Part V: The Fifth Commandment.
PART V: THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT OF THE DECALOGUE
§ 152. The Fifth Commandment is: “You shall not kill” [Exod. 20:13]. The end purpose and aim of the commandment is to prescribe the mutual duties of love by which people are to help each other; for we must conclude what is affirmed from what is denied, and it forbids those things that endanger the safety and protection of human life.
(1) We are forbidden to kill without any specific limitation of persons or of manner or of number or of instrument. After all, the Lawgiver does not say: “A man shall not kill” or “A woman shall not kill,” etc.; “You shall not kill a parent,” “not a citizen,” etc.; “You shall not kill publicly”; “You shall not kill with a sword or with a club”; “You shall not kill many.” Instead, it says in general, “You shall not kill,” to make it understood that killing is universally forbidden.
(2) Saying this as a negative command accuses the corruption of our nature by which we are inclined toward killing.
(3) Because anger, hatred, envy, etc., are forbidden under the name of a more serious sin, this shows what place those sins have before the judgment of God, even though we regard them as lesser sins.
(4) The explicit interpretation of this law given by Christ in Matt. 5:21[–22] shows that not only outward but also inner killing is forbidden. Not only the hand but also the heart are commanded not to kill—that is, one should not be inclined to kill; one should not seek opportunities and the means of killing; etc.
(5) The commandment not to kill comes after [the commandment] that teaches us to honor our parents, under whom magistrates are also included. From this it is clear that a magistrate, insofar as he is a public person and punishes criminals according to God’s Law, does not sin against this law. This is proven quite clearly from Gen. 9:6; Exod. 22:18; Rom. 13:4; etc.
§ 153. The positive meaning of this commandment is set forth in the epitome of the entire Second Table in Lev. 19:18: “You shall love your neighbor as yourself.” Christ explains the negative meaning very nicely in Matt. 5:22, 24–25: “Whoever is angry with his brother shall be liable to judgment. Whoever says to his brother, ‘Raca!’ shall be liable to the council; and whoever says, ‘You fool!’ shall be liable to hellfire. Be reconciled to your brother. Make friends quickly with your accuser while you are on the way.” This shows that one violates this commandment not only by external works but also by the inner impulses of the heart, words, and gestures. This commandment therefore requires:
(1) Loving our neighbor from the heart—that is, embracing him in genuine benevolence; having true and serious empathy for the calamities that we see happen to our neighbor; being gentle and kind to him; loving harmony; gratefully acknowledging the kindnesses that our neighbor shows us; bearing with our neighbor’s weaknesses; etc.
(2) Loving our neighbor with our words—that is, being friendly and courteous, helping him with advice, and uplifting him with consolation.
(3) Loving our neighbor in deed—that is, testifying to our inner love with action. To this belong many remarkable virtues, for example: Particular justice, which does not harm anyone’s body or life. Beneficence, which exercises works of love. Brotherly pardon, which forgives offenses. Distributive, punishing justice, by which a magistrate, endowed with divine authority, punishes evildoers. Military and civil fortitude, which endures perils and hardships for the defense of the republic and fights for justice. Friendship, which out of true and sincere benevolence creates a mutual sharing of honorable duties.
Sins against the Fifth Commandment.
§ 154. The following conflict with this Fifth Commandment:
(1) Killing our neighbor in our heart—that is, becoming angry with him rashly, hating him, envying him, thinking and plotting evil against him, burning with desire for revenge, fostering enmity and grudges, having a low opinion of our neighbor, not caring about the bad things that happen to him, refusing to be reconciled to him, refusing to forgive his offenses, rejoicing at his misfortune, etc.
(2) Killing him with our tongue—that is, reviling him, calling down evil upon him, judging and condemning him rashly, criticizing [him], starting verbal fights, refusing to give advice and consolation, making fun of his misery. Here belong angry gestures that show hatred and ill will toward our neighbor. Christ includes these in the expression “Raca” [Matt. 5:22].
(3) Killing our neighbor with the actual, external act. This can occur in various ways, not only with hand, sword, club, stone, spear, but even with poison. In fact, whoever has given an efficacious cause for someone’s death must be judged to have killed—for example, those who hinder conception; those who force out fetuses by abortifacients [abortionis pocula]; those who strike pregnant women; those who harm their own lives by lusts, luxury, or in other ways; those who prescribe medication for the sick without good sense and being ignorant of the medical art; etc. This is all called “causal homicide” [homicidium causale]. To this class belong those who aid in killing by counsel, effort, or false witness; those who do not defend people whom they could and should protect from being killed.
