32.

Summa mentis virtus est Deum cognoscere V prop. 27, and our man is pars infiniti Dei intellectus II prop. 11. This knowledge of God, i.e. of things sub specie aeternitatis II prop. 44 is summa [187] mentis acquiescentia V prop.

27. According to Schelling in his first period, of the Absolute, as identity of the finite and infinite, only an absolute knowing is possible; religion here thus entirely loses its independence, faith is an incorrect, impure apprehension of the idea, Philosophie u. Religion (Sämmtl. Werke, Erste

Abth. VI S. 11 f.). Hegel in particular has elaborated this intellectualistic determination of the essence of religion. With him the Absolute is thinking itself, which enters into the oppositions and from these again returns to identity with itself. The whole world is thus a development of spirit, a logical unfolding of the content of reason, a process in which the idea first objectifies itself in nature and then from that in spirit returns again to itself.

One of the moments which this process runs through is religion. The human spirit is that in whom the Absolute comes to itself and becomes conscious

of itself. And this self-consciousness of the absolute spirit in the finite spirit is religion. Religion is thus essentially knowing, not feeling and not acting, but knowing, and indeed of God by the finite spirit, or objectively God's knowing of himself through and in the finite spirit. Der Mensch weiss nur von Gott, insofern Gott im Menschen von sich selbst weiss, diess Wissen ist

Selbstbewustseyn Gottes, aber ebenso ein Wissen desselben vom Menschen, und diess Wissen Gottes vom Menschen ist Wissen des

Menschen von Gott. Der Geist des Menschen von Gott zu wissen, ist nur der Geist Gottes selbst, Vorles. über die Philos. der Religion, herausg. v.

Marheinecke 1832 Werke XII S. 428. Religion, however, is not the highest knowing; it is only a knowing of the absolute in the form of sensible, historical representations. The highest, true knowing is first attained in philosophy. Religion is therefore temporary, a lower form, suitable for the undeveloped. But philosophy loosens the idea from the sensible representations of religion and thus comes to an absolute, adequate, conceptual knowing of God, ib. S. 15 f. cf. Strauss, Christl. Gl. I 12.

Feuerbach, Wesen des Christenthums 1841 and Strauss, Christliche Glaubenslehre 1840, Der alte und der neue Glaube, 2e Aufl. 1872 drew the consequence and completed the breach with the Christian religion. Idealism turned into materialism. Just as already in the previous century by La

Mettrie, cf. Stöckl, Gesch. der neueren Philos. I 378, so [188] now again by many faith in God was held to be the greatest and most harmful error.

Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Edgar Bauer, Max Stirner preached the barest egoism. Materialism, which arose in Germany about 1850, judged no differently, Büchner, Kraft und Stoff 1855, 16e Aufl. 1885 S. 392 f. Specht,

Theol. u. Naturwiss. 3e Aufl. 1878 S. 71 f. Moleschott, Kreislauf des

Lebens 1852. Carl Vogt, Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft 1854. Czolbe, Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus 1855.

10. Now Hegel has seen very well that religion also contains knowledge and that religion and metaphysics are most closely related. The nature of the matter also makes this clear. Religion is always a relation of man to a divine

Power standing above him. Religion therefore is not and cannot be without a definite conception of God; and this in turn includes other conceptions concerning world and man, origin and final end of things. These religious conceptions have transcendental significance for the believer; he is most deeply convinced of their objective reality and truth. As soon as he begins to regard these conceptions as products of his imagination, as ideals without reality, or also despairs of the knowability of the metaphysical, his religion is finished. Skepticism destroys the object of religion and thereby religion itself. God must also be served with the understanding; but when the understanding sees that the religious conceptions do not correspond to a reality, it ceases to be religious. Religious and theoretical world-view, theology and science are not the same but nevertheless cannot possibly struggle with one another. Such a dualism is in irreconcilable conflict with the unity of the human spirit, Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie. II. Die

Religion des Geistes, 2te Aufl. Leipzig, Friedrich S. 3-27.

But Hegel erred in this, that he placed religion and philosophy in relation to one another as lower and higher, as representation and concept, and thus conceived them as successive moments of one process. The Hegelians such as Strauss, Glaub. I 12 f. and Biedermann, Christl. Dogm. 2e Aufl. I 184 f. themselves saw what was incorrect in this. Content and form are never so [189] mechanically and externally connected, that a complete change of the latter leaves the former unchanged. The conversion of religious

representations into philosophical concepts also affects the religious content itself. The history of Hegelian philosophy soon brought this to light. With it there remained of the Christian dogmas as good as nothing; trinity, incarnation, satisfaction retained the orthodox names but were interpreted entirely differently. The facts of Christianity were reckoned as belonging to the form and were deemed worthless. In place of that one obtained concepts that no longer had any content. A second error of Hegel consisted in this, that he gave religion and philosophy an equal content and yet held the former to be a lower form of the latter. Religion was thereby lowered to a relatively good, which only still had value for the simple and the undeveloped. The philosophers were far elevated above it and had enough in philosophy. This now rests on a total failure to recognize the essence of religion. For religion and science are indeed related but yet also as different as heaven and earth. Even if they also have many times the same content and object, these nevertheless appear in both under an entirely different point of view. In science it is a matter of knowledge, in religion it is a matter of comfort, peace, blessedness. Religion and philosophy are just as little as the état théologique, métaphysique and positive of A. Comte historically successive states of the human spirit, but are different points of view under which often the same thing can be considered. Even the most profound philosopher therefore does not, with all his knowledge, get beyond religion; by science he can never satisfy his religious need. Science may indeed tell him that and what God is; only through religion does he know that that God is also his God and his Father. Science may teach him that there is sin and grace; only through religion does he become partaker of the blessedness of forgiveness and of the sonship of God. Even if science could know everything, and even if it could solve all metaphysical

problems; even then it would give only theoretical knowledge, and no personal participation in the goods of salvation. Not to knowing, but only to believing is blessedness bound. But it is far from the case that science and [190] philosophy can bring it so far. Precisely on the most important questions it remains without an answer. The expectation that Renan could cherish of science in 1848 proved to himself in 1890 to be nothing but an illusion, Renan, L'avenir de la science. Pensées de 1848. 2e éd. Paris 1890.

Science tells us neither what God nor what man is; it leaves us unacquainted with the origin and the destination of things. The phenomena it observes, but the noumenon remains hidden from it. It can never replace religion and never compensate for its loss, Voigt, Fundam. dogm. 120 f.

Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie II S. 3-27. H. Siebeck, Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie, Freiburg 1893 S. 1-11. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 92-96.

Pfleiderer, Grundriss der christl. Gl. u. Sittenlehre § 11.

11. Others have therefore defined religion by moral action and sought its seat in the will. Pelagianism in its various forms, Semipelag. Socin.

