6. § 6. Meaning of the Principia.
§ 6. Meaning of the Principia.
. According to Simplicius, the Neoplatonic commentator on Aristotle, Phys. 32 and likewise according to Hippolytus in his Refutatio omnium haeresium I 6, cf. H. Ritter et L. Preller, Historia philos. graecae
1886 p. 16, 17, Anaximander was the first who designated the ground of things, for which he held the ἀπειρον, with the name of ἀρχη. Perhaps, however, he thereby only indicated that the ἀπειρον was the beginning and the first of all things, Ed. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen, 4e Aufl. I 203. But in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle this word acquired the meaning of ultimate cause of things. Aristotle understands by ἀρχαι in general the first things in a series, and then especially the first causes, which are not to be derived from any others; he gives Metaph. V. 1. 1013, a, 17 this definition: πασων μεν οὐν κοινον των ἀρχων το πρωτον εἰναι ὁθεν ἠ ἐστιν ἠ γινεται ἠ γιγνωσκεται, id unde aliquid est aut fit aut cognoscitur.
Such causes he assumed especially in twofold domain, in that of being and of consciousness, in metaphysics and in logic. The being of things was by him derived from four ἀρχαι, namely ὑλη, εἰδος, ἀρχη της κινησεως and
τελος, Phys. II, 3, 194_{b}, 16 etc. But likewise he assumed such ultimate causes in logic. Aristotle namely observed that by no means can a proof be given of everything; of many matters, after all, we have not [141] a mediate knowledge by demonstration but an immediate knowledge by reason. The proofs themselves must, in order not to form a regressus in infinitum, proceed from such propositions, which as immediately certain are not susceptible of any proof and do not need it either. And these propositions
Aristotle called ἀρχαι ἀποδειξεως, ἀρχαι συλλογιστικαι, ἀρχαι ἀμεσοι, or also, as general presupposition of all demonstration, ἀξιωματα, Anal. post. I 2, 72a, 7, etc. and he says there himself of them: λεγω δ' ἀρχας ἐν ἑκαστῳ γενει ταυτας, ἁς ὁτι ἐστι μη ἐνδεχεται δειξαι. In the same sense the Latin principium was used. Cicero speaks e.g. of rerum principia Acad. IV 36, principia naturae Off. III 12, principia naturalia Fin. II 11, principium philosophiae Nat. D. I 1, principia juris Leg. I 6, etc. In accordance with the above-cited definition of Aristotle there was now later in logic a threefold principium distinguished, principium essendi, existendi and cognoscendi, according as the being, the becoming or the knowledge of some thing had to be derived from something else. From principium causa was then again so distinguished, that causa designated the principium as influxu suo determinans aliquid sibi insufficiens ad existendum, and as tempore or at least natura prior than the thing which it caused. Causa is thus a particular kind of principium; every causa is principium, but not every principium is causa, J. F. Buddeus, Elementa philosophiae instrumentalis, ed. 5a 1714, I p. 140 sq. 288 sq. Liberatore, Instit. philos. ed. 8a Romae 1855 I 217.
2. This mode of speech was also adopted in Theology. In Holy Scripture ἀρχη not only often has a temporal meaning Marc. 1:1, Joh. 1:1 etc., but also a few times a causative meaning. In the LXX the fear of the Lord is
called the ἀρχη της σοφιας Spr. 1:7, and in Apoc. 3:14 and Col. 1:18 Christ is called the ἀρχη of creation and of the resurrection. The church fathers often speak of the Father as ἀρχη, πηγη, αἰτιον of Son and Spirit, Athan. C.
Arianos II. Basilius, adv. Eunom. I. Damasc. de fide orthod. I 9, etc., just as Augustine also calls the Father principium totius divinitatis, de S. Trin. IV cap. 20. Thus God was the principium essendi or existendi of all that is created, thus also of science, and in particular again of the [142] theology.
In this latter domain it was always expressly repeated that God was the principium essendi of theology. There was a special reason for this. No knowledge of God is possible, except only from and through God Matth.
11:27; 1 Cor. 2:10 v. It was an axiom of earlier theology: a deo discendum quid de ipso intelligendum, quia non nisi ipso auctore cognoscitur. That there is in the creature any knowledge of God, that is due only to God. He is knowable only because and insofar as He himself wills that. Already the analogy of a human being proves the truth of this. A human being is to a certain extent the principium essendi of our knowledge concerning his person, 1 Cor. 2:11; he must reveal himself, show himself to be seen by appearance, word, and deed, in order that we may be able to learn to know him somewhat. But with a human being this is always relative; he often reveals himself wholly involuntarily and against his will; he often reveals himself in traits of character and peculiarities which are unknown to himself; he sometimes also reveals himself otherwise than he is, false and untrue, etc. But all that does not occur in God. He is in an absolute sense principium essendi, causa efficiens principialis of our knowledge of God, for He is absolutely free, self-conscious, and truthful. His self-knowledge, his self-consciousness is the principium essendi of our knowledge of God.
Without God's self-consciousness no knowledge of God in the creatures.
Pantheism is the death of theology. The relation now of this self-knowledge of God to our knowledge of God was formerly expressed thus, that the former was the theologia archetypa of the latter, and the latter the theology ectypa of the former. Our knowledge of God is an imprint of that knowledge which God has of himself, but then always in a creaturely sense.
The knowledge of God in his creatures is only a weak likeness, a finite, limited sketch accommodated to human or creaturely consciousness, of the absolute self-consciousness of God. But however great the distance may be, the principium essendi of our knowledge of God is only God himself, who reveals himself freely, self-consciously, and truthfully.