The catalog of virtues shows other sins, too, which are committed against this commandment. Thus against particular justice there are injustice and violent or fraudulent harm against one’s neighbor. Against beneficence and friendship there are pretended friendship, enmity, and gratification in unlawful things. Against brotherly pardon there are impoliteness, ill will, and private revenge. Against distributive, punishing justice there are cruelty, tyranny, excessive lenience and indulgence, and partiality. Against fortitude there are the timidity that deserts those whom we ought to defend and rashness that hurls itself into unnecessary perils.
These all should be illustrated with statements and examples of Scripture, adding also the promises and warnings about rewards and punishments, both temporal and eternal, in soul, body, and fortunes, etc. “To lecture about sins without mentioning threats is not to teach the Law but to abolish it,” as Chemnitz writes sternly (Loci, part 2, in explicat. quinti praecepti, p. 195).52
Whether suicide is a sin.
§ 155. (I) Here the question arises: Is suicide a sin against the Fifth Commandment? We respond. Yes.
** Suicide conflicts with: (1) The divine law “You shall not murder.” (2) The law of nature. (3) Moral precepts, for it violates one’s duty of having fortitude. (4) The state, for it takes a citizen from the republic. (5) Civil law, for self-killers are infamous. If hatred of oneself is unlawful, surely all the more is suicide. But we have the former in Eph. 5:29. Martial writes: “I do not want the man who ransoms his reputation by the easy shedding of his blood; I want the man who can be praised apart from his death.”53 [Again:] “It is easy to despise death when things are going badly, but that man is brave who can endure misery.”54 Augustine (Ad epist. Gaudentii secundam, bk. 2, ch. 5): “Although many innocent people are killed by others, no innocent person is killed by himself. In fact, innocence is [defiled]55 by the very thought of planning to kill one’s self, so that when he kills himself it is not an innocent person who is dying.” De civ. Dei (bk. 19, ch. 4): “Tell me, please, did Cato kill himself out of patience or impatience? For he only would have done it if he could not bear Caesar’s victory patiently. Where, then, is his fortitude? Clearly it failed; it succumbed; and, therefore, it was overcome.” (See Lactantius, Instit., bk. 3, ch. 18.) Someone has sung the following about Lucretia: “Lucretia, if you welcomed that fornicator, you are without justification in asking for the rewards of a justified death. But if violence was forced upon your chaste decency, what is this madness? Why die for someone else’s crime? It is in vain, then, Lucretia, that you long for praise, for either you perish as a criminal or die as a mad woman.” **
In Holy Scripture, man is forbidden to kill man. But now, whoever kills himself certainly is killing a man. Just as we are not the lords of someone else’s life, so neither have we received power over our own life to harm or to waste it as we will. “No one is lord over his members” ([Corpus Iuris Civilis], l. 3, ff. Ad leg. Aquil.). We draw the line here: that one may not die without the command of the highest ruler and overseer. We are citizens of the republic—moreover, of the church—and may not take a useful citizen from the republic.
Augustine (De civitat. Dei, bk. 1, chs. 17ff.) treats this question carefully and lists various reasons why suicidal people kill themselves: impatience with a disaster already received or threatening, hatred of and flight from the sin of another, unbearable shame over one’s own sin, pursuit of vainglory, desire for a better life, etc. However, he shows that none of these is a just and sufficient cause. He writes (ch. 26):
This we say, this we assert, this we approve in every way: no one should bring voluntary death upon himself as if to flee temporal ills, lest he come into eternal ones. No one should do it because of others’ sins, lest by the same sin he begin to have a most serious one of his own, though otherwise he was not polluted by another’s sin. No one should do it because of his past sins, because of which he needs this life all the more that those sins might be cleansed by repenting. No one should do it out of a desire for the better life for which we hope after death, for those who are guilty of their own death do not receive a better life after death.
(See Augustine, Contra Petilianum, bk. 2, ch. 49, and Letters 60 and 204.)