Remonstr. Deism, Ration. etc. has prepared this view, insofar as the fides in this direction is supplemented by, or even consists solely in, a nova obedientia. Doctrine is then only a means and subordinate; the main thing is love; what matters is a virtuous, moral life. Spinoza too, alongside the intellectualistic, has this moralistic view. Holy Scripture is God's word, because it contains the vera religio, the lex divina, Tract. theol. pol. cap. 12

§ 18 sq. It intends nothing praeter obedientiam, cap. 13, and this obedientia erga Deum consists in solo amore proximi, ib. § 8. Philosophy and faith are so distinct that the former has as its goal the veritas, the latter the obedientia and pietas, cap. 14 § 38. The intellectualis sive accurata Dei cognitio is not a gift to all believers, but the obedientia is; this is demanded of all, cap. 13 §

9. But above all Kant has given this moralism currency. The theoretical reason namely cannot reach the supersensible. God, freedom, immortality are scientifically not to be proved. They are only postulates of practical reason for the fulfillment of the moral law and for the obtaining of the highest good, i.e. the blessedness connected with virtue. Believing is thus holding for true not on theoretical but on practical grounds. Morality becomes the foundation of religion. And religion ist subjektiv betrachtet das

Erkenntniss aller unserer Pflichten als göttlicher [191] Gebote. Religion here is not directly and immediately grounded in human nature, but only through the moral. It also has no content and matter of its own, but is nothing other than a further determination of the moral; not in the object but only in the form lies the difference between the two. Kant therefore also had to acknowledge that no religion has been satisfied with his religion. All religions contain, besides pure rational faith, many other dogmata, a doctrinal historical Glauben. But he explains this from the weakness of human nature, which is not easily convinced that a moral walk is all that God demands of us. The calling is to purify the Kirchenglauben more and more and to have it pass over into the pure Vernunftglauben, Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft, herausg. van K. Rosenkranz

1838. Kant's religion therefore in fact consisted in nothing other than the rationalistic trilogy God, virtue, immortality. But J. G. Fichte went further and derived from moral consciousness no other postulate than that the I regards the entire not-I, the world, as the "sensualized material" of its duty, recognizes it as so ordered that its moral willing and acting lies on the line of the moral goal of the whole, in other words, that there is a moral worldorder. Here religion has wholly been absorbed into the moral. Cf. Ueber den

Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung 1798. This

moralism has been deepened into ethicisme, in that the moral is conceived not only psychologically but also metaphysically. The will, the good, love is then the proper being, the Ursein, the Absolute; from that everything, the Trinity, the world, redemption, is to be explained; that power of the good realizes itself in the human world by means of the moral. That is the fundamental thought from which Schelling proceeded in his second period: es gibt in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein anderes Sein als Wollen,

Wollen ist Ursein, Ueber das Wesen der menschl. Freiheit, Sammtl. Werke VII 331 f. Rothe especially transferred this ethicisme into theology; piety has no content of its own but coincides in concreto with true morality,

Theol. Ethik § 114-126; the church therefore also passes over into the state § 440. Since then this ethical direction has gained great influence. The ethical is alternately regarded as foundation (Neokantians), content [192]

(Ethischen among the Vermittelungstheologen and among the Modernen), or even as complete compensation (Morale indépendante. The ethical movement in religion) for religion. The ethical direction among the Vermittelungstheologen followed in the footsteps of Schleiermacher and Rothe, cf. my Theol. van D. Ch. de la Saussaye, Leiden 1884, bl. 20 v. In this country Hoekstra sought the foundation of religious faith in practical reason, in the will, Bronnen en grondslagen van 't godsd. geloof 1864 bl. 23 v. 49 v. 63 v. The ethical Modernen who attach themselves to him define religion as devotion to the moral ideal, as pure morality, Dr. Hooijkaas, God in de geschiedenis 1870. Godsdienst volgens de beginselen der ethische richting onder de Modernen, four lectures by Hooijkaas, Hooijkaas

Herderschee, Oort and van Hamel, 's Bosch 1876. cf. Rauwenhoff, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 1887 bl. 116 v. Rauwenhoff himself places the essence of religion in faith in a moral world-order, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 373 v. Related to that is

the doctrine of the Morale Indépendante, cf. C. Coignet, La morale indépendante dans son principe et dans son objet, Paris 1863. Vacherot, La religion, Paris 1869 cf. Bibl. v. mod. Theol. 1870 I 333 v. Caro, La morale indép. Paris 1876. E. Bersier, sur la question de la mor. indép. in de

Handelingen der Ev. Alliantie 1867. Cramer, Christendom en Humaniteit 1871 bl. 159 v. and likewise that ethical movement which has penetrated from America into England and Germany, and, indifferent to all religion, recognizes no dogma but love for the good. See W. M. Salter, De godsdienst der moraal, Dutch by Dr. Hugenholtz 1889, cf. Lamers, De godsd. evenmin moraal als metaphysica 1885. Bibl. v. mod. Theol. 1887, 4e st. bl. 579. Kuenen in de Hervorming 1888, reply by Salter ib. 15 Dec.

1888. Dr. Felix Adler, Die ethischen Gezellschaften, Berlin, Dümmler 1892.

Die ethische Bewegung in Deutschland, vorbereitende Mittheilungen eines Kreises gleichgesinnter Männer u. Frauen zu Berlin, ib. 1892. St. Coit, Die ethische Bewegung in der Religion, vom Verf. durchges. Uebersetzung v.

Gizycki. Leipzig, Reisland 1890. Against that: Dr. M. Keibel, Die Religion u. ihr Recht gegenüber dem modernen Moralismus. Halle, Pfeffer, 1892.

Also Otto Dreyer, Undogmatisches Christenthum, Braunschweig 1888; Egidy, Ernste Gedanken, Leipzig 1890 (cf. Gids Mei 1893); [193] H.

Drummond, Summum Bonum, Pax Vobiscum, The spiritual law in the natural world; Tolstoi, Vernunft u. Dogma, Wie ist mein Leben? both with Otto Janke, Berlin. Worin besteht mein Glaube, Leipzig 1885 etc. strive for an undogmatic, practical, moral Christianity, a Christianity of the Sermon on the Mount.

