The Author's Reply To Gaunilo
T H E A U T H O R ' S R E P L Y T O
GA U N I L O
[I.] S T A N S E L M begins by remarking that he is replying to
Gaunilo as an orthodox Christian ('catholicus') ; that is, he is assuming that Gaunilo is a believer who knows by faith that
God exists, and that he is not in the same position as the Fool.
Thus St. Anselm can assume that Gaunilo accepts his major
premiss, namely, that God is definable as 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' , though, as we shall see later,
St. Anselm acknowledges that this premiss is also rationally justifiable to one who does not believe in God.
Gaunilo's main objection was that 'that than which nothing
greater can be thought' is 'in the mind' merely in the way in which something which cannot be thought of as really existing is said to be 'in the mind' ; 1 and further that we cannot infer that a thing actually exists from the fact that it exists in the mind. Now, says Anselm, if Gaunilo's first objection is valid,
it would mean either that the definition of God as 'that than
which nothing greater can be thought' is false, or that we cannot form any notion of God at all. But no one believing in God could maintain either of these propositions ; therefore Gaunilo's obj ections must be dismissed. This, as we have suggested, is an ad hominem argument against Gaunilo in that it assumes that, as a believer in God, Gaunilo must admit that the notion of
God is not a meaningless one and that we must be able to form some idea of God. Later, as we have said, Anselm will attempt
to argue on purely rational grounds that a meaning can be given to the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' . Here, however, Anselm's point is that he ought not
to have to prove to a Christian believer that 'that than which
nothing greater can be thought' is meaningful or is 'in the
mind', for, to use a contemporary Wittgensteinian term, it is part and parcel of the Christian 'language-game' .
St. Anselm now produces a wholly new variation on the original proof in Chapters II and III of the Proslogion. God is
I P• 169.
THE A U TH O R ' S REPLY T O GAUN I L O [I]
defined once again as 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' . Now if 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' had a beginning, then it would be less great than
it would be if it had no beginning of its existence. 'That than
which nothing greater can be thought', then, cannot have a beginning of its existence. This, however, is still on the con
ceptual level ; Anselm is simply establishing a formal connexion between being 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' and 'not having a beginning', and he has done
nothing yet to show that the former concept is instantiated in
reality. Anselm's next move is to establish a connexion between
'not having a beginning' and 'not being able to be thought of as not existing', that is, to establish that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought', since it does not have a beginning, exists necessarily or non-contingently. But if 'that than which
nothing greater can be thought' must exist necessarily, then,
if it can be thought of, or if it possibly exists, it must actually exist. 1
This version seems to be a variation on the proof in Chapter III of the Proslogion. Instead of assuming, as he did in Chapter
III, that to exist necessarily was greater than to exist con tingently, St. Anselm here gives a reason for this, namely that
necessary existents have no 'beginning' of their existence
whereas contingent existents do. One may wonder, however, whether the new premiss, 'whatever has no beginning is greater than whatever has a beginning', is any more evident than the original premiss in Chapter III of the Proslogion. Docs
'beginning' mean temporal beginning or beginning in time, so
that Anselm's meaning is that eternal beings, beings that have not begun in time, are greater than temporal beings ? If this
1 Anselm seems here to equate necessity defined in terms of having no beginning, or, in the next section, in terms of non-spatio-temporality or non-compositeness, with necessity defined in logical terms as 'not being able to be thought of as not existing'. However, D. P. Henry, 'The Proslogion Proofs', pp. 1 50-1 , notes :
'Doethius' "necessary beings" --the heavenly bodies and the eternal principles of things-are not . . . sufficient for Anselm, since the being which he has in mind must be unique.' Anselm wishes 'to exalt the being of "that than which nothing greater can be thought" above the multiplicity of the merely physically necessary, which thought can decompose and which hence, while "not possible not to be'', can nevertheless be thought not to be . . . . There is thus only one being that is "not possible to-be-thought not to be", and it is greater than that which is "possible to-be thought not to be".'
