God Creation
God, Creation & Human Rebellion
Lecture Notes of Archibald Alexander
from the Hand of Charles Hodge
Edited by
Travis Fentiman
Introduction by
James M. Garretson
Brought to you by
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We hope this work helps you to enjoy & glorify God
This work and its format has been placed in the public domain by Travis Fentiman (2023), the
previous copyright holder. Use it in any godly, profitable way you desire. It was previously
printed in 2019 by Reformation Heritage Books (Grand Rapids), which had a temporally
limited, exclusive publishing privilege.
Table of Contents
Preface 3
Foreword 5
Introduction 8
1. Philosophy of the Mind 34
2. Theology 46
3. Revealed Theology and Prophecy 59
4. Inspiration 70
5. Attributes 75
6. Trinity 96
7. Decrees 112
8. Predestination 117
9. Election 121
10. Reprobation 128
11. Creation 132
12. Providence 141
13. Angels 160
14. Covenant of Nature or of Works 172
15. Seals of the Covenant 177
16. Sin 180
17. On the Will 193
Preface
And he was a ready scribe…which the LORD God of Israel had given.
—Ezra 7:6
The work before you came about in a unique way. I quite unexpectedly happened upon the
manuscript of this volume in an online library. Realizing the value of this hidden treasure, I was
quite dismayed that Charles Hodge's cursive notes of Archibald Alexander's lectures on
systematic theology were nearly unreadable. But with a bit of time, effort, and scrunching of the
face, individual words were picked out, then sentences. I sat back and realized that the only thing
preventing this gem from seeing the light of day was a significant amount of human labor that
regular people could do.
The amount of labor involved to transcribe and check the 260 manuscript pages would be
too much for a solitary, busy individual. However, with a bit of recruiting of friends through the
internet, who kindly and readily volunteered their time and work, our ten-person team was able
to knock out the task in two months. Great thanks is due to these selfless "scribes" whom the
Lord gave for this endeavor: Sheila West, Alex Sarrouf, Tucker Fleming, Justin and Genesis
Spratt, Bence Gyula Fazekas, Logan West, Mark Wallace, and Psyche Joy Ives. To our surprise,
by the end of the project we were able to read Hodge's old handwriting quite well!
Hodge's notes are sometimes abbreviated and terse. Updated English, punctuation,
formatting, and minimal stylistic changes have been made in order to make these notes easier to
read, all the while trying to preserve something of their original character. Text and footnotes in
brackets are the editor's. Foreign languages were translated by the editor. Alexander's Scripture
quotations are almost always from the King James Version or close to it (possibly due to them
being given from memory, from the original languages, or as a paraphrase, or it may be due to
Hodge's shorthand). The original manuscript is available at Internet Archive under the "creator,"
"Hodge, Charles," and is titled, "Lecture Notes of Archibald Alexander on Theology"
(https://archive.org/details/lecturenotesofar00hodg). For any questions regarding the original
reading, see the manuscript.
This volume is a gift to you out of love for Christ, who gave everything for His beloved
people. The editors and transcribers have received no financial compensation for their work in
order that the final cost of this volume might be lower and that the work would receive a wider
distribution. We hope that, by the story of this preface, many "regular" persons will be inspired
to accomplish similar and greater feats that will bless the kingdom of Christ throughout the
world. May the Lord make spiritual "silver and gold" become "as plenteous as stones" (2 Chron.
1:15) so that the earth may become "full of the knowledge of the LORD, as the waters cover the
sea" (Isa. 11:9)!
Travis Fentiman, MDiv
Foreword
Nothing is more to be desired in our day than a return to the theologically rich teaching of the
best days of Princeton Seminary. In those blessed years following Archibald Alexander's
appointment as the first professor for Princeton Seminary,1 the study of theology was to the
students far more than an academic exercise. Under the deeply spiritual influence of Alexander,
students were given a profound love for Christ, for the sacred Scriptures, and for the souls of
those who heard them preach.
Princeton Seminary was set up by the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in
the United States of America under the leadership of Dr. Alexander in 1812. It is the oldest of the
Presbyterian seminaries in the United States. From the start the theology taught there was
influenced by Jonathan Edwards and was referred to as belonging to the "Scottish School."
Another representative theologian who taught there included Charles Hodge, who, along
with Dr. Alexander, promoted the doctrines of the excellent Westminster Confession and
catechisms. The extent to which Princeton Seminary was used by God in those days to advance
His church is apparent from the fact that Hodge taught nearly three thousand students in the fifty
years of his ministry in the seminary.
The term Princeton theology, used to describe the outstanding Bible-based theology of
the seminary, began to be used about the year 1831. The exposition of good doctrine was now
appearing in the journal known as the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, which was
concerned to enter into controversy with the followers of the well-known, and then popular,
1 Alexander held three separate titles over his career at Princeton: professor of didactic and polemic theology (1812–1840), professor of pastoral and polemic theology (1840–1851), and professor of pastoral and polemic theology and church government (1851).
evangelist Charles Grandison Finney (1792–1875). Finney, regrettably, belonged to a very
different theology that held to such wrong ideas as "perfectionism"—that a Christian can become
sinlessly perfect in this life. He also taught that, of himself apart from God's effectual grace, man
has the ability to repent.
Sadly, Westminster Confession Calvinism was declining in America at this date.
Evolutionary ideas would begin to influence the popular mind in the late 1850s with the
publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species. Against all such errors the faithful theologians at
Princeton Seminary were firmly opposed. Dr. Alexander's students, contrary to the backsliding
spirit of their day, were being taught to love the theology of Francis Turretin of Geneva and of
John Owen, the eminent Calvinist theologian of England.
During these early days at Princeton, Professor Alexander gathered the students together
on Sabbath afternoons for prayer and discussion relating to issues of practical theology. His aim
was to build up students' souls in godliness in addition to academic excellence. The goal in view
was the saving of souls and the building up of young men to be spiritual leaders whose lives
reflected genuine godliness.
According to A. A. Hodge,2 one of the outstanding traits of Alexander was his gift of
originality, which showed itself in his genius for spontaneous ways of expressing deep, spiritual
truths. As we discover from his biographies, Dr. Alexander had a wonderful memory enriched by
his wide reading. He had an amazing capability for giving wise counsel to those who sought his
advice and opinion.
A. A. Hodge also informs us that Dr. Alexander possessed the remarkable gift of being
able to talk wisely. Alexander himself was aware of this, and he could speak of himself in this
2 Archibald Alexander Hodge (1823–1886) was the son of Charles Hodge, named after the latter's beloved professor.
way: "If I have any talent, it is to talk sitting in my chair." He had a mind schooled in the best
Reformed doctrine.
In the classroom students were taught divine truths so clearly that they sometimes felt
their eyes could see things invisible and eternal. Students sat spellbound as they listened to
Alexander expound divine doctrines, the power of which shaped mind and character and
prepared them for their future life's work in the pulpit. Reverence for God, the Bible, and truth
are all-important if a man is to be an influential preacher.
Among the eminent theologians who studied at Princeton was Charles Hodge (1797–
1878), who graduated in 1819 and became an eminent instructor himself at the seminary in 1820.
The book now before you consists of notes on theology taught by Dr. Alexander in the seminary
and written down by Hodge in his own cursive handwriting. Little did young Hodge imagine that
his carefully written records of Alexander's lectures would be published and made available to
the Christian world some two hundred years later! But such is the wonderful providence of God.
Alexander later became the professor of pastoral and polemic theology and church
government. In his declining years, he supported many worthy and good causes such as the
American Sunday School Union, the American Bible Society, and the American Tract Society.
"Old age," Alexander wrote in later life, "is not an unpleasant part of life, where health and piety
are possessed." He fell ill on September 18, 1851, and felt sure he was soon going to die. His
condition worsened on October 17 to the point where he became unable to walk any more. His
mind, though, was as clear as ever. He offered a lovely prayer in preparation for eternity and
went to be with the Lord a few days later on October 22, 1851.
Maurice Roberts
Verbi Dei Minister
Introduction
Dr. James M. Garretson
What value can be found in a seminary student's lecture notes from the early nineteenth century?
Much in every way when one learns that the scribblings are the classroom records of two of the
greatest theologians and seminary educators in the history of American Christianity.
It is given to only a few men each century to have an impact on future generations of
church leaders and educators. In this respect, the lives and literary legacies of Archibald
Alexander (1772–1851) and his prize student and successor, Charles Hodge (1797–1878), are
without peer in the record of American theological education. Readers familiar with the history
of American Christianity recognize the strategic role Princeton Theological Seminary served in
its development and expansion. Founded in 1812 by the Presbyterian Church in the United States
of America, the seminary was intended to be a bastion of orthodoxy in preparation of a pious and
learned Presbyterian ministry.1 Rooted in the theological heritage of colonial Presbyterianism,
Princeton was envisioned as a ministerial training institution devoted to the cultivation of
practical, or experimental, piety as much as to the formation of a Christian mind.2
The founding of seminaries during the nineteenth century signaled a new and more
advanced model of ministerial training intended to offset population growth and the shortage of
1 For recent overviews of American Presbyterianism, see Lefferts A. Loetscher, A Brief History of the Presbyterians (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983); James H. Smylie, A Brief History of the Presbyterians (Louisville: Geneva Press, 1996); D. G. Hart and John H. Muether, Seeking A Better Country: 300 Years of American Presbyterianism (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2007); Bradley J. Longfield, Presbyterians and American Culture: A History (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2013); and S. Donald Fortson III, The Presbyterian Story: Origins and Progress of a Reformed Tradition (n.p.: Presbyterian Lay Committee, 2013). Hart and Muether are particularly useful in examining the theological currents that affected the development of Presbyterianism in the United States.
2 For a primary source collection of sermons, lectures, articles, and essays on the theology of pastoral ministry that was taught at Princeton Seminary during its first century, see James M. Garretson, Princeton and the Work of the Christian Ministry, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2012).
available clergy for existing pulpits and an expanding frontier. Denominational seminaries also
provided opportunity for preservation of their ecclesiastical heritage for future generations.
Various factors gave impetus to the new educational model. As American colleges
adjusted their curriculum at the end of the eighteenth century to accommodate advances related
to the scientific Enlightenment, church leaders became increasingly distressed at the diminishing
number of graduates interested in pursuing ministerial office. Many schools also noted a decline
in student piety. Campus life was often marred by decadence and student rebellion. The
combined impact of these circumstances helped undermine the Christian educational interests for
which the majority of American colleges had been founded during and after the colonial period.3
Institutions originally founded to train and supply future ministers to American congregations
were now redirecting their energies to other educational objectives.4
In addition to a period of massive political upheaval, American culture in the late
eighteenth century also saw the rise of the Radical Enlightenment and its corresponding impact
on church and society. Deism and infidelity were rampant, immorality was widespread, and
church attendance was in decline. Philosophical skepticism and a virulent hostility to Christianity
threatened the moral foundations of society, even as churches struggled to defend and explain
Christian doctrine in relation to the emerging scientific and philosophical paradigms.5
3 For analysis of these changes and the concerns they created for the founders of Princeton Theological Seminary, see Mark A. Noll, "The Founding of Princeton Seminary," Westminster Theological Journal 42 (Fall 1979): 72–110. For a more detailed examination of the institutional and educational changes taking place at the college since its founding in 1746, see Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 1768–1822: The Search for a Christian Enlightenment in the Era of Samuel Stanhope Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989).
4 For an informative introduction to the period, see William C. Ringenberg, The Christian College: A History of Protestant Higher Education in America (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2006), 41.
5 For important studies documenting the broader development of theology in America during this period and its impact on American church life, see Paul C. Conkin, The Uneasy Center: Reformed Christianity in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); and E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the Civil War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003).
American colonial colleges had placed strong emphasis on training in grammar, logic,
and rhetoric. Study of Greco-Roman literature and mastery of the Greek and Latin languages
were mandatory. The curriculum included study of theology and Christian evidences, but the
number of required courses was minimal in relation to the overall program. Upon graduation,
ministerial aspirants would often attach themselves to resident clergy in preparation for
ordination. While useful for the practical experience it provided, the model was uneven and very
much dependent on the personality and availability of the overseeing minister.
The older model with its classical curriculum necessarily gave way to study in the hard
sciences. Declining interest in the ministerial office paralleled student enthusiasm for the new
courses being adopted. The classics curriculum would undergo revision in the face of new
advances in science. While theological courses had been part of traditional curriculum among
America's colleges, study of the liberal arts had always overshadowed time spent on theology, to
the detriment of the ministerial preparation envisioned. Increasing hostility to historic
Christianity likewise impacted curriculum consideration. Confronted with the apologetic
challenges of Enlightenment thought and deterioration in campus piety, it became apparent a
new model for ministerial training was needed.
Not everyone was as equally committed to the educational preparation valued by the
Presbyterian Church. Cultural factors at home and academic changes abroad would have an
equally profound impact on how ministerial preparation was conceived and implemented in
American church life at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Populism would prove a
powerful factor in American culture, as would the increasing allure of the German university
model to American educational philosophy. The former would devalue formal education, while
the latter would methodologically and principally corrupt the subject matter from within the
academy.
It is arguable that with the passing years, the educational level of clergy declined in
relation to the democratizing tendencies inherent to the rise of American populism during the
early nineteenth century.6 Formal training was disparaged by some and minimized by others.
Clericalism was rejected in favor of a democratic populism, leveling hierarchical distinctions in
both society and the church. Whether in empowering the common man in society or the laity
within the churches, the effect devalued structured leadership. Presbyterianism was affected by
the movement, but not to the extent of other church traditions.
Simultaneous to these developments in America was the rise of German universities with
their accompanying specializations in ancient Near Eastern literature, languages, and culture.
The German university model would subsequently redefine the nature of biblical research, the
writing of theology, and the framing of the Christian message as it found popular outlet in the
pulpit. Interest in a supposedly detached scientific objectivity in studying the natural sciences
and now sacred truth had replaced historic recognition of and dependence on the work of the
Holy Spirit in illumining a biblical text for its meaning and application. Sacred learning had
given way to secular methodology in studying the Bible and writing theological texts, which was
reflected in both academic and popular publications.
However well-intentioned the fresh discovery of the Bible's meaning and message may
have been, the effect of the new educational model would prove disastrous to the church's
spiritual vitality and witness, both in Europe and North America. Rather than reinforcing
Christian belief, this new focus maligned the Bible's message and denied the integrity of its
6 For the standard study, see Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).
transmission and translation. Once the Bible's inspiration was denied, its authority was rejected
and religious skepticism became the order of the day in the very institutions earmarked for
training clergy.
But the problem with the German model was bigger than the methodological issues being
embraced. A detached and scientific objectivity to the learning process is no more attainable in
the study of theology than in any other field of study. Learning is interactional between subject
and object, even more so when the interest of study is the person-to-person, divine-human
relationship of Creator and creature. In this interaction, learning is always relational and never
impersonal. Consequently, a person's character and faith, or lack thereof, will have an inevitable
impact on one's approach to studying the Bible and embracing its message of salvation and
judgment.
What is true for the student is equally true for the teacher. Knowledge of spiritual truth
requires a spiritually teachable disposition (John 7:17). Although the German university model
became normative in American college education, an awareness of the Holy Spirit's role in
ministerial education had not been forgotten by Princeton Seminary's founders. They believed
that spiritual truth could be properly understood, embraced, and taught only by spiritually
minded men. The doctrines we believe must be accompanied by a believing faith in the revealed
deposit of divine truth embodied and preserved in the Old and New Testaments. Apart from the
new birth, or divine regeneration of the human soul, theology can never be taught properly nor
understood "experimentally" in all the ways Christ intends His Word to be believed and obeyed.
Accordingly, Princeton Seminary's founding documents drew attention to the spiritual
character of the professors as well as the subject matter.7 Aiming for an able and faithful
7 For a comprehensive account of the ministerial and spiritual priorities that characterized the seminary from its founding in 1812 through its reorganization in 1929, see David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, vol. 1,
ministry, the school's founders and early faculty were as equally committed to the cultivation of
personal piety in their individual and community life as they were to serious academic study in
preparation for the grave and holy calling of the Christian ministry.8
In contrast to the limited instruction in theology, biblical studies, church history, and
practical theology provided by colonial colleges, the new model of ministerial education would
provide several years of advanced study in these respective fields. The classical curriculum was
still considered the best foundation for a learned ministry, but now it would be accompanied by
the intensive and detailed coursework that marked early nineteenth-century ministerial
curriculum. Some departments in the new seminary curriculum were based on training
introduced at college or pre-college academies and tutorials. Instruction in homiletics, or
preaching, built on existing principles relevant to the history, purpose, and practice of rhetoric.
Courses in exegesis, biblical studies, and doctrine were covered in greater depth. Likewise,
instruction in church history, historical theology, and church government took on new
importance in relation to the developing identity and mission of American Presbyterianism.
While it was not uncommon for students to have mastered Greek and Latin before
entering college, study of the Hebrew language was only in its infancy in American educational
institutions at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The inclusion of Hebrew studies in the
seminary curriculum was a new development in ministerial academic formation. Few today
realize that upon completion of his two-year study in European universities, thirty-year-old
Charles Hodge was one of the most competent linguists of ancient and modern languages living
in America during the 1830s.
Faith and Learning, 1812–1868 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1994); and David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, vol. 2, The Majestic Testimony, 1869–1929 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1996).
8 For an institutional history of the school, see James H. Moorhead, Princeton Seminary in American Religion and Culture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012). For a study of Alexander's role in founding the seminary, see James M. Garretson, "Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary," The Confessional Presbyterian 8 (2012): 3–19.
Although changing nineteenth-century educational currents would eventually place
greater emphasis on the ministerial office as a profession rather than a calling, initial interest in a
specialized ministerial curriculum paralleled developing specialization within the university
curriculum. Seminaries sought to provide the kind of specialized training that would enable
ministers to defend and present biblical truth with a commensurate level of education equivalent
to the best universities of the time.
A school's reputation is only as good as the faculty it employs.9 While the broad contours
of the curriculum and educational objectives were determined in advance of faculty
appointments, it was not until the opening year of the school in 1812 that Archibald Alexander
was elected as its first professor of didactic and polemic theology. Alexander would be joined the
following year by Samuel Miller (1769–1850), and a few years after that Charles Hodge would
join his former professors as instructor in biblical languages. Together, the three men would
establish the spiritual and intellectual trajectory of Princeton Theological Seminary for
generations to come.10
Archibald Alexander was middle aged when he was appointed as Princeton Theological
Seminary's first professor.11 His background served him well in his new position. As a young
man, he worked as an itinerant missionary along the Virginia/North Carolina border, afterward
9 For a collection of funeral sermons, eulogies, and related biographical observations on nineteenthand early twentieth-century faculty, see James M. Garretson, Pastor-Teachers of Old Princeton: Memorial Addresses for the Faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary, 1812–1921 (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2012). For a related study, see Gary Steward, Princeton Seminary (1812–1929): Its Leaders' Lives and Works (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2014).
10 For analysis of the theological emphases that emerged during the school's first century, see Mark A. Noll, The Princeton Theology, 1812–1921: Scripture, Science, and Theological Method from Archibald Alexander to Benjamin Warfield (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1983).
11 For a biography of Alexander's life, see James W. Alexander, The Life of Archibald Alexander, D.D. (1854; repr., New York: Sprinkle Publications, 1991). For a twentieth-century intellectual biography, see Lefferts A. Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983). For a brief introduction and overview of Alexander's life, see John Oliver Nelson, "Archibald Alexander, Winsome Conservative (1772–1851)," Journal of the Presbyterian Historical Society, 35 (March 1957): 15–33. For an older overview and evaluation, see Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, "Archibald Alexander," index volume, no. 1 (January 1870): 42–67.
serving as pastor of several rural charges and as president of Hampden-Sidney College, a small
school in Virginia. He subsequently received a call to pastor the Pine Street Presbyterian Church
in Philadelphia, where he served prior to his appointment at the seminary.12
A natural scholar, Alexander was also a popular preacher and caring pastor.13 Converted
during his teenage years, Alexander witnessed firsthand the transformation of Virginian culture
as it was impacted by revival during the 1790s. A profound spiritual sensitivity marked his
pastoral ministry and labors as a professor. Alexander was often sought out by congregants and
students for spiritual guidance on matters of faith and practice.14
Alexander wrote apologetic works, theological treatises, academic articles, and popular
publications, but he is probably most remembered for his important work Thoughts on Religious
Experience, first published in 1841.15 The nineteenth-century equivalent to Jonathan Edwards's
eighteenth-century classic, The Religious Affections, Alexander's treatment is a penetrating series
of essays on the work of the Holy Spirit in relation to a life of piety.16
As the seminary's founding faculty member, Alexander was responsible for designing the
curriculum and providing classroom instruction. By the end of the first academic year, student
enrollment had increased, and the General Assembly appointed Samuel Miller to serve alongside
12 Alexander's preparation for his faculty appointment at the seminary is recounted in John DeWitt, "Archibald Alexander's Preparation for His Professorship," Princeton Theological Review 3 (October 1905): 573– 94. 13 For a study on Alexander's theology of preaching and pastoral ministry, see James M. Garretson, Princeton and Preaching: Archibald Alexander and the Christian Ministry (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2005). For observations on Alexander's published sermons, see Hughes Oliphant Old, The Reading and Preaching of the Scriptures in the Worship of the Christian Church, vol. 6, The Modern Age (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007): 228– 43. 14 For a representative selection of Alexander's writings on piety, see James M. Garretson, A Scribe WellTrained: Archibald Alexander and the Life of Piety (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011).
15 For a recent bibliography of Alexander's material, see Wayne Sparkman, "The Rev. Dr. Archibald Alexander (1772–1851): An Annotated Bibliography," The Confessional Presbyterian 8 (2012): 120–52.
16 See Archibald Alexander, Thoughts on Religious Experience (1840; repr., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1978). For a critical review of Alexander's work, see Gordon E. Jackson, "Archibald Alexander's Thoughts on Religious Experience, a Critical Revisiting," Journal of Presbyterian History 51 (Summer 1973): 141–54. For an overview and summary of its contents, see Steward, Princeton Seminary (1812–1929), 73–96.
Alexander as professor of church history and ecclesiastical government. Apart from shared
instruction in pastoral theology and homiletics, the two men were free to specialize in their
respective departments.17
Alexander, like several of his sons who would later teach at the seminary, was a
polymath. Having received his education as a young man through tutors and regional academies,
he was particularly influenced by Rev. William Graham while a student at Liberty Hall
Academy.18 Graham was a graduate of the College of New Jersey, where he studied under Dr.
John Witherspoon. Instruction in moral philosophy and rhetoric marked Witherspoon's
curricular interests, as did incorporation of elements of the Scottish philosophical school known
as Common Sense Realism. Graham's academy was modeled in large measure on Witherspoon's
educational emphases.
Scottish philosophy—a mixture of Baconian inductive thought and observations on how
the human mind or senses can know not just perceptions but objective reality—was extremely
influential in shaping American intellectual culture. Authors such as Francis Hutcheson, Thomas
Reid, and Dugald Stewart found inroads into American society through the academy and pulpit
alike. The approach proved a popular apologetic deterrent to the philosophical skepticism and
resulting moral relativism associated with thinkers such as David Hume. Baconian methodology
and Scottish Realist philosophy would become the reigning intellectual paradigm undergirding
theological instruction in America throughout the nineteenth century, although with waning
influence outside more conservative theological institutions in the decades following.
17 For Miller's instruction on preaching and the work of the pastoral ministry, see James M. Garretson, An Able and Faithful Ministry: Samuel Miller and the Pastoral Office (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014). 18 Modeled on the curriculum John Witherspoon established under his educational reform as president of the College of New Jersey, Liberty Hall Academy placed strong emphasis on classical studies, moral philosophy, criticism, "practical mathematics, mensuration, and navigation." Graham's academy eventually became Washington and Lee University.
Alexander first began studying theology during his teenage years. Puritan authors such as
Bates, Boston, Flavel, and Owen, alongside the writings of Jonathan Edwards, helped shape
Alexander's theological convictions, as did the works of Hugh Blair on belles lettres and
rhetoric. Francis Turretin's three-volume Institutes of Elenctic Theology was instrumental in
fine-tuning Alexander's maturing theological framework, as were the secondary standards of the
Presbyterian Church, the Westminster Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms.19
Turretin's work served as the main theological text for the study of theology at Princeton
Theological Seminary for most of the nineteenth century until replaced by Hodge's three-volume
systematic theology in the early 1870s.20
For the majority of his tenure at Princeton, Alexander served as professor of didactic and
polemic theology. With increasing age, he relinquished the chair to Charles Hodge in 1840, at
which time Hodge was elected by the General Assembly to the renamed chair of exegetical and
didactic theology. During his final decade at the seminary, as professor of pastoral and polemic
Theology,21 Alexander was able to devote more of his attention to the field of practical
theology—a subject for which he was eminently suited and one which, with the passing of the
centuries, remains the most celebrated among his many literary contributions.22
19 For a recent critical edition of Turretin's classic work, see Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, 3 vols., trans George M. Giger, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1992– 1996). For a study on Turretin's life and writings, see James W. Alexander, "Institutio Theologiae Elencticae," BRPR 20, no. 3 (July 1848): 452–63.
20 Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871–1872; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979). 21 In the last year of his professorship (1851), Alexander's title was expanded to include church government.