12. Now it suffers no doubt that religion and morality stand in the closest connection with one another. That affinity appears in the first place from this, that religion itself is a moral relation. Religion does indeed rest on a

mystical union of God and man, but is itself no substantial communion of both, but an ethical relation of man to God. God has no religion; but God's indwelling in man cultivates on his side that relation to God, which we call religion, Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 57 v. 64. This relation is therefore of an ethical nature; it is regulated in that same lex moralis, which also determines the other relations of man to his fellow-creatures; all religious actions of man are moral duties, and the whole of religion is a moral command. Conversely, the moral life is again a service of God. To visit widows and orphans Jak. 1:27, is not, in the proper sense, a religious act, but can nevertheless be called religion, because religion must manifest and confirm itself therein. Scholasticism therefore made a distinction between actus eliciti and actus imperati of religion, Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 81 art. 1. Faith without works, without love, is a dead faith. Love to God proves itself for us in love to the neighbour Jer. 22:16. Jes. 1:11 v. 1 Joh. 2:3 v. Jak. 2:17 etc. Our whole life ought to be a service of God. The superscription: I am the Lord your God, stands also above the commandments of the second table. Love is the one great principle, that fulfils the whole law, Rom. 13:13. The moral law is one organic whole, so that he who transgresses one commandment violates the whole law Jak.

2:10. The neighbour must be loved for God's sake, and sin against the neighbour is also a sin against God. This relation of religion and morality already makes it clear, that morality can never constitute either the content or also the foundation of religion. In spite, indeed, of their intimate affinity, both are essentially distinct. Religion is [194] always a relation to God, morality to men; religion has as principle the πιστις, morality the ἀγαπη; religion reveals itself in those religious actions, which together form a cultus inand externus, morality manifests itself in the deeds of justice,

mercy, honesty etc. toward the neighbour; religion is regulated in the first, morality in the second table of the law. This distinction between religion and ethos cannot be maintained by pantheism, because God here has not a proper existence independent of the world; a personal relation between God and man is here not possible; love to God then cannot express itself otherwise than in love to the neighbour. Deism too, on account of the denial of the communion of God and man, can cultivate no proper religion. There is indeed still faith in God, but no serving of God otherwise than in the fulfilment of the moral commandments. But on the theistic standpoint man stands in relation to the world but also in a proper, distinct relation to God as a personal being. Religion is therefore something essentially other than morality and reveals itself in a proper series of acts. If, however, this is so, then morality also cannot be the foundation of religion, but conversely this must form the basis for that. The relation to God is then the primary and the central one, which determines all other relations of man. Both historically and logically morality is always grounded in religion. Religion urges the moral duties, and morality seeks the sanction of religion. An autonomous morality occurs in reality nowhere. Everywhere and among all peoples morality finds its last ground and its last end in religion. Morality loses the ground under its foot, if it is deprived of divine authority in the conscience.

Alle Moral hat sich geschichtlich aus der Religion entwickelt, und wenn auch die so entwickelten geistigen Anlagen der Menschheit zur Sittlichkeit

Dank ihrer Herkunft eine Zeit lang selbstständig fortbestehen können, wenn sie von ihrem Mutterboden abgelöst werden, so ist doch diese selbstständige Existenzfähigkeit zeitlich sehr begrenzt und schon in der zweiten Generation machen zich deutlich die Symptome des Verfalls der

Sittlichkeit bemerkbar, E. v. Hartmann, Relig. philos. II 59. Materially, of

course, by far not all obligations and actions, which men [195] hold to be moral, are in agreement with the will of God. But the formal, that which makes all duty into unconditional duty, which binds man in the conscience, that is from God. There is no morality without metaphysics. Menschen, gewoonten, zeden enz. cannot obligate absolutely in the conscience. Only

God can do that. Therefore conscience is sacrosanct and freedom of conscience an inexorable demand and an inalienable right. The commands and prohibitions, which are not fixed in the conscience, are not felt as moral. A law, which has no foundation in the popular conscience, is powerless. By virtue of this connection there is also a reciprocal influence of religion and morality upon one another. Temporarily they can, both in an individual and in a people, fall apart and even struggle with one another.

But they cannot rest, before they are in harmony and equilibrium. What is approved in religion cannot be condemned in morality, and conversely. The relation to God and to men must both bear one and the same moral character, be regulated in one and the same moral law. Religion and morality, cultus and culture must be rooted in one and the same principle.

That is the case in Christianity. Love is the fulfilment of the law, and the bond of perfection. H. Schultz, Religion und Sittlichkeit in ihrem

Verhältniss zu einander, religionsgeschichtlich untersucht (Stud. u. Kr. 1883

Heft 1 S. 60-130). J. Köstlin, Rel. u. Sittl. (Stud. u. Kr. 1870). Pfleiderer, Moral u. Religion, Haarlem 1872. Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 114 f. Martensen,

Die christl. Ethik 3e Aufl. 1878 I 19-33. Janet, La morale, Paris 1874 p. 596 s. Hoekstra, Godsdienst en zedelijkheid Theol. Tijdschr. II bl. 117 v. Id.

Wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 251 v. Lamers, Godsd. en zedel. Amst. 1882. Ch. de la Saussaye, Lehrb. der Religionsgesch. I 166 f. C. Stage, Relig. u. Sittl.

Vortrag. Berlin, Bibliogr. Bureau 1894. Lamers, De Wetenschap v. d. godsd.

II 167 v. Hugenholtz, Studiën op godsdiensten zedekundig gebied, Amst.

1884 I passim. Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie 2e Aufl. II 55-64. Siebeck, Handbuch der Rel. Phil. S. 243 f. Kaftan, Das Wesen der christl. Religion,

Basel 1881 S. 124 f. Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. S. 96 f.

13. Finally, there are also those who assign religion a place in feeling and for that sometimes even assume a separate faculty [196] in man. Mysticism and pietism had already paved the way for that in earlier times. But only through the Romanticism of the previous century did this view for a time become dominant. Romanticism was in general a reaction of the free, unbound life of feeling against objective classicism, which bound and regulated everything. The subject raised itself above the laws that, in every domain of life, had been set upon its spontaneous expression; imagination resumed its rights over against the understanding; the organic view took the place of the mechanical; the idea of becoming displaced that of making. In every field the eye opened for the free, the natural, the genial; coming-intobeing, growth, development was the manner in which things arose; not the useful but the beautiful, not prose but poetry, not labor but play, not manufacture but art had the highest value. The mannerism of earlier times turned into a superficial sentimentality. Such was the movement which in England found its spokesman in Young, Southey, Wordsworth, S. T.