Therefore we do not approve when Adelhelmus, abbot of Malmesbury, argues that virgins should be declared56 blessed who laid violent hands upon themselves because of their fear of being violated. Jerome writes more correctly (Letter ad Marcellum de obitu Blesillae, speaking in the persona of God): “I do not accept such souls as have left their bodies against My will.” Chrysostom (on Galatians 1) says that “suicidal people are criminals and worse than murderers.” The example of Cato57 is heathen; that of Samson [Jdgs. 16:26–30], heroic; that of Razis [2 Maccabees 14:37–46], outside the canon; that of Jonah [Jon. 1:12–15], prophetic. If examples should have force, we propose the patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs who never lifted their hands against themselves when all the worst torments were being done to them. The examples of Ahithophel [2 Sam. 17:23], Judas [Matt. 27:3–5], and Pilate (in Eusebius, Hist., bk. 2, ch. 7) make suicide infamous, and yet not all people without distinction who commit suicide should be thought condemned to eternal death. Celichius treats this subject in a special writing.
Whether punishments imposed by magistrates conflict with the Fifth Commandment.
§ 156. (II) The question arises: On what basis can it be shown that criminal punishments imposed by magistrates are not sins against the Fifth Commandment?
We respond. There exists a clear rescript of God’s opinion giving the right of the sword to the magistrate. Gen. 9:6: “Whoever sheds the life of man, by man shall his blood be shed.” Rom. 13:4: “He does not bear the sword in vain.” Therefore just as a magistrate exercises the judgments of God rather than of man (2 Chron. 19:6), so also it is divine rather than human authority that imposes the punishments. [The magistrate] is God’s minister, and at His will he administers a divinely granted sword to kill those whom he with the voice of the law orders to be slain and to defend those whom he decides are to be saved. If magistrates do this, not only do they not sin by killing, but they would be sinning by not killing. The sword of the magistrate that kills criminals is so far from being against the sanction of this commandment that it rather is in service to the commandment and has the same aim as does the commandment. For the end purpose of this commandment is to provide for the safety of human life. Using the sword of vengeance to punish enemies of the human race, disturbers of the public peace, and those who plot against our life serve this same end. Guilty blood is shed lawfully, lest guiltless blood be shed unlawfully. Augustine (De civ. Dei, bk. 1, ch. 21): “He does not do the killing himself who owes service to his commander, just as a sword is the auxiliary of its user. Therefore by no means have those acted against the commandment ‘You shall not murder’ who have waged war at God’s command or who have punished criminals by death while serving as a person of public authority according to His laws, that is, according to the authority of His most just reasoning.”
** [Arguments] that an arithmetic proportion should be observed in imposing punishment on a murderer. (1) It is stated absolutely: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” [Gen. 9:6]. (2) Partiality is simply prohibited by divine Law (Lev. 19:15; Deut. 1:17). (3) With regard to his office, a judge is bound to render to each person his due. Hence the word δίκαιoς [“just”] is like δίχαιoς (“going through the middle”) because he observes equality. (4) Saul sentenced his own son to capital punishment (1 [Samuel] 14). David pursued Absalom (2 [Samuel] 13). (5) If this does not happen, many evils result. Poland, where killings have multiplied, is proof of this. (6) Men in high office sin in two ways, not only by deed but also by example.
[Arguments] that a geometric or harmonic proportion should be observed: (1) In Exodus 21 a murderer is decapitated, but a master who has killed a slave by chastising him too severely is free from that punishment. (2) All laws would be subverted because the infinite variety of times, places, and persons would provide judges with an infinite dissimilarity of cases. (3) At the intercession of his people, Saul freed his son according to a fair justice.
To decide, one must make a distinction: an arithmetic proportion can be observed if there is an extrinsic quality that has no bearing on the nature of the deed, such as wealth, poverty, nobility, insignificance of birth, etc. A geometric proportion can be observed if there exists a condition which aggravates or accentuates the deed. Furthermore, there is a distinction between ἀκριβoδίκαιoν and ἐπείκεια (between strict justice and equitable justice). Insofar as strict justice is concerned, no distinction of persons should be applied, but all must be punished equally, etc. **
What should be decided about accidental homicide?
§ 157. (III) The question arises: What should be decided about accidental homicide? We respond.
