Part VII: The Seventh Commandment.
PART VII: THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT OF THE DECALOGUE
§ 166. The Seventh Commandment is: “You shall not steal” [Exod. 20:15].
(1) The rabbinic scholars think that this commandment speaks about the theft of a person or kidnapping. However, the interpretation handed down in the writings of the prophets and apostles shows that theft is categorically forbidden. The word 
properly means secretly to plot and to steal something so as to deceive the awareness of the person to whom it is of value. Thus in Gen. 31:26, Jacob is said to have “stolen the heart of Laban because he went away without Laban’s knowledge.”
(2) Although God wanted this commandment to forbid not only stealing but also—and much more—robbery and plundering, yet He makes clear mention of stealing [or theft]62 so that we might understand that under the prohibition of the lesser the greater is forbidden even more so. Furthermore, robbery and plunder can be countered and resisted by the authority of the magistrate, but theft, which is perpetrated in secret, often escapes the knowledge of a judge and of other people for a long time.
(3) The end purpose and aim of the commandment is to fortify external resources, lest they be exposed to people’s deceits, evil practices, and plundering.
(4) The affirmative should be concluded from what is forbidden. Namely, this commandment sanctions all the virtues which support and preserve our neighbor’s property; and it approves of a certain distinction of ownership, the just acquisition of goods and resources, possession, and legitimate use.
The virtues required in the Seventh Commandment.
§ 167. From these fundamentals it is easy to gather the virtues of this commandment.
(1) If we must not steal, then we must certainly perform the tasks of our vocation diligently to acquire those things which are necessary to sustain life and to nourish those under our care. Therefore the first virtue of this commandment is diligence in performing the tasks of our vocation. By this we are sure that our vocation and the tasks of our vocation are pleasing to God since we have been reconciled to God through faith in Christ. With this faith shining forth, we diligently perform the works of our vocation, entrusting the result to God, seeking blessing and success from Him, and humbly awaiting all things needful from His hands. Eph. 4:28: “Let the thief no longer steal but labor with his hands.”
(2) If theft is forbidden, then surely the distinctions of properties and of ownerships should not be disturbed. Therefore the second virtue of this commandment is commutative justice [iustitia commutativa].63 In transactions [contractus] this preserves fairness congruent with right reason and honorable laws. There are various kinds of transactions: buying and selling, bartering, leasing, partnerships, permanent tenure of land [ἐμφύτενσις],64 etc. Upright reasoning and virtuous laws regulate the fairness of all these. To this virtue pertain the return of a deposit, payment of debt, return of those things that were taken away by theft or robbery.
(3) If we must not steal, then we must certainly be content with those possessions which God has given us through the honorable tasks of our vocation. Therefore the third virtue of this commandment is contentment, whereby we, content with our lot, recognize God’s gracious blessing, endure the burden of poverty patiently, and view another’s fortune “with the eye not turned back.”65 1 Tim. 6:[6]: “Godliness that is content with one’s lot is great gain.”
(4) If we must not steal, then we must certainly protect and use our own property profitably; we must avoid unnecessary expenses, lest we bring voluntary poverty upon ourselves and are driven later to theft and robbery. Therefore the fourth virtue of this commandment is parsimony, which avoids unnecessary spending, protects our property, and incurs expenses only when the need is necessary or honorable. To this virtue belongs a temperance that observes due moderation in lifestyle.
(5) If we must not steal, then we must instead give to a neighbor in need. Therefore the fifth virtue of this commandment is beneficence and generosity, which shares possessions and works not owed by civil obligation but by natural and divine obligation wherever and whenever it is fitting. To this belong the duty of lending, free giving, hospitality, etc.
Sins against the Seventh Commandment.
§ 168. The antithesis shows the sins by which one sins against this commandment:
(1) Laziness; interfering in the affairs of others; needless poverty; illicit and meddlesome activities; trusting in our own industry and diligence.
(2) Injustice, which is any unjust transfer of property, whether it occur by force or fraud. The former is called robbery; the latter, theft. There are various kinds of theft. Simple theft is taking away a private citizen’s property apart from his consent or knowledge. To this kind of theft belong all kinds of fraudulent activities in transactions that cheat one’s neighbor in business, be it faulty merchandise, unfair price, the use of unfair weights and measures, counterfeit money, deceptive words, or other deceits. The apostle calls this “transgressing and defrauding a brother in business” (1 Thess. 4:6). Embezzlement [peculatus] is theft perpetrated in a matter of the state. Sacrilege is stealing something sacred. Cozenage is unjust transacting; usury is the profit received only from lending; kidnapping [ἀνδραπoδισμός] is the theft of a person. Also, it is sin against reciprocal justice to deny wages that are due to workers, to refuse to return a deposit, to maliciously delay or refuse to pay a debt, and to refuse to restore another’s property.