22 "Christians, and especially clergymen, of strong intellect, of studious habits, of scholastic attainments, often find their professional pursuits so absorbing to their taste, as to become their great temptation. They bury themselves in books—exhaust their minds in researches, which though they may be theological in their relations, are purely intellectual in their process. But, I think no one who intimately knew Dr. Alexander can think otherwise, than that profoundly as he studied the range of theological and philosophical science, his heart was in the Bible, and in experimental religion; that his musings were not on the speculative theories of his own, or other men's minds; but in the revelations of the divine Spirit, and the actual workings of the human heart, in its relations to God and inspired truth." From John Hall, "A Sermon on the Death of Dr. Alexander," cited in Garretson, Pastor-Teachers of Old Princeton, 13.
Like Alexander, Hodge's family was of Scots-Irish descent. But unlike Alexander's rural
upbringing and stable family life, Hodge's personal history prior to his college years was marked
by repeated tragedy, financial stress, and relocation.23 Presbyterian in affiliation, the Hodges
would be numbered among influential civic and commercial leaders in the city of Philadelphia at
the end of the eighteenth century. Hodge's father had served as a surgeon with the Continental
Army during the American Revolution, later becoming a prosperous dockside merchant in
Philadelphia. Six months after Charles was born, his father died, leaving his widowed mother
responsible for raising two of the five children who had not succumbed to measles or the yellow
fever epidemics that ravaged Eastern Seaboard cities such as Philadelphia during the 1790s.
Unfortunately, the Hodges never recovered from the death of their father; the family's
commercial interests suffered loss through absence of his entrepreneurial skill, regional
epidemics that decimated their business ventures and home life, and later embargoes arising out
of war with England. An industrious caretaker of her children's needs and future professional
security, Mary Hodge, Charles's mother, took in boarders and rented out portions of the houses
in which they lived in order to make ends meet. The family would move as needed to
accommodate their modest income; at one point, Mary Hodge sent Charles to Somerville, New
Jersey, to attend a college preparatory academy in anticipation of a future career in medicine.
Mary Hodge's industriousness provided important educational opportunities for her
children, first in Philadelphia and later at the College of New Jersey. Hodge's older brother,
Hugh, would become a renowned Philadelphia gynecologist whose groundbreaking expertise in
this field furthered advancement of female medical care from which today's practitioners still
23 For an older biography of Hodge, see Archibald Alexander Hodge, The Life of Charles Hodge, D.D., LL.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N.J. (1880; repr., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 2010). For recent treatments of Hodge's life, see Paul Gutjahr, Charles Hodge: Guardian of American Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Andrew A. Hoeffecker, Charles Hodge: The Pride of Princeton (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2011); and S. Donald Fortson III, Charles Hodge (Darlington, UK: EP Books, 2013).
benefit. Charles Hodge would find early entrance to the College of New Jersey, graduating in
1815 at the age of eighteen. The seminary began a year prior to Hodge's matriculation at the
college; as a young boy, Hodge was present in the gallery, listening to Alexander's inaugural
lecture and related presentations by Samuel Miller and others delivered at the opening
convocation in August of 1812.
While growing up in Philadelphia, Hodge was influenced by his family pastor and
prominent churchman and educator, Dr. Ashbel Green.24 By the time of Hodge's arrival at the
College of New Jersey, Green was serving as president of the college and in a similar capacity on
the seminary board. Like Hodge's future seminary mentors, Alexander and Miller, Green was
also committed to confessional churchmanship and experimental piety. Beloved as a pastor and
respected as a preacher, Green placed strong emphasis on catechetical training in the spiritual
nurture of his congregation and care for covenant children.25 Green's pastoral influence in
Hodge's life predated Alexander's; while often overlooked, it played a seminal role in shaping
Hodge's life and theology.
Revival swept through the college during the winter months of 1814–1815. Green and
Alexander spoke often to the students and provided spiritual counsel. Seventeen-year-old Charles
Hodge, along with a large number of the student body, experienced the effects of the Spirit's
work in conversion and commitment to a life of piety. In January 1815, Hodge made public
24 Green played an important role in rebuilding the College of New Jersey, founding Princeton Theological Seminary, and shaping nineteenth-century American Presbyterianism. For an informative introduction to Green's life, see Joseph H. Jones, ed., The Life of Ashbel Green, V.D.M. (New York: Robert Carter & Bros., 1849). A review of Green's biography by J. W. Alexander appeared in the same year. See James W. Alexander, "The Life of Ashbel Green, V.D.M., Begun to Be Written by Himself in His Eighty-Second Year, and Continued till His Eighty-Fourth; Prepared for the Press, at the Author's Request, by Joseph H. Jones, Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia," BRPR 21, no. 4 (October 1849): 563–82.
25 Hodge sat under Green's catechetical instruction, the substance of which was subsequently published in two volumes (vol. 1, 1829; vol. 2, 1841). For a review of the first volume of Green's lectures, see Archibald Alexander, "Review: Lectures on the Shorter Catechism, by Ashbel Green," BRTR 2, no. 2 (1830): 297–309. Alexander's remarks can also be found in Garretson, Princeton and the Work of the Christian Ministry, 1:315–16.
profession of faith and joined the Presbyterian Church at Princeton. The experiences of these
months would prove instrumental in Hodge's spiritual development and future leadership in the
church.
Upon graduation from the college in 1815, Hodge returned to Philadelphia to live with
his mother and recuperate his health. As the months passed, Hodge felt called to the Christian
ministry and planned on attending seminary. During these months, he also had opportunity to
accompany Alexander on an itinerant missionary tour, further deepening his friendship with the
older man. By the time Hodge completed his seminary studies in 1819, Alexander had become
more of a spiritual father than a professor to the fatherless young man.26
While a student at seminary and during the year following his graduation, Hodge's vision
for Christian service became more focused as he tested his gifts in preaching and pastoral care in
combination with Alexander's mentoring and spiritual friendship. He pursued licensure while
serving various temporary ministry positions. Hodge soon received invitation from Alexander to
serve at the seminary as instructor of biblical languages. Hodge's scholarly aptitude seemed to
lay claim on service as a professor over that of a pastor-preacher, although he continued to
preach as opportunity afforded. Following additional study of the Hebrew language while in
Philadelphia, in May 1820 Hodge received a one-year appointment to teach biblical languages at
his alma mater. Hodge's scholarship and classroom competence would be rewarded by the
General Assembly when he was elected on May 24, 1822, as professor of oriental and biblical
literature, a position he would hold for almost two decades until his reassignment to the
department of exegetical and didactic theology.
26 For a touching review of Alexander's biography, see Charles Hodge, "Memoir of Dr. Alexander," BRPR 27, no. 1 (January 1855): 148. Hodge's review can also be found in Garretson, Pastor-Teachers of Old Princeton, 27–52.
Samuel Miller's impact on Hodge's student life at the college and seminary was also
substantial. A son of the manse and longtime pastor in the city of New York, Miller was an
intellectual historian who became a renowned professor of church history and church
government. His publications in these fields became standard treatments of their topics.
Dignified and stately in deportment, Miller, like his colleague Archibald Alexander, was
passionately invested in the lives of his students. An advantage of the smaller student enrollment
during the seminary's first decade was the close personal contact it provided between faculty and
students. The formality of the classroom was more than offset by the familial atmosphere of the
campus, with its common ministerial vision and fostering of lifelong friendships. Miller and
Alexander were in many respects de facto spiritual father figures for the young men under their
tutelage. Their piety, meekness, and humility bore powerful testimony in the example of
Christlike love and service that marked their public ministry and campus presence.
Besides the formal classroom instruction, one of the means used to foster experimental
piety among the students as Christian men and in their future service as pastors was the Sabbath
afternoon conference. Here Alexander and Miller, and later Hodge, would discuss the practical
implications of applied theology to the students' lives and public calling. An inspiring record of
these weekly gatherings is provided by A. A. Hodge in a collection of his father's sermon
outlines, Princeton Sermons.27
A related but separate observation on the spiritual impact of the two senior professors can
be found in an address Charles Hodge delivered at the reopening of the seminary chapel on
27 See Charles Hodge, Conference Papers: Or Analyses of Discourses, Doctrinal and Practical, Delivered on Sabbath Afternoon to the Students of the Seminary (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1879); reprinted as Princeton Sermons: Outlines of Discourses, Doctrinal and Practical, at Princeton Theological Seminary (1958; repr., Banner of Truth, 2011), vii–xviii.
September 27, 1874. Hodge's remarks capture the pervasive spiritual atmosphere present at the
campus during its opening decades, due in no small measure to Alexander and Miller:
They were in the first place, eminently holy men. They exerted that indescribable but powerful influence which always emanates from those who live near to God. Their piety was uniform and serene; without any taint of enthusiasm or fanaticism. It was also Biblical. Christ was as prominent in their religious experience, in their preaching, and in their writings, as he is in the Bible. Christ's person, his glory, his righteousness, his love, his presence, his power, filled the whole sphere of their religious life. When men enter a Roman Catholic Church, they see before them a wooden image of Christ extended upon a cross. To this lifeless image they bow. When students entered this Seminary, when its first professors were alive, they had held up before them the image of Christ, not graven by art or man's device, but as portrayed by the Spirit on the pages of God's word; and it is by beholding that image that men are transformed into its likeness from glory to glory. It is, in large measure, this constant holding up of Christ, in the glory of his person and the all-sufficiency of his work, that the hallowed influence of the fathers of this Seminary is to be attributed.28 Any assessment of Alexander's instruction in theology must keep these considerations in
mind in order to understand the personal and intensely spiritual backdrop to Hodge's academic
experience. The pervasive spiritual atmosphere present during weekly meetings in the "Old
Oratory," was equally present in the formal classroom instruction. Study of theology always took
place within this devotional context. Even the most metaphysical considerations were examined
within this atmosphere; while speculation was eschewed, students were taught that theology,
properly conceived, is doxological in nature and must be approached with a spiritual disposition
in order to live all of life coram Deo.29 The combination of spiritual fervor; experience of
revival; power of Spirit-anointed, Christ-centered preaching; missionary interest; faculty
involvement; and sense of the holy calling of the pastoral office would have done much to shape
the aspirations and convictions of the young men who attended the school at this time.
28 See Hodge, Life of Charles Hodge, 586–87. 29 Nicholas Murray would later write, "His was the most simple-hearted piety. He read the Bible like a child, and he exercised a simple faith in all it taught and promised. There was no effort to explain away its doctrines, or to modify its principles by the teaching of philosophy falsely so called. He was a metaphysician; and yet all the metaphysics and German mysticism upon earth weighed not a feather with him against one simple text of Scripture fairly interpreted. His mind and heart were imbued with Divine truth, and his experience of its power was rich and ripe." See Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 654.
Faculty commitment to spiritual life was accompanied by diligent study of Scripture and
related texts. In his work as a professor, Alexander read widely in biblical, systematic, and
historical theology. Criticism, hermeneutics, and typology were areas of concentrated research.30
Alexander was conversant with the works of Herman Witsius, Johannes Cocceius, and other
seventeenth-century divines whose writings had yet to be translated from their Latin originals.
Among the subjects included in the theology curriculum was the study of mental philosophy
(epistemology), an area of special interest for Alexander.
Alexander's approach to the study of mental philosophy is summarized in the
correspondence of Joseph Henry, LLD, a former student at the College of New Jersey and later
secretary of the Smithsonian Institute:
He had studied in early life the subject of mental philosophy, and had adopted the principles of the inductive method. All ideas he considered as derived from sensation or consciousness, and without attempting to explain the essence of mind or of matter, he contented himself with a knowledge of the laws of their phenomena, and with referring these to the will of the Creator of the universe. All knowledge superior to this was derived from revelation, the truths of which, however mysterious and beyond reason, he adopted with implicit confidence. He was much interested in all questions of physical science, and particularly in the researches in which I was engaged. All his conceptions of truth were simple and clear. His was not a mere speculative faith, or a theoretical system of Christian duty, but one which was eminently reduced to practice. He taught by his example as well as by his precepts, and his influence will long live after him, not only in his published works, but in the memory of his pupils, and in its effect on the character and conduct of all who enjoyed the pleasure and profit of his quaintance.31 Like his mentor, William Graham, Alexander formulated his own system of mental
philosophy. While Alexander embraced aspects of the Scottish school, he adapted it where
appropriate in relation to studying Scripture and the theology of the Westminster standards.32
30 For related publications, see Archibald Alexander, The Canon of the Old and New Testaments Ascertained; or the Bible Complete without the Apocrypha and Unwritten Traditions (New York: D. A. Borrenstein for G. & C. Carvill, 1826); and Archibald Alexander, Evidences of the Authenticity, Inspiration, and Canonical Authority of the Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1826).
31 See Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 685–86. 32 For observations on Alexander's instruction on the relationship between that of the intellect and affections, see Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and Pietism, 168. For a perceptive article examining the
Alexander viewed its observations as preparatory to, but not determinative of, the content and
character of revealed truth. Alexander's religious epistemology defended a unitary operation of
the soul (mind, will, and emotions) while recognizing rational and moral dimensions to human
cognition. Alexander's biographer summarizes his approach:
Deeply persuaded that many theological errors have their origin in a bias derived from false metaphysics, he set about the methodizing of his thought upon mental philosophy, always keeping in hand the clew which he had received from his venerated preceptor, William Graham. The German philosophy was as yet unknown among us, and he was never led to travel the transcendental or "high priori road," but treated mental phenomena on the inductive method, as the objects of a cautious generalization. While he uniformly recommended the perusal of Locke, it was as he often declared, not so much for the value of his particular conclusions, as for the spirit of his investigation, the calmness, patience, and transparent honesty of that truly great man. He likewise expressed great favour for Reid, Beattie, Buffier, Campbell and Stewart, with whose general methods, as well as their views of intuitive truths and constitutional principles of reason, he was in agreement, while he dissented from many of their definitions, distinctions, and tenets. These were subjects which fell in with his tastes, habits of thought and course of reading; and as preliminary to the development of the revealed system, he regarded them as forming a necessary part of every complete theological course.33 According to J. W. Alexander, Archibald's skill in metaphysical reasoning was especially
notable in "his lectures on the Will, and his elaborate refutation of Dr. Thomas Brown's work on
Causation." "No portion of his course," we are told, "more awakened the interest of his auditors
and such was the ingenuity with which he made these lessons bear on theological questions still
in reserve, that in the days of church-controversy it used to be a common remark, that students
relationship between piety and reason among the early Princetonians, see Paul Kjoss Helseth, "'Right Reason' and the Princeton Mind: The Moral Context," Journal of Presbyterian History 77 (1999): 13–28. For a related treatment examining the interrelationship between piety, Scottish Common Sense Realism, and the Reformed epistemological convictions that informed Alexander's approach to the teaching of theology and apologetics, see Paul Helseth, "Right Reason" and the Princeton Mind: An Unorthodox Proposal (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2010), 3– 39. For a seminal article on the relationship between Scottish Enlightenment philosophy and its impact on American theologizing, see Sydney E. Ahlstrom, "The Scottish Philosophy and American theology," Church History 24 (1955): 257–72. For an extended study on the related impact of the Scottish Enlightenment on science, ethics, faith, and reason, see George M. Marsden, "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia," in Reckoning with the Past: Historical Essays on American Evangelicalism from the Institute for the Study of American Evangelicals, ed. D. G. Hart (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995), 221–66.
33 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 366.
who had been imbued with Dr. Alexander's metaphysics were sure to swallow his entire
system."34
The seminary curriculum also included study of natural religion and moral philosophy
(ethics), the latter a subject of posthumous publication.35 Alexander incorporated insights from
both general and special revelation into his approach. "While he was far from being a rationalist,
he was never satisfied with the tactics of those reasoners who under the pretext of exalting
revelation, dismiss with contempt all arguments derived from the light of nature." For Alexander,
general revelation serves the purposes of special revelation. "Here he freely declared his
judgment that many sound, able and pious men had greatly erred. He rendered due homage,
therefore, to the labours of such writers as Nieuwentyt, the younger Turretine, and Paley, and
spent much time in considering and unfolding with nice discrimination the various schemes of
argument for the Being and Perfections of God, and the necessity and antecedent probability of a
revelation."36
As an educator, Alexander was a popular communicator.37 Fidelity to revealed truth lay
at the heart of his instruction, the responsibilities of which rested heavily on his conscience.38 As
his biographer is careful to note, "The anxieties belonging to an attempt to lay down the great
34 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 367. 35 See Archibald Alexander, Outlines of Moral Science (New York: Charles Scribner, 1852). 36 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 367. 37 William M. Paxton, a student and later professor at the seminary, left record of Alexander's instruction: "As a teacher, the impression made upon the students was his power to penetrate a subject. The class to which I belonged heard his lectures upon Didactic Theology as well as those of Dr. Hodge. Dr. Hodge gave us a subject with massive learning, in its logical development, in its beautiful balance and connection with the whole system. Dr. Alexander would take the same subject, and strike it with a javelin, and let the light through it. His aim was to make one point, and nail it fast. I always came from his lecture with these words running through my mind, 'A nail driven in a sure place.'" See William M. Paxton, "Archibald Alexander, D.D. Address," in Garretson, Pastor-Teachers of Old Princeton, 24–25.
38 A former student writes of Alexander's orthodoxy and paternal regard for his students: "As a professor of Theology he was able, discriminating, sound in the faith, and most ardently attached to the great doctrines of grace; and as a teacher he was as a father to his pupils." See Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 655.
lines of a method for teaching the whole system of revealed truth, to those who were to be the
ministers of the Church, were just and burdensome."39
In the early years of his professorship, Alexander's approach was "more extemporaneous
and colloquial; there was more use of existing manuals, and less adventure of original
expedients." For study of theology proper, Alexander believed it "best taught by a wise union of
the text-book with the free lecture." While selections from various seventeenthand eighteenth-
century authors were translated and distributed, Alexander assigned Turretin's Institutes of
Elenctic Theology as his primary theological text. He felt Turretin's treatment the best textbook
for training the mind and learning the doctrines of the Christian faith in a concise and orderly
fashion.40
Turretin made special effort to organize his subject matter in a question/answer format.
By such arrangement, propositional statements made topics of inquiry clear, thereby inviting
statements of defense or rebuttal. Preservation of truth and promotion of piety were both of
concern. Truth and error were real, and Turretin wanted his readers to be able to understand,
explain, and defend the Christian faith in a clear and logical manner. Turretin's goals match
nicely with Alexander's interests. Both valued biblical truth in its exposition and defense. Each
expressed concern about the danger of doctrinal decline and spiritual declension.41
39 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 368. 40 "It was ponderous, scholastic and in a dead language, but he believed in the process of grappling with difficulties; he had felt the influence of this athletic sinewy reasoner on his own mind, and had observed that those who mastered his arguments were apt to be strong and logical divines." Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 368. 41 Practical considerations were likewise impetus to publication of a popular theology for lay people. See Archibald Alexander, A Brief Compendium of Bible Truth (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1846), 136–38. This was reprinted by Reformation Heritage Books in 2005.
Alexander augmented assigned readings with personal observations.42 He also worked
hard to provide students with resources that facilitate the learning process. Alexander's pedagogy
is recounted in brief summary by his biographer:
Dr. Alexander often dissented from the learned Genevan, and always endeavoured to cultivate in his students the spirit and habit of original investigation. It is likely that his labours at this period derived a peculiar vivacity from his time of life, from the freshness of the employment, and from the necessity of adapting himself to a limited circle. He very laboriously engaged in making such brief aids in the way of syllabus and compendium as might furnish to the student a manageable key to the whole classification. He prepared extensive and minute questions, going into all the ramifications of theology; lists of which still remain in the hands of some alumni. He assigned subjects for original dissertations, which were publicly read, and commented on by both professors and students; a near approach to the acts held in the old university schools, under the scholastic moderator. To this were added, at a date which we find ourselves unable to fix with precision, the debates of a theological society, meeting weekly, always on some important topic, and always closed by the full and highly animated remarks of the professor.43 For instruction in theology, Alexander, like Turretin, preferred a topical arrangement of
subjects. While respectful of the redemptive-historical character of Scripture and theologians
who made it the organizing principle of their theological instruction, Alexander preferred the
advantages of the former for focused study and retention in understanding.
The natural and simple light, in which it was a characteristic of the professor to view all subjects, and the predominance of logical nexus as the element of association in his mind, concurred to cause a preference for the ancient and more obvious scheme of classifying Scripture truth. Hence he did not adopt the Federal method of arrangement, as it has been called, of Witsius; great as was his sympathy with the evangelical warmth and unction of that school. For the same reasons his judgment disapproved the order suggested by Chalmers, in the preface to what remains of his original and striking but fragmentary theological course. For, while he agreed with this great author in considering the plan of redemption as the ultimate scope and crowning glory of all theology, he nevertheless preferred as a medium of scientific communication, that disposition of topics which takes its departure from the Being, Attributes, and Works of God; that is, from Theology in its strictest acceptation.44
42 "As a Professor in the theological seminary, he discharged every duty, not only with signal ability, but with great punctuality and fidelity. His lectures were generally written; and they were always luminous, and, to every thoughtful student, in a high degree attractive." See William B. Sprague in Presbyterian Reunion: A Memorial Volume, 1837–1871 (New York: De Witt C. Lent & Company, 1871), 114.
43 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 369. 44 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 370.
Classroom assignments reflected Turretin's approach. Students were expected to read
assigned material, provide a written or oral summary of the subject matter, and make defense of
the content reviewed. By such means, students became familiar with the material and the
organizing principles underlying its presentation. Students learned sound doctrine as well as how
to think and reason.
On each head or title he was accustomed to assign a considerable portion of the textbook, to be carefully perused by the class, and to be made the subject of a sifting examination; also naming the chief authors who had treated of the points respectively, and sometimes, when these works were numerous, allotting them to different students, with a requisition that they should give some account of each, either orally, or what was more common, in writing. This examination and these essays gave rise to brief but animated remarks from the chair, and he was never more felicitous or more convincing than in such impromptus; in which his eye would kindle and flash, and his expressive face become radiant, as he poured forth the gatherings of an extraordinary erudition, or pursued the thread of nice and delicate analysis, with a clearness and closeness of argument which his partial hearers thought unrivalled. To this was added, however, and with greater fullness as years advanced, the delivery of formal and elaborate lectures on the grand articles of the faith.45 The design of the curriculum was both to instruct in sound doctrine and provide training
that would enable ministers to defend the Christian faith and refute "gainsayers." A graduate of
the seminary would be able to explain orthodox doctrine and refute heresy and detractors to the
Christian faith. Study of polemical theology, therefore, formed an important part of the
theological curriculum.46 The approach Alexander adopted was twofold. With respect to heresies
and theological distortions within the professing church, Alexander utilized historical analysis in
elucidating doctrinal compromise, its effects on individuals and corporate church life, and the
45 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 370–71. 46 Polemic theology addressed a wide cross-section of religious outlook. Representative lecture topics include Arminianism, heresies of the primitive church, Arianism, deism, indifferentism or latitudinarianism, Socinianism, Epicurianism, French infidelity, atheism, unitarianism, modern Socinianism, Judaism, Jewish Talmud, semi-Pelagianism from Jansenians, ancient Greeks, Anabaptists, Moravians, Arian-Quaker controversies, points of controversy with the papists, Spinoza, pantheism, ethnicism or paganism, theology and Hindus, religion of the Grand Lama, Mohamedism, quietism, Buddhism and Djanas, history of polemic theology, and the evils of theological controversy.
remedies required for restoration of biblical orthodoxy. J. W. Alexander explains his father's
manner of handling heresy:
The division of this department into Didactic and Polemic Theology, which the Plan of the institution made imperative, gave the professor an opportunity to go over all the leading doctrines in the way of defence against the objections of errorists, heretics, and infidels. In doing this he brought to bear his remarkable stores of recondite reading. He gave the biography of eminent opponents, clear analyses of their systems, and refutation of their reasons. Of necessity he was thus carried into the field of Dogmengeschichte, the progress of controversies, the debates and conclusions of councils, the construction of creeds, and the whole round of symbolical theology. What might be considered by some an inordinate length of time was devoted to the cardinal differences, such as the controversy with Deists, Arians, Socinians, Pelagians, Arminians, papists and Universalists; all being made to revolve around the Calvinistic system, which, upon sincere conviction, he had adopted.47 Training in polemical theology also included introduction to religions that students would
encounter on foreign mission fields as well as aberrations of Christianity taking root in American
culture during the early nineteenth century.48
He was so earnestly in favour of having the young clergyman armed at all points against adversaries, that he greatly extended his lectures, so as to embrace the varieties of heathenism and Mohammedanism with which missionaries must be brought into conflict; and also the forms of error which prevail in our Western country. Accordingly he has left copious reviews of Campbellism, Shakerism, and even Mormonism, with details which show how largely and attentively he must have examined all the available authorities of these heretics. In conducting these studies, he alighted on a method which gave him great pleasure, and was always interesting to his pupils. Early in the session each member of the class had allotted to him some erroneous system of controversy, to be made the subject of a dissertation. The whole term was sometimes allowed for preparing these, and some of the essays became almost volumes. All this was over and above his extensive course of lectures. He was far from having a stereotyped plan; but besides undertaking new subjects of instruction in the close of his life, as we shall occasion to say, he made frequent changes in his modus operandi to the last.49 Alexander's biographer is careful to note that while his formal duties required study of
polemical discourse, "he was in no sense an active controvertist." Rather, he sought to convince
47 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 371. 48 American religion underwent vast changes in the nineteenth century. For an informative and richly illustrated study of its development, see Grant Wacker, Religion in Nineteenth Century America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). For an important treatment of one of the most influential new religious movements, see Philip F. Gura, American Transcendentalism: A History (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
49 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 371–72.
through careful reasoning and winsome testimony to the truth of the gospel message. "When
falsehood was read or heard by him, it was the tendency of his mind, from its strong logical
interest, rather to yield himself to the consideration of adverse arguments, and to weigh them
with a judgelike calmness, than to seek on the spot for weapons of refutation." A principled and
peace-loving man, "his practical maxim was the audi alteram partem; and those who were privy
to his daily studies were astonished at the time which he bestowed on the most dangerous
writers. And yet his own opinions were held with a firmness which in his mature years seemed to
suffer not even a momentary shaking. The habits to which allusion has been made, tended
beyond doubt to produce in him a peculiar reserve and impartiality in stating the opinions of
adversaries, and in refuting them."50
While a variety of student lecture notes exist from Alexander's classes, an obvious
benefit of the present collection is their author. Hodge was just as meticulous in his note taking
as a student as in his later labors as a professor. The same precision of expression found in his
personal writings can be found in the compact nature of his notes. But of what importance are
Hodge's notes for today's student of theology?