** Toletus (bk. 5, ch. 6, p. 349) frees and absolves the man from mortal sin who is taken by sudden passion so that he is not sound of mind and kills another person. **
Accidental killings can occur in two ways: sometimes attention is given to something unlawful, useless, and foolish, but at other times to something lawful and honorable. Accidental homicide can come from pursuing either. An example of the former is if a drunk should fall down the stairs and crush a child to death or if a drunk rashly discharges a gun and harms his neighbor. An example of the latter is Deut. 19:5: “If a man goes with his neighbor into a forest to cut wood, and his hand swings the ax to cut down the tree, but the head slips from the handle and strikes his neighbor so that he dies.” In the first case, though it should not be said that an intentional homicide occurred, he still is not absolved of all fault, because his neighbor was killed by his unlawful or rash action. The latter case cannot be condemned as homicide in the proper sense of the word, nor can such a person be subjected to the penalty for homicide or great wrongdoing. This is why in such a case God Himself established in the law the cities of refuge (Exod. 21:13; Num. [35]:6; Deut. 19:6; Josh. 20:2). On the other hand, even though accidental homicide may not be subject to ordinary punishment in the state, it still is not a good nor indifferent thing before God, as is clear from the fact that such a killer was forced to live outside his own city in the cities of refuge until the death of the chief priest (Num. 35:25; Josh. 20:6). This indicated that another forgiveness for this sin comes to the penitent by faith through the death of Christ, who is the Chief Priest of the New Testament. Rabbi Salomon provides the following reason for this law: “The shedding of blood, even if it is accidental, shortens life and is a terrible thing before God.”
What should be determined about killing in self-defense?
§ 158. (IV) The question arises: What should be determined about killing in self-defense? We respond.
There are two kinds of killing in self-defense: public and private. It is public when, by authority of the magistrate, lawful war is waged, the requirements for which shall be listed in its own commonplace [On Political Magistracy (Commonplace XXVII), §§ 396– 429]. It is private when someone is oppressed by unjust force and is compelled by the need for defense to harm the life of another to save his own life or those of his neighbors. Concerning the former, there is no doubt that it is lawful, unless we, along with the Anabaptists, are willing to disapprove of lawful wars. There is a serious controversy about the lawfulness of the latter. But because the defense of our own body and those of our neighbors conforms not only to the law of nature but also to the law of love, almost everyone claims that such defensive homicide is lawful if due conditions are observed, especially that of inculpable protection. Exod. 22:2: “If a thief is found breaking in and is struck so that he dies, the striker shall not be guilty of his death.” Yet because in this case one could too easily leap over those things that are required for the precondition of inculpable protection—especially since zeal for revenge and the fires of anger sometimes rush upon the unwary—it is safest, in the forum of one’s conscience, more to mourn and weep because of that bloodshed rather than to boast and be elated; better to accuse one’s deed before the judgment of God than to excuse it; better to ask forgiveness for Christ’s sake from the mercy of God than to bring that act into God’s sight. Chemnitz treats this entire question carefully (Loci, [part] 2, ch. De vindict.).
** Proof is taken: (1) From the example of Abraham (Gen. 14:14), who was a pilgrim in the land of Canaan and had no political authority nor authority over the Sodomites. Nonetheless he armed his family to defend his nephew, fell upon and killed his enemies, and this defense did not displease God. Now, if Abraham, a private citizen, was allowed in a case of necessity to defend his nephew by killing his foe, all the more is one allowed to protect his own life. (2) From divine approval in Exod. 22:2, where God Himself absolves a homicide from punishment in which a robber or thief is slain who comes at night and sets an ambush for us, if this is for the sake of the defense of our own body or those of the household. Therefore such homicide is not contrary to God’s will. (3) From the law of nature. We have inscribed by nature and engraved upon our hearts not only that we should not harm anyone but also that we should defend our body against unjust force either by the ordinary authorities or by our own defense, when the public officer is unable to come to our assistance. Nature engrafts upon every living thing a desire for life and a drive to preserve it, etc. (4) From the concession of the magistrate. To drive away obvious violence in the failure of public assistance as best one can happens according to the laws and with the approval of the legal and divinely established authority. Therefore one should not censure such defense as private revenge. (5) From the absence of a divine prohibition. Christ did not come to take away civil laws or to change the laws of nature, nor is there anything in the New Testament which would approve changing the law that a thief or robber who comes by night can be killed with impunity. (See Meisner, Refut. Socini, p. 203.) **