C O M M ENTARY
is what he means, then his equation of eternal beings with necessary beings is quite obviously invalid, for it is evident that an eternal being can be contingent. Or does 'beginning' mean
'coming into existence' in the sense that a thing comes actually to exist ' after' possibly existing, so that Anselm's premiss is that beings that come to exist are greater than those that do not
need to come into actual existence ? If this is what Anselm means, then it is difficult to see that this is any more evident than the premiss in Chapter III of the Proslogion, for the ques tion remains whether it makes sense to speak of beings which do not need to come into existence.
As we have remarked, St. Anselm is here emphasizing the connexion between the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' and the notion of 'necessary existence' .
Why then, i t may b e asked, does h e not see that h e could formu late a more economical proof by doing away with the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' altogether ?
Thus, one could define God straight off as 'that which cannot be thought not to exist' or 'that which necessarily exists'. And then, if it were admitted that this notion could be thought of, that is, that the notion of a necessary existent were possible, it would follow, as St. Anselm has already argued, that it must actually exist, for if that which cannot be thought not to exist can be thought of, then it must be thought to exist ; or, if that
which cannot not-be can be, then it must actually be. Why
did not St. Anselm develop his argument in this way ? As we have already suggested, the only answer must be that St.
Anselm did not think of his proof as a simple conceptual analysis of the notion 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' or 'that which necessarily exists', but rather as a genuine
inference or argument in which the premiss 'what exists in reality is greater than what exists in the mind' , or 'what exists necessarily is greater than what exists contingently', is an
absolutely indispensable element.
Anselm now gives another justification of the premiss in Chapter III of the Proslogion, this time trying to link contin gency with spatio-temporality and compositeness ; that is to say, he argues that whatever exists in space and time, and in such a way that it is composed of parts, exists in a contingent way.
To prove then that 'that than which nothing greater can be
THE AUTH O R ' S R E PLY TO GAUN I L O [I ] - [I I I]
thought' exists necessarily, is ipso facto to prove that 'it does not exist as a whole in any particular place or at any particular time, but it exists as a whole at every time and in every place' . 1
\'Ve know then, Anselm concludes, that ' that than which
nothing greater can be thought' must, if it exists, exist in such
a way that it cannot be thought not to exist, and consequently we know that it has not had a beginning of its existence, nor is it a spatio-temporal being, nor one composed of parts. How can
Gaunilo claim then that he cannot think of or understand 'that
than which nothing greater can be thought' ? Of course, we do not understand it completely or in a determinate way ; but even to understand it partially or indirectly is still to understand something about it, just as to see daylight is to see the light of the sun although we do not see the sun itself directly.2
[IT.] If 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' can
be understood in this way then, Anselm goes on, it is 'in the
mind', for to be understood and to be 'in the mind' arc synony mous.J And, if it is 'in the mind', then it must exist in reality,
since to exist in reality is greater than existing in the mind alone, so that it would be self-contradictory to say that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' exists in the mind
alone (while admitting that to exist in reality is greater than to
exist in the mind alone) .
[III.] St. Anselm now considers Gaunilo's example of the 'Lost Island', which is meant to show that, from the notion of a 'most excellent' thing, we cannot infer that it exists in actual
reality. I concede, says St. Anselm, that from the notion of the 'Lost Island', or the notion of anything else, for that matter, we
cannot infer actual existence. It is only in the one unique case that this inference can be made, namely with the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' .
Anselm's reply to Gaunilo here, however, needs to be filled out in more detail to be satisfactory. Thus, for example, he
would need to say that the notion of the 'most excellent'
I p. I 73.
2 Ibid.
3 pp. 1 73-4. St. Anselm's elaborate demonstration of this fairly obvious point affords an amusing illustration of his 'dialectical' style: 'Sicut enim quod cogitatur, cogitatione cogitatur, et quod cogitatione cogitatur, sicut cogitatur sic est in cogitatione : ita quod intelligitur intellectu intelligitur, et quod intellectu intelli gitur sicut intelligitur ita est in intellectu.'
