Locus 3 — The Cause of Sin and Concerning Contingency
disturbance or confusion of the divine order. Therefore it is correct to say that sin is a defect or a lack, as the dialectitians say. is evil or a defect or a lack and we are acknowledging that sin is not to be minimized. Just as the order in the work of God, namely in man, is a thing established by God and pleasing to Him and of service to man, so that for this reason it is called very good; so, on the contrary, these ruins are an overturning of the order, which has not been ordained by God. Rather it has been accom plished by the devil and the will of man, and thus has been rejected by God and is destructive to the devil and to man. Thus these ruins or this destruction or these disorders are called "evil," that is, out of harmony with the divine mind, displeasing to God, and fatal to the devil and to man.
It is easy to define original sin. It is darkness in the mind, that is, the human mind does not have an enlightened understanding and a firm commitment to divine providence, divine admonitions and promises.
And in the will there is a turning away, that is, the will is without a fear, love, or trust in God. The heart is without the obedience which is in harmony with the law of nature, but it is carried beyond God's order and con trary to God by its wandering and erring inclinations. It is well known that these evils constitute a lack or a defect and are not something established by God. They are a horrible perversion of human nature. Therefore,
God is not the cause of sin in His propagation and preservation of the substance of human nature, even though He does aid and preserve this mass of humanity such as it now exists, in the way that a potter makes a cup not out of gold but out of lead, and even though
He is truly and horribly angry at this perversion. But He sent His Son to assuage this wrath and to heal the wound in our nature. Thus it can be understood that God is not the cause of the vices with which we are born, nor does He will or approve this evil.
This explanation will shed some light on the fol lowing discussion of actual sin, concerning which there are many intricate questions. At this point it is easy to understand the idea of a defect if a person will look not only at the actions but also at the mind which directs the actions. It is all perfectly clear that it is a defect or lack when Eve, in eating the fruit, was not governed by the light of God, and that her will was turned away from God. Although in the meantime external and internal forces came into play which are positive things, and although there are erring forces—indeed a disordering of the regular order, as when a ship is tossed about because of lack of sails and oars by the winds and the tempests—yet this imagery describes these defects.
Moreover, as long as the ship remains a ship some motions remain, even so as long as man remains man certain activities remain, albeit they are erring and con fused. Thus God is not the cause of sin. For although
At this point let us be done with the argument that since a defect or lack is nothing, that is, it is not a positive thing, why is God angry at nothing? The truth is that there is a great difference between nothing in the sense of a deprivation and nothing in the sense of the negative. For "nothing" understood in the sense of deprivation requires a subject, and there is in that sub ject (man in this case) a certain corruption on account of which the subject has been rejected, as when the ruins of a building are a corruption as they stand in a heap of broken rubble. Thus original sin is the corrup tion and disorder of certain elements of man. God hates this and because of this corruption He is angry with the subject. In the case of a disease "nothing" indicates a deprivation because man as the subject remains and in that subject there is some kind of disorder. But the horse of Alexander now is a "nothing" in the negative sense [because it no longer exists].
He does sustain human nature to an extent, yet the defects in the human mind are not produced by Him, and Eve's free will was properly and truly the cause for her action and she voluntarily turned herself away from God.
When this statement has been established, that God is not the cause of sin and that He does not will sin, it follows that sin occurs by contingency, that is, that not all things which happen take place by neces sity. For since sin has arisen out of the will of the devil and of man and does not take place by the will of God,
[human] wills were so constituted that they were able not to sin. Furthermore the cause of the contingency of our actions is the freedom of our will. At this point we are speaking of the contingency of human actions, not of the forces of other things, of which we shall speak under physical matters.
This brief explanation will suffice, for it is true and when considered properly brings some light to the stu dent. We are not seeking more detailed disputations and interminable labyrinths. Mathematical matters can be subjected to embellishments beautiful to the eyes, but these matters of which we are speaking cannot be handled this way. However, with attentive consideration they can little by little be better understood. A wounded man hurts when he looks at his wound. He knows that his wound is not merely something negative, but that the members of his body have been torn apart. Thus
Paul groans when he sees the crimes and iniquities of Nero, which he knows are not a mere "nothing" in the negative sense but the hideous ruins of a divine work.