It is often the case that profundity and prolixity go hand in hand. But good educators
know the value of simplicity in style and delivery. The best teachers have so mastered their
material that their presentation is marked by clarity and order. The result is material that is both
informative and comprehensible.51 While some, perhaps most, material offered in theology
50 Alexander, Life of Archibald Alexander, 372–73. 51 Charles Hodge spoke of Alexander's impact on his students: "The three great sources of influence, ascendancy over the intellect, power over the religious feelings, and ability to win the affections of his pupils, united in Dr. Alexander, each in an eminent degree. His talents and learning rendered all his lectures instructive. They communicated knowledge, removed difficulties, illustrated important principles, and produced conviction." Charles Hodge, "Memoir of Dr. Alexander," 157. See also Garretson, Pastor-Teachers of Old Princeton, 47–48.
courses is worthy of expanded treatment, there is also important pedagogical value in material
that is both manageable in amount and easy to recount.
Because Hodge attended the seminary during its first decade, his notes provide record of
the emphases Alexander wished to impress on his students in relation to the great issues facing
the church, theological education, and pastoral training at the outset of the nineteenth century.
While in his early years as a professor Alexander would have been glancing backward in history
at the threat of infidelity and deism, he also lived at a time of pronounced change in theological
study—whether from German "neologists" and philosophers or from the changing trajectory of
American theology soon to be awash in disputes about transcendentalism, romanticism, "new
measures," resurgent Pelagianism, debate surrounding strict or system subscription, true and
false religious experience, and reasons for division within the Presbyterian Church in the
eighteenth and again in the nineteenth century.
Similar in style to catechetical instruction, the compact format allows a quick summary of
key matters brief enough to be easily digested but substantive enough to provoke additional
thought and inquiry. Although further study and comparison would be necessary to learn of the
ways in which Alexander added, deleted, or rearranged material throughout the years of his
instruction, today's reader is able once again to join Hodge and other young men in the lecture
hall as their revered professor explains the manner in which the "deposit of truth" finds
expression in systematic doctrinal formulation.
It is likely that fellow students would have checked with Hodge to make sure their notes
were accurate. Hodge's diligence provides contemporary students of theology opportunity to sit
once again at the feet of one of Christ's choice gifts to His church.
Systematic
Theology
Princeton, Jan. 1818
The Chain of Salvation
God has ordained
Christ has merited
The Word promises
The sacraments seal
Faith receives
The mouth confesses
Works testify
Salutis Catena
Deus ordinavit
Christus meruit
Verbum promittit
Sacramenta obsignant
Fides recipit
Os fatetur
Opera testantur
Chapter 1
Philosophy of the Mind
1. What is truth?
Truth, which is the object of all science, scarcely admits of a strict definition. Beattie1
says, that is truth which the constitution of our nature determines us to believe, and that is
falsehood which the constitution of our nature determines us to disbelieve.
2. Is the mind of man capable of attaining any certain knowledge?
Yes. The supposition that it can be proved that all human knowledge is uncertain destroys
itself by taking it for granted that the uncertainty of our knowledge can be certainly
known. So man can[not] be a consistent universal skeptic, for he would have to doubt of
the reality of his doubting everything.
3. Are there innate ideas in the mind of man?
No, if we understand this phrase as used by Mr. Locke,2 who considered it as meaning
certain impressions or notions existing in the mind previous to and independent of
reflection and sensation. It is one thing herein to say that men have an innate knowledge
of such and such things, and another to say that they have an aptitude to receive them.
The mind is not a tabula rasa [blank slate].
4. Are there any self-evident or intuitive truths?
1 [Possibly James Beattie (1735–1803), Evidences of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. (1786).] 2 [John Locke (1632–1704) was an English philosopher and influential Enlightenment thinker.]
Yes. Those propositions which, from the constitution of my nature, I am under the
necessity of believing as soon as they are presented to my mind are called self-evident
truths. Or, that is an ultimate principle which forces our belief by its own intrinsic
evidence and which cannot by any reasoning be rendered more evident.
5. On what evidence does the belief of our existence rest?
We have no other direct evidence of our existence than that of consciousness, though
strictly speaking existence is not the object of consciousness, but we are conscious of our
thoughts. That which does not exist cannot think. In this view Descartes's3 cogito ergo
sum [I think, therefore I am] is correct.
6. On what evidence do we believe that the world exists?
On the testimony of our external senses we cannot help believing it.
7. Why do we believe what we distinctly remember?
We can give no other reason than that such is the constitution of our nature that we are
under the necessity of believing what we distinctly remember, as well as what we
perceive or are conscious of.
8. Why do we believe in testimony?
Our belief is not the result of experience but arises from the constitution of our nature.
3 [René Descartes (1596–1650) was a French mathematician, scientist, and the father of modern Western philosophy.]
9. Into how many kinds may first truths be divided?
1. The existence of the objects of sense and consciousness
2. Necessary truths, as mathematical axioms
3. Philosophical principles, as that every effect must have a cause
4. Moral truths
5. Truths reported to us by a competent number of witnesses, past or present
6. Truths founded on uniform experience, as that the sun will rise tomorrow
7. Those founded on memory
10. Can their number be ascertained?
No.
11. How can they be distinguished from vulgar prejudices?
The essential qualities of first truths are:
1. They are incapable of proof or disproof, as all other truths are less clear and
certain;
2. [They are] admitted in all countries and at all times;
3. They are practically followed even by contrary theorists.
With respect to many we can be certain that they belong to this class; with regard to
others it may be doubted whether they are known by the faculty of common sense or by a
short process of reasoning.
12. Can there be any reasoning with those who deny them?
No. For there can be no reasoning without premises, and these in the first instance must
be self-evident. Reasoning is the comparison of ideas already known and thereby
inferring others before unknown. If some things are not admitted without proof we would
have to reason on ad infinitum [to infinity].
13. Can intuitive truths be always easily distinguished from the deductions of reason?
No.
14. Are there some truths necessarily in every science?
In every science there must be some truths self-evident or we could never commence our
investigations.
15. Are the conclusions of reasoning more certain than first principles?
No. For these conclusions derive all their strength from the premises or principles from
which they are drawn. The superstructure cannot have more stability than the foundation.
16. Can our belief in these principles be shaken by reasoning?
No. Though we may be unable to answer the arguments of sophisters against them, yet
we can't withhold our assent from what is self-evident if we try.
17. How does it appear that matter and mind are essentially different?
If the word matter be taken in the sense in which it is used in natural philosophy, there
can be no doubt on the subject. For of all the properties essential to matter, not one can be
predicated of mind; and of those essential to mind, not one can be predicated of matter.
Therefore the substances to which these properties belong must be essentially different.
18. Could omnipotence endow matter with the power of thinking?
No; it implies a contradiction. It is the same as to ask whether a being can be essentially
active and essentially inactive at the same time.
19. Are our ideas of mind as clear as those of matter?
Yes, our ideas of each are confined to their properties and are as clear in the one case as
the other.
20. What is perception, and what are the immediate objects of the mind in perception?
Perception is the means by which the mind keeps up its intercourse with external things.
Considered as an act of the mind, it requires these three particulars:
1. Some notion of the object perceived
2. An irresistible conviction of its present existence
3. This conviction is immediate and not the result of reasoning
The objects of the mind in perception are the qualities of bodies with certain states and
conditions of our own bodies, mechanical powers, chemical powers, and so on. Every
object of perception must have a real existence, must be external, and must be present.
21. What was long the opinion of philosophers on this subject?
It was long supposed that species, forms, phantasms, or ideas were the immediate objects
of perception.
22. To what skepticism did this opinion lead?
Berkeley's4 taking for granted that all the objects of our knowledge were ideas proved
that the material world does not exist. And Hume,5 setting out with dividing all the
perceptions of the human mind into impressions and ideas, and by asserting that the latter
differs from the former only in being a weaker perception, comes at last to the conclusion
that "mankind" (both soul and body) "are nothing but a bundle or collection of different
perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual
flux or movement."6
23. Can we explain how the impressions on the organs of sense produce perception?
No. A certain sensation is always followed by a certain perception, but how or why, we
cannot tell. Dr. Hartley attempted to explain it on the principle of nervous vibrations.
24. What is sensation, and how is it distinguished from perception?
Sensation is distinguished from every other act of the mind in having no object distinct
from the act itself. Its essence consists in being felt. Sensation is related to perception as
the sign to the thing signified.
Sensation taken by itself does not imply the belief of anything external, but
perception does. Sensation supposes a sentient being and a particular way in which that
4 [George Berkeley (1685–1753) was an Irish philosopher, known for his view of what later would be called subjective idealism.]
5 [David Hume (1711–1776) was a Scottish philosopher who is known for his influential view of empiricism, skepticism, and naturalism.]
6 Hume
being is affected, but nothing more. Perception supposes something distinct from the
mind which perceives and the act of perception.
25. What is consciousness?
It is an involuntary act and signifies the immediate knowledge we must of necessity have
of all the present operations of our minds. It regards only what is present and also what is
in the mind.
26. What is judgment?
That act of the mind by which one thing is affirmed of another or denied of another.
27. What is memory?
That faculty by which we have an immediate knowledge of things past. It implies the
capacity of retaining knowledge and also a power of recalling it to our thoughts.
28. What is reasoning?
It is that power of the mind by which we draw inferences or by which we are convinced
that a relation belongs to two ideas on account of our having found that these ideas bear
certain relations to other ideas.
29. Do we always give an implicit belief to memory?
Yes. We are forced by the constitution of our nature to believe what we distinctly
remember; and we can't help it if we would.
30. Does memory never deceive us?
No. We are sometimes at a loss to know whether we remember or not, but it is impossible
that what we do remember should not be true. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish
memory and imagination.
31. What is conception and what is imagination?
Conception is that power of the mind by which we are able to form a notion of our past
sensations or of absent objects of perception. Its business is to present the mind with an
exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived.
Fancy selects and presents to imagination all the materials it requires, and
imagination is the power of so modifying these materials (or in other words our
conceptions) by combining the parts of different ones together so as to form new wholes
of our creation. See App., p. 3.7
32. What is attention, and should it be reckoned a distinct faculty?
Attention is the fixedness of the mind on a particular object. When this object is external
it is called "attention," but receives the appellation of "reflexion"8 when the object is
within. It is not a distinct faculty.
33. What is abstraction?
Abstraction is the faculty by which we resolve or analyze a subject into its known
7 [This inexplicable "App.," which occurs throughout the original manuscript, appears to have been a syllabus or supplement to Alexander's lectures, possibly an appendix.]
8 [reflection?]
attributes, or it is the power of considering certain qualities apart from the rest.
34. Are there any general conceptions?
Yes. And these are formed by the power of abstraction, separating from individuals their
attributes and then by the faculty of generalization, collecting such as are common to a
number into one idea. In this way our notions of general species are formed.
35. For what do general terms stand for in reasoning?
In regard to this point there have been three different opinions, the advocates of which
have respectively been called Realists, Nominalists, and Conceptualists.
Plato and Aristotle,9 though they differed in some particulars relative to this
subject, both taught that there were certain substantial forms or essences corresponding to
general form terms, and the mind contemplated [these] when it used these terms.
Zeno10 and his followers of the stoical sect11 held, on the contrary, that universals
had neither form nor essence but that they were mere nominal representations of
particular objects. The doctrine of Aristotle prevailed generally until the eleventh century,
when Roscellinus12 embraced the opinion of the Stoics, and together with his pupil
Abelard13 greatly spread the doctrine of the Nominalists.14
9 [Plato (c. 428–348 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC) were both Greeks and were two of the most important philosophers of the ancient world.]
10 [Probably Zeno of Citium (c. 334–c. 262 BC), who was a Greek philosopher of Athens and the founder of the Stoic school.]
11 [Stoicism was a school of Hellenistic philosophy that emphasized personal ethics involving not being controlled by a desire for pleasure or fear of pain, understanding the world around us, and treating others justly.]
12 [Roscellinus (c. 1050–c. 1125) was a French philosopher and theologian, often regarded as the founder of Nominalism.]
13 [Peter Abelard (1079–1142) was a French scholastic philosopher, theologian, and logician.] 14 [Nominalism is a metaphysical, philosophical view that denies the existence of universals and abstract objects, holding them to exist in "name" only.]
Conceptualists15 differ naturally from both the preceding. They maintain that as
words are connected by common consent with certain attributes common to many
individuals, that as soon as a general term is pronounced, all these attributes are brought
before the mind by the faculty of conception and that this collection of ideas (or
conception) is the object contemplated when general terms are employed.
36. In the use of general terms, does the mind always think of an individual?
No.
37. What is association, and what is its importance?
Association is the tendency of the mind to pass from one thought to another on account of
some relation between them. It is of the greatest importance as it has great influence in
regulating the succession of our thoughts and, by the indissoluble combinations it leads
us to form in our infancy and youth, affects both our intellectual powers and moral
characters. See App., p. 4.
38. What is conscience, and is it an original faculty?
There are three different opinions on this subject:
1. Some consider conscience not only as an original, but also an indifferent faculty,
so that the decisions of conscience and the understanding may be directly opposed
to each other, and that conscience is always right.16
15 [Conceptualism lies between Realism and Nominalism and denies the presence of universals in particulars outside of the mind's perception of them.]
16 [Nathaniel] Emmons [(1745–1840) was a New England, new school theologian who developed postEdwards, Hopkinsianism further.]
2. That it is neither original nor uniform and that it would permit men to determine
that injustice and ingratitude are morally right but that utility prevents their
making such decisions.17
3. That it is an original, but not an independent faculty, involving in every act the
exercise of the understanding together with an approving or disapproving emotion
of the heart. See App., p. 4.
39. Is it properly called "the Moral Sense"?
Moral sense refers as much to the actions of others as to our own. Conscience refers only
to our own. The latter is the exercise of the former on a particular class of objects. Yet
conscience is often used in the extended sense of the first of these terms.
40. Is it uniform in its dictates?
Yes, within certain limits; that is, as there are first principles in every science, so in
morals there are some things so plain that men never differ in regard to them. But when
we leave these, the decisions of conscience become as various and inconsistent as the
conclusions of reason on points of mere speculation.
41. Is conscience distinct from the understanding?
No. It is the exercise of the understanding on moral subjects accompanied by a feeling of
the heart as to their being right or wrong.
17 Paley/Locke [William Paley (1743–1805) and John Locke (1632–1704) were English philosophers. The former was a Christian apologist; the latter was one of the most influential Enlightenment thinkers.]
42. Is there anything more in conscience than a judgment of the understanding?
Yes. See the foregoing answers.
43. How can the diversity in the operations of conscience be accounted for?
In the same way as we account for the vast diversity in the operations of other original
faculties, such as taste and judgment. Men often agree in a moral principle though they
err in its application. Thus one nation approves of parricide,18 while another reprobates it;
yet the conscience of both teach that we ought to do good to our parents.
44. What are simple ideas and what are complex ideas?
A simple idea is an idea of a simple object, that is, of an object without parts—or it is an
idea that cannot be resolved into two or more ideas. A complex idea arises from the
combination of two or more simple ideas, or it is an idea of a complex object.
45. Are all our simple ideas derived from sensation and reflection?
Such is the general opinion of philosophers, but it is difficult in this way to account for
our ideas of identity, of unity, of duration, and so on. See App., p. 4.
18 [The killing of one's father, or parents.]
Chapter 2
Theology
46. What is theology?
It is that system or body of doctrine concerning God and divine things revealed by God,
for His own glory and man's salvation.
47. In what sense was the word used by heathen authors?
They used it as synonymous with metaphysics. Aristotle divided philosophy into natural,
mathematical, and theological.
48. How was it used by the fathers of the Christian church?
They applied the term particularly to that part of the Christian doctrine which treated of
the divinity of our Savior. Hence John is called by them Theologus [Theologian].
49. How is theology divided?
Into true and false. True theology is divided into that of vision and that of revelation; the
latter again is divided into natural and supernatural, and into natural and revealed.
50. What is natural theology?
It consists in the knowledge of those truths concerning the being and attributes of God,
the principles of human duty, and the expectation of a future state derived from reason
alone.
51. How does it appear that there is any natural theology?
It is proved from man's having a natural law written in his conscience (Rom. 2:14), from
all nations having some religion, and from its being so congenial to our minds.
52. Is that theology sufficient to lead men to the true knowledge of God?
It may lead us to the knowledge of God as Creator, Preserver, and Governor, and to the
knowledge of those attributes manifested in the works of God, but it cannot make us
acquainted with His character as Redeemer and as a God who forgives iniquity,
transgression, and sin.
53. Has natural theology been held in its purity by any nation destitute of revelation?
No, and it is remarkable that the progress of corruption in the doctrines of religion have
been in exact proportion to the advance of nations in the arts and sciences.
54. Should a perfect knowledge of natural theology give any hope to a sinner?
No, it cannot disclose the plan according to which God can be just and yet justify the
ungodly, and therefore it can afford no rational hope that God will pardon sin.
55. How do men acquire the idea of a God?
The mind of man is so formed that though it has no innate ideas of God, nor any intuitive
perception of His existence, yet it has a faculty well suited to receive this truth so that
when it is proposed, it easily and readily apprehends it.
This differs from Descartes's notion of an innate idea only in making it necessary
that the truth should be proposed to the mind. This knowledge of a deity has probably
been preserved in the world by tradition; without this, men would be atheists.
56. How can the existence of God be demonstrated?
The arguments for the being of God have generally been divided into those from a priori
[from what is before] and those a posteriori [from what comes after]. It has also been
argued from the universal and uninterrupted consent of all nations, from the aptitude of
our minds to receive this truth, and from the operations of natural conscience.
57. What is the nature of the argument a priori [from the prior]?
It consists in arguing from cause to effect. It begins with establishing our own existence
from consciousness, that we are not necessarily existent and therefore must have a cause;
that something must have existed from all eternity or nothing could ever have existed;
that this being must exist by an internal necessity of nature; that what exists necessarily
must exist alike everywhere, must be perfect, act everywhere, and so on.
It is, however, very generally doubted whether this argument has any foundation
or whether it is at all conclusive. Dr. Samuel Clark's1 demonstration is the most
ingenious and learned specimen of this method of arguing. See Dr. Alexander's lecture.
58. What is the nature of the argument a posteriori [from that which is later]?
It is a reasoning from the effect to the cause. It is founded on the principle that every
1 [There were many prominent theological and philosophical writers by the name of Samuel Clark(e) during the 1600s and 1700s, including an Anglican (bap. 1624–1669), puritans (1599–1682) and (1626–1701), and a latitudinarian Anglican (1675–1729).]
effect must have a cause, and whatever excellence is found in the effect must exist in a
much greater degree in the cause.
59. How is the existence of God proved from the structure of the universe?
The works of nature prove the existence of God by their production, harmony,
preservation, and adaptation to their ends. Design, wherever manifested, is an
unanswerable proof of a directing intelligence.
60. How is this truth established from a consideration of the body of man?
By the order and fitness of every part, we are "fearfully and wonderfully made" [Ps.
139:14], and from the admirable difference of the features of men.
61. What is the force of the argument from general consent?
The universality and uninterruptedness of the belief in the existence of God is a
phenomenon that nothing but the truth of the fact can solve, particularly when we
consider that all wicked men must wish it were not so. The idea of a God is not derived
either from sensation or reflection; its existence in the breasts of men can only be
accounted for by supposing it to be received by tradition from the first man, who must
have received it from God Himself.
62. Can any argument be drawn from miracles in favor of this truth?
Nothing very conclusive, as it is more difficult to establish the truth of a miracle than of
the divine existence.
63. How does the existence of conscience prove the being of a God?
There is a law in the human mind that in some measure is the rule of good and evil; this
law must have a lawgiver, the transgression of this law excites the dread of punishment,
and this operation of conscience is universal, regarding even the most secret acts of
wickedness. Moreover, men cannot free themselves from the authority of conscience,
however much they may desire it.
64. On what argument did Descartes depend for the proof of this truth?
He held that the idea of God was impressed on the mind of man by the Deity Himself.
And that as we have an idea of an infinite being, that of which this idea is the type must
also exist.
65. In what way do atheists attempt to evade the arguments in proof of a god?
Modern atheists endeavored to maintain the eternity of the world and its inhabitants;
ancient atheists, admitting the world was formed in time, deny that it is the work of an
intelligent agent, but the result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms.
66. How can it be demonstrated that the world is not from eternity?
1. From the continual changes constantly occurring before our eyes
2. From the natural history of the world
3. From the late origin of the arts and sciences
4. From there being neither history nor monument indicating the world to be older than
five or six thousand years
5. From the decay of the centrifugal force
67. How can the absurdity of an infinite succession of dependent beings be proved?
It is proved by the argument of the chain of an infinite number of links that it would be
absurd to say supported itself when we cannot discover the least tendency to self-support,
though we ascend it as high as our thoughts can reach.
Or, we may argue thus: when a man is brought into being, the whole cause
necessary to produce this effect must at that time be in existence. But when a man is from
his immediate parents only, it may be that all of his progenitors are in existence; therefore
all the cause necessary for the production of a human being resides in his parents, quod
est absurdum [which is absurd].
68. Have there been any speculative atheists?
Yes, some few among both the ancient and modern philosophers have professed
themselves to be atheists. Atheism has even had its martyrs. Lucilio Vanini,2 a native of
Naples and teacher of atheism in France, was condemned and executed at Toulouse, AD
1619.
69. How do you know that God is a being of infinite perfection?
It is a dictate of nature, a first principle that must be taken for granted and that indeed is
included in the very definition of the term God.
2 [Lucilio Vanini (1585–1619) was an Italian philosopher, physician, free-thinker, and one of the first significant representatives of libertinism.]
70. How can this be reconciled with the prevalence of idolatry and polytheism?
It is very difficult to remove all the difficulties arising from these sources to this opinion.
The difficulty may be lessened by remarking that
1. The heathen, in worshiping images (at least in the first instance), considered them
merely as the habitations of their deity.
2. Those gods to whom they ascribed principles and actions inconsistent with
perfection were merely intermediate deities.
3. From the corruption of human nature, superstition has obtained such power as to
make men believe and act in opposition to even the first principles of reason.
4. They received implicitly the religious opinions of their forefathers without
inquiring or thinking for themselves.
71. Is the unity of God a dictate of natural theology?
If we admit that it is taught by the light of nature that God is infinitely perfect, it must
follow that nature teaches His unity, as infinite perfection excludes the idea of superiority
or equality in any other being. Besides, we have clear evidence of the existence of one
God, but see no proof of more than one.
72. How is the spirituality of God demonstrated?
It is demonstrated that He is entirely different from matter, as matter is inert essentially,
but God must be active essentially. Spirit is the noblest of substances with which we are
acquainted; we therefore ascribed it to God from the principle recognized above.
73. How is the omnipotence of God proved?
It is proved by creation; there is no indication of want [lack] of power to be discovered in
the universe.
74. How does it appear that He is wise?
It is manifested by the variety and beauty of His works, by the fitness of creatures for
their end, and in the subordination of one creature to another. Wisdom is the right use of
knowledge.
75. Can His omnipresence be demonstrated by reason?
Were God not capable of perceiving and acting in all places at all times, He must be
limited and possessed only of finite knowledge.
76. Does the goodness of God appear evidenced from His works?
It is manifested in the provision He has made for the happiness of His creatures, in the
pleasures of animal life, and in the intellectual powers of man. The air, earth, and sea are
full of animated happy beings.
77. Does natural theology teach that God should be observed and worshiped?
Yes, our obligation to obedience rests on the omnipotence and infinite excellence of God
and His relation to us as Creator and Preserver.
78. Do all men agree in this truth?
Mankind in general does, as appears from every nation having some form of religious
worship, though there are doubtless individuals who question the propriety of praising
God or the efficacy of addressing Him in prayer.
79. Does it inform us how we should worship Him?
It is a dictate of natural religion to pray, but the method of approaching God by a
mediator is a subject entirely of revelation.
80. Can we learn the justice, holiness, and truth of God from a survey of His works?
These attributes, properly speaking, cannot be said to be capable of demonstration from
the works of God. We are led to ascribe justice to God from the dictates of conscience
and the sentiments of justice in our own breasts. The same may be said of the other two:
they are included in the idea of an ens summe perfectum [all-perfect Being].
81. Does it teach that the wicked will be punished?
Yes, reason teaches that it shall be well with the righteous and ill with the wicked. That
the doctrine of future punishment is a part of natural religion appears from its being
prevalent in all nations and ages; its truth is strongly confirmed by the natural dread
excited by conscience in the breasts of the wicked and by the analogy of the present state,
since God has ordered that our happiness or misery, even here, shall depend in a great
measure on our own conduct.
82. How does it appear that God exercises a moral government over the world?
1. The first argument in proof of God's moral government is that since in fact God does
govern the world by the distribution of rewards and punishments according to some
settled rule, it is more natural that this rule should be the moral merit or demerit of
men.
