Chapter 1
Philosophy of the Mind
1. What is truth?
Truth, which is the object of all science, scarcely admits of a strict definition. Beattie1
says, that is truth which the constitution of our nature determines us to believe, and that is
falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbelieve.
2. Is the mind of man capable of attaining any certain knowledge?
Yes. The supposition that it can be proved that all human knowledge is uncertain destroys
itself by taking it for granted that the uncertainty of our knowledge can be certainly
known. So man can[not] be a consistent universal skeptic, for he would have to doubt of
the reality of his doubting everything.
3. Are there innate ideas in the mind of man?
No, if we understand this phrase as used by Mr. Locke,2 who considered it as meaning
certain impressions or notions existing in the mind previous to and independent of
reflection and sensation. It is one thing herein to say that men have an innate knowledge
of such and such things, and another to say that they have an aptitude to receive them.
The mind is not a tabula rasa [blank slate].
4. Are there any self-evident or intuitive truths?
1 [Possibly James Beattie (1735–1803), Evidences of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. (1786).] 2 [John Locke (1632–1704) was an English philosopher and influential Enlightenment thinker.]
Yes. Those propositions which, from the constitution of my nature, I am under the
necessity of believing as soon as they are presented to my mind are called self-evident
truths. Or, that is an ultimate principle which forces our belief by its own intrinsic
evidence and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered more evident.
5. On what evidence does the belief of our existence rest?
We have no other direct evidence of our existence than that of consciousness, though
strictly speaking existence is not the object of consciousness, but we are conscious of our
thoughts. That which does not exist cannot think. In this view Descartes's3 cogito ergo
sum [I think, therefore I am] is correct.
6. On what evidence do we believe that the world exists?
On the testimony of our external senses we cannot help believing it.
7. Why do we believe what we distinctly remember?
We can give no other reason than that such is the constitution of our nature that we are
under the necessity of believing what we distinctly remember, as well as what we
perceive or are conscious of.
8. Why do we believe in testimony?
Our belief is not the result of experience but arises from the constitution of our nature.
3 [René Descartes (1596–1650) was a French mathematician, scientist, and the father of modern Western philosophy.]
9. Into how many kinds may first truths be divided?
1. The existence of the objects of sense and consciousness
2. Necessary truths, as mathematical axioms
3. Philosophical principles, as that every effect must have a cause
4. Moral truths
5. Truths reported to us by a competent number of witnesses, past or present
6. Truths founded on uniform experience, as that the sun will rise tomorrow
7. Those founded on memory
10. Can their number be ascertained?
No.
11. How can they be distinguished from vulgar prejudices?
The essential qualities of first truths are:
1. They are incapable of proof or disproof, as all other truths are less clear and
certain;
2. [They are] admitted in all countries and at all times;
3. They are practically followed even by contrary theorists.
With respect to many we can be certain that they belong to this class; with regard to
others it may be doubted whether they are known by the faculty of common sense or by a
short process of reasoning.
12. Can there be any reasoning with those who deny them?
No. For there can be no reasoning without premises, and these in the first instance must
be self-evident. Reasoning is the comparison of ideas already known and thereby
inferring others before unknown. If some things are not admitted without proof we would
have to reason on ad infinitum [to infinity].
13. Can intuitive truths be always easily distinguished from the deductions of reason?
No.
14. Are there some truths necessarily in every science?
In every science there must be some truths self-evident or we could never commence our
investigations.
15. Are the conclusions of reasoning more certain than first principles?
No. For these conclusions derive all their strength from the premises or principles from
which they are drawn. The superstructure cannot have more stability than the foundation.
16. Can our belief in these principles be shaken by reasoning?
No. Though we may be unable to answer the arguments of sophisters against them, yet
we can't withhold our assent from what is self-evident if we try.
17. How does it appear that matter and mind are essentially different?
If the word matter be taken in the sense in which it is used in natural philosophy, there
can be no doubt on the subject. For of all the properties essential to matter, not one can be
predicated of mind; and of those essential to mind, not one can be predicated of matter.
Therefore the substances to which these properties belong must be essentially different.
18. Could omnipotence endow matter with the power of thinking?
No; it implies a contradiction. It is the same as to ask whether a being can be essentially
active and essentially inactive at the same time.
19. Are our ideas of mind as clear as those of matter?
Yes, our ideas of each are confined to their properties and are as clear in the one case as
the other.