When considering this matter we learn that something In the second place, this also must be granted, that apostolic Scripture attributes to man, even now after the Fall, a certain liberty of choosing those things which are subject to reason and of performing the ex ternal works commanded by the law of God. Thus the righteousness of the Law is called the righteousness of the flesh, Rom. 10:3-5, because to some extent ex ternal obedience can be accomplished by the powers of this nature, as Paul says, and the Law was laid down for the unrighteous, that is, to coerce the unregenerate
and by swift and sudden accident things which men value fall into ruins." and to punish the stubborn, 1 Tim. 1:9. Likewise, "The Law was our schoolmaster unto Christ," Gal. 3:24. Un less this liberty is in some way left in our nature, there is no value in the law and governments and the entire civil rule. Thus there does remain some freedom which, as I have said, is the source of contingency.
It is concerning these great difficulties, concern ing our human weakness and the unpredictability of human affairs which have many mysterious causes, that Jeremiah speaks his warning, and at the same time teaches us to flee to God and seek from Him and expect from Him both guidance and help.
But because God says that there are limits to contingency, we must hold to the distinction. On the one hand, God sets limits to the things which He wills, and on the other hand, to the things which He does not will. Further, He limits the things which depend wholly on His will and the things which He Himself does in part and which the will of man does in part.
Therefore we must at this point cling to these promises: "It is not you y/ho speak but the Spirit of your heavenly Father who is in you," Matt. 10:20. Likewise,
John 14:18; Phil. 2:13; Luke 11:13; Ps. 37:23. We rely on His promises; we seek and await help from God and we know nothing salutary can be done if God does not help us. As Christ says, "Without Me you can do noth ing," John 15:5. And the Baptist says, "A man can re ceive nothing of himself unless it be given him from heaven," John 3:27.
God foresees the crimes of Saul, but He does not will them or force the will of Saul, but He allows the will of Saul to proceed in this way and does not force him to go further. Meanwhile, however, He sees where
Saul will be restrained. Thus His prevision does not take away necessity, nor does it change in the will of man the method of action which still remains in human nature, that is, the liberty which, still remains.
Pompey, Brutus, Antony, and many others made great efforts, but God advanced other people. There fore, although these points are stated by way of warning concerning the help of God in good and salutary ac tions, yet we must not conclude from this that there is absolutely no freedom of choice for the human will.
Much less does it follow that all good and evil things of necessity come from God. Thus the statement of Jeremiah must be understood correctly, namely, that salutary actions cannot be brought about only by hu man wisdom and powers.
Nor does the fact that God sustains human na ture stand in the way of contingency or liberty. For even at the time that the will of Eve was the cause of her action, because in the creation freedom was a gift be stowed upon the human race, divine sustenance did not form an impediment to this gift. Thus, however great the freedom is, it is not hindered by the sustaining of God, but just as God sustains Saul, whatever he is, likewise the will of Saul is properly the cause of his evil action.
Let us learn that it is a great and immeasurable gift of God that we are helped to be the saving instru ments of God in the whole administration of things, and that we are not deserted even though we were a plague to the human race, as Pharaoh, Nero, Manichaeus, and other men like them have been. We should daily heed this statement of Christ: "Without Me you can do noth
At this point certain objections are raised, such as Jer. 10:23, "I know, O Lord, that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man's power to direct his own steps." And even though below in the book entitled
"The Free Will" these words have to be explained, yet at this point also the reader must be warned briefly. It is one thing to speak of the choice of the will and an other concerning the outcome or success of an act of the will. Pompey wanted to wage war on Caesar and he freely willed to do so, but many other causes gov erned the outcome and not only the will of Pompey.
Thus the statement of Jeremiah is instructive and com forting. The "way of man," that is, both his inward di rection and the public demands made upon him or his calling, cannot be sustained only by the powers of man.