2. That peace and external advantages are the natural consequences of prudence in regard
to ourselves and our affairs, and inconvenience and suffering the result of negligence
and rashness.
3. From the natural course of things, vicious actions are to a great degree actually
punished as mischievous to society, and there is a necessity for its being so.
4. In the natural course of things, virtue as such is actually rewarded and vice as such
punished. Virtue, as such, is rewarded by the satisfaction attending it by the hope of
future happiness and by the approbation of all good men, and so on.
5. The tendencies of virtue and vice are necessarily to produce respectively good and bad
effects, both in individuals and in societies. Thus power under the direction of virtue is
more efficacious than if directed by vice.
83. By what arguments is the immortality of the soul proved?
1. By its immateriality
2. It is not probable that God should make all His creatures temporary
3. The capacity of the soul to increase in knowledge is unlimited
4. The desire of immortality being deeply implanted in our souls
5. The unequal distribution of good and evil in this world
6. [The idea has been] Prevalent in every age and nation
84. What degree of conviction do these arguments produce?
They only render the truth of the doctrine probable; it is the gospel that brings life and
immortality from this state of dimness and obscurity into light.
85. Is the knowledge of the truths of natural religion sufficient to salvation?
No:
1. Since Christ is only known by the gospel
2. Because the state of the Gentiles is called the times of ignorance (Acts 17:30)
3. Were salvation by a common religion, [there would be] no necessity of revelation,
but the world by wisdom knew not God
86. In what respects is natural theology defective?
It cannot teach us the true character of God, the method of reconciliation to Him by an
atonement, the nature and extent of our duties to the Supreme Being, [or] our destiny in a
future state, and it is defective in certainty, authority, and motives.
87. Is the necessity of revelation evinced [proved] by a view of the truths of natural theology?
Yes; reason teaches man only sufficient [enough] to render him sensible of the necessity
of being taught of God.
88. How is the necessity of revelation evinced by the view of the history of the world?
By observing that
1. In exact proportion as men increased in human wisdom have they become
ignorant of God.
2. The most erroneous and shocking ideas were prevalent respecting His nature and
worship.
3. The state of morals arising from these errors was exceedingly corrupt.
89. Was not revelation necessary to give a greater certainty to the truths of natural religion?
Yes, as the greatest men have only been doubtful of some of the most important branches
of true religion, such as the immortality of the soul, and so on, and as the sophistry of
man's deceitful heart would teach him to question the plainest principles of natural
theology.
90. Was it not necessary to give authority and sanction to these truths?
It was.
91. Was not revelation necessary to inform us whether God was reconcilable to sinners, and on
what terms?
The delay of punishment might excite in the sinner some hope that God would show
mercy, but reason could never discover that a just God could pass by transgression. And
we see all men erring in regard to the terms on which they expect forgiveness, trusting to
works of righteousness, not to grace through faith.
Chapter 3
Revealed Theology and Prophecy
92. What is revealed theology?
The system of doctrine contained in the Word of God.
93. How can it be proved that a revelation has been made?
It is evident that a revelation is practicable, and we have seen that from the nature and
situation of man, it is both probable and necessary. And that it has been made is certain
from the internal and external evidences accompanying certain communications
professing to be from God.
94. By what means was a revelation made?
By immediate converse with God, by the ministry of angels, by Urim and Thummim [Ex.
28:30], by voices, visions, and inspiration in these last times that God has spoken to us by
His Son.
95. Why was it necessary that it should be committed to writing?
1. It was necessary to preserve it as a constant rule of faith and practice
2. To vindicate it from fraud and corruption
3. To propagate it to posterity and to those afar off
96. Is everything that God has revealed to man contained in the sacred Scriptures?
No, although they comprehend all that is necessary to salvation, as is proved because
1. A curse is pronounced against those who should add or detract from the Word
2. The end of the Scriptures requires their perfection
3. Traditions are forbidden: "teaching for doctrines the commandments of men"
4. No reason can be given why God should wish one part of the Word to be written
and another part delivered viva voce [by living voice]
97. How can it be proved that the sacred Scriptures contain a divine revelation?
First, from the internal evidence they possess, which is
1. That from them may be extracted a system of religion entirely new, both with
regard to object and doctrines, not only infinitely superior to but unlike everything
that had before entered into the mind of man.
2. That from them also may be collected a more extensive, correct, and pure system
of morals than is to be found in all the works of the wisest men of preceding ages.
3. That such a system of religion and morality could not possibly have been the work
of any man or set of men, much less of the obscure and illiterate persons who
actually did discover and publish it to the world. It must be from God.
Second, from the external evidence of miracles and prophecy.
98. How can the authority of the sacred Scriptures be established?
It rests on the credibility of the apostles and prophets as witnesses of facts and as
deliverers of doctrines; and since them, it is supported by the strongest historical
evidence.
99. What is the difference between genuineness and authenticity?
A book is genuine when it is the production of the man whose name it bears, authentic
when what it communicates is correct.
100. What is a miracle?
It means in the original import of the word, "a wonder"; more definitely, it is an effect
contrary to the established constitution or course of things, or a sensible deviation from
the known laws of nature.
101. Are miracles of different kinds?
Yes:
1. Such as none but God Himself can perform, implying omnipotence
2. Such as require supernatural agency but may be supposed to be within the power
of good or evil spirits
102. How do miracles prove a divine revelation?
They are the testimonies of God in favor of the truth they are wrought to maintain.
Neither can their authority be diminished by observing that even demons have performed
miracles. For this objection bears only against the second kind of miracles mentioned
above, and these are always attended by circumstances that determine their origin.
103. Is any testimony sufficient to prove a miracle?
Yes. It is plain that it is possible that a miracle may be wrought under circumstances that
render deception impossible.
104. What was Hume's argument against miracles, and how is it answered?
He maintained it to be contrary to experience that a miracle should be true but not
contrary to experience that testimony should be false. Therefore the argument against
miracles he thought to be stronger than any drawn from testimony could be in their favor.
His argument is founded on the principle that experience is the ground of our confidence
in testimony, which is just the reverse of the truth since the most experienced are
generally the most incredulous. This doctrine of Hume's is fully confuted by Dr.
Campbell, by Dr. Gleig, by Professor Prince, and so on.
105. Wherein are the miracles of the sacred Scriptures different from those related in other
books?
Other miracles are defections in the number, circumstances, or character of those who
bear testimony for them, or the miracles themselves are such as may be accounted for by
supposing them to be merely false perceptions. Or they are only tentative miracles, or
exaggerated stories, and so on. See [William] Paley's Evidences.
106. Can the success of the gospel be accounted for without miracles?
No, the success of such a system as the gospel, in spite of the most uniform and powerful
opposition, and [in being propagated] by the weakest instruments would, except on the
supposition of miracles, be a greater miracle than any contained in the sacred Scriptures.
107. Could the witnesses of Christ's miracles have been deceived?
No.
108. Was it possible for them to have obtained credit if what they said had been false?
No, for those to whom they preached were addressed as witnesses of the truth of the facts
they asserted.
109. Can any reason be assigned for their attempting to establish an imposture?
None, for men do not choose evil for its own sake. And from the nature of the religion
which they propagated: the worldly prosperity of its first teachers was incompatible with
success. As they knew themselves to be impostors, they could be activated by no hope of
future reward, and here failure and success were alike to be attended with misery.
110. Is a man's suffering for his opinions any proof of their truth?
None, men have died on different sides of the same question. Error can boast almost as
many martyrs as truth.
111. Is it an evidence of his sincerely believing them?
Yes, "all that a man hath will he give for his life."
112. If Christianity had been an imposture, could its propagators have avoided betraying
themselves?
They could not. The history they record is so long and circumstantial that their perfect
harmony appears not only to require the truth of what they communicate but also a
superintending care of providence.
113. If miracles are important to prove a revelation, why have they ceased?
Because their frequency would destroy their authority, since it would then be difficult to
distinguish the interruptions from the regular course of nature. Besides, there may be
reasons with which we are not acquainted why it is best that they should not now be
wrought. See App. p. 7.
114. Is the evidence of miracles as strong now as at first?
It is. At present our belief in miracles rests on the testimony; at first it rested on the
witness of the senses.
115. If miracles should now be wrought in favor of doctrines opposite to the Bible, what would
be the consequence?
It is impossible that miracles of the first class should be wrought in opposition to the
Bible since God cannot deny Himself, and the tendency of miracles of the second kind
being bad proves their origin to be evil and thus destroys their authority.
116. How does prophecy prove a divine revelation?
Because it argues a knowledge of futurity that can only be derived from God.
117. Are prophecies always obscure?
Generally, before their accomplishment.
118. Why is prophecy so often involved in obscure and symbolical language?
1. Because they were not intended so much for those to whom they were at first delivered
as for ages then future
2. Were they more obvious it would be objected that the event was made to correspond to
the prediction by those interested in the accomplishment
119. Does the obscurity of some prophecies weaken the evidence of those that are plainer?
No, our not understanding all does not prove we can understand none.
120. What particular prophecies have been remarkably fulfilled?
Of the deluge; of the number of Abraham's posterity; of the superiority of Jacob over
Esau; of the destruction of Nineveh, Babylon, Jericho, Jerusalem; of the Messiah, the
time of His coming as mentioned in Daniel, His character, fate, chapter 53 of Isaiah, and
so on.
120. Can it be proved that these prophecies were written before the events occurred to which
they refer?
Yes, they are found in the most ancient book in the world, preserved by those who are
unfriendly to the cause many of them are produced to support.
121. Are any prophecies fulfilling now?
Continued dispersion of the Jews, independence of the Arabs, progress of the gospel.
122. Does the evidence of prophecy become stronger or weaker by the lapse of time?
Stronger.
123. Have there been any true prophecies besides those contained in the Bible?
It is very probable that many predictions uttered by men divinely inspired were never
recorded in the Bible, but as the knowledge of futurity belongs only to God, there never
could have been a true prophecy not derived directly or indirectly from Him.
124. What judgment should we form of the heathen oracles and the books of the Sibyls?1
1. The testimony respecting many is unsatisfactory.
2. The responses were often so given as to suit the event, should it happen either way.
3. They failed much more frequently than they proved correct.
4. The truth of the event may often be accounted for by the skillfulness of the prophet or
prophets in conjecturing, or by the assistance of demons whose wonderful sagacity
and great experience might enable them to conjecture what was future with
considerable certainty.
The books of the Sibyls were merely a collection of Jewish, Christian, and
heathen sayings turned into wretched verse. This collection was made by some
1 [A collection of oracular, often prophetic, utterances written in Greek hexameters ascribed to the Sibyls, who were thought to be prophetesses who uttered divine revelations in an ecstatic state. Fourteen books and eight fragments of Sibylline Oracles survive in an edition of the sixth or seventh century AD]
indiscreet Christian about the time of Antonius Pius;2 this is what is now extant. But
besides these there were ancient oracles of the Sibyls mentioned by Plato, Aristotle,
Varro,3 and Livy.4 Who or how many the Sibyls were is not known. The character of
the authors must have been bad as they often directed to wicked and superstitious
services. Hence if they were inspired it must have been by demons.
The story of the three books sold to Tarquin5 is a mere fraud. Those laid up in the
capitol were subject only to the inspection of the sacred college. When those were
burned with the capitol in the time of Scylla and search being made in order to restore
them, abundance of prophecies under the name of the Sibyls were produced so that
about 80 years BC, the world was filled with them. Augustus6 is said to have burned
two thousand volumes of them. These contained many prophecies relative to the
Messiah, derived probably from the Jews scattered among the nations.7
125. What is the internal evidence of the truth of the sacred Scriptures?
Those proofs that are founded on the nature of their doctrines and the character of the
dispensation itself.
126. How do the matter, scope, and style of the sacred Scriptures prove their divinity?
2 [Antoninus Pius (AD 86–161) was a Roman emperor.] 3 [Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BC) was an ancient Roman scholar and writer.] 4 [Titus Livius (64 or 59 BC–AD 17) was a Roman historian.] 5 [Lucius Tarquinius Superbus was the semi-legendary last king of the Roman kingdom. This story of the acquisition of the Sibylline books is one of the famous mythic elements of Roman history.]
6 [Augustus (63 BC–AD 14) was the first Roman emperor.] 7 [There is an illegible note on the inside margin.]
The matter or contents testify to its divine origin by the sublimity of its mysteries and
purity of its precepts extending even to the thoughts; their scope in tending to glorify
God, sanctify and save man; their style, by its majesty, simplicity, and gravity.
127. Is there any evidence to be derived from Jewish and heathen authors?
Yes, Tacitus, Suetonius, the younger Pliny, and Juvenal8 all speak of the Christians, and
Tacitus especially gives a succinct account of their origin. There is in Josephus9 several
allusions to the Christian history; the genuineness of the most important of those,
however, is disputed.
With respect to the Old Testament, many of the facts there recorded are to be
found preserved in obscure allusions in the works of early heathen writers, such as the
state of innocence, the fall, the deluge, and so on. See Butler, p. 67.10
128. Are there any contradictions in the sacred Scripture?
There is a most wonderful harmony in all the sacred writers, considering their
circumstances, such as admits of no other explanation than a divine superintendence.
Those inconsistencies that do exist may in general be accounted for by recurring to the
similitude of things done at different times and the ambiguity of names (one person or
place having several names). It must, however, be admitted that there are some
8 [These were all Roman writers in the first two centuries AD.] 9 [Josephus (AD 37–c. 100) was a Jewish historian during the first century.] 10 [Possibly Joseph Butler (1692–1752), The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed.]
discrepancies, particularly in numbers, only to be reconciled on the supposition of the
corruption of the text.11
129. Are there any doctrines contrary to reason?
None, though there are many incomprehensible.
130. Does the chronology, geography, and history of sacred Scripture coincide with what other
writers teach on this subject?
In general they do. Where there is a disagreement, the sacred Scripture, apart from their
inspiration, are the best entitled to credit.
131. Do the sentiments, customs, and manners mentioned or alluded to in the sacred Scriptures
agree with what is known of Eastern nations?
Very exactly, even as they are at the present day, for in the East, national character and
manners have changed much less than in the West.
11 [Alexander probably has in mind the histories and numbers of the lists of kings in Chronicles and the numeric accounts of Ezra and Nehemiah, as numerous kings had the same name and as this numerical data is particularly not easy to harmonize. However, Alexander's allowance of the permanent and irremediable corruption in the transmission and preservation of the Scriptures is contrary to Matt. 5:18 and many other express statements of the Scriptures themselves. The numeric data in Ezra and Nehemiah can be harmonized (as books on Bible difficulties demonstrate), as well as the chronologies of the kings. For the latter, see Floyd Nolen Jones, Chronology of the Old Testament: A Return to the Basics, 14th ed. (The Woodlands, Tex.: KingsWord Press, 1999).]
Chapter 4
Inspiration
132. What is inspiration, and into how many kinds is it divided?
Any supernatural influence on the mind of man that enables him to discover truth or to
understand it, which by the exertion of his natural powers he would not have discovered
or understood so clearly, may be called inspiration. As to its object, therefore, it may be
considered
1. As leading to the knowledge of truth before unknown
2. As affording clearer knowledge of truth before known
3. As giving assurance to the mind of the truth, of such things as we have
observed ourselves, or heard from others
But with respect to which when left to ourselves we are liable to fall into mistakes, it has
been distinguished into that of
1. Suggestion
2. General superintendency
3. Of elevation
133. What is meant by inspiration of immediate suggestion?
That by which the Spirit of God reveals particular truths to the mind immediately. This
revelation may be of words as well as of things, or the truth may be revealed and it may
be left to the person inspired to clothe it in his own language.
134. What is meant by superintendency and elevation?
Superintendency is that by which the Spirit influences the inspired person to write or
speak such things as he may know by the common means of acquiring information but
which preserves him from the errors incident to human imperfection.
Elevation exists where no new truths are revealed and when no particular
superintendencies are required, and it consists in strengthening and elevating all the
powers of the mind for some special purpose so that the production shall far exceed the
natural abilities of the person.
Such inspiration we may suppose existed in those who composed divine songs
and also when persons were called to make their defense before kings and governors. But
in the latter case it would appear that the very words as well as the ideas were suggested
to them by the Holy Ghost. In the composition of divine poems and psalms, something
more was necessary to preserve from error than mere elevation of mind.
It is doubtful, therefore, whether this ought to be considered as a distinct species,
for we have reason to believe that even preachers and writers may have their minds
elevated by a divine influence, but we cannot say that they are inspired, for that which
distinguishes inspiration from the illumination of which all Christians partake is that by
the former something unknown is revealed, whilst by the latter, the mind is furnished
with a spiritual discernment of truths that speculatively were well understood before.
135. Is this distinction correct?
Not altogether.
136. What kind and degree of inspiration is to be ascribed to the sacred writers?
1. The plenary inspiration of the sacred Scriptures should be maintained.
2. Though the inspiration was plenary, yet there is no necessity of supposing any greater
influence on the mind of the person inspired than what was sufficient to accomplish
the object in view.
3. The proper method, therefore, of ascertaining the kinds and degrees of inspiration will
be to consider the difference of the matter contained in the Holy Scriptures.
4. Many things in Scripture must be considered a direct revelation from God, both as to
the ideas and words, such as laws and positive institutions; prophecies, whether literal
or symbolical; and to this class belong also the discourses and sayings of our Lord
Jesus Christ, who was the great medium of communication between God and man.
5. But many things contained in Scripture are of such a nature that they could be known,
and some of them must be known by those who received them without any revelation.
The question, then, is what need was there of inspiration to write such things? Answer:
it was necessary
1. To guide the persons in the selection of facts and circumstances
2. To preserve them from such slips of memory as all men are liable to, and to
revive in their memory such discoveries as could not be exactly retained too
long a time
3. To assure them of facts they may have received only on probable evidence
6. It is not necessary to suppose that, in writing such parts of the Scriptures, the very
words were suggested to them, as the truth of the facts and not the beauty or sublimity
of the language was the object in view, and the great variety of style in the sacred
Scriptures evinces that the writers were in a good degree left to choose their own
language.
But as the precision and perspicuity with which truth is communicated depends
greatly on the language by which it is conveyed in order to [receive] a clear revelation
of the will of God, it was necessary that fallible and especially unlearned men should
be under a particular guidance in the selection of their words so as to preserve them
from ambiguous and improper terms. The rule, therefore, seems to be this: that as far
as was necessary for certainty and perspicuity in the things revealed, there was a
superintending influence in guiding to the selection of proper words.
7. Many compositions contained in Scripture are of a devotional and moral kind, such as
psalms and prayers. These, when they proceed from pious men, are to be considered as
inspired, though we are not to consider every declaration or discourse in the sacred
Scriptures as inspired, as those of Job's friends, the speeches of wicked men.1
8. The last class of Scripture truths are such as contain reasonings and discussions on
particular points, such as the epistles of the apostles. Here we think that the writers
were under a divine guidance so as to be preserved from error, but in the choice of
words and in the particular style of writing and method of reasoning were left very
much to their own natural genius. So far, however, as divine assistance was requisite
to make the reasoning correct and to guide them to proper words by which to express
their ideas, so far was it afforded to the inspired writers.
1 [Alexander's purpose in this discussion is to differentiate the providential operations in how God immediately and directly inspired from His Holy Spirit the various sayings and accounts of variously morally qualified persons in the Scriptures, probably from critics who criticized inspiration as a simplistic (and therefore untrue) concept. While Alexander rightly denies the immediate and direct inspiration by the Holy Ghost to the evil speeches of men in Scripture (evil does not come from God), yet there is no reason to believe that Alexander did not believe that the special governance of God was still upon those evil speeches and that the entirety of the sixty-six books of Scripture are still authoritative canon for the church, rightly interpreted in their context.]
136. Were the words as well as the ideas revealed?
See the answer to the proceeding question.
137. In how many different ways were revelations made?
1. Many truths recorded in Scripture were spoken by God Himself or by Jesus Christ, the
Son of God. Thus, immediate intercourse existed between God and the first man.
2. Truths not capable of being known by reason were revealed to chosen men by
immediate suggestion to the mind, as the gospel to Paul.
3. Revelations were frequently made by visions, in which by some symbolical
representations the persons were instructed in the truths intended to be made known.
4. Revelations were made by dreams, of this we have numerous examples.
5. They were made by the mission of angels.
6. By Urim and Thummim, and voices, or as the Jews say2 בת קול.
2 ]For the urim and thummim, see Ex. 28:30 and Num. 27:21. The Hebrew above is pronounced "bat kohl" and literally means "daughter of a voice," or, "the proceedings of a voice," namely God's voice. The term was given by the Jews for the places in the Old Testament where God audibly spoke from heaven, though many superstitious and extrabiblical legends became attributed to this term.]
Chapter 5
Attributes
138. Are the divine attributes the same with the divine essence?
They are, for were they not, God would be neither supremely simple nor perfect since He
would be made up of different attributes really distinct. Neither could He be immutable
were His attributes distinguishable from His essence.
139. How are they usually distinguished?
Theologians have adopted various modes of distribution. The most common are those
into communicable and incommunicable, natural and moral.
140. What attributes are termed communicable?
Knowledge, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, truth.
141. What are the incommunicable?
Self-existence, independence, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability, unity.
142. Is there any objection to this distribution of the divine attributes?
It has been objected that of those attributes called incommunicable, some faint
resemblance is to be found in creatures. Thus finite duration is some image of infinite
duration as much as finite power of omnipotence.
143. How are they otherwise divided?
Natural and moral, absolute and relative.
144. What are the natural perfections of God?
Unity, self-existence, omnipotence, immutability, spirituality, eternity, wisdom,
knowledge.
145. Which are the moral perfections of God?
Justice, holiness, goodness, truth.
146. Are there any other theological divisions of the divine attributes?
Negative and positive.
147. What perfections arise out of the necessary existence of God?
All His natural perfections and some of His moral, as Dr. S. Clarke1 supposes.
148. What perfections are dependent on the divine will, and what on His understanding?
His moral attributes depend on His will, as morality is seated in the will. His knowledge
and wisdom appear to be connected more immediately with His understanding.
149. What names are given to God in the Holy Scriptures?
Jehovah Aleim [Elohim, YHWH God], Adonai Jah [Lord Yah], Sheddi [Shaddai,
Almighty], Aloi [Elohi, my God].
1 [See the footnote under question #57.]
150. What is the import of these names?
יהוהsignifies "self-existence" [and] "eternity" from הוה; אל imports "strength" from איל
[help], אלה [God] a cultu [from the cult]; שדי"all-sufficient," if from שדה "all mighty";
"to pour forth," if from ה שד vastavit [made empty]; אהיה"I am" imports "independence,"
"immutability," "eternity," and so on. יה from היה "to exist" denotes "the essence" ο, ων;
עליון "most high" from עלה "to ascend"; אדון "Lord," "supporter." The Greek names
κυριος and θεος are also significant. The first denotes "self-existence" from κυρω "to
exist," also "authority." The second, "maker," "pervader," from θεω "to place."2
151. Is there any distinction between the self-existence and independence of God?
No; the latter is implied in the former. What exists of itself can depend on no other.
152. How can it be demonstrated that God is self-existent and independent?
These imply that God cannot but be, and be what He is, and that altogether in and of
Himself. They are proved
1. From express passages of Scripture: "I am that I am" (Ex. 3:14); "I am Alpha
and Omega, the beginning and the ending" (Rev. 1:8).
2. As God is the cause of all things and the upholder of them all, it would imply a
contradiction to say He was dependent on anything.
3. If God is infinitely above the highest creatures, He can depend on none.
153. How may the unity of God be demonstrated? 2 See Horae Solitariae.
It may be proved from His self-existence and infinity. The unity of God means that there
neither is nor can be more than one individual divine substance. It is plainly declared in
the Word: Deuteronomy 6:4, "Hear oh Israel, the Lord our God is one God." Exodus
20:3, "You shall have no other gods before me." James 2:19, "You believe that there is
one God, you believe well." The unity of God is inferred from His necessary existence
and infinity, from the unity of design observable in the world, and from the supposition
of more gods than one being unnecessary.
154. How is the spirituality of God evinced?
The spirituality of God is His immateriality, and it comprises a negative and positive
idea. The first consists in removing from our idea of God the known properties of matter.
The second in referring to Him the powers of perception, thought, will, and action. That
God is immaterial appears from
1. His self existence
2. His being where body is
3. From His omnipresence
4. From His invisibility
5. From the express language of Scripture. "God is a Spirit" (John 4:24).
155. What is meant by the simplicity of God, and how is it proved to be a divine perfection?
The simplicity of God is that divine attribute by which God is not only free from all
composition or division but utterly incapable of either. It is proved
1. From the divine independence
2. From His unity
3. From His absolute perfection
156. Is God necessarily invisible?
Yes; spirit is invisible.
157. Is activity essential to God?
Yes, an inactive spirit is a contradiction.
158. What is meant by the "life" of God?
The most perfect kind of existence, comprehending both being and blessedness, by which
He not only is and is happy but also is the source of existence and happiness. God is life
essentially, "The Father has life in Himself" (John 5:26) and eternally.
159. Is there any distinction between the immensity and omnipresence of God?
The omnipresence of God arises from His immensity: the latter as an absolute attribute
belonging to God from eternity, the former refers to His relation to place as existing in
time.
160. How does it appear that God is omnipresent?
1. From the plain declarations of Scripture; see Psalm 139. "Do not I fill heaven and
earth says the Lord" (Jer. 23:24).
2. It is necessary that the preserver of all things should be present with all things.
3. It is necessary to His perfection.
161. Is He everywhere present with His essence or only with His power and knowledge?
Effects being produced everywhere proves that God is essentially everywhere. Besides,
His power and knowledge belong to His essence.