C O M M ENTARY
island is a notion of merely a relative 'greatest', for no matter how excellent or perfect or 'great' an island may be, it can never be so great that we cannot conceive of a greater, and it will certainly never be the most excellent or most perfect or 'greatest' being absolutely speaking. On St. Anselm's premisses, of course, an actually existing island will be greater or more perfect than one merely thought of, but this does not imply that there is an actually existing island. The case of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought', however, is different, for here, so St. Anselm claims, we have the concept of something which is the 'greatest' absolutely speaking, something than which it is not possible in any way to think of a greater. And, St. Anselm goes on, if we can think of this then we must conclude that it exists necessarily; 'he who thinks of it, thinks of something which cannot be thought not to exist'.1
[IV.] St. Anselm next replies to Gaunilo's point that we ought not to say that God cannot be thought ('cogitare') not to exist, but rather that He cannot be understood ('intelligere') not to exist. This, says Anselm, would not help, because, if we use the word 'understand' only of direct and immediate knowledge of actually existing things, then we should have to say that nothing known to exist can be 'understood' not to exist, and then it could be said of many things besides God that they were such that they could not be understood not to exist, so that this
(not being able to be understood not to exist) would not be a peculiar and distinguishing characteristic of God. Anselm, then, prefers to say that we can 'think' of things as not existing, even while we know that they do actually exist. Thus, things
'which have a beginning or end or which are made up of parts and . . . all those things which do not exist as a whole in a particular place or at a particular time, can be thought as not existing'.2 That is to say, spatio-temporal and composite things are contingent. And Anselm concludes that God, not being a spatio-temporal and composite being, is non-contingent, or 'cannot be thought as not existing' .3 As we have already seen, however, this conclusion does not follow, for a non-spatio temporal and non-composite being might still be contingent.
In what sense, then, do we say that God cannot be thought
I P• 1 77,
2 Ibid. a Ibid.
T H E A U T H O R ' S RE PLY T O GAU N I L O [IV] - [V ]
not to exist ? Not just in the sense, Anselm replies, in which we 'cannot think of something as not existing while knowing that it does exist, since we cannot think of it as existing and not exist ing at the same time' ,r for this applies to things other than God ;
but also in the sense that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' cannot even be conceived not to exist. This latter applies to God alone, for with all other things, even though they exist they can still be thought of as not existing. But then, in what way can the Fool say that God does not exist ? St.
Anselm refers back to Chapter IV of the Proslogion, where the possibility of denying that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' actually exists is admitted and explained by saying that he who makes the denial does not really comprehend what the formula 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' means.
St. Anselm's reply here, however, is not wholly satisfactory for if the proposition ' God exists' is not a logically necessary one, then it can be denied without self-contradiction. In other words, it is possible to think that God does not exist. However, it might be argued that only after we have gone through St.
Anselm's proof do we see then, as a result of the proof, that God cannot be thought not to exist, or, that the proposition 'God
(that than which nothing greater can be thought) actually exists' is a logically necessary one. That is, we prove that the proposition 'God exists' is a logically necessary one. St. Anselm would have to give some such account as this in order to meet
Gaunilo's objection fully.