The human mind cannot foresee all dangers or prepare against them. It often imagines things, as when Josiah erred in waging war against the Egyptians. All wise men have made errors, as Cicero exclaims, "0 that I had never been wise." Many accidents happen which pro duce difficulties and complications for the counsels of men. One mistake often brings enormous ruin, as in the case of David's adultery. Second, the outcome sometimes does not match the good counsel and the good intent. Great calamities can suddenly arise which cast down the mighty from their seats, as is truly said:
"All human affairs are tenuous and hang by a thread; ing," John 15:5, so that we ardently pray to be directed by God. Furthermore, it is clear that it does not follow from this that God is the effective cause of sin. Indeed, the church of God, since it knows the true God, seri ously abhors and hates the sins of Nero and will never say that such actions of necessity occurred or hap pened by the will of God.
Some people raise in objection the statements in Eph. 1:4-5, "Elect according to the plan of Him who made all things according to the good pleasure of His will," and in 1 Cor. 12:6, "It is the same God who works all things in all." It is certain that these statements in their context are speaking only of the church and the salutary actions which God causes and directs in His church. They are not speaking of His universal sus taining of things or of the individual actions of all ani mate beings. Therefore these statements must be carefully understood so that they are not transferred from their normal sense to some strange meaning.
Paul warns that the church is not preserved or ruled by human counsels or powers, but by the mar velous works of God. The preservation of Noah in the
flood, the protection of the people in Egypt and in the desert, the things done by Moses, Joshua, Samuel,
David, and other godly men were and are the works of God accomplished in them to aid the church and spread the true doctrine. moves because God has established this order and can change it, as the stories of Joshua and Hezekiah show.
This point will be treated more thoroughly later on.
I have dealt with the primary material which is usually discussed on this question, and when these points have been carefully considered, those who are astute can correctly judge concerning this entire con troversy and can clearly enough understand that the opinions of the Stoics must never be brought into the church. For how can the man pray to God when he holds that all things happen by necessity? Second, this idea is harmful to good morals as is stated in the tra gedies, "The guilt lies with fate, and let no one interfere with fate." For example, the servant of Zeno used to say that he was unjustly punished because fate forced him to do wrong. We must flee such talk and ideas.
Plato speaks more correctly as we read in the second book of his Politeia, "We must oppose anyone in a city which we wish to be well ruled, who says or hears
(whether an old man or a youth, whether in poetry or some other form of writing) that God is the cause of any kind of evil." To say such a thing is of no value to a city and no amount of explanation changes that fact.
Thus these statements are comforting to us be cause they testify that God is present with the members of the church and He supports them in their dangers and hardships. God aided David in his battles; He helped the dying Lawrence to make a strong confession when he was torn by fear. Likewise we ourselves are strengthened by these words and promises and pray that we may be directed, as the prophet often cries,
"Direct me in Your truth and teach me . .. Ps. 25:5.
You do all things salutary in Your church, You are in me also as in a member of Your church, You are strong.
Make me an instrument of Your salvation apd *a vessel of Your mercy. ... An explanation of these statements sheds much light on many other similar statements. But finally to be correct we must add that necessity is of two kinds. On the one hand we call it an absolute ne cessity when something or some proposition is nec essary in a fundamental sense and to oppose it is absolutely impossible and means the destruction of ev erything. For example, these statements are matters of absolute necessity: God is; God is an essence, intel ligent, eternal, of immeasurable wisdom, power, righ teousness, goodness, willing what is righteous, pure, but not willing conflict with His own intention, nor willing unrighteousness, cruelty, incest, lusts, etc.
I will add an explanation of the commonly used argument, as it seems to me, which is useful for godly minds. For the objection is raised that a secondary cause does not act without a primary cause. Thus the secondary cause, such as the will of Eve, is properly the cause of sin, and therefore the first cause is also the cause of sin. I realize that ingenious minds are sometimes disturbed by this objection, and as a result of this disturbance fall into absurd notions. Although the way to get around this point is tenuous and slippery, yet I shall deal with another reply which is weightier and more substantive, which is derived from the fun damental principle that God is present with His crea tures, not in the sense of a Stoic god who is bound to secondary causes, so that He can move only in a simple way, as secondary causes move, but rather God is a completely free agent who sustains nature and by His own counsel acts in various different ways toward dif ferent things.