Coleridge. In France it was introduced by Rousseau, who in his profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard (Emile, livre 4) builds up his whole deistic dogmatics and morality out of feeling: le sentiment est plus que la raison, notre sensibilité est antérieure à notre intelligence. In Germany

Winckelmann opened eyes to the beauty of Greek art; Lessing set over against the poetry of French classicism the genius of Shakespeare; Herder pointed out in history the revelation and operation of eternal, divine nature;

Hamann, Claudius, Lavater, Stilling proceeded from rich subjectivity and set this over against the flat, mechanical conception of the Aufklärung; Kant and Fichte placed the I of man in the foreground. Everywhere there was a breach with objectivity; the subject became absolute principle. Under this influence Jacobi appealed to feeling, as the unmittelbare Vernehmen des

Göttlichen. Religion is feeling for the true, beautiful, and good; admiration, love, esteem for the divine; and such a feeling is innate in us as Grundtrieb der menschlichen Natur, Werke II 59 f. 194 f. etc. The aesthetic rationalism of Jacobi was worked out by Fries and de Wette in such a way that they made a strict separation between the empirical-mathematical world-view

[197] of the understanding and the ideal, aesthetic-religious world-view of feeling. Schleiermacher's conception of religion is to be explained from that same romantic direction. In the second discourse from his Reden über die

Religion 1799 he defines religion as the immediate consciousness of the being of all the finite in and through the infinite. It is not knowing and not doing, not metaphysics and not morality, but feeling of the infinite. The object of that feeling is not a personal God, with whom man lives in communion, but the universe, the world as a whole, conceived as unity. And the organ for the perception of that infinite is not understanding, reason, or will, but feeling, the direction of the mind toward and the sense for the infinite. More precisely this feeling is not defined. And still vaguer is the answer to the question when that feeling becomes specifically religious feeling. Schleiermacher answers that in the 3rd discourse only in figurative language: one must open one's feeling as widely as possible to the world as a whole, contemplate everything in the one and the one in everything, conceive all the particular as a revelation of the infinite, etc. All this does not say much; it seems that in the end every feeling is religious which is

aroused by the world-whole and reveals to us the highest unity. In any case the religious feeling is not clearly delimited over against the aesthetic. In the Glaubenslehre we encounter in substance the same conception. Here too piety is feeling § 3, namely, feeling of absolute dependence § 4. But there is nevertheless a twofold difference. In the Reden God was the whole, in the Glaub. He is the absolute causality of the world; correspondingly the feeling there was sense for the infinite, and here immediate selfconsciousness and absolute dependence. God here acquires more an existence of his own, distinct from the world, and religion therefore also a content of its own, distinct from the feeling for the world. Thus some approximation to theism is to be perceived. But the fundamental thought is nevertheless the same insofar as God is not conceived as transcendent above but only as immanent in the world, and the organ for the divine is not reason, conscience, etc. but feeling. This conception of religion has not only been adopted by some Vermittelungstheologen, even if with modification, but is in principle found with all who, alongside the mechanical [198] world-view, still attempt to build up an aesthetic world-view and in it include religion or even let it be wholly absorbed into it. Lange Gesch. des

Mater. S. 830 says that the core of religion consists, not in a doctrine about God etc., but in the elevation of the mind above reality and in the Erschaffung einer Heimath der Geister. Above the world of facts, the Welt des Seienden, man builds by his imagination a Welt der Werthe, a Welt der

Dichtung. Pierson, Eene levensbeschouwing, champions such an idealformation; the feeling of man, aroused from without, creates from the representations which the understanding obtains from the sensibly perceptible world, religious, ethical, aesthetic ideals, which indeed are no realities existing independently of us but nevertheless are of great value for

our life, bl. 113-179. Opzoomer even assumed a separate religious feeling and saw in it the source of religious representations, De weg der wetenschap, een handboek der logika 1851 § 15. De Godsdienst bl. 126140. Het wezen der kennis, textbook of logic § 14. Rauwenhoff considers the essence of religion indeed to be located in faith in a moral world-order but nevertheless ascribes the form of religion, veneration of a personal God, to imagination. Cf. also Guyau, L'irreligion de l'avenir, Paris, Alcan, 1887.

Dr. R. Koch, Natur und Menschengeist, Berlin 1891 etc.

14. Also with this view it is without contradiction that feeling occupies an important place in religion. Religious representations in themselves and without more are still no religion; only then does this arise, when man enters into a real, personal relation to the object of those representations.

And such a personal relation to God cannot but act upon feeling; it does not leave man cold and indifferent, but stirs him to the deepest part of his soul; it awakens in him a strong feeling of pleasure and displeasure and cultivates a whole series of affections, consciousness of guilt, pain, repentance, regret, sadness, joy, gladness, trust, peace, rest etc. Religion awakens the deepest and tenderest affections in the human heart. There is no power that seizes and stirs more deeply, more generally, more strongly. All these affections awakened by the religious representations give to religion warmth, [199] intimacy, life, power, in contrast with the deadness of intellectualism and the coldness of moralism. The heart is the centre of religion.

But for that reason feeling is not yet the only religious function, not the only seat and source of religion. Feeling, taken here not as a separate faculty, which it is not, but as the whole of the passions and affections, is of course passive; it reacts only to that which is brought into contact with it by consciousness, and is then turned into a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. It

has nothing in itself and brings forth nothing out of itself, but judges things, the representations, which come from outside, only according to whether they are pleasant or unpleasant. In itself feeling, every affection, is neither good nor evil, neither true nor untrue. These are categories not properly belonging to the affections, but to the representations. Of the affections they can only be used, insofar as these are aroused by true or untrue representations, and are accompanied by good or evil directions of the will.

In religion, therefore, it is also not feeling, but faith, the religious representation, that is the first; but that faith then also acts upon feeling.

When, however, as with Schleiermacher, feeling is detached from faith, from the religious representation, and is made into the proper and only source and seat of religion, then feeling loses its quality, becomes wholly independent of the category of true and untrue, of good and evil, and in fact every feeling as such is already religious, true, good, and beautiful. And that was the dreadful error of the whole of romanticism.

Naturally, therefore, the error readily suggests itself, of confusing and identifying religious feeling with sensuous and with aesthetic feeling. From history the affinity and the transition of religious and sensuous love are known to everyone. But equally dangerous is the mixing of religious and aesthetic feeling, of religion and art. Both are essentially distinct. Religion is life, reality; art is ideal, appearance. Art cannot fill up the gulf between ideal and reality. It does indeed lift us for a moment above reality, and makes us live in the realm of ideals. But this takes place only in the imagination. Reality remains [200] the same for all that. Art does indeed show us in the distance the realm of glory, but it does not bring us into it and does not make us citizens of it. It does not reconcile our guilt, it does not dry our tears, it does not comfort us in life and in death. It makes the

Dort niemals Hier. That religion alone does. It is and gives reality. It bestows life and peace. It posits the ideal as true reality and makes us partakers of it. Therefore aesthetic feeling can never replace religious feeling, art can never replace religion. Yet both are connected. Religion and art have from the beginning been closely connected; the decline of the one brought that of the other along with it; the last driving force of art lay in religion. Cf. G. Portig, Religion und Kunst in ihrem gegenseitigen

Verhältniss, Iserlohn 1879-'80. I 5. 85. 90. 225 enz. Paulsen, System der Ethik, Berlin, Hertz 1889 S. 434 f. In religion, specifically also in worship, the imagination has its right and its value. Beim religiösen Process ist allerdings auch die Phantasie betheiligt, aber nicht als Erzeugingsprincip, sondern nur als Belebungsprincip. Die Einbildungskraft kan immer nur bereits gegebene Stoffe und Triebe gestalten, aber nie kan sie die Religion selbst erst schaffen, Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. 91. But the stage is least of all suited for a moral institution (Schiller). The theater cannot replace the church and Lessing's Nathan cannot replace the Bible (Strauss). Ideals and creations of the imagination are no compensation for the reality that religion offers. Religious feeling, however intimate and deep it may otherwise be, is only pure when it is aroused by true representations, Hartmann,

Religionsphilosophie II 27-55. S. Hoekstra, Godsdienst en Kunst 1859.