(3) Greed, the inordinate love of wealth “by which the heart is set on [riches]” (Ps. 62:10); the feigned refusal of that which is necessarily owed or which is offered honestly.
(4) Stinginess and niggardliness; prodigal squandering, which is the closest path to greed and fraud.
(5) Inhumanity, lack of compassion, closing the ears to the cries of the poor, rashly refusing to lend.
Not only do those who do the stealing sin against this commandment but also those who share in their theft, be it by plan, mandate, consent, secrecy, or permission. A negligent servant is said to be worse than a brazen thief, as is also the faithless worker who dishonestly demands the full price for his labor.
Whether all theft is forbidden.
§ 169. (I) The question arises: Is all theft simply forbidden? We respond. Musculus (Loci) uses the following distinction:
Of those things which are forbidden by divine Law, some things are so ordered that they can never be committed without fault. This is true, for instance, for all those things that are forbidden in the First Table of the Law and some also in the Second, such as committing adultery, bearing false witness against a neighbor, etc. On the other hand, other things are so ordered that sometimes not only can they be done without sin but a sin is even committed if they are not done. We are commanded to love our parents; yet that honor ceases if they give orders contrary to the commandments of the heavenly Father. We are ordered not to kill; yet the magistrate does not sin by killing criminals but would sin by not killing them. Regarding this commandment, this also is the case in 2 Kings 11:[1–2]: “When Athaliah, the mother of Ahaziah, was destroying all the king’s offspring, Jehosheba, daughter of King Joram, sister of Ahaziah, stole Joash, son of Ahaziah, from among the king’s sons who were being slain and hid him.” This kind of theft should not be censured at all. To this also belongs the Israelites’ theft when, at God’s command, they carried off with them the gold, silver, and clothing of the Egyptians (Exod. 12:35).
However, if we wish to speak accurately, those were not thefts properly speaking, because hiding the future king should be considered a prudent defense against tyrannical cruelty. Neither does what the Israelites did fit the proper definition of theft, because the Egyptians had unjustly oppressed and exhausted the Israelites. Therefore it was just for there to be a restitution, especially by authority of the greatest judge, God, who is the owner of all goods. If in the civil court it is not judged to be theft when a magistrate forcefully and justly takes away enough goods from a debtor who refuses just repayment in order to satisfy his creditor, then all the less should this fair arrangement of God be accused of being theft. Moreover, the Egyptians did not give their property to the Israelites unwillingly, but God moved and turned their hearts (Exod. 12:36). Hence some note that in the description of this plundering the word is not 
but 
—the former meaning “to steal”; the latter, “to despoil” (Exod. 3:22).
Whether theft is forbidden by nature.
§ 170. (II) The question arises: Is theft forbidden by nature? We respond. Yes, because: (1) The moral Law is nothing else but the public, solemn repetition of the law of nature. But now, the moral Law forbids theft.
(2) Civil laws have made this clear. ([Corpus Iuris Civilis,] lib.1, §3, ff. De furt.: “Theft is the fraudulent taking of property for the sake of gain, the thing itself, or for its use or possession. To perpetrate this is forbidden by natural law.” [Corpus Iuris Civilis,] lib. probr. 42., ff. De verb. sign.: “Some disgraceful things are shameful by nature; some, by civil law; and some, by city custom. For example, theft and adultery are shameful by nature.” [Corpus Iuris Civilis,] lib. nam hoc 14, ff. De condic. indeb.: “By nature it is fair that no one should profit from someone else’s loss.” [Corpus Iuris Civilis,] lib. ex hoc jur., ff. De just. et jur., says that “there are distinct domains of ownership by universal law [iure gentium].66 ”)
Clever thefts were praised among the Spartans, and the Egyptians committed many thefts without harming their honor (according to Alexander ab Alexandro, Genial., bk. 6, ch. 10). However, this does not hurt [our argument], for the barbaric behavior of a few peoples does not in any way remove or alter the law of nature. Moreover, the solemn repetition of the divine Law was established for the specific purpose of undoing the corruptions with which the heathen had corrupted natural law. When it says in Prov. 6:30: “It is not a great fault if a man steals,” this must be interpreted comparatively. Compared to adultery, it is called a smaller sin, though in and of itself it may be far greater.