But there is another kind of necessity, the ne cessity of consequence, which refers to those things or propositions which can be constituted by their own nature in another way, but become necessary either on account of preceding causes or because they have been determined. And there are great differences among these. On the one hand, God determines the good things which He wills, many of which He ex presses, as that the dead shall be raised on a certain day, that is, this is necessary and happens out of the necessity of consequence. On the other hand, He sets limits to the evils which He does not will, that is, He sets boundaries and does not allow evils to go beyond them. Thus it was necessary that Pharaoh persecute the Israelites, but this was not necessary of its own nature, but is actually contingent. It is not impossible that the opposite might occur, but because a matter turns out in a certain way, it is said to be necessary or a necessity of consequence. This simple distinction is useful and often taught in the schools, so that we might consider which events actually depend upon and arise from the will of God and which come from some other source.
As in the case of physical things, although He sustains the natural order, yet He sometimes, contrary to this normal order, commands the sun to go back ward, holds back the rain for three years and then sud denly sends a great flood, and makes an old woman fertile. Likewise we daily should know of the many things in our physical lives which take place counter to the power of secondary causes, and yet God sustains them. Many people are freed from various dangers at the hands of disease, in battle, at sea—where second ary causes have left them without hope. Therefore in order that prayer can truly take place, let us keep in mind that God is present in such a way, performing His work, not as the Stoics imagine, bound to secondary causes, but sustaining nature and governing many things by His completely free will. God acts in this way,
At this point we ought to say something about necessity in a physical sense, such as that fire of ne cessity warms or the sun of necessity moves. But the teaching of the church also says that this physical ne cessity is a necessity of consequence. Thus the sun
Others say this: The secondary cause does not act without the first cause which produces something positive, while the secondary, like the will of Eve, does do things which are deficient. At this point they reply that the secondary cause does not act positively but with His will, sustaining and aiding the person who acts in keeping with His order, but not aiding one who goes contrary to His order, even while He sustains His order.
In this way He established the will of Eve, so that it was a free agent which could observe or disregard God's order. The solution, though complicated, should be this:
A secondary cause does not act without a first, namely, without something to sustain it. This is universally true, but not always helpful. For the first cause does not support a result which He does not will. Thus the will of Eve in turning herself away from God is a personal and independent cause of her action. aberrantly and deficiently. This solution, if thus ex plained, will be clearer (and the meaning of the obscure solution is consistent with it), namely, that the relation ship of the primary and secondary causes is to be con sidered to be as God, 3 free agent, wills it to be and not compared with the union of a husband and wife.
These arguments are difficult, and therefore in thinking about God we should direct our mind and eyes to the revelation of God, so that we can recognize Him
The Stoics and the Christians do not understand in the same way the proposition that a secondary cause does not act without a primary. For the Stoics believe that there is a similar connection in all things, whether good or bad, just as there is an essential connection between the husband and the wife in procreation. But for the Christians it is necessary to distinguish between the good and the bad. The secondary cause does not act without the primary, which acts in a sustining role; but the first cause does many things apart from the secondary, because it is a free agent. And the sec ondary cause is free, just as the will of Eve was free to do evil, without the aid of the first cause. For liberty has this quality. This is a clear and none too compli cated explanation. in the way that He has revealed Himself and thus con clude that God is freely present and bringing aid to those who call upon Him, as He has promised, "The Lord is near to all who call upon Him," Is. 55:6.
These statements regarding individual action and help must be burned into our soul. For this abstruse argument regarding the general sustaining by God can not be looked into with real penetration, just as God's act of creation cannot be fully understood. In summary, let us cling to this proposition: God is present with His work, not as a Stoic god but as a truly free agent who sustains His creation and governs many things.