Lamers, Wetenschap v. d. godsd. II 164 v. Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. S.

97 f.

15. The result is therefore that religion is not limited to one of man's faculties, but embraces the whole man. The relation to God is a total and central one. We must love God with our whole understanding and with our whole soul and with all our powers, etc. Precisely because God is God, he claims us wholly, in soul and body, with all faculties and in all our relations.

Yet there is order also in this relation of man to God. Here too every faculty in man exists and works [201] according to its own nature. Knowledge is the first; no right service of God without right knowledge. Ignoti nulla cupido. The unknown is unloved. He who goes to God must believe that He is and a rewarder of those who seek Him, Hebr. 11:6. Faith is from hearing,

Rom. 10:13, 14. The Heathen came to idolatry and unrighteousness because they did not keep God in acknowledgment, Rom. 1:18 v. But that knowledge of God penetrates into the heart and there awakens all kinds of affections of fear and hope, sorrow and joy, sense of guilt and forgiveness, misery and deliverance, as they are depicted for us throughout the whole of Scripture, above all in the psalms. And through the heart it in turn works upon the will; faith reveals itself in love, in works, Jak. 1:27. 1 Joh. 1:5-7.

Rom. 2:10, 13. Gal. 5:6. 1 Cor. 13, etc. Head, heart, and hand are equally, though each in its own way, taken possession of by religion; it takes the whole man, soul and body, into its service. Therefore religion also comes into contact with all other powers of culture, especially with science, morality, and art. Proudhon once said: il est étonnant, qu'au fond de toutes les choses nous retrouvons la théologie. But Donoso Cortes rightly answered to that: dans ce fait il n'y a rien d'étonnant que l'étonnement de

Mr. Proudhon. Religion as Relation to God indicates the place in which man stands over against all other creatures. It contains dogma, law, and cultus and therefore stands in close connection with science, morality, and art. It embraces the whole man, in his thinking, feeling, and acting, in his whole life, everywhere and at all times. Nothing falls outside religion. It extends its power over the whole man and humanity, over family and society and state. It is the foundation of the true, the good, and the beautiful.

It brings unity, coherence, life into world and history. From it science,

morality, and art took their origin; to it they return again and find rest. It is the beginning and the end, the soul of everything, the highest and deepest.

What God is for the world, that is religion for man, Staudenmaier, Encyklopädie der theol. Wiss. 1834 S. 114 f. 146.

And yet it is distinguished from all the powers of culture and preserves, over against them all, its independence. Religion is [202] central; science, morality, and the cross are partial. Religion embraces the whole human being, but science, morality, and art are rooted in the different faculties of intellect, will, and feeling. Religion intends nothing less than eternal blessedness in communion with God; science, morality, and art are limited to the creatures and wish to enrich this life by the true and the good and the beautiful. Thus religion is to be compared with nothing; it occupies in the life and the history of humanity a proper and independent, a unique and allgoverning place. Its indispensability can even be proved from the fact that man, at the very moment that he rejects religion as a delusion, nevertheless again makes some creature into his God, and in other ways seeks compensation for his religious need, in the service of humanity (Comte), in moral idealism (Salter), in ideal-formation (Lange, Pierson), in spiritism, theosophy (Mad. Blavatzky, Mrs. Besant), or in other religions such as Buddhism, Mohammedanism, etc. Cf. H. Druskowitz, Moderne Versuche eines Religionsersatzes. Heidelberg 1886. Id. Zur neuen Lehre. 1888.

C. Origin of religion.

16. Of the origin of religion there is, just as little as of that of language, a satisfactory explanation. The derivation of religion from fear, from priestly

fraud, from ignorance, is indeed still always current in some atheistic circles, but nevertheless finds no scientific defence. Darwin, the Descent of man, transl. by Dr. Hartogh Heys van Zouteveen 3rd ed. 1884 I p. 127 f. seeks religion in germ, embryonically, already in the animals, in the love e.g. which a dog feels for his master, and which is accompanied by a feeling of subordination and fear. But this analogy does not hold for various reasons. In the first place we know little of the inward, psychic life of the animals; further, religion is always connected with veneration, cultus, and a religious act, such as prayer, sacrifice etc., does not occur among the animals; and moreover there are in the animals undoubtedly certain qualities of fidelity, attachment etc., but these nevertheless no more constitute religion, than those same qualities among men toward one another are already [203] religion; the proper object of religion, a supersensible power, is wholly unknown to the animals. It therefore remains for the present with the word of Lactantius, Instit. div. 7, 9 religio est paene sola, quae hominem discernit a brutis, cf. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die

Religion I 207. Abr. d. A. v. d. Hoeven, Religion the essence of man. 1848. p. 29 f. Hartmann, Religionsphil. I S. 3-11. Saussaye, Lehrb. d. Relig. gesch. I 10 f. Lamers, Wet. v. d. godsd. II 150 f. Hoekstra, Wijsg. godsdienstleer I 1 f. The explanation of religion from animism, E. B. Tylor,

Primitive Culture 1872, from fetishism, Fr. Schultze, Der Fetischismus, ein Beitrag zur Anthropologie und Religionsgeschichte 1871, and from the veneration of ancestors, H. Spencer, Ecclesiastical Institutions, being part

VI of the principles of sociology, London 1886, § 583 etc. proceeds from the wholly arbitrary presupposition that the lowest forms of religion are the primitive ones, and takes accompanying phenomena of religion for its essence. Also the attempt of Max Müller, e.g. in his The origin and the

development of religion traced in the religion of India, Utrecht 1879, to derive religion from the feeling of the infinite, has with good reason found little acceptance; the observation of the endless in nature after all in itself and without more does absolutely not lead to the concept of the infinite and still much less to the veneration of the Infinite One, of God. Equally unacceptable is the hypothesis which seeks the origin of religion in the impulse toward causality, in man's need for an explanation of world and life, cf. Peschel, Völkerkunde 1881 S. 244 f. Voigt, Fundamentaldogm.

1874 S. 94 f., for religion, in spite of all affinity, is essentially different from metaphysics and philosophy and answers to wholly other needs of man.

And finally there are also few any more who with Cicero de nat. deor. 1,15.