162. Is He equally present everywhere?
Yes, though not in the same manner: His glorious presence is particularly in heaven, His
gracious presence with the good, and so on.
163. Is He present in empty space beyond the limits of creation?
Yes, for He might create other worlds beyond the bounds of those already made, and He
would be essentially present in them as well as in ours. Whatever pertains to God is
infinite, but were His essence contained within any limits, it would be finite. Solomon
says, "Behold the heaven of heavens cannot contain You" [2 Chron. 6:18].
164. Is space a divine attribute? Or is it a creature? Or quality? Or nothing?
Space is nothing more than a certain relation of being and cannot be conceived of but as
relation. We derive the idea from extended substances.
165. How may it be demonstrated that God is eternal?
The eternity of God implies His existence without beginning or end, or succession of
duration. That He is without beginning is inferred
1. From His self-existence
2. From express passages of Scripture, "I was set up from everlasting, from the
beginning, or ever the earth was" (Prov. 8:23).
That He is without end is inferred from His spirituality, simplicity, and immutability.
"From everlasting to everlasting, God" [Ps. 90:2].
166. Does the eternity of God exclude all succession of duration?
Yes, because
1. He is said to be before succession. "Before the day was, I am" (Isa. 43:13).
2. Were His duration successive, then there must have been some first day or year,
which is inconsistent with the idea of eternity. Besides, a day would then be but a
day to Him, and not "as a thousand years" [2 Peter 3:8].
3. Succession is inconsistent with immutability and perfection.
4. His knowledge proves Him without successive duration. "For He sees the present
without a medium, the past without recollection and the future without foresight.
To Him all truths are but one idea, all places but one point, and all times but one
moment."
167. Have we any idea of duration without succession?
No, our idea of duration is derived from the succession of our ideas.
168. Do not the Holy Scriptures speak of past, present, and future with respect to God?
Yes, in accommodation to the only mode in which we are capable of conceiving of the
works of God and in respect to the effects produced in times.
169. Is time a portion of eternity or something entirely distinct?
They are entirely distinct, being species of duration directly opposed. Eternity always was
and will be; it is one unsuccessive, unmoving presence. Time began, continues by
succession, and is to terminate.
170. Is immutability a divine perfection?
Immutability is that perfection by which all possibility of change is denied in the deity.
Malachi 3:6, "I am the LORD, I change not"; Hebrews 13:8, "Jesus Christ the same
yesterday today and forever." The immutability of God belongs to everything pertaining
to the divine nature. To suppose Him capable of change is inconsistent with His supreme
perfection, with His simplicity, and with His eternity. Indeed, true eternity is true
immutability, though they differ in our conceptions. Immutability is the state itself,
eternity the measure of that state.
171. Is the will of God immutable as well as His essence?
Yes, because
1. The will of God is the same with His essence; it is Deus volens [God-willing].
2. His purposes are eternal.
3. There can be no cause for a change in the divine will. He may will a change
without changing His will. Psalm 33:11: "The counsel of the Lord stands forever;
the thoughts of his heart to all generations."
172. Is immutability of will reconcilable with liberty?
Yes, for the liberty of God's will does not consist so much in indifference as in
independence on all things without Himself. What God is, He chooses to be, though He is
what He is immutably; and to be immutably good is no weakness, but the height of
perfection.
173. How can the repentance of God be reconciled with immutability?
This language is used in accommodation to the weakness of our capacity in the same
manner as the several members of the body are in Scripture referred to God. When,
therefore, God is said to repent, it is nothing more than that there is such a change in His
conduct as in man proceeds from a change of mind, or repentance; though this change in
God's dispensation was the object of an eternal immutable decree.
174. How can the nonfulfillment of threatenings be reconciled with immutability?
All these threatenings are conditional, though the condition may not have been expressed;
and they are intended more to declare what could be the result of natural causes or the
inseparable connection between demerit and punishment than what God intends to
accomplish in every particular case.
175. How is the knowledge of God distinguished?
It may be variously considered
1. As to its mode and object
2. Speculation and practical
3. As the knowledge of simple intelligence and of vision
176. What is the knowledge of simple intelligence?
The knowledge of all possible things, of all that may be, though it never shall be.
177. What is the knowledge of vision?
The knowledge of all things future. It follows the act of the divine will decreeing, which
it presupposes.
178. Is there any Scientia Media [middle knowledge]? 3
This signifies a middle species of knowledge between the two just mentioned, differing
from the knowledge of intelligence (or natural knowledge), because it relates to future
3 [In short, middle knowledge served the grounds for the idea that God chose to predestine to come to pass one of the possible universe-outcomes that His creatures might have chosen apart from God's decree. This was an attempt to reconcile man's free will with God's sovereignty. Middle knowledge was first set forth by Jesuits, most notably Luis de Molina (1536–1600), in the late 1500s and was shortly adopted by Jacob Arminius (1560–1609) and most of his followers. At the Reformation, the Reformed, following in the Augustinian tradition, posited that God has two fundamental types of knowledge: (1) knowledge of all things possible that He could bring to pass if He so chose and (2) knowledge based on His actual, free decree to create and ordain all things that will ever come pass—a knowledge of all things future. The Jesuits and Arminians posited a type of knowledge for God in between these two, or a "middle knowledge." This middle knowledge involved a knowledge of what creatures would do in various possible situations considered apart from any decree of God. God chooses a possible scenario, or world, for His creatures where their autonomous free will is not impinged on, but which gives God's desired outcome, and God wills to create it so. The typical Reformed response to this, as Alexander gives, is not to accommodate such a paradigm but to deny that such a middle knowledge is possible for God at all. It is impossible for anything to happen, or to be conceived of happening, apart from the concurrent will of God, as the creature is in all ways dependent on the will of the Creator.]
things, and from that of vision, because it refers to things only hypothetically future.
Turretin's4 arguments against a Scientia Media are
1. That the other two kinds of knowledge embrace everything that is capable of
being known
2. Because things cannot be foreseen as true that are not true
3. Because all the acts of a created will are subject to the divine providence
4. No uncertain knowledge is to be attributed to God
5. Scientia Media
A. Destroys God's dominion over the free acts of the will.
B. If there were a Scientia Media, some other cause might be assigned for
predestination than the mere beneplacitum [good-pleasure] of God.
179. By whom and for what purpose was it invented?
By the Jesuits to support the semi-Pelagian doctrine respecting the foreknowledge of faith
as the cause of election, and to maintain the freedom of the will.
180. Does the knowledge of God extend infallibly to contingencies?
Anything is said to be contingent in the language of theology that in the nature of things
might have been otherwise than it is. It refers not to the event that is certain but to the
mode of production. That God knows things contingent is proved
4 [Francis Turretin (1623–1687) was a professor of Geneva, representing something of the height of scholastic Reformed orthodoxy. Turretin's Institutes in the Latin were widely used at Princeton and many orthodox seminaries in America in the 1800s. Turretin's section is found in Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James Dennison (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1992) 1:212–18.]
1. From its being said in the Bible: "Hell and destruction are before the Lord, how
much more the hearts of the children of men." [Prov. 15:11]
2. From His predicting them
3. From the perfection of His nature
4. From His decreeing them
181. Is the knowledge of God noetical or dianoetical?5
Noetical; He perceives everything by intuition.
182. What is the object of the divine will?
Good.
183. Does God will anything necessarily?
Necessity is twofold:
1. Absolute, by which a thing from its nature cannot be otherwise than it is
2. Hypothetical—that is, something else being granted, the other follows of
necessity, as salvation from election
Now God wills Himself absolutely necessarily, because He is the chief good and
therefore He cannot but will and love Himself.
184. Does God will anything freely?
5 [The difference is that noetical, for Alexander (see #402), refers to a knowledge of things through a simple intuition unmediated through anything or the things themselves, which knowledge God alone has. Dianoetical refers to knowledge through discursive reasoning based on the things themselves, which knowledge creatures have.]
Liberty also is twofold:
1. That of spontaneity which is opposed to coercion
2. That of indifference
In the first sense, what God wills most necessarily, He wills freely. But in the second also
He wills all created things freely. For all created things are with respect to God
contingent; that is, He might will or not will them.
185. Is the will of God properly divided into secret and revealed?
Yes, the first refers to the will that lies hid in God, the last to that made known in the law
and gospel. The first has for its object all things God has determined to effect or permit,
the second all that relates to our duty.
186. What other terms are used to express this distinction?
Decretive and preceptive, ευδοκιας and ευαιρεστιας ["approval" and "good pleasure"].
These are derived from Scripture: the first, [from] Matthew 11:26; the second, [from]
Romans 12:2; Ephesians 5:10; also beneplaciti et signi [of good pleasure and of sign].
187. Is there no contrariety in these two wills?
No. The decretive will determines the event; the preceptive prescribes the duty. They do
not contradict each other, because they have different objects, and though God may will
that event should take place contrary to His precept, yet He forces no one to act against
His commandment.
188. Is the will of God properly distinguished into antecedent and consequent?
No. By the first is understood that by which God wills something to a rational creature
prior to any act of the creature; the second is that by which He wills something after some
act or many acts of the creature.
Thus they say He has an antecedent will to save all men, and a consequent will to
save only those who believe. Christ had an antecedent will to gather together the children
of Israel and a consequent will to scatter them abroad. But this is dishonorable to God, as
it ascribes contrary wills to Him, makes Him mutable, His will inefficacious, and subjects
Him to the conduct of man.
189. Into efficacious and inefficacious, absolute and conditional?
If these terms refer respectively to the decretive and preceptive will of God, they may be
correct; but if they are referred only to the decretive will, they are not.
190. Can any cause be assigned for the divine will? Can any reason?
The will of God is the first cause, the cause of all things, and consequently it can have no
cause prior to it. But as God does everything most wisely, He must have reasons for His
volitions though they be hidden from us.
191. Is the will of God the primary rule of right and wrong?
It is as it regards man because God is perfectly good, but not as it respects God Himself,
for God wills many things because they are good in themselves. Were the will of God the
only rule of right and wrong, He might make atheism, envy, pride, and so on virtues.
192. How does it appear that justice is a divine attribute?
Justice is that attribute which disposes God to render to Himself and all His creatures that
which is equal and right. Psalm 11:7: "The righteous Lord loves righteousness." His
justice appears in His giving righteous laws to all His creatures, in the sanctions of these
laws, and so on.
193. What is general justice?
It is that by which God does what is right in all His works.
194. What is vindicatory justice?
That by which God punishes sin as sin.
195. How can it be demonstrated that this last is an essential attribute of God?
1. From the voice of Scripture
2. From the dictates of conscience and the consent of all people
3. From the sanction of the law and all the Levitical ceremonies and from our
redemption by the death of Christ
196. How may it be proved that God is good?
1. Because it is essential to perfection.
2. He that is the cause of all created good must be the supreme good.
3. His word declares Him good. Psalm 25:8: "Good and upright is the Lord."
4. Proved from the works of creation, providence, and redemption.
197. How is goodness defined?
It is that attribute by which God is beneficial to His creatures.
198. What is the love of God, and how is it distinguished?
The love of God is His natural delight in that which is good. It is distinguished in the love
of benevolence, beneficence, and of complacency.
199. What is love of benevolence, what of beneficence, what of complacency?
The first is that by which God from eternity wished well to His creatures, the second that
by which He does them good in time, the last is that by which He delights in them on
account of some rays of His own image He finds upon them.
200. By what considerations is the love of God recommended to us?
By the majesty of Him who loves, by the vanity and unworthiness of its recipients, by the
dignity of Him in whom we are loved, and by the multitude and richness of the blessings
that flow from it.
201. What is the grace of God?
God's free favor and love. It is distinguished into common and special.
202. How are the mercy and the grace of God distinguished?
Mercy is the divine benignity exercised toward the miserable. Grace is the same
benignity exercised toward the unworthy.
203. Wherein does the greatness of the divine mercy appear?
1. From the character of Him who exhibits it, who is perfectly blessed and independent
2. From the character of its objects who are enemies, miserable and sinful
3. From its effects: redemption from sin and hell, and the conferring eternal life
4. From its duration, which is eternal
204. How is the truth of God evinced?
It is that essential attribute by which God is infinitely removed from all falsehood and
deceit. It is evinced by the sense of the excellence of truth found in the minds of His
creatures, by the fulfillment of predictions, and so on.
205. Can it be proved from the sacred Scriptures?
Romans 3:4: "Yea, Let God be true and every man a liar." Psalm 31:5: "Into your hands I
commit my spirit: You have redeemed me, O Lord God of truth." Psalm 100:5: "For the
Lord is good, his mercy is everlasting, and his truth endures to all generations."
206. What is the distinction between the truth and faithfulness of God?
The truth of God consists in the exact agreement of His words and works with His
thoughts, inclination, and will. His faithfulness consists in the exact correspondence of
His works with His declarations, predictions, and all the relations in which He stands to
His creatures.
207. Does the word holiness mean any distinct attribute or the aggregate of all?
Some divines consider it as a distinct attribute, others as the aggregate of all.
208. Can the holiness of God be defined or analyzed?
Charnock defines it to be negatively "a perfect and unpolluted freedom from all evil,"
positively as the "rectitude or integrity of the divine nature."6
209. Is omnipotence an attribute of God?
Yes, though the power and will of God do not differ essentially, but the first is more
extensive than the latter. It is divided into ordinate and absolute: the latter is that by
which He is able to do what He will not do, yet which may be done; the first is that by
which He does that which He has decreed to do. It [omnipotence] is
1. Ascribed to Him in the sacred Scriptures: Matthew 19:26: "with God all things
are possible"
2. Proved from power in His creatures
3. Proved from the works of creation, providence, and redemption
210. Can God do anything?
Yes, anything not repugnant to His nature, nor involving a contradiction.
6 [Stephen Charnock (1628–1680) was an English Puritan divine who wrote the classic on the existence and attributes of God: Discourses upon the Existence and Attributes of God (London: Thomas Tegg, 1840), 470]
211. How are impossible things distinguished?
Into supernatural, natural, and moral.
212. What is a supernatural impossibility?
Such as implies a contradiction and that divine power cannot effect, such as to make a
sensitive stone.7
213. What is a natural impossibility?
That which cannot be effected by the power of second causes, as creation.
214. What is a moral impossibility?
That which cannot be done consistently with the laws of holiness.
215. Is it any derogation from omnipotence not to be able to do impossibilities?
No. They are not the objects of power.
216. Could God create an infinite being?
No. Two infinite beings imply a contradiction.
217. Could God deny Himself or act inconsistently with His perfections?
2 Timothy 2:13: "If we believe not, yet He abides faithful: He cannot deny Himself."
7 [Alexander may be referring to making a stone that can sense things. However, if it could sense things, then, by definition, it would not be a stone.]
218. What is the dominion of God?
It is His absolute right to and authority over all His creatures to do with them as He
pleases.
219. On what is His dominion founded?
The foundation of God's dominion is twofold:
1. The supreme excellency of His nature
2. The number and richness of His benefits as Creator and Preserver
220. Is the dominion of God absolute and unlimited?
Yes. As He is perfectly independent, so He is subject to no law but does with His own
what He wills, and no one can say unto Him, "What doest Thou?" [Job 9:12].
221. Have we any adequate ideas of God?
None. We know only in part. God is infinite and, of course, by every finite being,
incomprehensible. "Can you by searching find out God?" [Job 11:7].
222. How does it appear that God is infinitely perfect?
It is a dictate of common sense and should always be considered as a first principle in
theology. The Scriptures represent all His attributes as infinite.
223. Do the works of God prove Him infinite in all His perfections?
His works, unless it be the act of creating, are all finite, and therefore cannot strictly be
said to prove their author infinite.
224. Do all men agree in ascribing infinite perfections to God?
They do, as far as their ideas of perfection extend.
225. Is God infinitely happy?
Yes, for His independence and omnipotence place Him beyond the reach of all external
evil, and His infinite perfection and holiness forbid the supposition of any cause of pain
within Himself; but if happy at all, He must be infinitely so.
226. Is it right to ascribe to God everything we know to be a perfection?
We can't avoid it.
Chapter 6
Trinity
227. Does the light of nature teach us anything of the mode of the divine existence?
It does not, because the works of nature are not capable of being the medium of such a
communication.
228. Is the doctrine of a Trinity of persons in the unity of the divine essence inconsistent with
reason?
It is not contrary to reason, though beyond its reach. A doctrine is properly said to be
contrary to reason when it contradicts some first principle of reason or some conclusion
derived by demonstration from first principles. But the doctrine of the Trinity does not
contradict any such principle or conclusion, because we do not say that three persons in
the Godhead are one person, or that one divine being is three divine beings.
The argument drawn from reason against this article of our faith rests on this
principle, that because among angels and men every distinct person is also a distinct
being, therefore if we say there are three distinct persons in the Godhead, we must admit
there are three distinct beings in the deity, which is Tritheism. But this is evidently
arguing from finite to infinite, which must from its nature be an inconclusive argument.1
229. Has the doctrine of a Trinity in deity been prevalent among ancient nations?
Yes. Evident traces of the doctrine can be discovered in the mythology of almost every
1 Waterland against Claude, Question 22. [Daniel C. Waterland (1683–1740) was an Anglican theologian who was anti-latitituinarian and defended the Trinity in numerous works.]
nation in the world; And it should be remarked that the nearer we ascended to the
fountain of traditionary knowledge, the more correct has been the opinion of the ancients
on this subject.
230. Does this doctrine invoke any contradiction in terms?
No, as seen before.
230. Can it be comprehended by man?
No, and that both because it is but partially revealed and because of the impossibility of
finite creatures embracing completely what relates to infinite God.
230. Is the word Trinity to be found in sacred Scripture, and is it proper to use?
The word itself is not found in sacred Scripture, but it still should be used because of its
utility, in defining the precise meaning of those who receive the doctrine it contains. It is
absolutely necessary in expounding Scripture that words not found in the Bible should
often be employed.
231. Is this doctrine revealed in the Old Testament?
Yes, though like other parts of the plan of divine truth, with much less clearness than
under the gospel dispensation. That it was revealed is proved
1. From Genesis 1:26 where God says, "Let us make man in our image."
2. From the Spirit being said, "to brood upon the waters," and from such
expressions as these, "I will save them by Jehovah their God" [Hos. 1:7].
3. From the history of the creation, which is attributed to each of the three persons
of the Trinity.
4. From the liberation from Egypt, which is also ascribed to each of the divine
persons: "I am the Lord your God which brought you out of the land of
Egypt." Yet in Exodus 3:2; 23:20; 32:34, the Angel of the Lord is said to have
done it. That this Angel was also God, appears from his being called the "God
of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob" (Ex. 3:6). See also Exodus 14:19 and 13:21;
23:20, and so on. This work is ascribed to the Spirit (Isa. 63:7–9);
5. From the descriptions of the Messiah
6. From the threefold benediction of the high priest (Num. 6:23–24) and from the
Trisagion (Isa. 6:3)
7. All those passages asserting the deity of the Son and Spirit
8. The same being is God both of the Old and New Testament. This doctrine is
found explained with wonderful clearness in Jewish writers before the
Advent.2
232. Is it a fundamental doctrine in the Christian system?
Yes, so far as to believe there is but one God, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit having
the divine perfections ascribed to them are that God, though distinguished from each
other by those acts and relations we are accustomed to call personal. This is proved
1. From John 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they might know You, the only true
God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent."
2 [See, for instance, Peter Allix, The Judgment of the Ancient Jewish Church against the Unitarians in the Controversy upon the Holy Trinity and the Divinity of Our Blessed Savior (Oxford, 1821).]
2. Because it contains the great object of faith and worship, "He that denies the
Son, the same has not the Father" (1 John 2:23).
3. Because on this depends the doctrines of the incarnation, atonement, the
mission of the Spirit, regeneration, and so on.
4. Because it is the great distinguishing doctrine between Christianity and
Judaism, Mahometanism, and so on.
233. How does it appear that there are three distinct persons in the divine essence?
1. From the baptism of Christ (Matt. 3:16), where the Father spake from heaven, the Son
ascended from the Jordan, and the Spirit descended from above in the form of a dove
and rested upon Him.
2. From our baptism: "Teach all nations baptizing them in the name of the Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost" (Matt. 28:19).
3. From the apostolic benediction: "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the love of God,
and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all" (2 Cor. 13:13).
4. Those places in which mention is made of three to whom divine works are equally
attributed, as John 15:26; 1 Corinthians 12:4–6.
234. Is the word person to be taken in its common and definite sense?
No. The word person, when applied to the deity, is distinguished from the term as applied
to men:
1. Divine persons are in substance perfectly one and the same with and in one
another, but all created persons are separable.
2. Divine persons are the same individual substance, but created persons can only
have the same kind of substance.
3. All divine persons are and must be one and the same being, but every created
person is a distinct being. Brown3 defines a person, "A thinking substance,
which can act by itself." Calvin's4 definition is a "Subsistentia in the essence
of the Deity, by which it is related to others, yet distinguished by
incommunicable properties." Melanchthon's:5 "An individual subsistence,
living, intelligent, incommunicable, not sustained by any other and not a part
of any other."
235. Is the distinction of persons real or modal?
The divine persons are said to differ from the divine essence ut modus a re [according to
the mode of the thing], being the thing itself with personal properties. It is also real and
essential.
236. Does not the doctrine of three distinct persons lead to Tritheism?
No, for the three persons are the same essence.
237. By what properties are the persons of the Trinity distinguished?
They are distinguished:
3 [John Brown of Haddington (1722–1787) was a divine of the Scottish Secession Church. A Compendious View of Natural and Revealed Religion, book 2, ch. 2.]
4 [John Calvin (1509–1564) was an influential French/Swiss theologian, pastor, and reformer during the Protestant Reformation. He was a principal figure in the development of the system of Christian theology later called Calvinism. Institutes of the Christian Religion, book 1, ch. 13, section 6.]
5 [Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560) was a German Lutheran reformer, collaborator with Martin Luther, the first systematic theologian of the Protestant Reformation, intellectual leader of the Lutheran Reformation, and an influential designer of educational systems.]
1. By what relates to themselves, in regard to each other
2. By their external operations
First, the Father is said to be unbegotten, the Son begotten, the Holy Ghost to have
proceeded. Secondly, the Father is said to work of Himself, the Son to work from the
Father, the Spirit from both.
238. Are the personal properties communicable?
They are not.
239. Do the terms Father and Son express the eternal relation of the first and second persons?
This was universally the opinion of Christians during the early ages of the church. Roell6
was the first, who, admitting the Godhead of the second person, denied His eternal
filiation. Turretin argues for the doctrine against the Socinians:7
1. From Psalm 2:7: "You are my Son, this day have I begotten You."
2. From Proverbs 8:22–23, and so on, "The Lord possessed Me in the beginning
of his ways."
3. From Micah 5:2: "His goings forth were of old even from everlasting."
4. From the nature of His sonship.
5. From His being called the "image of the invisible God" (Col. 1:15 and Heb.
1:3).
It is further urged in favor of this doctrine that the Son is represented as sent (1 John 4:9–
6 [Hermann Alexander Roell (1653–1718) was a Dutch Reformed professor at Franeker.] 7 [Named after Fausto Sozzini (1539–1604). Socinianism denied the pre-existence of Christ, limited the foreknowledge of God, denied original sin, rejected the propitiatory view of the atonement, did not hold to infant baptism, and replaced hell with annihilationism.]
10; Gal. 4:4).
2. "God was manifested in the flesh" (1 Tim. 3:16). "The Son was manifested"
(1 John 3:8). Hence the Son must have existed as God and as the Son previous
to His advent.
3. In Hebrews 1:2 God is said to have made all things by His Son, which implies
His preexistence as the Son.
4. In Hebrews 7:3 we are told that Melchizedek was made like the Son of God,
without beginning of days.
240. Is Christ called the Son of God in reference to His incarnation?
Those who answer the preceding question in the negative, answer this affirmatively and
vice versa.
241. Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son as well as the Father?
This question was long and warmly debated between the Greek and Latin churches; the
Greeks contended that the procession was from the Father only. The Latins, that it was
both from the Father and the Son. The opinion of the Latins appears to be best supported
by the sense of Scripture, because
1. The Spirit is said to be sent by the Son as well as by the Father
2. The Spirit of the Son, not less than the Spirit of the Father, is said to be given
(Gal. 4:6)
3. What the Spirit has is said to be of the Son (John 16:13–15)
4. Christ breathed the Spirit upon His disciples (John 20:22)
242. From what sources is the evidence of Christ's divinity derived?
From the names, attributes, offices, and works ascribed to Him in the sacred Scriptures.
243. By what names and titles of the true God is He called?
"Jehovah," "God," "The Lord of Hosts," "The Almighty," "The Most High" (Mark 5:7;
Luke 8:28), "The Everlasting Father," "Prince of Peace" (Isa. 9:6; John 14:11, Luke
1:79), and so on.
244. Are these names never applied to mere creatures?
The epithet god is sometimes figuratively ascribed to angels and magistrates, but not so
with the rest.
245. Is the name Jehovah ever ascribed to Christ, and is it communicable?
This name as it expresses the incommunicable essence of the deity and implies necessary,
independent, and eternal existence, is most clearly peculiar to the only true God. It is
applied to Christ as Redeemer (Isa. 60:16 and 63:7–9). Jeremiah prophesied that a
righteous Branch should be raised to David, a king in whose days Judah should be saved,
whose name should be called "Jehovah our Righteousness" (Jer. 23:6). Zechariah 12:10:
"They shall look on Me whom they have pierced." Here the name Jehovah is used, and
this passage is by John referred to Christ [John 19:37]. See also Isaiah 47:4; 54:5, 8;
Jeremiah 33:15–16; see App., p. 8.