A corollary of this question is that theft is inexcusable by any pretext of necessity, though the Jesuit Maldonatus teaches the contrary (Summa, quaest. 8, art. 3): “The poor do not commit theft when they, pressed by extreme necessity, sieze another’s property, because then the property is improperly that of another but is common to an endangered life. It is not extreme necessity in a situation where there is almost no cure—as when a poor man is breathing his last—but when he cannot hardly be helped in any other way.”
Whether it is just for thieves to be punished by hanging.
§ 171. (III) The question arises: Is it just to punish thieves by hanging? To many this seems excessively harsh and rigid since divine Law establishes a punishment of [restoring] fourfold or fivefold (Exod. 22:1), since there is no comparison between a man’s goods and his life, and since the harshness of punishments should not exceed [the crimes’] category.
** (See Zepper;67 Piscator; the jurist Antonius Matthaeus; Keckermann, Curs. philos., disp. 32, q. 2.) The reasons for that Carolina law’s severity against thieves are: (1) The freedom of the Christian magistrate. The Christian magistrate is not bound as strictly to the forensic laws as was the magistrate of the people of Israel. Therefore their sanctioning [of capital punishment for theft] must not be evaluated directly according to [the forensic laws of Israel.] You see, if they exercise their freedom in other punishments—as, for instance, not to punish the insults of children with the sword, not to kill heretics, etc.—then surely some freedom remains for them in making punishment of thieves harsh, since we must make similar judgments about similar situations. (2) Utility, which is manifold: (a) citizens’ fortunes are better preserved; (b) evil is the more quickly removed from their midst; (c) others are effectively deterred from crime of this sort. (3) Equity. It is a common rule of law that punishments increase as the crimes increase. But now, theft has grown so much in the Roman Empire68 that hardly anyone has a safe place for his property. (4) Necessity. No legislator or ruler who is concerned for the welfare and safety of his subjects can or should be presumed to be so cruel and severe as to establish the death penalty without having been compelled by necessity. (Meisner, Philos., part 2, p. 586.) **
From this it is clear that for thieves, especially armed burglars, to be given capital punishment is not something that should meet with our disapproval. Besides Wesenbecius’s proof (Parat.)—that capital punishment has had the approval of almost all peoples—one should also note that in the Mosaic state the punishment eventually becomes sevenfold or even complete confiscation of all one’s goods due to the great number of robberies (Prov. 6:31): “If he is caught, he will pay sevenfold, and he will give up all the goods of his house.” In fact, in Exod. 22:2 God Himself establishes that a thief who is caught with intent to rob can be killed without trial: “If a thief is found breaking in and is struck so that he dies, the one who struck him will not be put to death.” Capital punishment is also assigned to the theft of a person. Exod. 21:16: “Whoever steals a man, whether he sells him or is found in possession of him, shall be put to death.” David’s decision in 2 Sam. 12:5 was undoubtedly founded on that basis: “That man deserves to die who was unwilling to take of his own sheep and cattle and took the poor man’s lamb.” Therefore it was put into the hands of the judges to increase or diminish punishments as the circumstances changed. Therefore such punishment of theft has been sanctioned today by the public authority of the magistrate, as is clear from the Constitut. Carol. in the Peinlichen Halsgerichts-Ordnung (art. 160). Thus, once laws have been passed, we must not pass judgment about laws but according to them, especially since in this matter it is not so much a matter of the violated property as the nature of the crime and the authority of the magistrate to deter. [Codex Iuris Civilis] (l. Capitalium 28, § Grassatores, ff. De poenis): “Robbers who do this for the sake of loot are considered despoilers of their neighbors; and, if they have decided to attack and plunder with the sword, they are punished with their lives, especially if they have done this quite often and on the roads. The rest are put into the mines or relegated to islands.” However, in minor thefts which have not been repeated, especially in the case of those perpetrated at the compulsion of extreme necessity, we say that it is the duty of the Christian magistrate to exercise forbearance [ἐπιείκεια]. We shall speak later in their own place about alms, the sharing of things, and about usury [On Political Magistracy (Commonplace XXVII), §§ 232–56; cf. On Death (Commonplace XXIX), § 271; On Good Works (Commonplace XX), § 133].