2,5. Sextus Emp. 9,18 and the optimistic rationalists of the previous century let religion arise from childish poetry, the grateful feeling, the naive joy, which in the innocent man of nature were aroused by the glorious and beneficent nature, and which led him on to the recognition and veneration of a supernatural being, which bestowed all that, cf. still Pfleiderer, Relig. phil. II 24 f.; scholarship nowadays sees in that portrayal of the innocence of the men of nature [204] and of the beauty and beneficence of nature nothing other than a poetic idyll. Reality shows us everywhere a difficult struggle for life.

Therefore there now prevails a wholly different conception concerning the origin of religion. Nature often stands hostile over against man. With her storms and thunderstorms, with her scorching heat and piercing cold, with her raging forces and unbridled elements, she has set herself upon man's existence and life. He sees himself continually compelled, over against her, to protect his life, to maintain his existence. But he is weak and powerless.

And so, in the anxious conflict between himself and nature, between the

feeling of self and of need, he then calls to his aid an invisible power, which stands above nature and can help him in the struggle. Man wants to be happy, but he is not, and by his own power he cannot become so either; therefore, in religion he seeks to make favorable to himself all those personal powers which, according to his conception, are present in the phenomena of nature. This explanation of religion has the peculiarity that it lets religion arise not from theoretical but decidedly from practical motives; not from representations, but from emotions of fear, anxiety, a sense of need, etc. In so far it is a return to the primus in orbe deos fecit timor of Petronius. Furthermore, it is already found in Hume, cf. Stud. u. Krit. 1890,

2tes Heft S. 245, and in the Système de la nature, cf. Stöckl, Gesch. der neueren Philos. 1883 I 386, but has especially in more recent times been accepted in a very wide circle as the best solution of the question concerning the origin of religion. Yet it does not occur with all in the same form. Some say that religion arose from the Selbsterhaltungstrieb in general; in religion man wants to become partaker of some good, whatever this good may be, a sensuous, physical, egoistic good or also a moral, spiritual good; in a word, he wants a happy life, deliverance from physical or also from ethical evil. Thus W. Bender, Das Wesen der Religion und die

Grundgesetze der Kirchenbildung Bonn 1886. Ed. Zeller, Ursprung u.

Wesen der Religion (Vorträge und Abhandlungen, II 1877 S. 1-83). J.

Kaftan, Das Wesen der christl. Religion, Basel, Bahnmaier 1881. S. 38 f. H.

Siebeck, [205] Lehrb. der Religionsphilos. 1893 S. 58 f. Others seek the origin of religion decidedly in ethical Selbstbehauptung, in the maintenance by man of his moral freedom and worth over against the necessity and the compulsion of the physical world. In this way Kant already postulated, on the ground of man's moral nature, the existence of a God who could make

the world of necessity serviceable to that of freedom, the law of nature to the moral law, the physis to the ethos. And in the same way reason Ritschl,

Die christl. Lehre von der Rechtf. u. Versöhnung, 2e Aufl. III 1883 S. 186.

W. Herrmann, Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit, Halle, Niemeyer 1879. S. 267 f. cf. also Rauwenhoff, Wijsbeg. v. d. godsd. 94 v. Finally there are also still those who recognize in religion not only an ethical but also a mystical element, and who therefore consider it grounded not more or less in a free act of will but in the nature of man; according to these, in religion man certainly seeks ethical Selbstbehauptung, but yet also something else and more, namely communion with, life in God, and thereby precisely also freedom over against the world; religion is first of all a relation to God, and thereafter to the world. Thus Pfleiderer, Religionsphilosophie, 2e Aufl. Berlin 1883. II 28 f. Id. Grundriss der christl. Glaubensund Sittenlehre. 3e Aufl. Berlin,

Reimer 1886 § 10. Lipsius, Lehrb. der ev. prot. Dogm. 2e Aufl. 1879 § 18.

Nitzsch, Lehrb. der ev. Dogm. S. 99 f.

17. Yet this explanation of religion, however generally accepted, cannot satisfy. In the first place, the idea of God remains unexplained here. Usually one says that the undeveloped, childlike natural man makes no distinction between the personal and the impersonal, thinks the forces in nature according to the analogy of himself, and deems all things inhabited by souls, spirits. The foundation and presupposition for religion is then the socalled animistic worldview. But in the first place it is very improbable that the obvious distinction between personal beings and impersonal things was unknown to the first human beings. Next, belief in souls and spirits, who dwell and work in the phenomena of nature, is in itself still no religion; these souls or spirits become a religious object [206] only when the concept

of the divine is transferred to them. There must be assumed in man a certain awareness of the deity, in order to be able to make the souls and spirits, which he thought present in the forces of nature, into the object of his religious veneration. To be sure, the psychological method attempts to reverse the order; according to it the natural man first placed himself in a religious relation to one or another personally conceived natural force, and later abstracted from that the concept of the divine, Hartmann,

Religionsphil. I 15. But in any case it does not proceed thus with historical human beings; all first receive through instruction and upbringing the concept of the Deity and develop on that basis a religious relation. And there is not a single proof that with the first human beings it proceeded otherwise or could also proceed otherwise. A religious relation to one or another power always already presupposes the idea of God; and this remains unexplained with the above-mentioned method. In addition, the origin of religion in the subjective sense also remains incomprehensible with this psychological analysis. Let belief in personal beings in nature be given; but why is and especially when does the seeking of any sensible or moral good from those beings become religion? Religion after all arises only when not in general help is asked, as human beings also seek it from one another and in art and science, but when in a wholly particular way faith, trust, awareness of dependence with respect to an invisible divine power is awakened in the heart. Religion always presupposes a certain distinction between God and world, between the power of a being above and the subordinate forces in nature. To be sure, then that divine power can be thought as indwelling in the phenomena of nature, but the object of religious veneration is nevertheless never the natural force in itself but the divine being, which reveals itself and works in it. The greatest objection

against the above-mentioned explanation, however, lies in this, that with it God becomes nothing other than a helper in need, a being whose existence has been devised in order to provide man with some good or other. Religion becomes a means to satisfy the sensible or moral, but always nevertheless egoistic needs [207] of man. Egoism has been the source and the origin of religion, Hartmann, Religionsphil. I 27. The first form, in which this explanation of the origin of religion was rendered above, states this clearly and without concealment. In the second form religion is derived not from sensible but from moral needs; the Deity is no product of eudaemonistic wishes but a postulate of practical reason. However, this makes little difference in the essence of the matter. The subjective and egoistic point of departure is not overcome; God remains a servant of man. The third form attempts to avoid this egoism, by recognizing in religion a mystical element and thus making God the direct object of religious veneration; but here too this mysticism has been added later, it has not been the principle and the origin of religion. With the above-mentioned explanation, in whatever form it may be presented, man always first stands in relation to the world; and out of the conflict with that world religion and the idea of God are born.

