Part VIII: The Eighth Commandment.
PART VIII: THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT OF THE DECALOGUE
§ 172. The Eighth Commandment is: “You shall not speak false testimony against your neighbor” [Exod. 20:16]. Our neighbor’s resources are protected by the preceding Seventh Commandment, so next it follows that the Eighth Commandment should look out for his reputation, lest it be tarnished by lies or malicious charges.
(1) The word 
means “to respond.” Therefore this commandment is expressly about the specific testimony we give in court when interrogated about some case. The word 
is used both for a person who is testifying as well as for the thing, or testimony, that the witness gives. Moreover, it is the nature of testimony that one testifies about a truth and sure thing which he knows, has seen, and has heard. Others must trust him since they do not know nor did they see.
(2) We are not forbidden to speak testimony simply, for human society cannot do without using testimony. Rather, God’s command forbids us to give false testimony.
(3) Neither are we forbidden to speak testimony against our neighbor, seeing as sometimes we are compelled by love for God and zeal for truth and justice to give testimony in court against our neighbor. Rather, it is giving false testimony against him that is forbidden.
(4) Since this commandment forbids false testimony in court, it is understood that the same commandment fortifies the order of judges and their legal actions.
(5) By synecdoche, under the one kind of false, forensic testimony (which is more troublesome than the rest) is contained a denouncement of all lying in general. Lev. 19:11: “You shall not steal nor deal falsely nor lie one to another.” Matt. 19:18; Mark 10:19; Rom. 13:19 [Vg]: “You shall not bear false witness.”
(6) Therefore the aim and end purpose of this commandment is the preservation of truth in human society.
The virtues required in the Eighth Commandment.
§ 173. From these foundations one can easily see how truth, or truthfulness, is the primary and chief virtue of this commandment. It should shine: (1) in the heart, that we be led by a serious love of and zeal for the truth; (2) on our tongue, that we profess the truth freely, fearlessly, and faithfully; (3) in our behavior, that we avoid deceitful pretexts and concealments; (4) on our actions, that we keep our agreements and promises unbroken.
Furthermore, since the benefit of truthfulness is widely applicable in common life, the following catalog of virtues for this commandment can be made with respect to objects: (a) In the courts and indeed by all who are involved in public affairs or who are summoned to court. A judge should give his verdict on the basis of what he has discovered after hearing both sides. A plaintiff should bring a just accusation. The accused who is aware of his crime should neither deny nor minimize it. Witnesses should offer neither unknown nor false facts, nor should they hide the truth maliciously. Defense attorneys should not undertake the defense of evil cases, nor should they maliciously avoid good ones. (b) In giving advice, where one’s aim must be the truth, the glory of God, and the welfare of the neighbor. (c) In treaties and transactions [contractus], where one must act “free of trickery and deceit,”69 according to the ancient saying. (d) In the learning and arts that are useful and necessary to human life. (e) In all the civil realm, that truth be spoken about the neighbor, his innocence defended, and that uncertainties be placed in the best construction with a moderate interpretation.
Sins against the Eighth Commandment.
§ 174. The following, then, are in conflict with this commandment:
(1) A love of lying; a delight in false testimonies.
(2) Speaking falsehood in court, [such as] when a judge gives a false verdict, when judgment is passed before both sides have had a sufficient hearing, when judgment is perverted by bribery, favoritism, fear of peril, desire for popularity; when the legitimate order and process of the courts are disturbed, when a plaintiff brings a false accusation against a defendant, when he takes legal action for insignificant reason, when a defendant denies his crime or minimizes his case contrary to his conscience, when witnesses deny or corrupt or hide the truth, when they testify about a matter about which they have insufficient knowledge, when defense attorneys take on the defense of an evil case, when they encourage litigation for personal gain, when they avoid good cases maliciously; or [speaking falsehood] in advising, [such as] when people give bad counsel; or [speaking falsehood] in treaties and contracts, [such as] when they are drawn up with ambiguous or deceitful language; or [speaking falsehood] in subjects of learning or the arts, when these are maliciously corrupted; or [speaking falsehood] in the civil realm, [such as] when our neighbor’s reputation is tarnished by insults and slander, when true judgment is perverted by flattery, when a true crime of a neighbor is made public due to one’s ambition or vanity, when ambiguous words or deeds are distorted by sinister interpretations.
(3) Making insidious insinuations and pretenses in life and behavior.
(4) Violating agreements and contracts, etc.
Here also one should place sins of omission as well as those things which make us participants in the sins of others. These can easily be perceived from the examples of sins just mentioned.