20. What is perception, and what are the immediate objects of the mind in perception?
Perception is the means by which the mind keeps up its intercourse with external things.
Considered as an act of the mind, it requires these three particulars:
1. Some notion of the object perceived
2. An irresistible conviction of its present existence
3. This conviction is immediate and not the result of reasoning
The objects of the mind in perception are the qualities of bodies with certain states and
conditions of our own bodies, mechanical powers, chemical powers, and so on. Every
object of perception must have a real existence, must be external, and must be present.
21. What was long the opinion of philosophers on this subject?
It was long supposed that species, forms, phantasms, or ideas were the immediate objects
of perception.
22. To what skepticism did this opinion lead?
Berkeley's4 taking for granted that all the objects of our knowledge were ideas proved
that the material world does not exist. And Hume,5 setting out with dividing all the
perceptions of the human mind into impressions and ideas, and by asserting that the latter
differs from the former only in being a weaker perception, comes at last to the conclusion
that "mankind" (both soul and body) "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual
flux or movement."6
23. Can we explain how the impressions on the organs of sense produce perception?
No. A certain sensation is always followed by a certain perception, but how or why, we
cannot tell. Dr. Hartley attempted to explain it on the principle of nervous vibrations.
24. What is sensation, and how is it distinguished from perception?
Sensation is distinguished from every other act of the mind in having no object distinct
from the act itself. Its essence consists in being felt. Sensation is related to perception as
the sign to the thing signified.
Sensation taken by itself does not imply the belief of anything external, but
perception does. Sensation supposes a sentient being and a particular way in which that
4 [George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish philosopher, known for his view of what later would be called subjective idealism.]
5 [David Hume (1711–1776) was a Scottish philosopher who is known for his influential view of empiricism, skepticism, and naturalism.]
6 Hume
being is affected, but nothing more. Perception supposes something distinct from the
mind which perceives and the act of perception.
25. What is consciousness?
It is an involuntary act and signifies the immediate knowledge we must of necessity have
of all the present operations of our minds. It regards only what is present and also what is
in the mind.
26. What is judgment?
That act of the mind by which one thing is affirmed of another or denied of another.
27. What is memory?
That faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of things past. It implies the
capacity of retaining knowledge and also a power of recalling it to our thoughts.
28. What is reasoning?
It is that power of the mind by which we draw inferences or by which we are convinced
that a relation belongs to two ideas on account of our having found that these ideas bear
certain relations to other ideas.
29. Do we always give an implicit belief to memory?
Yes. We are forced by the constitution of our nature to believe what we distinctly
remember; and we can't help it if we would.
30. Does memory never deceive us?
No. We are sometimes at a loss to know whether we remember or not, but it is impossible
that what we do remember should not be true. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish
memory and imagination.
31. What is conception and what is imagination?
Conception is that power of the mind by which we are able to form a notion of our past
sensations or of absent objects of perception. Its business is to present the mind with an
exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived.
Fancy selects and presents to imagination all the materials it requires, and
imagination is the power of so modifying these materials (or in other words our
conceptions) by combining the parts of different ones together so as to form new wholes
of our creation. See App., p. 3.7
32. What is attention, and should it be reckoned a distinct faculty?
Attention is the fixedness of the mind on a particular object. When this object is external
it is called "attention," but receives the appellation of "reflexion"8 when the object is
within. It is not a distinct faculty.
33. What is abstraction?
Abstraction is the faculty by which we resolve or analyze a subject into its known
7 [This inexplicable "App.," which occurs throughout the original manuscript, appears to have been a syllabus or supplement to Alexander's lectures, possibly an appendix.]
8 [reflection?]
attributes, or it is the power of considering certain qualities apart from the rest.
34. Are there any general conceptions?
Yes. And these are formed by the power of abstraction, separating from individuals their
attributes and then by the faculty of generalization, collecting such as are common to a
number into one idea. In this way our notions of general species are formed.
35. For what do general terms stand for in reasoning?
In regard to this point there have been three different opinions, the advocates of which
have respectively been called Realists, Nominalists, and Conceptualists.
Plato and Aristotle,9 though they differed in some particulars relative to this
subject, both taught that there were certain substantial forms or essences corresponding to
general form terms, and the mind contemplated [these] when it used these terms.