God thus comes to stand in the third place; He becomes a Wunschwesen, a product of man's egoism, an aid in the struggle against nature. The affinity of all these explanations with that of Feuerbach is clearly evident. But why, so it can be asked, does man not content himself with the forces present in nature? Why does he not seek in science, art, industry etc., in all the factors of culture, the help that he needs in the struggle against nature? How is it to be explained that man continues to believe in the gods, creations of his wishes, even where they so many times disappoint him and leave him to his own lot? Whence is it that he sacrifices everything, even the dearest that he

has, to his gods and deems nothing too costly for their veneration? How does it finally come about that he continues to serve the gods, even when by other means and ways his dominion over nature gradually expands? If the above-mentioned explanation of the origin of religion is the correct one, then over against art and science it forfeits its independence and its end is reached as soon as man can save himself in another way. [208]

18. But, apart from these special objections, there is, against the method itself according to which the origin of religion is investigated, serious misgiving. What does it mean, that the arising of religion must be explained scientifically? It cannot mean that the religion of the first man or of the first men is historically traced. For the history of religions leaves us here completely in the lurch; the historical method is unusable. To hold the religious forms of the lowest, savage peoples for the original ones; for that there is lacking, as is also more and more being seen, all right. The method therefore can be no other than the psychological one, and this can of course never bring it further than to a hypothesis, which seems plausible and, for lack of better, may for a time rejoice in a general assent. But which is the question that this psychological method, in the search for the origin of religion, sets itself? Surely no other than this: from which causes and forces in man or in mankind has religion proceeded? There must therefore be sought for that point, wo noch nicht religiöse Lebenskräfte des Menschen zu dem Lebenskeim der Religion sich verbinden? Holsten, bij Rauwenhoff

50. Hypothetically, therefore, a man must be assumed, so undeveloped and barbarous, that of religion with him there is as yet no question. An original, inborn semen religionis may on this standpoint not be acknowledged. For then this original feeling, or whatever one wishes to call it otherwise, is something scientifically unexplained, a kind of mystical revelation, a

presupposition already of that which one seeks to explain, Dr. Bruining, Gids Juni 1884. The psychological method therefore demands that religion be explained from factors in man, which in themselves are not religious, but which through a certain combination, under the influence of nature from without, cause religion to arise. But such a godless man is a pure

Gedankending, an equally idle and empty abstraction as the natural man of Rousseau and of the adherents of the contrat social; in reality he has never existed. Religion itself thus becomes wholly a product of chance, just like morality in Darwin. A "mere chance", says Prof. Rauwenhoff 97, cf. 193,

250, 263 could bring man to it, to make for himself some or other thing from nature into a god. Another combination of the factors, and there would never have been religion. Thereby religion loses its independent place, its universality and necessity; even its value and its right are then no longer to be maintained. For it is not true, what Zeller, Vorträge und Abhandl. II 57 f. asserts, that the value of religion is independent of the manner of its arising; if the origin of religion is accidental, it loses the firm foundation on which it must rest. And also its right of existence is then threatened in a serious manner. For if religion is thus explained, that the existence of God thereby in no way needs to be assumed, then it is, even if its arising were psychologically a necessity, metaphysically nevertheless nothing other than an absurdity. The psychological method indeed attempts to understand religion without the existence of God. Man is a mere natural being, a product of nature. He is the one who, led by all sorts of circumstances, is brought to religion and produces the idea of God. God does not create man, man creates God. The religie subjectiva is the source of the religio objectiva. Man determines whether he and how he wishes to serve God. The psychological method is hereby judged; it is in principle in conflict with the

essence of religion and therefore destroys the phenomenon that it has to explain, Kant, Lotze, Albrecht Ritschl, eine kritische Studie von L. Stählin,

Leipzig 1888 S. 245 f. Compare further on the origin of religion Rauwenhoff, Theol. Tijdschr. 1885 bl. 257 v. Id. Wijsb. v. d. godsd. bl. 37109. Saussaye, Lehrb. der Rel. Gesch. I 21 f. en de daar aangeh. litteratuur.

Siebeck, Lehrb. der Rel. Philos. 43 f. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsdienstleer I 136 v.

D. Result.

19. The preceding investigation compels us to choose another point of departure and to follow another method. The essence and the origin of religion cannot be explained by the historical and psychological method; its right and value cannot thereby be maintained. It will not do to understand religion without God. God is the great presupposition of religion. His existence and revelation is the [210] foundation on which all religion rests.

Now it is indeed called unscientific, in the explanation of any phenomenon, to go back to God; and indeed He may also not serve as asylum ignorantiae.

But it is nevertheless a poor science that may take no account of God and seeks to explain all things outside of and without Him. In the scientific explanation of religion this holds in a double sense. For God is here the proper and direct object. Without Him all religion is an absurdity. The choice here stands only between these two, that either religion is a folly, because God does not exist or is absolutely unknowable, or that it is truth, but then inexorably, and in a strictly logical and scientific sense, demands and presupposes existence and revelation. Whoever cannot accept the first

is compelled to assume the second and to acknowledge God as the principium essendi of all religion. There is religion only because God is and wills to be served by creatures. Only then, when the existence of God is established, are the essence and origin, right and value of religion to be understood.

But religion demands still more. It presupposes not only that God exists, but also that He reveals and makes Himself known in one way or another.

All religions have this concept of revelation. It is not imposed upon religion from without, but flows forth from its origin and essence itself. There is no religion without revelation; revelation is the necessary correlate of religion.

The essence of religion consists not only subjectively in a religious disposition, which expresses itself at pleasure, but also in a religio objectiva, in a dogma, morality, and cultus, which therefore have authority for the believer only because, according to his conviction, they contain the will and the service of God. The origin of religion is historically not to be indicated and psychologically not to be explained, but necessarily points to revelation as its objective foundation. The distinction between religion on the one side and science and art on the other side leads us by the hand to that same concept of revelation. Nature, the world around us, is the source of our knowledge and artis magistra. But in religion that same world comes into consideration under another point of view, viz. as revelation of God, as making known His eternal power and divinity. In religion it is a wholly

[211] different matter for man than in science and art. In religion he does not seek an increase of his knowledge nor a satisfaction of his imagination, but an eternal life in communion with God, a real change of being, a deliverance from sin and misery. In religion it is God Himself that is at issue for him, because he realizes that only in God can he find rest and

peace. Therefore religion demands another source than science and art; it presupposes a revelation, which causes God Himself to come to him and brings him into communion with Him. Religion is in its essence and origin a product of revelation. Gradually this also begins to be acknowledged. The philosophy of religion, which for a time deemed the concept of revelation not worthy of serious discussion and subjected it only to a negative criticism, is compelled to reckon with it. The conception of that revelation is still very different and sometimes very incorrect; but the fact nevertheless speaks strongly, that many take up this concept again and attempt to ascribe to it a positive sense, cf. Pfleiderer, Grundriss § 13 f. Rauwenhoff, Wijsb.