§ 175. There are secondary, nonprincipal virtues of this commandment that restrain man’s tongue, such as: (1) Keeping silent, a quality which knows how to keep secrets well and keeps quiet about things that do not need to be said or are not helpful to say. Talkativeness, idle speech, betrayal, and excessive silence go against this. (2) Friendliness and affability, which willingly and kindly listens, responds, and speaks when it is needed and welcomed. Conflicting with this are moroseness, listening to others with disdain, responding harshly, and fake kindness. (3) Wit, which is the spice of truth; it uses metaphor and humor to admonish, delight, or censure others while taking into account the persons, the time, and the place. Conflicting with this are scurrility, which circulates obscene jokes and insults and censures and rails at others with biting words. This is a disposition to use wit at the wrong time. (4) Also related to this are candor, simplicity, constancy, modesty, seriousness, eloquence, gentleness, a desire for true glory, etc. However, all of these are nothing more than the offshoots and fruit of truth and truthfulness.
Whether every lie is sin.
§ 176. The virtues and vices of this commandment should likewise be illustrated with statements and examples of Scripture, adding the promises and threats, and giving examples of the rewards and punishments, etc. However, our purpose here does not permit us to undertake this now.
Therefore the question arises: (I) Is every lie without exception sin against the Eighth Commandment?
We respond. Lying may be divided, with respect to its purpose, into pernicious lying, lying out of duty, and playful lying. (See Augustine, Enchirid. ad Laur., ch. 22; Lombard, Sent., part 3, dist. 38; [Ius canonicum, c. 14] Ne quis., [causa] 22, q. 2.) The purpose of pernicious lying is to do harm; of dutiful, to benefit; of playful, to give pleasure. No one doubts that this commandment prohibits pernicious lying, but many have doubts about dutiful and playful lying as to whether they should be listed as sins. Augustine expressly treats this subject in his book Ad Consentium and in Letter 1 ad Hieron. Since playful lying does not cause much harm and, furthermore, dutiful lying seems to benefit (since they are not as contrary to charity as is pernicious lying), they should be considered very minor sins. However, by no means should they be placed into the category of adiaphora or virtues since a misuse of words [signorum] happens not only in pernicious lying but also in dutiful and playful lying. Words are the symbols of our minds and of things. Therefore they abuse words who by them signify something other than what they have conceived in their mind.70
** Augustine (Letter 2 ad Hieron.): “If lies told out of duty have entered into the Sacred Scriptures, then what authority will remain in them?” And again: “Then what statement of the Scriptures would one cite as weighty enough to crush the evil of contentious falsehood? For as soon as you will have cited it, someone who understands it differently says, because he supports the opposite view, that the writer has lied out of some honorable sense of duty.” Also, De mendac. (ch. 14): “Whoever thinks that there is some kind of lying which is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, because he thinks that he, a deceiver of others, is virtuous.” Again: “By no means, to no purpose, by no dispensation human or divine can a lie be spoken licitly.” Jerome takes a milder position, for he writes as follows (commentary on Galatians 2): “King Jehu of Israel should serve as an example to show us that pretense is in some cases useful and should be employed, for he could not have killed the priests of Baal without having pretended that he wanted to worship the idol (2 Kings 10).” **
Thomas ([ST,] 2.2., q. 110, art. 3): “Lying is an evil [in respect] of its own genus, for it is an act that is based upon an undue matter. Because words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for someone to signify with his voice what he does not have in his mind.” To be sure, we must help our neighbor, but with licit and legitimate means. Good intention does not make actions good which by their nature are sins. The apostolic precept is (Rom. 3:8): “Do not do evil that good may come of it.” If one were permitted to lie for the benefit of his neighbor, then surely he would be permitted to do this all the more for the glory of God.
As for me, I would concede that the lie that is not combined with the will or intent to deceive is not a mortal sin; but it does not at all follow from this concession that playful and dutiful lying are not sins. Besides the fact that the abuse of words also occurs in such lies, they also have this failing: those who use these kinds of lies deprive themselves of authority so that they cannot later admonish, reproach, or give advice with good effect; for their hearers think that they are lying out of duty to call them back into the way, not that things are actually so.