246. What divine attributes are ascribed to Christ?
Eternity: Proverbs 8:22–23 and Micah 5:2: "his going forth were of old even from
everlasting." Revelation 1:8, "The First and the Last." John 1:1 and 8:58.
Omnipresence: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name" (Matt. 18:20).
John 3:13; Colossians 1:17; Hebrews 1:3.
Omnipotence: Revelation 1:8: "The Almighty"; Philippians 3:21; Revelation 11:17–18;
22:12–13, 20.
Omniscience: John 21:17 "Lord, You know all things." John 1:18; 2:25; Matthew 9:23;
Revelation 2:13; Hebrews 4:13.
Immutability: Hebrews 1:11, 12: "The heavens shall perish, but You remain.... You are
the same, and your years shall not fail." Hebrews 13:8; Psalm 102:24–27.
247. What works is He said to have wrought that prove His divinity?
The creation, preservation, and redemption of the world.
248. By what passages of the sacred Scriptures do you prove that Christ created the world?
John 1:3: "By Him were all things made, and without Him was not anything made that
was made." Hebrews 1:2; 3:4; Colossians 1:16–17.
249. Is Jesus Christ declared in the sacred Scriptures to be the preserver of all things?
Yes. Hebrews 1:3: "Upholding all things by the word of his power." Also John 5:17, 19;
Colossians 1:17–18.
250. How do you prove that the new creation is His proper work?
Because redeeming, calling, justifying, sanctifying, preserving, and, at last, raising
sinners are all ascribed to Him in sacred Scripture: Matthew 20:28; Acts 20:28; John
5:21, 25; 10:16; Matthew 9:6; Isaiah 53:11; Colossians 3:13; Ephesians 5:28, 29;
Hebrews 13:12; 9:14; John 10:10, 28; Jude 1; John 5:28; 1 Peter 3:18.
251. Do the miracles of Christ prove His divinity?
Yes, because some of these required almighty, and hence incommunicable, power, yet
they were performed by His own inherent virtue, and thus the apostles declare that they
act in the name and through the power of Christ (Acts 9:34).
252. What worship is ascribed to the Son in the sacred Scriptures?
Divine, as Hebrews 1:6: "Let all the angels of God worship Him." Psalm 2:12: "Kiss the
Son." John 5:22: "The Father has given all judgment to the Son, that all men might honor
the Son even as they honor the Father." Revelation 5:13, Every creature in heaven, earth,
and sea are represented as saying, "Blessing and honor and glory and power be unto Him
that sits on the throne and unto the Lamb forever and ever."
253. Did He permit divine worship to be paid Him when on earth?
Matthew 2:11, The wise men of the east "fell down and worshiped him"; so did Nathaniel
and Thomas and His disciples when He ascended. He required this worship in
commanding His disciples to believe in Him as they believed in God (John 14:1), in
requiring supreme love (John 21:15–17; Mark 12:30, and so on), also obedience and
subjection of soul (Matt. 17:5), in instituting baptism, and so on. See App., p. 9.
254. Does He receive divine honor in heaven?
Yes, as seen above.
255. Is the famous text 1 John 5:78 a part of authentic Scripture?
This question has been very much disputed. The text has been defended by Bengelius,9
Mills,10 Horseley11 and others, and opposed by Father Simon,12 Wetstein,13 Griesbach,14
and the majority of modern commentators. The testimony as it stands at present is
decidedly against the text: it is not found in any of the Greek codices now extant, nor in
any of the ancient versions, nor in the Russian copies of the Bible before the fourteenth
century, nor is it quoted by any of the early fathers.
It is urged in favor of it that it is found in the Complutensian polyglot published
[in] AD 1520, and in the Latin codices, which reach as high up as the ninth century, that
it is quoted by Vigelius Tapsensis15 about the sixth century, and that it is now so common
in all editions of the Bible.16
8 [1 John 5:7: "For there are three that bear record in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one."]
9 [Johann Albrecht Bengel (1687–1752) was a Lutheran pietist clergyman and Greek-language scholar known for his edition of the Greek New Testament and his commentaries on it.]
10 [John Mill (1645–1707) was an English theologian. Mill is noted for his critical edition of the Greek New Testament, which included notes on many variant readings.]
11 [Samuel Horsley (1733–1806) was the bishop of Rochester from 1793.] 12 [Richard Simon (1638–1712) was a French priest who was an influential biblical critic, orientalist, and controversialist.]
13 [Johann Jakob Wettstein (1693–1754) was a Swiss theologian best known as a New Testament critic.] 14 [Johann Jakob Griesbach (1745–1812) was a German biblical textual critic whose fame rests on his work in New Testament criticism.]
15 [Vigilio, bishop of Tapso (Tunisia), an ecclesiastical writer.] 16 See App., p. 10.
256. Are the texts Acts 20:2817 and 1 Timothy 3:1618 authentic as contained in our Bible?
With respect to the last mentioned, it is objected that it is not found in all the Greek
codices, nor in the Syriac, Arabic, or Latin versions as it is in our copies, but is written
"he was manifested" [as opposed to "God was manifested"]. But as there are only two
codices with this reading, they should not be opposed to all the rest.
It can also easily be accounted for that this diversity should exist, since the
ancient M.S.S. [manuscripts] were written in capitals, and words that occur frequently are
often contracted, thus πρ for πατερ [father] and ΘC for ΘEOC [God], which shows that
OC, "who," might easily be mistaken for ΘC, "God." And there is a dispute whether it is
OC or ΘC in the Codex Alexandrinus even among those who have inspected the M.S.
[manuscript]. The sense of the passage appears to require the reading adopted in our
Bibles.
With respect to the text in Acts 20:28, there are three different readings:
εκκλησιαν του θεου [church of God], του κυριου [of the Lord], του κυριου και θεου [of
the Lord and God]. For the first there are a few M.S.S. with the Vulgate, and latter
Syriac; for the second [there are] some M.S.S., and these the most ancient: the Coptic,
Armenian, [and] Ethiopic versions; for the third there is a great majority of M.S.S.
257. Have any important texts been made to support the divinity of Jesus Christ by attending to
the Greek article?
Yes. It has been ascertained that και19 is often exegetical as well as copulative and that
17 [Acts 20:28: "Take heed therefore unto yourselves, and to all the flock, over the which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers, to feed the church of God, which He hath purchased with his own blood."]
18 [1 Tim. 3:16: "And without controversy great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached unto the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory."]
this is the case when it is placed between nouns, the first of which has an article and the
latter has none: 2 Corinthians 1:3, "Blessed be God and" ([or] "even" as it should be
rendered) "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."20 ο θεος και πατερ. See also Ephesians
1:3; 2 Thessalonians 2:16; 1 Peter 1:3; Romans 15:6; Philippians 4:20; Colossians 2:2.
Upon this principle the following passages strongly teach the deity of Christ:
Titus 2:13, "Looking for that blessed hope and the glorious appearing of the great God
και even our Savior Jesus Christ." So 1 Timothy 5:21, "I charge you before God και even
the Lord Jesus Christ." Also Ephesians 5:5, "Kingdom of Christ even και of God," and
2 Thessalonians 1:12, "The grace του θεου ημων και κυριυ Ιησου Κριστου [of our God
and Lord Jesus Christ]." See 1 Timothy 6:13; 2 Peter 1:2; Sharpe;21 and Middleton.22
258. What light arises on this subject by comparing the texts of the Old and New Testament?
It is found that the names, works, and titles which in the Old Testament are ascribed to
the true God are in the New Testament applied to Jesus Christ. Compare Isaiah 7:14 with
Matthew 1:23; Isaiah 63:11 with Luke 2:11; Isaiah 3:8 with 2 Corinthians 3:18; Psalm
77:15 with Luke 1:51; Psalm 104:24, Matthew 11:19; [and] 1 Samuel 15:29 with
2 Corinthians 12:9; Isaiah 54:5 with 2 Corinthians 11:2; Isaiah 8:14 with Romans 9:33.
19 [Commonly translated "and," but it has other grammatical uses as well. The "exegetical" use of this article between two nouns means that the latter noun explains the former noun.]
20 [The King James Version translates it correctly, per the point Alexander is making: "Blessed be God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."]
21 [Granville Sharp (1735–1813) was a social activist, biblical scholar, classicist, and a talented musician. In Greek classical literature he stumbled on what is now known as the Granville Sharp Rule, which very much applies to key passages regarding Christ's divinity, some of which Alexander quoted: "When the copulative kai connects two nouns of the same case, if the article ho, or any of its cases, precedes the first of the said nouns or participles, and is not repeated before the second noun or participle, the latter always relates to the same person that is expressed or described by the first noun or participle."]
22 [Thomas Fanshawe Middleton (1769–1822) was a noted Anglican bishop who followed Sharp and wrote the book The Doctrine of the Greek Article Applied to the Criticism and Illustration of the New Testament (London, 1833).]
259. How does it appear that the Holy Spirit is a person distinct from the Father and the Son?
1. From personal actions being ascribed to Him, as teaching (John 14:26), witnessing
(John 15:26), revealing future things (1 Tim. 4:1), separating men for the ministry and
sending them out (Acts 13:2 and 20:28), conferring gifts on men (1 Cor. 12:11).
2. From our Savior saying, "I will ask the Father and He will send you another
comforter" (John 16:7).
3. From the distinct mention made of Him in baptism in the apostolic benediction.
4. From His appearing in a visible form at the baptism of Christ (Matt. 3:16) [and] at the
day of Pentecost (Acts 2:3).
5. Because men are said to sin, to blaspheme, to lie against the Holy Ghost (Isa. 63:10;
Matt. 12:31–32; Acts 5:3). See App., p. 10.
260. How can the divinity of the Holy Spirit be established?
From the names, works, attributes, and worship ascribed to Him in sacred Scripture.
261. What divine names and so on are given to the Holy Spirit in the sacred Scriptures?
1. The names:
A. Jehovah of Hosts: compare Isaiah 6:9 with Acts 28:25, "Well spake the Holy
Ghost by Isaiah"; 2 Samuel 23:2
B. Most High God: Psalm 78:56; Hebrews 3:17–18
C. The Lord: 2 Thessalonians 3:5; Matthew 9:38
2. Attributes:
A. Eternity: Hebrews 9:14, "Who through the eternal Spirit"
B. Omnipresence: Psalm 139:7, "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit?"
1 Corinthians 3:16; 2 Timothy 1:14
C. Omniscience: 1 Corinthians 2:10–11, "For the Spirit searches all things, yea
the deep things of God." 2 Peter 1:21
D. Omnipotence: Luke 1:35, "The power of the Highest." 1 Corinthians 15;
Romans 8:11
3. Works:
A. That of creation: Psalm 104:30, "You send forth your Spirit, they are created;
You renew the face of the earth." Genesis 1:2; Job 26:13
B. Preserving all things: Psalm 104:30; Isaiah 34:16
C. Performing miracles: Matthew 12:28; 1 Corinthians 12:4
D. Convincing men of sin: John 16:9
E. Enlightening their minds: Ephesians 1:17, 18
F. Regenerating their hearts: John 3:5, 6, and so on.
4. Worship: By prayer, Revelation 1:4; 2 Thessalonians 3:5; in baptism, and so on.
262. How can it be demonstrated that these persons are one in essence?
1. Because these three persons are all comprehended under one supreme individual
appellation, as Isaiah 44:24, "I am the Lord that makes all things, that stretches forth
the heavens alone, etc." The Trinity is the God of Israel, and so on.
2. They have in common the name Jehovah: Deuteronomy 6:4, "The Lord our God is one
Jehovah." Psalm 83:18, "You whose name alone is Jehovah, are most high over all the
earth."
3. Because the authority, the council, and the power by which all things are directed are
ascribed to Christ and the Holy Spirit in common with the Father.
4. Because they participate in those divine attributes that can belong only to the divine
essence. There can be but one infinite Being.
5. Because there is a concurrence in all the acts of the Godhead: the Trinity made all
mankind, quickens the dead, instructs us, and so on.
263. How does it appear that they are equal in all respects?
This necessarily results from their respective divinity. They have the same names,
worship, works, and nature, and therefore must be equal and in essence the same. Those
passages of sacred Scripture in which any inferiority is attributed to the Son or Spirit
refer merely to the different parts they have condescended to act in the economy of
Redemption. Quare, Gloria Patri, et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto in eternum [Wherefore,
glory be to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit forever].
Chapter 7
Decrees
264. What are the decrees of God, and how does it appear that they exist?
They are called the "essential, internal acts of God." They are His eternal purposes. Their
existence is
1. Proved from the perfection of the divine nature. His knowledge being infinite
and infallible supposes that He has determined things to be as they are.
2. They are proved from the harmony observable in creation and providence.
3. They are constantly ascribed to God in the sacred Scriptures.
4. They are also proved by the prediction of things the most contingent (Amos
3:7; Matt. 8:17; John 19:36).
265. What kind of acts are the decrees of God?
The acts of God are divided into three kinds:
1. Those internal acts which have no relation to beings without;
2. External transient acts, as [making] creation;
3. Those internal acts of God which have a reference to things without. Of this
last kind are decrees, being the councils of God concerning future things
without Himself.
266. Are the divine decrees essentially or accidentally in the divine nature?
They cannot be considered as accidents in the divine nature, for this would be
inconsistent with simplicity, contrary to absolute perfection, and opposed to
immutability, for accidents are the root of all change. And this is as much as is necessary
to be said on this subject, for we cannot easily conceive of decrees being the divine
essence, of which they are the internal acts.
267. Are all the decrees of God from eternity?
Yes, because this is attributed to them in the sacred Scriptures, as when the kingdom is
said to be prepared for the righteous "from the foundation of the world" (Matt. 25:34),
also [in that the righteous are said to be] elected (Eph. 1:4; 2 Tim. 1:9); also from Acts
15:18, "known unto the Lord are all things from the beginning of the world." If the
decrees are made in time, then after the manner of men God acts from the circumstances
of the moment, which is altogether inconsistent with His infinite perfection.
268. Are the decrees of God immutable?
Yes. There may be changes in the external dispensations of His providence, but there can
be none in His purpose, because this would argue some defect in His foreknowledge,
wisdom, or power. "The counsel of the Lord stands forever; the thoughts of his heart to
all generations" (Ps. 33:11). Hebrews 6:17, "Wherein God willing more abundantly to
show the immutability of his counsel."
269. Are the decrees of God wise and free?
Yes. This appears from His wisdom and sovereignty manifested in the execution of them.
For whatever perfections God manifests in His works, these He designed in His eternal
purpose to glorify. Romans 11:33, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and
knowledge of God." Matthew 11:26, "Even so Father: for so it seems good in your sight."
270. Are the decrees of God absolute or conditional?
The decrees of God are all absolute considered in themselves because
1. They are from eternity.
2. They are dependent only on the good pleasure of God (Matt. 15:25; Eph. 1:5).
3. They are immutable (Isa. 46:10).
4. It is inconsistent with the wisdom and power of God to make decrees that have
uncertain objects.
5. It makes the purposes of God dependent on the fickle will of men. Isaiah 46:10,
"Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things
which are not yet done, saying my counsel shall stand and I will do all my
pleasure."
271. May they not be considered as conditional in regards to their object?
They may—that is, the event or object is decreed under a condition; thus, salvation under
the condition of faith. But this mode of speaking confounds conditions and means.
272. Do the decrees of God involve the certainty of future events?
Certainty, or as Turretin says, necessity is of three kinds:
1. Physical, such as resides in second causes (e.g., fire will burn)
2. That of coaction1
3. Hypothetical necessity of the event, by which things in their nature contingent
cannot but take place, on account of the ordination of God
In this last sense things decreed are necessary, or rather certain, because
1. The eternal and immutable purposes of God must take effect.
2. This necessity is asserted in sacred Scripture: Matthew 18:7, "For it must needs
be that offenses come." Matthew 26:54, "But how then shall the scriptures be
fulfilled that thus it must be?"
3. The most casual things are said to come to pass of necessity: Exodus 12:12, 13;
Proverbs 16:33; John 19:36.
4. They are foreseen as future and therefore must take place.
5. They are predicted as future, and the Word of God cannot fail. See [Jonathan]
Edwards, Freedom of the Will, part 2, section 11.
273. Does the decree of God make Him the author of sin?
No, because the decree, though it may render sin certain, is not the cause of sin, since it
neither imports the evil disposition from whence it flows nor intimates the least
approbation of it, but is merely permissive. There is a great difference between allowing
sin and causing it. It may be considered as the polar star of theology to remember that
God is infinitely perfect and to ascribe to Him nothing which is not consistent with this
character. See Edwards, On the Will, part 4, section 4.
1 [Compulsion, specifically a person outwardly forcing another person to do something.]
274. How are the decrees of God conversant about the free acts of moral agents?
God uses all things agreeably to the nature He has given them. He works with necessary
causes in one way and with contingent causes in another, violating the nature of neither,
yet accomplishing His purposes by both.
275. Is there any just ground for the distinction between absolute and permissive decrees?
There is, in a certain view. God decrees all good absolutely and is the cause of it, but He
permits evil, though the decree to permit is in itself absolute.
276. What is a permissive decree?
Such as relates to sinful actions. "A permissive [decree] determines the event of the evil
permitted and overrules it to a good end, contrary to the intention both of the work and
the worker." Fisher's2 Catechism [Q. 7.28] It merely determines the certainty of its event.
277. Are all things, even the most minute, decreed?
Nothing is so vast or so minute as to be beyond the limits of God's providence or plan.
The hairs of our heads are numbered, and a sparrow falls not to the ground without the
notice of our heavenly Father [Matt. 10:29–30].
2 [James Fisher (1697–1775) was a founder of the Scottish Secession Church.]
Chapter 8
Predestination
278. Does the word predestination include reprobation as well as election?
In the sacred Scriptures the word is more frequently used in application to election only,
but most divines now extend it to embrace both because the word προοριζειν is often
used in reference to wicked actions and because reprobation is expressed by Zanchius1 as
perfectly synonymous with predestination.
279. Were angels predestinated as well as men?
Yes: Paul says to Timothy, "I charge you before God and the elect angels" (1 Tim. 5:21).
If some were elected or chosen, it implies that others were left or reprobated, who are
said to be reserved in chains and darkness to the great judgment.
280. Is man as fallen the object of predestination?
This is generally the opinion2 among orthodox divines in opposition to those who
suppose that man, as creatable, was the object of God's predestinating decrees,3 because
1. That which does not exist cannot be the object of a positive decree.
2. If man, as creatable, was the object of predestination, then either all creatable
men or only a part of them must have been predestinated; but it is evident that
1 [Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590) was an influential Italian, Reformed theologian, and professor.] 2 [Also known as infralapsarianism. Alexander below calls it sublapsarianism.] 3 [Known as supralapsarianism.]
all were not, and if but a part were, they must have been foreseen as certainly
future, and so on.
3. If a man as creatable and fallible4 was the object of predestination, then the
creation and fall are means of predestination, which they cannot be, otherwise
God would have entered into a decree to save or destroy man before He had
determined His creation or its fall.
4. This doctrine makes God to reprobate men before that through sin they were
liable to reprobation.
It may moreover be further argued in favor of man as fallen being the object of
predestination
1. Because the saints are said to be chosen out of the world (John 15:19).
2. From Paul's figure of the mass from which the vessels of honor and dishonor
were made (Rom. 9:21). This mass represented the object of predestination,
which, with it, must have been corrupt.
3. Because the illustration of the mercy and justice of God in election and
reprobation supposes the object of these decrees to be already miserable or
sinful.
281. Does not a wise agent always determine the end before the means?
This principle is the ground of the famous axiom of Twisse,5 "That which is last in
execution was first in design," which Turretin says holds with regard to the ultimate end,
but not to all others (which would prove that what is next to last in execution must have
4 [Able to err.] 5 [William Twisse (1578–1646) was a prominent English supralapsarian and moderator of the Westminster Assembly.]
been next to last in design, etc.). It also holds where there is an essential subordination of
things, but there is no such subordination between creation, fall, and redemption.
282. What is the supralapsarian doctrine in regard to the order of decrees?
They make the decrees of election and reprobation to precede the decrees to create and to
permit man to fall.
283. What is the sublapsarian doctrine, and wherein does it differ from the other?
The sublapsarian doctrine is that the creation and permission of the fall of man were
decreed before his election or reprobation. The first of these [views, supralapsarianism,]
makes man as creatable and fallible (or to be created and to fall), as the object of the
decree of predestination; the second [makes] man as created and fallen [to be the object
of predestination].
284. Is there at bottom any difference between these two systems?
None. The purposes of God in reference to men may be viewed in the following order:6
6 [This "solution" is very similar to that of Peter van Mastricht (1630–1706). Heinrich Heppe summarizes and quotes Mastricht in Reformed Dogmatics (Wipf & Stock, 2007), ch. 8, "Predestination," p. 162:
Mastricht e.g. attempts to mediate the opposition between the supraand infralapsarian ways of looking at it by distinguishing a fourfold actus praedestinationis [acts of predestination] (III, ii, 12): "Four acts of God are here to be observed:
(1) the purpose to manifest the glory of mercy and of punishing righteousness; (2) the statute to create all men and permit them to lapse in a common beginning. (3) of those created and fallen to choose one in whom He would acquire the glory of mercy, and to
reprobate another in whom He would obtain the glory of avenging righteousness. (4) an intention to prepare and direct the means corresponding to election and to reprobation. By reason of the first act of predestination the object could only have been homo creabilis et labilis [man creatable and mutable], since no decree so far is presupposed to have been made concerning creation and the fall: by reason of the second act it is strictly homo creandus et lapsurus [man to be created
1) His decree to manifest the glory of His perfections in His dealings with man
2) His decree of creating and permitting them to fall
3) His fore-appointment of some men to be subjects of mercy and others of wrath
4) His fixing the means necessary for both of these objects
285. Did not God determine all things by one most simple act?
Yes, the decrees of God may be considered as one most perfect purpose, which destroys
all debate relative to their order.
and to fall]; by reason of the third homo creatus et lapsus [man as created and fallen]; by reason of the fourth homo electus et reprobus [man as elect and reprobate].
Since therefore, so far as it is distinguished from election and reprobation, predestination consists of two prime acts, you would be most accurate in saying that the object of predestination is homo creabilis et labilis, creandus at lapsurus; while at the same time the object of election and reprobation is homo creatus et lapsus. Thus most conveniently you will have reconciled specifically dissident views and most safely removed difficulties with which each side wants to saddle the side opposed to it."]
Chapter 9
Election
286. What is election, and of how many kinds?
This word sometimes signifies a vocation [calling] to an office, sometimes a selection of
a whole people to be in covenant with God, also the gracious act of the Holy Spirit
whereby men are separated from the world (John 15:19). But more properly or strictly it
is that eternal, sovereign, unconditional, particular, and immutable act of God whereby
He chooses some men to everlasting life through Jesus Christ.
287. How can it be demonstrated that election is personal? Because
1. Particular persons are said to have their names written in the Book of Life.
2. Some men are represented as personally chosen to everlasting life (Eph. 1:4–6; Matt.
20:16).
288. Is Christ the cause and foundation of election?
No, because
1. Election is made from the mere good pleasure of God: "I will have mercy on
whom I will have mercy" [Rom. 9:15; see also Eph. 1:5].
2. The mission of Christ was the effect of election and consequently cannot be its
cause: "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son" [John
3:16].
3. The elect are the object of Christ's merit, and the object must be before the act.
4. The determination of the end must precede the destination of the means. But
salvation is the end and Christ is the means. Thus, the desire to heal the sick
precedes the application of remedies.
289. Is it the same thing to be the foundation of salvation and of election?
No, Christ is not only the foundation but the sole foundation of salvation, though not of
election. For many more causes are requisite for salvation than for election, and the
means of election are the causes of salvation.
290. Has the act of election no respect to Christ?
Yes, it regards Him as the grand means of its accomplishment. For salvation never was
appointed to man but in reference to Christ, and God, by the same act by which He
determined to redeem His children, determined to send them Jesus.
291. Was election founded on the foresight of faith and holiness?
No, because
1. Faith and obedience are the fruit of election, Romans 8:29, "Whom He
predestinated, them He also called." Ephesians 1:4, "He has chosen us that we
might be holy." Acts 13:48, "And as many as were ordained unto eternal life
believed."
2. Election is of the sole good pleasure of God and not of works, Romans 9:11,
"that He the purpose of God according to election might stand not of works but
of Him that calls." [Romans 9:16,] "So then it is not of him that wills nor of
him that runs, but of God who shows mercy."
3. If election be from the foreknowledge of faith, then man chooses God rather
than God man, but Christ says, "You have not chosen Me, but I have chosen
you" (John 15:16).
4. If election was founded on the foresight of faith, there would be no room for
the objection noticed by Paul in the ninth [chapter] of Romans, to which he
simply replies, "who are you," and so on. See Hora Solitaria, Elect.
292. What is meant in the Scriptures by the foreknowledge that precedes election?
This is not a mere theoretical knowledge but also practical, implying approbation and
affection; in this sense it is frequently used in the Scripture (John 10:14). That this
foreknowledge is not a mere prescience [foreknowing], appears
1. First, because with this He foreknew those whom He reprobates as well as
those whom He elects
2. Because mere prescience is not the cause of anything
3. Because nothing can be foreseen of God but what He Himself has determined
293. Is election certain and immutable?
Yes, because the decree of election, like all the other decrees of God, are immutable, "My
counsel stands firm, and I will perform all my pleasure" (Isa. 46:10). "The gifts and
calling of God are without repentance" (Rom. 11:29. See also Heb. 6:17; Rom. 9:11).