[V.] In his argument Gaunilo used the formula ' that which is greater than everything' ('maius omnibus' ) , and assumed that
it was equivalent to Anselm's 'that than which nothing greater can be thought'. But, Anselm obj ects, the two formulas are not equivalent for the purpose of proving the existence of God. To illustrate this Anselm puts forward yet another variation of the Proslogion argument. 1n this version 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is defined as that which cannot be thought of as not existing. Now, 'what does not exist can possibly not exist, and what can not exist can be thought of as not existing.'z Therefore 'that than which nothing greater
I P• 1 79,
2 Ibid.
COMMENTARY
can be thought' must actually exist. Indeed, St. Anselm concludes, 'it neither does not exist, nor can not exist, or be thought of as not existing.'1 Now, he goes on, it is not evident that 'that which is greater than everything' (to adopt Gaunilo's formula) cannot be thought not to exist; that is to say, it is not immediately evident that, if 'that which is greater than every thing' did not actually exist, then it would precisely not be
'that which is greater than everything'. One would, in fact, need to show that 'that which is greater than everything' was identical with 'that than which nothing greater can be thought', in order to prove that the former could not be said not actually to exist without self-contradiction.
[VI.] St. Anselm goes on to answer Gaunilo's objection that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' may be 'in the mind' merely in the way in which a 'false thing' is in the mind.
Anselm replies that this is all that he needs for his argument to work, for all that is necessary to his argument is that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is 'in the mind' ; we do not need to know at the outset that there is some being existing in reality which corresponds to this thought. All that is needed is that the notion 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' be meaningful, not that it be true.
[VII.] The argument here is obscure; however, the gist of it seems to be that we do not need to understand 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' completely. It is sufficient for St. Anselm's purpose if we understand the notion partially or to some extent, for to admit that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is not a clear and distinct notion is not to say that it is without any meaning at all. It may well be, St.
Anselm concludes, that someone may be completely ignorant of what the term 'God' means, but no one can plausibly allege that he does not understand at all what 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' means.
[VIII.] St. Anselm now considers the important question of how it can be shown that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is a meaningful notion to one who is not a Christian
I p. 1 8 1 .
THE A U T HO R ' S R E PLY T O G AU N I L O (V]-[ V I I I ]
believer. Gaunilo had objected that, since by definition 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' signifies a being
essentially different from any of the things within our ex
perience, we can therefore have no notion of it at all nor can we get an idea of it from other things like it. Anselm replies, how ever, that we can form an idea of 'that than which nothing
greater can be thought' by reflecting upon the things within our experience. Thus, for example, we see that the things we know
have a beginning and end ; we acknowledge also that being subject to temporal conditions is a limitation or imperfection,
and we can infer that if there were a thing which, though it had a beginning, did not have an end, it would be better than the things which have both beginning and end. And again, on the same principle, we can infer that what has neither beginning nor end is better or more perfect or 'greater' than either of the former two. Now, cannot we go on to infer that if a being existed such that it was not subject to temporal conditions at all-'that which does not lack anything at all nor is forced to change or move'-it would be better or more perfect or 'greater' still ? This would, in fact, be a being so great that no greater could be thought. We can thus, by purely rational means appreciable by everyone, believers and unbelievers alike, show that the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be
thought' is a meaningful one. As St. Anselm puts it, 'In this way, therefore, the Fool, who does not accept the sacred au thority [of Revelation] can easily be refuted if he denies that he can form an idea from other things of that-than-which-nothing greater-can-be-thought.' 1 And this, in fact, chimes in with what
St. Paul says about the possibility of reaching an idea of God by reflecting upon His creation (Rom. i. 20) .2
The reasoning that St. Anselm uses here is very much like
that used in the Monologion arguments for the existence of God, and it may seem, at first sight, that St. Anselm has landed
himself in the paradoxical position of having to prove the existence of a supra-temporal being so great that there cannot be a conceivable greater in order to show that the main
I p. 187.
2 A text frequently cited by Aquinas later on, to support his view that the existence of God is not known self-evidently but only by an a posteriori proof based on certain facts about the world.
826610 H
C O M M ENTARY
premiss of the Proslogion arguments is meaningful. However, it is clear enough that St. Anselm's intention is simply to show that by a process of abstraction on temporal things, and by invoking the principle that being subject to temporal conditions is a metaphysical limitation or imperfection, we are enabled to see that the notion of a being so great that none greater may be conceived is a non-self-contradictory or logically possible or meaningful notion. But we still do not know whether this notion is realized or instantiated in actual reality; that, pre cisely, is the purpose of the Proslogion proof.