Zeno10 and his followers of the stoical sect11 held, on the contrary, that universals
had neither form nor essence but that they were mere nominal representations of
particular objects. The doctrine of Aristotle prevailed generally until the eleventh century,
when Roscellinus12 embraced the opinion of the Stoics, and together with his pupil
Abelard13 greatly spread the doctrine of the Nominalists.14
9 [Plato (c. 428–348 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC) were both Greeks and were two of the most important philosophers of the ancient world.]
10 [Probably Zeno of Citium (c. 334–c. 262 BC), who was a Greek philosopher of Athens and the founder of the Stoic school.]
11 [Stoicism was a school of Hellenistic philosophy that emphasized personal ethics involving not being controlled by a desire for pleasure or fear of pain, understanding the world around us, and treating others justly.]
12 [Roscellinus (c. 1050–c. 1125) was a French philosopher and theologian, often regarded as the founder of Nominalism.]
13 [Peter Abelard (1079–1142) was a French scholastic philosopher, theologian, and logician.] 14 [Nominalism is a metaphysical, philosophical view that denies the existence of universals and abstract objects, holding them to exist in "name" only.]
Conceptualists15 differ naturally from both the preceding. They maintain that as
words are connected by common consent with certain attributes common to many
individuals, that as soon as a general term is pronounced, all these attributes are brought
before the mind by the faculty of conception and that this collection of ideas (or
conception) is the object contemplated when general terms are employed.
36. In the use of general terms, does the mind always think of an individual?
No.
37. What is association, and what is its importance?
Association is the tendency of the mind to pass from one thought to another on account of
some relation between them. It is of the greatest importance as it has great influence in
regulating the succession of our thoughts and, by the indissoluble combinations it leads
us to form in our infancy and youth, affects both our intellectual powers and moral
characters. See App., p. 4.
38. What is conscience, and is it an original faculty?
There are three different opinions on this subject:
1. Some consider conscience not only as an original, but also an indifferent faculty,
so that the decisions of conscience and the understanding may be directly opposed
to each other, and that conscience is always right.16
15 [Conceptualism lies between Realism and Nominalism and denies the presence of universals in particulars outside of the mind's perception of them.]
16 [Nathaniel] Emmons [(1745–1840) was a New England, new school theologian who developed postEdwards, Hopkinsianism further.]
2. That it is neither original nor uniform and that it would permit men to determine
that injustice and ingratitude are morally right but that utility prevents their
making such decisions.17
3. That it is an original, but not an independent faculty, involving in every act the
exercise of the understanding together with an approving or disapproving emotion
of the heart. See App., p. 4.
39. Is it properly called "the Moral Sense"?
Moral sense refers as much to the actions of others as to our own. Conscience refers only
to our own. The latter is the exercise of the former on a particular class of objects. Yet
conscience is often used in the extended sense of the first of these terms.
40. Is it uniform in its dictates?
Yes, within certain limits; that is, as there are first principles in every science, so in
morals there are some things so plain that men never differ in regard to them. But when
we leave these, the decisions of conscience become as various and inconsistent as the
conclusions of reason on points of mere speculation.
41. Is conscience distinct from the understanding?
No. It is the exercise of the understanding on moral subjects accompanied by a feeling of
the heart as to their being right or wrong.
17 Paley/Locke [William Paley (1743–1805) and John Locke (1632–1704) were English philosophers. The former was a Christian apologist; the latter was one of the most influential Enlightenment thinkers.]
42. Is there anything more in conscience than a judgment of the understanding?
Yes. See the foregoing answers.
43. How can the diversity in the operations of conscience be accounted for?
In the same way as we account for the vast diversity in the operations of other original
faculties, such as taste and judgment. Men often agree in a moral principle though they
err in its application. Thus one nation approves of parricide,18 while another reprobates it;
yet the conscience of both teach that we ought to do good to our parents.
44. What are simple ideas and what are complex ideas?
A simple idea is an idea of a simple object, that is, of an object without parts—or it is an
idea that cannot be resolved into two or more ideas. A complex idea arises from the
combination of two or more simple ideas, or it is an idea of a complex object.
45. Are all our simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection?
Such is the general opinion of philosophers, but it is difficult in this way to account for
our ideas of identity, of unity, of duration, and so on. See App., p. 4.
18 [The killing of one's father, or parents.]