Also 2 Timothy 2:19, "The foundation of God stands firm having this seal. The Lord
knows those that are His."
Secondly, it is impossible to deceive the elect (Matt. 24:24).
Thirdly, there is an indispensable bond between election and glorification, as
appears from the golden chain exhibited by the apostle in Romans 8:29–30, "Whom He
did foreknow, them He did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, etc."
Fourthly, the names of the elect are said to be written in heaven (Phil. 4:3; Heb.
12:23; Luke 10:20), which denotes the infallibility of their salvation. The wicked are said
to be written in the earth (Jer. 17:13).
294. Can the number of the elect be increased or diminished?
No.
295. May believers be assured of their election in this life?
This can be known not by ascending into heaven and reading the Book of Life but by
perusing the book of conscience. Turretin resolves the case into a practical syllogism, the
major of which is in the mind and the minor in the heart. Whosoever truly repents and
believes is elected; I repent and believe: [Therefore] electus sum ["I am elect"]. This
further appears from the saints being represented as being certain of faith (which is the
fruit of their election): "I know in whom I have believed" (2 Tim. 1:12).
Secondly, from the witness of the Spirit, Romans 8:16, "The Spirit itself bears
witness with our spirits that we are the children of God" (Eph. 4:30; 1 John 3:24).
Thirdly, the example of the saints: Abraham, David, [and] Paul.
Fourthly, the effect is confidence and full assurance: "Let us draw near to and
with a true heart and full assurance of faith" (Heb. 10:22; Eph. 3:12; 1 Peter 1:18; John
16:22).
296. Will this not lead to security and licentiousness?
No, far from it, because nothing can be a greater incentive to piety than a lively sense of
the love of God and of the benefits freely bestowed upon us [who are] no better than
others involved in the same ruin with ourselves. Besides, no man has any evidence of his
being of the elect unless he leads a holy life.
297. How do you prove that the decree of God to save believers and to condemn unbelievers
does not comprehend the whole of the decree of election?1
First, because predestination in the Scriptures always refers to persons and not qualities.
"Many are called, but few are chosen" (Matt. 20:16). "Whom He did foreknow, them He
did predestinate" [Rom. 8:29].
Secondly, because predestination is represented to us as an efficacious will or
determination of God.
Thirdly, because it has been proved that election precedes the faith of those who
are finally saved.
1 [This view, usually associated with Arminianism, holds that persons become believers by cooperating with their natural power with the assisting grace of God or remain unbelievers of themselves, and that predestination is simply God's ordained will to save those who have become believers or to condemn those who remain unbelievers.]
298. Is there in God a general will to save all men?
No, which is proved from the decree of election and reprobation, which is inconsistent
with this general will.
Secondly, if God did will the salvation of all, would He not will also the means
necessary to their salvation?
Thirdly, if God has this general will of saving all, this will is either absolute or
conditional. If absolute then all will be saved; if conditional, then He must either effect in
them the necessary condition or merely require it. If the last, as it is impossible for man to
obey it, the salvation of such He never could have willed.
Fourthly, if God wills to save all, then either all are saved (which is false), or God
has an inefficacious, unproductive will (which is absurd).
Fifthly, He cannot wish to save those to whom He never sends the necessary
means of salvation.
299. Does not the decree of election include the means?
Yes, they are co-ordained and inseparably connected.
300. If the means never were used, would an elect sinner be saved?
No, for this would be uniting what God has forever separated: vice and felicity, moral
evil and physical good. "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord" (Heb. 12:14).
301. Does this doctrine discourage the use of means?
It ought not, for the end, though fixed, can be obtained only by the use of appointed
means; to neglect therefore the one is to forfeit the other. Besides, those who urge this
excuse for negligence do not regulate their conduct in regard to temporal things by the
same rule.
302. Had God any reason for electing some and rejecting others of the same mass?
An infinitely wise Being cannot act without a reason, but the reason of preferring one
rather than another resides not in the object of the choice, but in God Himself.
303. Do we know any reason for this distinction?
No, the Scriptures refer it to the mere bene placitum [good pleasure] of God.
Chapter 10
Reprobation
304. Can the doctrine of reprobation be separated from that of election?
No. The election and salvation of some implies the preterition and destruction of the rest.
305. Is reprobation properly distinguished into negative and positive?
Yes. The first referring to preterition, the second to praedamnation; both of these are
positive as the[y] relate [to] God inasmuch they require a positive act of the divine will.
See App., p. 12[?].
306. Is preterition founded on the sin of its object?
Yes, if considered separately—that is, it is necessary that the object of preterition be
sinful; but if considered comparatively, sin is not the foundation of the act of
preterition—that is, it is not the cause of one rather than another, being left.
307. Is the foresight of unbelief and impenitence the cause of one's being left rather than
another?
This [being left] is to be referred to the mere good pleasure of God as appears from
Romans 9:18, "whom He wills, He hardens", also from the case of Jacob and Esau and
the figure of the potter. Thus our Savior says, "even so Father, for so it seems good in
your sight." Unbelief is the effect consequence1 of reprobation, and of course could not
precede it. "You therefore hear them not because you are not of God" (John 8:47). "But
you believed not, because you are not of my sheep." And if reprobation be founded on
the foresight of impenitence, then it is not so great a mystery. And the apostle would not
have attributed it to the sovereignty of God as its only foundation.
308. What is the positive act of reprobation?
This includes a destination to perdition and to the intermediate steps of blindness of mind
and hardness of heart, of those whom God had seen proper to leave in the state of
corruption brought on by the fall of man.
309. Is there in it any destination to punishment without regard to sin?
No. Punishment always presupposes guilt.
310. Is the positive act of reprobation an act of justice or sovereignty?
Of justice.
311. Is it possible for any man to know in this life that he is reprobated?
No, however certain he may be of present enmity to God, he cannot be assured that God
has determined to permit him to remain so.
312. Has not this doctrine a tendency to lead men to despair?
1 [This is a significant emendation. If Hodge, following Alexander, had left effect, it would imply that God's reprobation produces unbelief (something sinful, which is contrary to the goodness of God). Using the word consequence signifies that the unbelief is from man, and follows reprobation, but is not produced directly by God.]
Not unless abused, but [it] should rather excite them to carefulness and diligence in their
walk and conversation.
313. Are the offers of mercy to all men consistent with the reprobation of some?
Yes, because these offers are not intended as intimations of His will to save all to whom
they are made, but to declare the way of salvation and to exhibit their duty to accept of it.
Besides, God's requiring obedience from those who hear the gospel is the appointed
mean[s] of converting the elect; at the same time it renders those who are reprobated
more useful and happy in the present world.
314. Ought the doctrine of predestination to be publicly preached?
Yes. Because Christ and [His] apostles taught it publicly: Matthew 11:20–25; John 8:17;
16:17.2 Secondly, because it is one of the most important truths of the gospel, being the
foundation of our gratitude and humility toward God, our support in temptation, our
consolation in distress, and our incitement to piety and holiness. Thirdly, to free the
doctrine from the calamities its adversaries cast upon it.
315. How ought it to be preached?
With the greatest moderation and prudence, being mindful to keep within the limits
prescribed in the sacred Scriptures and not being wise above what is written. Respect also
should be had to persons, times, and places, not to deliver it suddenly to all men but by
degrees, most frequently inculcating those part[s] best calculated to be useful. It should
be viewed a posteriori, non a priori [from derivative knowledge, not prior knowledge],
2 [The references to the book of John are not very legible and appears to be mistaken.]
reading the book of conscience, rather than attempting to scan the book of life; avoiding
all vain questions; scopus unicus nobis debet fidem instituere, non curiositatem pascere,
aedificationi consulere non gloria velificari [The only aim for us ought to be to establish
faith, not to feed curiosity, but to consult edification, not the glory in sailing].
Chapter 11
Creation
316. How are the acts of God distinguished?
Into immanent and intrinsic, immanent-extrinsic, and transient-extrinsic. These last are
called His works and are distinguished in those of nature and those of grace.
317. What sort of an act is creation?
It is a transient-extrinsic act.
318. Is it a production out of nothing?
Yes, this is the proper signification of ברא [to create] and κτζειν [to create].
319. What is the difference between mediate and immediate creation?
Immediate creation is simple production ex nihilo [out of nothing]. Mediate creation is
the molding of matter already existing, but so crude as to be within the power of no
second cause to arrange it.
320. Can we conceive how something can be produced from nothing?
No.
321. Does not creation imply a change in God?
No. Because it is an external-transient act from God and not in God. It implies no new
will, nor perfection, but is merely the eternal will and determination of God going into
effect. The change is in the creature a non esse ad esse [from non-being to being].
322. Is the creating power communicable to any creature?
No.
First, because it is ascribed to God alone, Isaiah 44:7, 24, "I am Jehovah who
made all things, who stretched out the heavens alone, and spread abroad the earth
by Myself." And thus the name Creator is given to Him alone as an
incommunicable epithet.
Secondly, because it is made the characteristic [which distinguishes]
between the true God and idols (Jer. 10:11–12).
Thirdly, because creation is a work of infinite power.
Fourthly, because every creature must have a subject on which to act, or it
can do nothing.
323. Does the working of miracles require almighty power?
There are some that do, others do not. And if men are ever employed in performing those
of the first kind they are to be considered merely as moral instruments.
324. How can it be demonstrated that this world was not eternal?
It is proved first by those passages that expressly declare the world to have been created,
as "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth," [Gen. 1:1] and those which
express the eternity of God by declaring [that] He existed before the foundation of the
world.
It is also proved from the late invention of useful acts, the short reach of history but to a
few thousand years past, from the world's being still far from completely inhabited, from
the heights that remain on the surface of the earth though they are continually washing
down by the rain, and so on. Besides, it is impossible that the world should be coeternal
with its maker; neither can any finite creature be eternal.
325. At what season of the year was the world created?
Some are of the opinion that it was in the spring, but most divines refer it to the fall:
1. Because the Israelites began their civil year in Egypt in the fall.
2. The deluge probably commenced in the fall, the season for rain: "but it was the
second month."
3. The sabbatical year commenced in the fall.
4. It would be most convenient for man and other animals that the earth should be
created with all its fruits.
326. Was the world created in a single moment or in six days?3
Augustine4 was of opinion that the world was created in a moment, and [that] the days
mentioned by Moses refer to the knowledge of angels, but this is opposed to the simple
3 [The gap theory, which posited a long and undefined gap of time between Gen. 1:1 and 1:2, became popularized a few years before these lectures by the Scottish minister Thomas Chalmers in his astronomical lectures in 1814, though this may not have been known to Alexander. The day-age theory of Gen. 1 (interpreting the days of creation week to be long ages) did not arise till after the publication of the foundational work of Charles Lyell, Principles of Geology (1830–1833), which advocated the principles of uniformitarianism, that natural principles acting slowly and uniformly over long spans of time could account for earth's natural history. Persons espousing and popularizing the day-age theory of creation on this foundation included the Swiss-American geologist Arnold Guyot (1807–1884), the Scottish geologist Hugh Miller (1802–1856), the Canadian geologist John William Dawson (1820–1899), and the American geologist James Dwight Dana (1813–1895).]
4 [Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430) was the most significant church father in North Africa.]
narration of Moses, to the world's being without form and void and to the account of the
institution of the Sabbath. Notwithstanding this, the respective work of each day must
have been the effect of but a momentary exertion of omnipotence.
327. What was the order of creation in the six successive days?
In the first day were created heaven, earth, and light. By the first of these is meant
particularly the "third heavens" [2 Cor. 12:2]; by the "earth," chaotic matter; by light, a
lucid body collected in one part of the hemisphere to distinguish between the day and
night.
The work of the second day was the creation of the firmament or expanse, that is,
the atmosphere; and the division of the waters above from those below the expanse, that
is, the clouds from the waters mixed through the earth.
The work of the third day was the collection of the waters and the production of
the herbs and fruits of the earth.
[On] the fourth were created the sun, moon, and stars.
On the fifth the fowls and fish were produced.
And on the sixth, all terrestrial animals together with man, the lord of this lower
world, quoddam universitatis compendium [which was the capstone of the whole].
328. When was man created, and how?
He was created on the sixth day from the dust of the earth and in the image of God.
329. Is there any evidence that man existed before Adam?
None, and the whole current of Scripture is against the opinion: 1 Corinthians 15:45,
"The first man was made a living soul;" Eve is called the mother of all living (Gen. 3:20).
He must have been the first man by whom sin passed upon all men, and this was Adam.
All men are called the children of Adam (Ps. 49:2). If men existed before Adam, there
must be for them a new church and a new plan of salvation.
330. Was man created in puris naturalibus [pure nature], that is, without moral qualities?
No:
First, because man was made in the image of God and thus good and righteous
(Eccl. 7:29).
Secondly, because he was made for the glory and worship of God (Prov.
16:4; Rom. 11:36), for which both wisdom and holiness were requisite.
Thirdly, because where two qualities directly opposed to each [other] can
be predicated of the same subject, one or the other must belong to that subject.
And fourth, this state of pura naturae is a mere fancy supported by no evidence.
331. In what did the image of God in which man was created consist?
It consisted neither in any participation of the divine essence (which can be asserted only
of the Son), nor in any similitude in outward appearance, but in his nature, righteousness,
dominion, and immortality—
To the first of these pertains the substance of the human soul, being spiritual,
incorruptible, and immortal, endowed with intelligence and will.
The second: original righteousness, consisting in wisdom of mind,
holiness of will, and rectitude of affections, together with the most perfect
harmony among all his faculties. That man was possessed of this original
righteousness is proved:
First, Genesis 1:31, "God saw all this which He had made, that they were
very good," and from Ecclesiastes 7:29, "God made man upright."
Secondly, the image which is restored to us by grace and perfected
in heaven must be the same as that in which man was created, for it is
called a renovation.
Thirdly, because God made man perfect, and this perfection was
not merely voluntary, that is, arising from holy acts of the will, but
supposes a holy principle whence these actions flow.
And lastly, original righteousness was necessary to enable man to
serve God or exercise his dominion over creatures.
The third constituent of this image of God is the dominion given to man
over the creatures of this lower world, and also his immortality.
332. Was the first man immortal before the fall?
Yes, because
Man was made in the image of God, which supposes immortality.
Secondly, because if Adam was holy, he ought to be immortal, since God
has connected inseparably righteousness and life, sin and death; and from the
nature of things, moral good and physical good must be united, and vice versa.
Thirdly, Adam incurred death by sin (Gen. 2:17 and 3:19); hence, death is
said to have entered by sin and to be its wages (Rom. 5:12 and 6:23).
Fourthly, what is contrary to nature cannot be a consequent of nature.
Lastly, no cause of death existed before the fall.
333. Was original righteousness natural or supernatural?
Natural, that is, it was necessary to the perfection of his nature, and was one of the natural
gifts conferred on man in the state of integrity, but [it] did not belong essentially to
nature. There is a difference between constituent faculties and moral principles; a change
in the first implies a change of species, but not so of the other.
That it is natural appears because whatever is transmitted ad posteros [to
posterity] must be natural, and had Adam remained holy he would have propagated a
holy nature as he did a corrupt one after his fall. The remains of original righteousness
are natural. If original righteousness be supernatural, then the want [lack] of it must be
natural: natural ends require natural means. It was the natural end of man to honor God
and be happy, for which original righteousness is necessary.
334. Are human souls created immediately [by God] or propagated ex traduci [by being carried
over (from the parents to the child)]?5
Turretin and most other divines embrace the opinion of immediate creation and argue in
favor of it from first, the law of creation; second, the testimony of Scripture; third, from
reason.
In regard [to] the first, he says our souls ought to have the same origin as that of
Adam. The texts of sacred Scripture he produces are Ecclesiastes 12:7, "The dust returns
5 [The two views as to the origin of the soul are called creationism and traducianism.]
to the earth as it was but the spirit returned to God who gave it"; Zechariah 12:1, "The
word of the Lord which stretches out the heavens, and lays the foundations of the earth,
and forms the spirit of man within him"; Hebrews 12:9, "the Father of our spirits," and so
on. The reasons he urges against it are drawn from the difficulty of accounting for the
mode in which this propagation is effected.
Dr. Alexander unites the two opinions and considers human parents as much the
authors of the soul as of the body, that God creates them both, yet both produced by
means of parents, so that in common they partake of Adam's nature. The soul never had
an existence separate from the body, and from the first moment of its being belongs to the
guilty race of man.
335. Were human souls created all at once or successively as men are born?
As men are born.
336. Is the soul of man immortal in its own nature?
Yes: All Scripture is founded upon the immortality of the soul (Matt. 22:32; 10:28), and
those places in which eternal life is promised, or eternal death threatened; from the
providence of God; His truth and wisdom require it; the desire of immortality proves it;
spirituality; independence of the body; the consent of all nations.
337. Were all worlds created during the six days mentioned in Genesis?
We have no reason to think they were not.
338. When were angels created?
This is not a subject of revelation. Most divines suppose they were included [in] the
works of the six days, the principal argument in favor of which is that what was before
the foundation of the world is, in the language of sacred Scripture, from eternity (Ps.
90:2; Prov. 8:22). But this supposition allows too little time for the fall of those who kept
not their first estate, for the devil's determining on the destruction of man, and his
effecting his ruin.6
6 [Be it considered whether at least six days were sufficient for the fall of Satan, if, in its outward expression, Satan's temptation of Eve and Adam to disobey God (which would overthrow the human race, the special object of God's favor) was the first outward manifestation of his rebellion, a third of the angels (Rev. 12:4) following thereafter. This understanding is consistent with the account in Isa. 14:12–15, which likely refers to Satan's fall into sin by pride, desiring to be like the Most High. Isaiah's account is general and reveals the birth and growth of sin internally in Satan, though it does not necessarily detail the specific instances of how this pride manifested itself in specific outward actions; thus, it is consistent with Satan's temptation of Eve being the first outward manifestation of Satan's subtle and treacherous rebellion. It is also possible that Satan's open rebellion from God in heaven happened before his temptation of Eve, and yet within the space of at least six days. If man did not remain long in his first estate (as is possibly referred to in the Hebrew of Ps. 49:12), then it is no wonder if some of the angels did not either.]
Chapter 12
Providence
339. What is the meaning of the word providence?
The corresponding Greek word is προνοια [forethought, or provident care] from
προτερον [prior] νοει [perceive], and has been considered as including the
foreknowledge, decree, and government of God. But more properly it belongs to the
execution and direction of what from eternity He had decreed.
340. How does it appear that there is a providence?
1. From the voice of nature and consent of nations
2. From Scripture
3. From the nature of God
4. From the nature of creatures, and so on
341. What opinion did the wiser heathen entertain on this subject?
Plato says, "quod sic currant omnia, parva et magna" ["as all things run along, small and
great"]. Aristotle says, "Whatever a pilot, charioteer, leader, lawgiver, general are in their
respective situations, the same is God in the world." The Stoics held the same opinions.
Seneca7 and Cicero8 both wrote on the subject.
342. What is the doctrine of Scripture on the subject of providence?
7 [Seneca (c. 4 BC–AD 65) was a Roman Stoic philosopher.] 8 [Cicero (106 BC–43 BC) was a Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher.]
The Scriptures uniformly represent God not merely as the creator of all things but as the
constant upholder and director of all things. See particularly Job, from chapters 12 to 41;
Psalms 8, 19, 91, 102 and 107; Proverbs 16 and 20; Matthew 6 and 10; Acts 14 and 17.
This is taught also by three great symbols:
1. Mount Moriah where Isaac was rescued, hence the phrase יחוח יראח [Gen. 22:8,
14, Yahweh provides], dominus providebit [the Lord will provide]
2. Jacob's ladder
3. The wheel of Ezekiel
343. Can any argument be derived from the nature of God in favor of a providence?
Yes, because His interference is as necessary for the support as for the creation of the
world, and from Him all second causes derive their efficacy. The doctrine may also be
inferred from His wisdom, power, and goodness.
344. How can a Providence be demonstrated a posteriori?
1. First, from the nature and condition of creatures, which requires the continued support
and protection of God. Psalm 104:28–29, "You hide your face and they are troubled;
You take away their breath and they die and return to their dust."
2. From the harmony and order observable in the world
3. From the accomplishment of prophecies
4. From the revolutions of states and empires, which prove that it is by the Lord that
kings reign and princes decree justice (Prov. 8:15)
5. From remarkable mercies and judgments
6. From conscience
345. Does not every argument for the existence of God prove His providence?
Yes, they are inseparably connected: if there is a God, He must be everywhere present,
beholding the evil and the good, and if present, must be actively so. Hence, the sacred
writers distinguish the true God from idols by referring to His providence, and they were
considered atheists who denied the one as much as those who denied the other.
346. Does the doctrine of providence destroy contingency?
In theological language, contingency is opposed to necessity, and everything that in the
nature of things might be otherwise than it is, is said to be contingent. This the
providence of God does not remove, because things remain indifferent in relation to
second causes though certain in reference to the first.
347. Does it take away liberty and the use of means?
No, for the certainty it induces is merely hypothetical, arising from the decree of God,
and implies no coaction on the will, which acts inevitably while it acts freely. In respect
to the use of means, the certainty of the end does not destroy but supposes the necessity
of the means, and the concurrence of the first cause does not exclude the concurrence of
second causes but draws them after it.
348. In what way does sin take place in the providence of God?
By His permission and efficacious direction, but it is by no means produced efficiently by
Him.
349. How can the prosperity of the wicked and the calamities of the pious consist with
providence?
Although the justice and providence of God require that it should be well with the
righteous and ill with the wicked, they do not require that it should always manifestly be
thus. For there is great wisdom in permitting some crimes in this world to go unpunished
to show that this is not the state of retribution. Moreover, did we view things aright, we
should not decide that every trial the believer meets with is an evil or that the prosperity
of the wicked is always a good.
350. Does the doctrine of providence involve a fatal necessity?
It does not as this term is generally received.
351. What is fate: physical, mathematical, stoical, and Christian?
The word is derived from fando loquendo [its use in speaking]. The Greeks used the word
ειμας μενη α μςιεω to divide, also πρωμενον ordinatum α περατοω termino. Physical fate
is nothing more than the necessary connection between cause and effect. Mathematical
fate is that [which is] supposed to arise from the influence of the stars. This of course was
held only by believers in astrology. Stoical fate, according to Chrysippus9 is the "natural
connection and order of all things from eternity, one succeeding to others, and this chain
remaining immutable." Cicero calls it the "order or series of causes, etc." Seneca makes it
an irrevocable necessity controlling the course of both human and divine affairs, "so that
9 [Chrysippus (c. 279 BC–c. 206 BC) was a Greek Stoic philosopher.]
the supreme ruler, though he governs continually, obeys."
This fate differs from Christian necessity because it places the necessity of things
without God, whereas the latter refers it to His eternal decree. It also subjects God
Himself to this necessity, but the other subjects the necessity to God. Again, it confounds
all causes, but the Christian fate distinguishes between natural and free causes, and
preserves both. Christian fate is the order or series of causes, dependent on divine
providence, by which it produces its effects. See App. 13.
352. Ought Christians to retain and use the word fate?
No, for whatever ideas those who use the term may attach to it, it has so long been used
in a sense inconsistent with truth on this subject that it will certainly be misunderstood.
353. Does providence extend to all things, small as well as great?
Yes, because He created all things and therefore cares for all. This is ascribed to God in
the sacred Scriptures: first, generally, as Nehemiah 9:6, "Thou, even Thou art Lord alone;
Thou hast made heaven and the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth and all
things that are therein, the sea and all that is therein; Thou preservest them all." And
particularly in such passages as Luke 12:7, where the hairs of our heads are said to be
numbered. So in Matthew 10:29 and 6:28, and Psalm 147:9, where the fowls of the air,
the lilies in the field, and even insects are said to be under the care of God.
354. Is an attention to things minute and vile incompatible with the majesty of God?
No, if He saw fit to create them, why not to preserve them? Besides, it exalts our idea of
the wisdom and power of God, which can be exercised with equal ease over the things
the most stupendous and the most minute.
355. How does it appear that fortuitous and contingent events are regulated by providence?
Because in the sacred Scriptures the direction of such circumstances is attributed to God,
such as the falling of an axe head, a falling lot, a random arrow, and so on (Prov. 16:33;
Ex. 21:13; Deut. 19:5).
356. How does it appear that free, voluntary actions are subject to providence?
From Proverbs 16:1, the preparation of the heart and the answer of the tongue are from
God. Proverbs 21:1, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water; He
turns it withersoever He will." Jeremiah 10:23, "It is not in man that walks to direct his
steps." Exodus 12:36, "And the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians."
Numbers 22:23, chapter containing the history of Balaam. Philippians 2:13, "For it is
God that works in you to will and to do of His good pleasure."
357. How many things are included in the doctrine of providence?
Conservation and government.
358. What is meant by conservation and government?
The first implies the upholding all creatures in their particular forms, in their powers of
action and in the actions themselves. The second, His superintendence of all things and
His leading and directing them to their destined ends. And this includes
1. His fixing certain laws or rules
2. His concurrence or cooperation with and directing the motions of His creatures
according to these stated rules and His own purpose
359. Is the concurrence of providence with human actions general and indifferent, or particular
and directive?
Durandus10 and many of the papists thought that nothing more was necessary than that
God should create and uphold the rational agent, without affording any concurrence at the
time of action. The Jesuits maintained that there is a general concurrence but that this was
determined to its particular effect by second causes. But the concurrence contended for
by most orthodox divines consists in
1. God's giving to second causes their efficiency
2. His preserving it
3. His exciting and applying second causes to action
4. Determining them to act
5. Directing them to their appointed ends
The arguments in favor of this particular and directive concurrence are
First, because in the sacred Scriptures the effects or actions of second causes are
ascribed to God. Thus He is said "to have sent Joseph into Egypt" (Gen. 45:7).