** Gesner (commentary on Genesis 27): “This definition of lying is incomplete: a false signification of a word with the intent to deceive.” Augustine (Enchirid., ch. 6; and De mendac., ch. 22): “Futhermore, lying comes from the corrupt lust of the flesh, and not from the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Its aim is either to insult God or to hurt a neighbor, whom to harm or afflict is iniquity. Otherwise it proceeds from a deceptive character.” **
As for the examples of saints who lied dutifully or playfully, they should neither be rashly condemned nor hastily imitated. Augustine answers regarding the Egyptian midwives: “It was not their lie but their faith and fear of God as well as their mercy toward the Israelite babies that pleased the Lord.” The rest [of these saints] spoke contrary to reality either out of a human spirit or by divine inspiration. In the case of the former, they suffered something human; in the case of the latter, we shall marvel at their words and deed, but we shall not imitate them. Thus Biel first answers in general (Sent., part 1, dist. 38, q. 1): “It is unnecessary for us to excuse the saints from every dutiful and playful lie, nor from every sin. They were not more perfect than the apostles who committed venial sins even after they had received the Holy Spirit.” Again: “They could have said such things by the intimate counsel of the Holy Spirit, through which the law is revoked.” Later he responds in particular to individual examples:
Abraham said that he would return, surely because he believed that his son would be raised from the dead after his sacrifice. Therefore he did not say anything contrary to what he had in mind. Isaac called his wife his sister following the custom of his people, where all female relatives were called sisters. Jacob called himself Esau because he actually was Esau, not in person, to be sure, but in office and authority. Furthermore, Isaac was asking about the one who deserved the blessing. Joseph calls himself a seer, expressing the opinion of the people who thought that he was just that; or, according to Alexander of Hales, the word for augury was used commonly in reference to knowledge of the future. When Rahab said that the scouts had left, she was commended not for her lie but for her piety. Jehu’s lie was pernicious because it brought death. It was not Judith’s lie but her concern for the freedom of her people which was commended.
These are Biel’s words. However, since neither playful nor dutiful lying meet the conditions of lying in the proper sense, it behooves us not to be too quick to condemn them.
Whether all pretense is forbidden.
§ 177. (II) The question arises: Is all pretense forbidden? We respond. People say that there is a distinction between pretenses. One kind aims only to deceive. No one doubts that this should be censured as sin. The second kind does not aim to deceive anyone but only to conceal plans, lest they be hindered. Here they refer to the example of Christ, who pretended that He was going to go farther (Luke 24:28). Bonaventure says: “There is a cautionary pretense, a didactic pretense, and a deceptive pretense. Joshua’s and David’s were of the first kind. Christ’s was of the second, to teach the disciples the duty of hospitality. Hypocrisy is of the third.” We are not required always to disclose what we know (Ecclesiasticus 19:8): “Do not discuss the behavior of others before friend or foe; and unless it would be sinful of you, do not reveal it.” Nevertheless be very careful not to use pretense when confession of the truth is called for, nor should we be sly under the guise of wisdom.
** Hunnius (QQ. on Genesis 18):
God says hypothetically: “As I live, I shall come to you” [Gen. 18:10] to carry out His plan, for He was not yet willing for it to be known that He was Jehovah. This is not pretense but disguise, which does not conflict with God’s nature: (1) Who would rightfully accuse Him for not having yet revealed who He was clearly to Abraham since God was not obligated to reveal Himself to Abraham? (2) Moreover, Abraham at first could have been unaware that it was the Lord who was appearing without any danger to himself. Therefore God put off disclosing Himself to a point of time when He judged it was most suitable to His plan. You see, He had not manifested Himself at this time for Sarah’s sake. He was waiting until she would display the lack of faith in her heart so that He would have a more suitable opportunity both to censure her and to strengthen her in the faith. The angels pretended that they would spend the entire night in the town square to carry out their plan and to arouse in Lot a desire to host them [Gen. 19:1–3], just as the Savior did too (Luke 24). This is not a kind of lying, because Christ and the angels did it not to deceive or harm anyone, not as a wicked trick, but only with the goal and intention of increasing in those from whom they seemed to be about to depart an eager desire to keep them.
(See also Hunnius, on Genesis 19.) **
Regarding Christ’s example [of intending to pass by the disciples, Luke 24:28], some claim that it signified how far He still was from the disciples’ hearts, even as it also foreshadowed His departure into heaven. Accordingly, there is no lie to be found in His pretense since His deed properly corresponded to the thing signified. Augustine (QQ. evang., bk. 2, q. 51):
What is written about the Lord—that “He pretended that He was going farther” [Luke 24:28]—does not involve a lie, for not everything that is pretended is a lie. Rather, when we pretend a thing that signifies nothing, then it is a lie. Moreover, when our fiction refers to a signification, it is not a lie but a figure of the truth. If this were not so, all things that wise and holy men or even the Lord Himself have said figuratively will have to be considered lies since, according to its usual meaning, truth does not consist of such statements, etc. Just as with words, deeds, too, may be feigned without lying in order to signify something.