46. Hartmann, II 69 f. Biedermann, Dogm. I 264. Lipsius, Dogm. § 53.

Nitzsch, Dogm. 127. Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. I 136 v. enz. Holy Scripture proceeds from the existence and from the revelation of God. God does not leave Himself without witness, and therefore on man's side there is a seeking, whether he might find and feel after Him. According to Scripture, revelation existed both before and after the fall. Revelation is the principium cognoscendi externum of religion.

If essence and origin of religion are thus explained from revelation, this must not be understood in the Socinian sense, as if religion were not grounded in man's nature but had arisen from an external communication of doctrine, Fock, Der Socin. 291 f. In that case Schelling, Philos. der Mythol.

I 141 would rightly have made the remark: wäre der ursprüngliche Mensch nicht an sich schon Bewusstseyn von Gott, müsste ihm ein Bewusstseyn von Gott erst durch einen besonderen Actus zu Theil werden, so müssten die, welche diess annehmen, selbst einen ursprünglichen Atheïsmus des menschlichen Bewusstseyns behaupten. Religion would then be a donum superadditum, not essentially proper to human nature. But man is man

because he is the image of God; he is [212] immediately, as man, a religious being. Religion is not the essence of man, as des Amorie van der Hoeven Jr. expressed himself less correctly, for religion is no substantia but a habitus or virtus; but it is nevertheless an essential property of human nature, given with it as such and so inseparably bound to it, that it has indeed been destroyed by sin, but could not be eradicated. Therefore religion is also universal and has also such great power in life and history. Whether one wishes it or not, in the end one always runs up against a certain religious disposition in man. One can call it differently, semen religionis, sensus divinitatis (Calvin), religious feeling (Schleiermacher, Opzoomer), faith

(Hartmann, Relig. Philos. II 67) etc., but it is always nevertheless a certain receptivity of human nature, to become aware of the divine, to which philosophical investigation into religion must return and in which it must end. Beyond that it cannot penetrate. For one of two: religion is essentially proper to human nature and thus given with it from the outset, or man was originally not a religious being, thus also not a man but an animal and has gradually developed into a religious being; and then religion is accidental and a transient moment in the process of evolution. The question to which philosophical investigation finally descends is this: is man from the beginning man, image of God, akin to God, a religious being, or has he gradually developed into that? Has culture or rough, wild nature been the first condition of the human race? Is the beginning of humanity absolute or relative? Cf. Schelling, Vorles. über die Meth. des akad. Studiums, Werke I 5 S. 286 f. He who wishes to maintain religion in its essence, and regards and acknowledges it as an essential property of human nature, takes the beginning of man as absolute and lets him be akin to God and religiously disposed from the outset. Such a one can also have no objection any longer

to the status integritatis, in which Scripture lets the first man appear.

According to Scripture, man has been man from the first moment of his existence, created in God's image, and thus from that same moment also a religious being. Religion is [213] not later added by separate creation or in the long path of evolution, but lies of itself enclosed in man's being created in God's image. Indeed that original condition has been corrupted and destroyed by sin, but man nevertheless remains akin to God, he is θεου γενος and continues to seek Him, whether he might feel after Him and find

Him. To the objective revelation of God there thus corresponds in man a certain facultas, aptitudo of his nature, to notice the divine. God does no half work. He not only creates the light, but also the eye, to behold that light. To the external the internal corresponds. The ear is adapted to the world of tones. The logos in the creatures corresponds with the logos in man and makes science possible. The beautiful in nature finds resonance in his sense of beauty. And so there is not only an external, objective, but also an internal subjective revelation. The former is the principium cognoscendi externum of religion, and the latter the principium cognoscendi internum.

Both principia are most closely connected with each other, as light with the eye, the thought in the world with reason in man. The question which of the two was first, the external or the internal revelation, is entirely superfluous.

In the same moment that God revealed himself to man by creating him in his image, this one knew God and served Him and conversely. And true, genuine religion can exist only in a perfect harmony of the internal with the external revelation; truly religious, image of God, servant of God, child of God, man in the full sense is he who loves God, as He is and makes himself known through revelation, with his whole heart and with his whole soul and with all his powers. Just as in science, so also in religion threefold principia

are therefore to be distinguished. There is religion, because God is God and as God wishes to be served by his rational creatures. To that end He reveals himself to man in word and deed — principium cognoscendi externum, and makes him subjectively capable of knowing and loving God through that revelation — principium cognoscendi internum. The forms in which revelation takes place outwardly and inwardly can be altered in accordance with the different condition in which man as creatura mutabilis can find himself [214] . They are different in the status integritatis and corruptionis, in the status gratiae and gloriae. But the three principia remain the same.

There is no religion except because God makes himself known objectively and subjectively to man. And again these principia also in religion find their foundation in the trinitarian being of God. It is the Father who in the Son and through the Spirit reveals himself. No one knows the Father except him to whom the Son by the Spirit wills to reveal it, Mt. 11:27, Joh. 16:13, 14, 1

Cor. 2:10. Cf. Schleiermacher, Der Christ. Gl. § 4. Schelling, Philosophie u.

Religion, Sämmtl. Werke Abth I. Bd. VI 26 f. Einleitung in die Philosophie der Mythologie, Sämmtl. Werke, Abth. II. Bd. 1-4. I 74 f. 119 f. Ulrici, Gott und die Natur, 2e Aufl. Leipzig 1866 S. 767 f. J. A. Dorner, Christ.

Glaubenslehre, Berlin, Hertz. 1879 I S. 552 f. Aug. Dorner, Ueber das Wesen der Religion, Stud. u. Krit. 1883 S. 217 f. J. T. Beck, Vorles. über

Christl. Glaubenslehre, Gütersloh 1887 I 149 f. 186 f. M. Kähler, Wissenschaft der Christl. Lehre, Erl. 1883 I 122. J. Köstlin, Der Glaube, sein Grund, Wesen und Gegenstand. Gotha 1859 S. 13 f. Id. Der Ursprung der Religion. Stud. u. Krit. 1890 S. 213-294. Id. Die Begründung unserer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung. Berlin 1893 S. 54 f. Gloatz, Spekulative

Theologie, Gotha 1883 I 1 S. 130 f. Heman, Der Ursprung der Religion, Basel 1886. C. Pesch, Der Gottesbegriff, Freiburg 1885. Dr. T. Cannegieter,

The task and method of the Philosophy of religion. 1886. Dr. Francken in Faith and Freedom 1887 instalment 1, 2. Drijber ib. 1890 instalment 5. p.

426-455. Pressensé, Les Origines 449 S.

CHAPTER II. External Principle.

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