3. From this principium essendi the principium cognoscendi is now to be distinguished. That there is theology, we owe only to God, to his selfconsciousness, to his good pleasure. But the means, the way, by which that knowledge of God comes to us, is [143] God's revelation, here still taken in an entirely general sense. The nature of the matter brings this with it. A human being becomes knowable to us only from this, that he reveals himself to us, i.e. that he gives himself to be seen, speaks, or acts.
Appearance, word, and deed are the three forms of revelation of the one human being to the other. Thus it is also with the Lord our God; his knowledge too flows to us only from his revelation; and that revelation too can only be appearance, word, and deed. Principium cognoscendi of theology is therefore the self-revelation or self-communication of God to his creatures. Whether that self-revelation of God now comes individually to each human being or is laid down for the whole of humanity in Scripture or in the church, can only be investigated later. For the present, let it suffice that the self-revelation of God, by virtue of the nature of the matter, can be the only principium cognoscendi of our knowledge of God. Only let the
remark be added to it, that, if that self-revelation of God is laid down in Scripture or in the church, that Scripture and that church can only have an instrumental, and thus in a certain sense accidental, transitory significance.
The H. Scripture is therefore at most causa efficiens instrumentalis of theology.
For, the aim of theology can be no other than that the rational creature know God and, knowing Him, glorify Him Spr. 16:4, Rom. 11:36, 1 Cor.
8:6, Col. 3:17. It is his εὐδοκια, to be known by men Matth. 11:25, 26. The self-revelation of God therefore intends to bring his knowledge into human consciousness and thereby, through it, again to prepare glory and honour for God himself. But that self-revelation of God then also cannot end outside, before, with man, but must continue on into man himself, i.e. the revelation can not only be external but must also be internal. Therefore formerly a distinction was made between principium cognoscendi externum and internum, verbum externum and internum, revelatio and illuminatio, the working of God's Word and of his Spirit. The verbum internum is the verbum principale, for this brings the knowledge of God into man, and that is the aim of all theology, of the whole self-revelation of God. The verbum externum, the revelation set down in the H. Scripture, thereby serves as a means; it is verbum instrumentale, necessary perhaps for all kinds of incidental reasons [144] in this dispensation, but yet by its nature temporary and accidental.
4. Thus we came to know three principia. First, God as the principium essendi of theology. Then the principium cognoscendi externum, viz. the self-revelation of God, which, insofar as it is deposited in Holy Scripture, bears an instrumental and temporal character. And finally the principium cognoscendi internum, the illumination of man by God's Spirit. These three
are one in this, that they have God as author, and that they have one and the same knowledge of God as content. The theologia archetypa in the divine consciousness; the theologia ectypa, bestowed in revelation and deposited in Holy Scripture; and the theologia in subjecto, the knowledge of God, insofar as it enters from revelation into the consciousness of man and is received, are all three from God. It is God himself who discloses his selfknowledge, communicates it through revelation, and brings it into man. And also materially they are one, for it is one and the same pure and true knowledge of God, which he has of himself, which he communicates in revelation, and which he brings into human consciousness. They may and can therefore never be separated and detached from one another. But on the other hand they nevertheless ought indeed to be distinguished. For the knowledge which God has of himself is absolute, simple, infinite, and in its absoluteness incommunicable to finite consciousness. Therefore formerly the theologia archetypa was also sometimes limited to that portion of God's self-knowledge which he had decided to communicate to creatures. But this distinction makes the relation between theologia archetypa and theologia ectypa mechanical, and forgets that absolute lies not only in quantity, but also in quality. Nevertheless the true thought lies in it, that the theologia ectypa, which is bestowed by revelation upon creatures, is not the absolute self-knowledge of God, but that knowledge of God, as it is accommodated, adapted to and made suitable for finite consciousness, thus anthropomorphized. This theologia ectypa, which objectively lies before us in revelation, is externa but is destined to be transferred into the consciousness of rational creatures, to become theologia ectypa interna, theologia in subjecto, [145] but in that also again undergoes changes according to the nature of the subject. It is not re et ratione, but yet gradu et
modo different in Christ (theol. unionis), in the angels and the blessed (theol. visionis), in men on earth (theol. viatorum, viae, revelationis) and then again among these in prophets and apostles, in theologians and laymen. It is modified in each one's consciousness according to his capacity. But materially it is and remains nevertheless one and the same knowledge, which proceeds from God and along the way of revelation is transplanted into the consciousness of his rational creatures. These threefold principia, distinct and yet essentially one, rest in the trinitarian being of God. It is the Father, who through the Son, as Logos, in the Spirit communicates himself to his creatures. Cf. on these principia of theology:
Thomas S. Theol. qu. 1; Fr. Junius, de vera theologia, Op. Omnia, Gen.
1607 I fol. 1375-1424, ed. Kuyper p. 45 sq.; Gomarus, Disput. Theol. thesis 1; Voetius, Diatribe de Theologia Ultraj. 1668; Owen, Θεολογουμενα, sive de natura, ortu ... verae theol. libri 6, Oxon. 1661; Alsted, Methodus Sacros.
Theol. octo libris tradita, Hanov. 1623 I Praecognita Theol. p. 1-138, and furthermore the first chapts. on theol. in various dogmatics of Turretinus,
Coccejus, Marck, Moor, Vitringa, etc. Dr. A. Kuyper, Enc. der H. Godg. II 177 v.