The Syriac [version] translated it: “He made them think that it was as if He were going farther on.”
** Gesner (on Genesis 27, q. 1): “When the subject is fiction and pretense, confes sion and religion must always be excepted.” Augustine thinks very truly about this that (De mendac., ch. 14)
to lie in a matter of religious doctrine is a capital offense and greatly to be avoided. Under no circumstances should any falsehood be adduced there. However, outside a time of confession, in matters pertaining to this life, things often occur in such a way that we cannot accomplish what is fair without some fiction, pretense, and shrewdness. Without such cunning, Rebecca would have been unable to get Jacob’s blessing without a hateful quarrel with her husband and upsetting the entire household [Genesis 27]. It would have been impossible for the midwives to protect the lives of the children in Egypt without their noble contrivance [Exod. 1:15–20]; for the Gibeonites to gain the friendship of the Israelites without cleverness [Josh. 9:3–21]; for Nathan to bring David to admit his sin without that story [2 Sam. 12:1–7]; for Hushai to find out the wicked plans of Ahithophel [2 Sam. 15:32–37]; for the women to hide David’s messengers [2 Sam. 17:17–20]; for Rahab to send away the scouts [Josh. 2:1–21]; and, finally, for Joshua, David, and the rest of the rulers to administer their tasks without the application of stratagems. **
Whether one may use equivocations in court or confession.
§ 178. (III) The question arises: May one use equivocations and hide the truth in court or in a case of confession?
We respond. The Jesuits think so. Thus Toletus writes (Instruct., bk. 4, ch. 21):
At times one may use equivocation and deceive his listener, though not always. But when a judge demands an oath against justice, one may use equivocation and swear according to his own mind contrary to the judge’s intent. Suppose a judge asks someone, “Did you do this?” and he answers, “I did not,” thinking to himself “not to tell you” or “not at this time” or the like. If a man asks his wife if she is an adulteress, she can say, “I am not,” even though it may be true, by meaning “I am not, as far as revealing this thing to you is concerned.” The same is true in the case of a man who is forced to swear that he will accept another woman as his betrothed, by meaning “if she pleases me later.” Also, if a man has been captured by robbers and swears that later he will pay a hundred gold coins as ransom for his freedom. Swearing equivocally, he can say to himself that, if he should be freed later, then he is not bound to pay. It is also true in the case of a man wrongfully detained by a guard. If he swears that he will return later in order to be let go, then he can use equivocation and is not bound to return.
Campianus (Letter ad generalem societatis, written from England and printed at Trier in the year ’83, p. 86): “The condition of Catholics in England is extremely serious. They have no freedom of conscience. Nothing remains intact for them—neither voice nor religion. You have to speak along with others. You must affirm by oath what others have affirmed, even if you believe much differently in your heart, even if your conscience feels the exact opposite.” (In fact, this follows the teaching of the heretic Basilides who, as Eusebius reports, Hist. eccles., bk. 4, ch. 7, based on Agrippa Castor, was unashamed to teach that one should not hesitate to deny the faith in time of persecution, even by perjury.) Gregorius de Valentia ([Comm.], vol. 3, p. 1346) calls equivocation “a prudent defense.” The Englishman Thomas Morton (Apol. cathol., bk. 2, ch. 13) cites the words of the priests of Visby [sacerdotes Wisbycenses], which they wrote to a noble Catholic. In this letter they say: “It is the skill of our Jesuits to deceive the magistrates when taking oaths. When the public officers ask, ‘Are you a priest?’ the priest can answer” (they claim): “ ‘I am no such person (but with this intent added in his heart but not declared with his mouth) as you wish me to be’ or ‘to tell you’ or something like that.” However, these are the teachings of deceitful and perjurious men. When we are examined as witnesses in the courts or when we must confess our religious convictions, we are obligated to speak the bare and simple truth without any equivocation involved. Regarding oaths there is an outstanding quote from Isidore ([Ius canonicum,] c. Qui perjurare, causa 22, q. 5): “By whatever trick of words a person swears, God takes it in the same way as the person understands it to whom the oath is made.” Ibid.: “God, the despiser of duplicity, considers the straightforward intent of both parties. He despises and hates trickery of words as much on the part of the recipient as on the part of the declarer.”