Locus 4 Human Powers or Free Choice Valla and many others have taken the freedom away from the will of man. Therefore all things happen with God's decree. This notion has arisen out of the disputes with the Stoics and brings them to the point of abolishing the idea of contingency of good and evil actions, indeed of all activities in even beasts and the elements. I have already said that we must not import
Stoic ideas into the church or uphold the fatalistic ne cessity of all things; but rather we must concede that there is some place for contingency. It was not nec essary that Alexander kill Clitus. are both used in place of "intellect" or "will," in the true sense of the word, not in the sense of willing something only in a pretense, that is, included under the will is a person's judgment and his true desires, not pretended ones, and not only some external work. There are also records of long arguments on the term "free choice" which can easily be evaluated by those who are inter ested. Bypassing these considerations we shall turn our attention to the subject itself.
For when there is doubt whether the human will is free, or when the question is asked in the church whether and to what extent the human will can obey the law of God, we cannot judge regarding this ques tion, unless we consider the greatness of our sin with which we are born or our natural weaknesses, also unless we know that we are commanded by the law of God to perform not only external civil actions but also the perpetual and perfect obedience of our entire hu man nature, in keeping with the command, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart..." For if the nature of man had not been corrupted by sin, he would have a clearer and firmer knowledge of God, he would not have doubt concerning the will of God, he would have a true fear, true trust, and finally he would show obedience to the entire law, that is, in the nature of man the light would shine more brightly concerning
God and all actions would be in keeping with the law of God. But now the nature of man is under the oppres sion of the disease of our origin, it is filled with doubts about God, it does not truly fear Him, nor truly trust in Him, nor burn with love for Him, and many are the flames of vile affections. Therefore, since it is manifest that the nature of man can never satisfy the law of God, we ask the question, What and how much can the will of man do?
Furthermore, we must not confuse the argument concerning divine determination with the question of free choice. For when we ask about the will of man and other human powers, the discussion revolves around only the matter of human weakness and not around all the powers in his complete nature. We should consider ourselves, the darkness of our mind, and the weakness of our will and heart. The church sets forth this doctrine of our infirmity not to plant Stoic ideas, nor to tie up our minds with perplexing and insoluable arguments, but to show us the benefits of the Son of God who was sent to destroy the works of the devil, who has inflicted tragic wounds upon human nature.
The less educated should be cautioned that the terminology has been taken from the physical world and refers to aspects of man. They should compare these terms with the language of the apostles and prophets.
Man has the ability of knowing and judging, which is called the mind (mens). The intellect or the reason also is a part of this knowing process. A second part of man is the seeking part, called the will (voluntas), which either obeys or resists the judgment. Under the will there are the desires of the senses or the affections, the subject and source of which is the heart. These desires sometimes agree with and sometimes contend against the will. Under the will is also the locomotive part of man. We will give a fuller explanation of these things when we describe the physical universe.
My first reply is: Since there remains in the nature of man a certain judgment and desire for things which are opposed to his reason and senses, there also re mains a desire for external civil works. Thus the human will can by its own powers and without regeneration perform to some degree the external works of the Law.
This is the freedom of the will which the philosophers correctly attribute to man. For Paul also—in distinguish ing the righteousness of the flesh from spiritual righ teousness—confesses that unregenerate men do have a certain love and do perform certain external works of the law, to restrain the hand from murder, from theft, and from violence. He calls this the righteousness of the flesh.
Furthermore, it is called free choice (arbitrium) when the mind and the will are joined together. Or free choice is the name given to the faculty or power of the will to choose and seek those things which have been shown to it, or to reject them. This faculty or ability in our nature in its perfect state was far greater, but now it has been hindered in many different ways, as we shall discuss later on. But now I want to explain the meaning of the term as it is most commonly used. It was by his free choice that Fabricius did not will to accept the gold offered by Pyrrhus or that Antigonus was unwilling to gaze upon the head of the murdered Pyrrhus when it was brought to him. Further, in the literature of the prophets and apostles the words "mind" and "heart"
Indeed, God has commanded this discipline also of the unregenerate, and He punishes their violation of it in this life with the most awful punishments, as the afflictions of murderers and incestuous men clearly