St. Anselm's reasoning here, as we have already indicated, rests upon the nco-Platonic principle that being subject to temporal conditions represents a metaphysical limitation or imperfection, and also upon the possibility of comparing
temporal, eternal, and supra-temporal things as more and less perfect or great in an absolute sense. For St. Anselm these two assumptions were so evident that they needed no proof. In our examination of the Proslogion, however, we saw how difficult it was to justify them, and we must conclude here that St.
Anselm does not succeed in giving an acceptable meaning to the notion of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' .
For all that, St. Anselm was aware, as we have seen, of the necessity of showing that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' had a rational meaning appreciable by the un believer. For him the formula 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is not wholly derived from faith, as Barth and others have claimed, so that the Proslogion arguments would be conclusive only for those who already believe in God.
[IX.] In one sense, as Anselm remarked earlier, we cannot think of or understand what 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' means, in that we cannot think of the thing in itself signified by this description. But this does not prevent us from knowing that 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is a meaningful notion. We know, for example, what
'ineffable' means, even though we cannot specify what is ineffable ; and we know what 'inconceivable' means, even though we cannot think of the 'object' that it means.
In fact, Anselm continues, one who utters the proposition 'that than which nothing greater can be thought does not
THE AUTHO R ' S RE PLY T O GAUNI L O [ I X]-[X]
exist' must assume that the notion of ' that than which nothing greater can be thought' is meaningful in order to be able to deny its existence. This argument, reminiscent of Meinong and
the early Russell, is obviously invalid for it assumes that 'God does not exist' is logically similar to 'Unicorns do not exist',
as though the atheist were saying that we know what it would be like for God to exist but that in fact He does not exist. But
the atheist claims rather that 'God does not exist' must be interpreted in the same way as 'Square circles do not exist',
where we are not denying actual existence of a possibly existing subject but rather denying that there can be any such subj ect at all.
[X.] In the final section St. Anselm indicates that the Proslogion proofs were meant not merely to prove the actual existence of
'that than which nothing greater can be thought', but also to
prove certain of the attributes of God. If God is 'that than
which nothing greater can be thought', then we must predicate
of God 'whatever it can, absolutely speaking, be thought better to be than not to be' . 1 If God is the greatest conceivable being, then He must possess his attributes in the greatest con
ceivable way. For example, if God is defined as 'that than
which nothing greater can be thought', and if it is greater to be goodness itself rather than merely to be a particular good
thing, then God must be goodness itself. In this way, by retaining the major premiss of the Proslogion proof, 'God is that
than which nothing greater can be thought', and by varying the
minor premiss, 'It is greater to be X than not-X', we can prove
all the attributes of God.
St. Anselm concludes with a polite bow towards Gaunilo.
Since Gaunilo praised those parts of the Proslogion that seemed acceptable, it is clear that his criticisms were not made in any malicious spirit but with complete goodwill.
1 p. rgr.
P R O S L O G I O N
W I T H
A R E P L Y O N B E H A L F OF T H E F O O L
GAUN I L O
A N D
T H E A U T H O R ' S R E P L Y T O
GAU N I L O
T R A N S L A T O R ' S N O TE
Several minor liberties have been taken in the transla tion.
The formula 'that-than-which-nothing-greater can-be-thought' and its variants have been hyphenated for the sake of convenience ; the Fool of the Psalmist has been given a capital letter; italics have been added in a few passages to make the meaning clearer ; and some supplementary words and phrases (enclosed in square brackets) have also been interpolated for the same purpose.
Biblical quotations have been translated directly from St. Anselm's text which differs slightly from
that of the Latin Vulgate version. References to the Psalms follow the Vulgate numbering which differs from that of the Hebrew texts followed by most other versions.