The heart of the king is said to be in His hand, and so on [Prov. 21:1]. He is
represented as using the wicked as his sword, rod, and so on (Isa. 10:15, 26; 13:5).
We are said in Him to live and move and have our being (Col. 1:17 [and Acts
17:28]). 10 [Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275–1332/1334) was a French Dominican philosopher and theologian.]
Second, because God is the governor of the world, and therefore all
actions external and internal, good and bad must be subject to His control.
Third, as the creature has its being, so also it must have its actions in God;
otherwise, the second cause would be coordinate and independent.
Fourth, if God exercises but a general concurrence, it is vain to pray to
Him in regard to anything in reference to which free agents are concerned.
Fifth, He is then no more the author of good than of evil. But James 1:17
says, "Every good and every gift is from above," and 1 Corinthians 4:7, "What
have you that you did not receive"; Romans 11:36, "For of Him and through and
to Him are all things."
Sixth, on the supposition of a mere general concurrence, God could not be
said to direct the falling of a sparrow or of the lot, to give rain and snow and
winds, or to provide food for the young ravens, and so on (Job 38:41; Ps. 147;
1 Sam. 2:7–9, etc.)
Lastly, this would render the decrees of God uncertain and His
foreknowledge fallible; it would withdraw the operations of the will from His
dominion; it would make the creature more efficient than God and destroy the
principal foundation of piety, which is the dependence of our will to the will of
God.
360. What is the difference between moral and physical concurrence?
Moral concurrence is that in which he that concurs operates as a moral cause by
persuading or dissuading of fixing or removing objects or occasions. Physical
concurrence implies an efficacious and real influence in the production of the effect by a
positive influence.
361. What is the difference between mediate and immediate concurrence?
Each of these are of two kinds: quoad suppositum [which has been supposed] and quoad
virtutem [according to the power]. Immediate concurrence of the first kind is when no
other substance intervenes between the cause and the effect to receive the action of the
cause, as when water chills. Of the second kind is when the cause acts by its own peculiar
virtue or power, as when fire burns. Mediate concurrence of the first kind is when some
substance intervenes between the cause and the effect, as between writing and the writer.
Of the second when the cause acts not by its own virtue, as the shining of the moon.
362. Does the concurrence of the deity extend only [to] the preservation of the principle of action
or also to the action itself?
Turretin says it extends to both. God is the author and preserver of all creatures and gives
them all their power and affords them whatever is necessary to every individual act, but
no man knows the mode of the divine cooperations. All we can do is to avoid all opinions
that tend to take away accountability from man or to make God the author of sin. The
soul is essentially active, acts from its nature, and acts of itself. [So] Dr. Alexander.
363. What is the difference between previous and simultaneous concurrence?
Previous concurrence is that by which God is said to influence causes, to excite creatures
and induce them to act, and also to direct this action to one thing rather than another.
Simultaneous is that by which He produces the act as to its entity or substance. These
differ not essentially from each other, the latter being merely the form continued.
364. How does it appear that a previous concurrence takes place in the operations and actions of
creatures?
First, the nature of the first cause and the subordination of second causes: the first cause
[God] is the first mover in every action; second causes must be acted upon in order to act,
otherwise they cease to be second causes.
Second, from this, that what is of itself indifferent to many actions to act or not to
act cannot be determined but by some other.
Thirdly, when two free causes [God and persons] are united in the production of
the same effect, they either must both be excited and directed to act at the same time by
some superior cause, or both from their nature determined to act, or the one must be
determined by the other. In the case under consideration, the two first cannot be admitted,
therefore the last must or there can be no simultaneous concurrence.
Fourthly, if God from eternity has decreed all these free actions, He must in time
predetermine the will to these actions, otherwise His decrees might be frustrated.
365. Does not such a concurrence infringe the liberty of the creature?
No, for there is no physical necessity imposed upon the will, but it is determined
agreeably to its nature to act. In a separate or divided sense, indifference as to the event is
not removed from the will, though it is as considered united with the first cause. This
motion of God is consistent with the mode of operating belonging to the will.
366. Does it not make God the efficient cause of all events?
The actions of the second causes are said to belong to God efficentis [efficiently], but to
creatures both efficientis et formaliter [efficiently and formally] and are denominated
from them.
367. How can such a concurrence take place in evil actions and God not be the author of sin?
This concurrence extends only to the entity of the act and not to its character and moral
quality. The act itself must be distinguished from its evil, which is but a circumstance.
368. How can such a concurrence previous as well as simultaneous be reconciled with liberty
and contingency?
It is attempted to reconcile these in some measure on the following grounds, that is, from
the order of the causes among themselves and from the mode of acting proper to them,
which is explained thus:
First, the concurrence of providence and the human will is not of equal and
collateral causes, but of unequal and subordinate.
Second, God concurs with second causes agreeably to their nature as His
decree is concerned both in determining the event and the causes that produce it,
so His providence secures the event without violating the nature of those causes.
Third, this concurrence is rational, so influencing the will that it
determines itself.
Fourth, this concurrence is different in respect to good and evil actions: in
the former it produces both the entity and the moral quality of the act; in the latter
merely the entity.
369. Is it possible clearly to understand this subject? See App. 13.
It is not in our present state.
370. Are sinful actions under the direction and government of providence?
Yes, and that neither by merely being permitted as Pelagians11 maintain, nor by being
efficiently produced, but in being efficaciously ordered and directed.
371. How many things may be distinguished in sinful actions?
Three:
1. The entity of the act
2. The evil of the act
3. The adjunct of the act, that is, the consequent judgment or punishment
372. What is meant by the permission of sin?
This permission is not moral (as opposed to prohibition and [that] which implies
approbation)12 but physical (as opposed to production13). Secondly, it is not merely
negative, supposing only a cessation of the divine will and providence in reference to evil
11 [Named from Pelagius (c. AD 360–418), who debated Augustine. Pelagianism held that Adam's original sin did not taint human nature and that humans' wills are capable of choosing good or evil without special divine aid.]
12 [That is, it is not a moral permission that condones the thing permitted or tolerated.] 13 [That is, physically permitting something is to be distinguished from physically producing something.]
actions,14 but also positive as He not only did not will to prevent sin but willed not to
prevent it.
373. Is sin ever the direct object of the divine will?
No, good alone can be the object of the will of God; in regard to sin His will terminates in
the permission of it, which is good.15
374. Is sin properly speaking a mean[s] of promoting God's glory?
No, it is not a causal or effective mean[s] of honoring God, but the reverse, though it is
the occasion of the illustration of His glory.
375. Why did God permit sin to enter into the world?
We cannot tell. The Arminians16 think one principal reason was that He did not wish to
interfere with the free agency of man. This permission of sin was not contrary to justice,
since He was not bound to prevent it, nor to His wisdom because the condition of the
creature was mutable according to His will (He was not obliged to counteract or destroy
this mutability), nor to His goodness since He loved His creatures as long as they retained
their integrity and as He has taken occasion hence to display His justice, mercy, wisdom
and love. This [question] refers to permission of sin at first when creatures were holy.
As to its permission among fallen men, reasons are evident:
1. As it is a punishment
14 [This distinguishes the Reformed view from other views, such as in Arminianism, Lutheranism, and so on.]
15 [In that it is for a good ultimate end.] 16 [Named after Jacob Arminius (1560–1609), whose system of theology was answered at the Dutch Synod of Dort (1618–1619).]
2. As it instructs believers in the knowledge of themselves
3. As examples
376. Is desertion included in the idea of the permission of sin?
It is, and this desertion is of two kinds:
First, privative, when it consists in the withdrawing of grace before enjoyed, but
which had been abused.
Second, when it implies only the not affording the grace necessary to
preserve from sin.
Or desertion in another view may be considered as threefold:
1. First, that of trial, to see what was in man, as was the case in regard to Adam,
Hezekiah, and so on
2. That of correction, as toward the church: Isaiah 54:7; Psalm 12:3
3. That of punishment, which is a judicial desertion: 2 Kings 21:14; Jeremiah
7:29; Romans 1:24
377. Does God ever employ a positive influence in the production of evil?
Many suppose that besides the permission and desertion already mentioned, there is a
certain efficacious operation in regard to evil that belongs to the Holy God. This opinion
is grounded on those passages of sacred Scripture where this agency appears to be
expressed, as when He is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart [Ex. 4:21, etc.], to have
commanded Shimei to curse David (2 Sam. 16:10), to have put a lying spirit in the
mouths of the false prophets (1 Kings 22:23), to give a strong delusion that men might
believe a lie (in 2 Thess. 2:11), and so on. They confess, however, their inability to
conceive of the mode of this operation, though [they] divide [it] into the three following
particulars:
1. The offering of occasions of sinning
2. Delivering to Satan
3. A certain immediate operation on the heart, and this may be done by some
internal proposition of objects by which the will is moved or by the impression
of thoughts in themselves good, which the wickedness of men pervert
378. How is providence concerned with sin as to its beginning, progress, and end?
First, as to its beginning: in permission, desertion and a certain efficacious operation of
providence. As to its progress in restraining it within proper bounds: so that it should not
be greater in degree, more extensive in its operation or lasting in its duration than is for
the best. And this is effected either by an internal illumination of the mind and repressing
of evil principles or by an external removing of the occasions to evil and restraining of
Satan. As to its end: in its wise ordering and direction so as out of evil to elicit good.
"You thought it for evil, but God thought it for good." See Isaiah 10:5–7; Job 1:20–22;
Acts 3:13–15.
379. Does not this concurrence with sin affect the purity of providence?
Not in the least, [not] any more than the rays of the sun are defiled by falling on things
impure and corrupt. And though the same work is often ascribed to God and Satan or
wicked men, yet it is in widely different respects. In one it is most holy, springing from a
holy principle and directed to a holy end. But in the other, [it is] a most evil work in its
principle, means, and end. As a judge may use lions and other savage beasts as
instruments of punishment, and a physician things evil in themselves as means of healing,
so a holy God may employ sinful actions for holy ends.
380. Does it furnish any excuse for the sinner?
No, as it does not destroy his liberty nor spontaneity.
381. Does not the blame of an action belong to the principal cause rather than to the instrument?
This principle holds in regard to homogenous17 causes (when both are positive and
physical or both [are] privative and moral, as when we say that the Word sanctifies,
therefore much more the Holy Spirit) but not in heterogeneous causes (the one being
physical or positive, the other moral or privative, as because the sword which slays a man
is an innocent cause, it does not follow that he that used it is also innocent).
Second, it is true in regard to entire and irrational instruments but not in regard to
metaphorical or mixed instruments, as the man who spurs a lame horse is not the cause of
his limping. But sinners are instruments of the latter kind.18
Third, the axiom is correct when the action of the principal cause is the same
morally with that of the instrument, as because the disciple of Pelagius holds erroneous
sentiments, therefore Pelagius himself did; but [the axiom] is not correct where the action
17 [Things having the same nature.] 18 [For instance, if God spurs a sinners, the spurring is not inherently wrong, and may be good, yet the sinner's consequent sinful response according to his nature, which God permits, is wrong and the evil is wholly of himself.]
is not the same morally, though it may be so materially.
382. Is not the cause of any cause also the cause of the effects of the last cause?
Yes, in regard to adequate causes when no true and proximate cause intervenes between
the thing caused and the second cause. And also in regard to essential and necessarily
subordinate causes, as He who caused the sun is the cause of light and heat.
But this is not the case where the cause of the inferior cause is so per se [of itself]
and of the thing caused only per accidens.19 Therefore, though the human will is the
cause of sin and God [is] the cause of the human will, it does not follow that God must be
the cause of sin, since the will is not necessarily or per se the cause of sin, but only by
defect or per accidens.20
383. Does God ever tempt men to sin?
Temptation is twofold. The one for trial, the other of seduction; the one good, the other
evil. In the latter sense, James says, "God tempts no man" [James 1:13]. When we pray
that our heavenly Father would not lead us into temptation, it is in reference to the
temptation of seduction, meaning that He would not deliver us to Satan to be tempted by
him to evil. In the former sense He tempts, or rather tries, all His children.
384. Does not the permission of sin fall under the rule not to do evil that good may come [Rom.
3:8]?
No, for there is a great difference between the doing and permitting of evil.
19 ["By accident" in the Aristotelian sense, in that it is not necessary by the thing's essence.] 20 [See question #473.]
385. Have any maintained that God was the author of sin?
Yes, some among both the ancient and modern sects, as Priscillianists,21 and so forth.
386. Do they attribute anything of the blame or evil of sin to Him?
No, for then they must have believed that God was not a perfect being.
387. How do men abuse the doctrine of providence in relation to things past?
First, by murmuring against it as unjust; and in the pious there is often too much
impatience, opposed to the humble submission becoming children. See examples of this
resignation in Job 1:21; 2:10; Psalm 39:[9–]10; 1 Samuel 3:18. Second, by despair, as
Cain, which is opposed to that firm trust and confidence the saints should possess.
388. How is this doctrine abused in relation to things future?
First, by too much confidence and security, leading to the neglect of the proper means for
effecting their ends. Second, by anxiety and distrust. Thirdly, by placing too great or too
little reliance on second causes.
389. What use should be made of the doctrine of providence?
1. Holiness, because the eye of a holy God, it teaches, is always upon us
2. Gratitude in prosperity
21 [Named after Priscillian († c. 385), a wealthy nobleman of Roman Hispania. Priscillianism was a form of Christian asceticism, holding to gnostic-Manichaean doctrines including that matter and nature were evil.]
3. Patience and humility in trials (Ps. 39:[9–]10; Luke 22:42; 2 Sam. 16:10)
4. Repentance
5. Consolation in peace and tranquility of mind, as we lie in the bosom of our God,
assured that all things shall work together for our good
Chapter 13
Angels
390. By what names are angels called in the sacred Scriptures?
Sometimes "spirits," at other [times] "seraphim" and "cherubim." Also "thrones,"
"dominions," and so on [Col. 1:16]. But most frequently they are called "messengers"
from their office, being ministering spirits.
391. How does it appear that angels are real beings?
1. They are necessary to complete the grade of being
2. This appears from the oracles of the Gentiles, from the apparition of specters, from the
cases of demoniacs
3. From the whole of sacred Scripture
392. How does it appear that they are created beings?
First, from those passages of sacred Scripture where it is said that God created all things
and where angels are called His host, ministering spirits [Heb. 1:14], and so on.
Second, it is expressly asserted in Colossians 1:16–17, "By Him were all things
made which are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be
thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers; all things were made by Him and for
Him. And He is before all things and by Him all things consist."
393. Did the creation of angels occur before this world was made?
Some divines think they were, others that they were not.
394. Does Moses make any mention of the creation of angels?
No, unless we consider it as contained in Genesis 1:1, as it is said [in] Genesis 2:1, "Thus
the heavens and the earth were finished and all the host of them."
395. Does not Job 38:6–7 imply that they existed before the world?
"When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy," many
persons do consider this passage as intimating that they existed prior to our world. But
Turretin and others suppose it means nothing more than that immediately on their
creation they broke out in the song of praise for what they were and what they saw.
396. Are angels spiritual or incorporeal substances?
Yes, [they are spiritual] as appears
1. Because in sacred Scripture they are called spirits, and a spirit has not flesh and
bones
2. Because spiritual faculties and operations are attributed to them
3. Were they corporeal, more than one could not be in the same place, but a legion
was in one man [Mark 5:8–9]
397. With what bodies did angels appear?
It cannot be easily determined. They were real bodies, but whether they were created for
them at the time or belonged to men then in existence or compacted from some other
matter cannot be ascertained.
398. What sort of knowledge do angels possess?
Angelic knowledge is fourfold:
1. Natural, such as appertains to them as a grade of being
2. Revealed, which God sees proper to make known to them
3. Experimental, which they derive from their intercourse with the world and the
church (Eph. 3:10; Luke 15:10)
4. Supernatural, belonging only to the good angels: the vision of God, and so on
399. Do they know future contingencies?
No, for these depend on the free will of God and cannot therefore be known but by
revelation. This knowledge is represent[ed] as peculiar to God (Isa. 41:22; 42:8–9).
Created intelligences cannot foresee things as future but by considering the causes
whence they are to flow, but the causes of contingencies are indefinite.
400. Can they search the heart?
No, for this belongs to God alone, "The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately
wicked, who can know it? The Lord searches the heart and tries the reins, etc."
401. Can they comprehend the essences of things?
No.
402. Is their knowledge noetical22 or dianoetical?23
Dianoetical, as God alone perceives all truth intuitively. But as they are so much superior
to men, it is probable that the number of self-evident truths to them is far greater than to
us.
403. Do they possess the power of mutual communication?
Yes, they are said to call one to another (Isa. 6:3; see also Zech. 2:3; Rev. 7:2; 14:18).
404. Are they endowed with liberty and moral agency?
They are; they possess intellect and the power of choice, which, together with conscience,
constitutes moral agency.
405. Are they subject to passions and affections?
No, so far as these arise from a sensitive nature; their loving God, hating sin, and
rejoicing in the salvation of a sinner are such exercises as belong to pure spirits, not being
mingled with the perturbation that accompanies the operation of such passions in us.
406. What power do angels possess?
Their power, though exceedingly great, is limited. They can perform miracles of the
second class.24 With respect to bodies they can operate upon them in various ways,
changing their places, and so on. They can also influence and excite the senses internal
and external, but they cannot, at least, immediately operate on the rational soul, otherwise
22 [A direct apprehending.] 23 [An apprehending through reason, inference, or some other means.] 24 [See question #101.]
they could read the thoughts.
407. Are there orders, or different ranks, of angels?
There is some difference of rank among them, as their different appellations prove; but
what this order is we cannot tell.
408. How many hierarchies or orders do the papists suppose?
They make three hierarchies: the supreme, mediate, and ultimate; each of these are
subdivided into three orders, making in all nine grades. In the supreme [hierarchy] they
place cherubim, seraphim, and thrones. In the mediate: dominions, principalities, powers,
virtues, archangels, angels. And to each of those they ascribe peculiar offices.
409. Whence did they derive this doctrine?
They receive it from the writings they falsely ascribe to Dionysius the Areopagite.25
410. Were these celestial hierarchies known to the fathers?
No, there is not the least notice of them in any of the early Christian writers as Irenaeus,26
Augustine, Cyril.27
411. How does it appear that this notion is vain?
1. Because Paul, from whom this pretended Dionysius says he received the doctrine,
25 [Dionysius the Areopagite is mentioned as a Christian convert of the apostle Paul in Acts 17:34. PseudoDionysius the Areopagite was a Christian Neoplatonist who wrote in the late fifth or early sixth century AD]
26 [Irenaeus († c. 202) was a significant early church father who originated from Smyrna.] 27 [Either Cyril of Jerusalem (AD c. 313–386) or Cyril of Alexandria (AD c. 376–444), both significant early church fathers.]
makes no mention of it.
2. This threefold division does not embrace all the different appellations given in sacred
Scripture to angels.
3. Paul mingles them all together when he calls them ministering spirits. The notion
appears to come from the Platonic school,28 which divides their genii [spirits] into
super-coelestes, coelestes [heavenlies], and sub-coelestes.
412. Is Michael a created angel or is he the Son of God?
This person is mentioned only six times in the sacred Scriptures: three in the Old
Testament (viz. Dan. 10:13; 10:21; and 12:1) and three times in the New Testament
(1 Thess. 4:16; Jude 9; and Rev. 12:7). There are three opinions respecting him:
1. That by the name Michael is always to be understood the Son of God.
2. That it signifies some created angel.
3. That in some places it signifies the one and in some the other.
The first opinion is supported by the following arguments:
1. The name seems to lead to this sense: it may be interpreted, "Who is like that
God" or "Who is as that God."
2. We never read of more than one archangel, which seems to indicate that he
must be a divine person.
3. The good angels are spoken of as belonging to Michael (Rev. 12:7), but they
have no Lord besides Jehovah; therefore, the archangel is Jehovah.
4. He is called "the Great Prince who stands for the people of God" (see Dan.
28 [Probably more specifically the Neoplatonist school (a strand of the larger Platonist tradition), which had its origins with Plotinus in the third century AD and involved a celestial hierarchy.]
12:1). Who can this be but Christ?
5. An argument may be derived from a comparison of Jude 9 with Zechariah 3:1,
6. The ancient Hebrews29 understood the archangel to be greater than an angel.
With them Michael is the same as Metatron, whom they call the chancellor of
heaven, whose name is as the Almighty and signifies two things: Lord and
Ambassador. This is the Angel by whom alone there is access to God.
The second opinion is that Michael is a created angel, entrusted with the government of
the other angels, and [this] is supported by these arguments:
1. That Michael and the archangel are the same is granted on all hands. Now the
archangel is distinguished from Christ: 1 Thessalonians 4:16, "For the Lord
Himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the
archangel, and with the trump of God."
2. Michael is called "one of the chief princes" (Dan. 10:13). Here by "princes" we
must understand the angels. The first princes are the chief angels, but Michael
is one of them and therefore must be of the same order.
3. An argument is drawn from Daniel 10:21, "And there is none that holds with
me but Michael your prince." It is thought that this speech would be very
unsuitable of the Son of God, whose power is omnipotent and whose help is all
sufficient.
4. An argument may be derived from this same passage; thus, Daniel relates that
he whom he saw clothed with linen and so on [Dan. 10:5–6] was the Son of
29 [That is, postbiblical Jews. Metatron is briefly mentioned in a few passages in the Talmud, though he primarily appears in mystical, Kabbalistic texts within rabbinic literature, such as the Zohar, which first appeared in the twelfth century.]
God, which agrees with the description given of him in Revelation 1. Now this
same person who touched Daniel and spoke soothingly to him [Dan. 10:10–11]
says, "The prince of the kingdom of Persia withstood me one and twenty days:
when, lo, Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me" (verse 13).
Whence it is certain that the Son of God who speaks and Michael, who is
spoken of, are different persons.
5. It is said that Michael durst not bring a railing accusation (Jude 9). It is argued
that this language is not becoming as applied to the Son of God.
The advocates of the opinion that Michael is Christ are Cocceius,30 Witsius,31 and so on.
413. What is the peculiar opinion of professor Lampe32 respecting Gabriel?
He not only maintains that Michael is the Son of God but that Gabriel is the Holy Spirit.
He says these two symbolical names are the only names of angels found in the sacred
Scriptures and that he who supposes they belong to created angels forgets the nature of
angels, which is spiritual, and they have neither language nor voice. If any think that
these symbolical names are not proper names, but only names of office, it is incumbent
on him to show why these names are given but to two of the whole choir of angels. But
such things are attributed to Michael and Gabriel as can only agree with the notion of a
divine person (see Dan. 10:16, 17, "For how can the servants of this my lord"), but the
saints have never been accustomed to profess themselves the servants of angels.
Wherefore nothing can be more probable than that these two names should belong to two
30 [Johannes Cocceius (1603–1669) a prominent Dutch theologian and professor born in Bremen.] 31 [Herman Witsius (1636–1708) was a prominent Dutch theologian and professor.] 32 [Friedrich Lampe (1683–1729) was a German pietist pastor, theologian, and professor of dogmatics. He followed in the Reformed, Cocceian tradition.]
of the hypostases [persons] of the sacred Trinity, one of whom was sent out to procure,
and the other to apply, salvation. Lampe says that the celebrated Hustius held the same
opinion.
Moreover, Lampe thinks that the two cherubim over the mercy seat were intended
to shadow forth their two divine persons, Michael and Gabriel. Witsius considers these
cherubim as representing the angels, and Parkhurst33 insists that they are symbolical
indications of the Trinity.
414. Do the sacred Scriptures make mention of more than one archangel?
No. See answer 412.
415. What are the employments of angels?
Their duties are various as they respect God, themselves, the world, and men. In regard to
God, they are employed in constant adoration and praise (Rev. 4:8; 7:11, 12) and in the
most cheerful and holy obedience, "Thousand thousands ministered unto Him, and ten
thousand times ten thousand stood before Him" (Dan. 7:10). They also adore Christ (Heb.
1:6) and ministered to Him while on earth (Luke 1–2; Matt. 4[:11]).
416. Why are they employed in ministering to the church?
Not because there is any absolute necessity for it, but rather from the kindness of God:
1. To the angels themselves as it confers on them the glory and delight of being
fellow workers with God
2. To believers as it promotes their comfort 33 [John Parkhurst (1728–1797) was an English academic, clergyman, and biblical lexicographer.]
3. It also tends to unite, by the communication of favors, angels with men in the
bonds of love
4. It promotes the good of the universe by uniting superior and inferior beings in
duties to each other
5. But especially it manifests the glory of God, the end of all things
417. What kind of a society do they form?
A society of harmony, holiness, and love.
418. Is there any reason to believe that they are instruments in the government of the world?
Yes. Aristotle supposed that they were employed to roll[?]34 on the stars. It appears,
however, that they are concerned in the administration of the providence of God from
Jacob's ladder [Gen. 28:12] and from Psalm 102, also from Revelation 14:18 and 16:5.
And they are sometimes the guardians of empires (see Dan. 10 and 11). They also
execute the designs of God toward men, evil and good, as in the punishment of Sodom
(Gen. 19:11) [and] of the Egyptians ([Ex.] 12:29; also see 2 Kings 19:35; Isa. 37:36; Dan.
4:13, etc.). With respect to good men, they are often occupied in teaching or directing
them (Gen. 16 and 32; Dan. 10; 1 Kings 19) and in guarding them: "The angel of the
Lord encamps round about those that fear Him" (Ps. 34:7). Examples of this [are]
frequent: in the case of Lot, the three friends of Daniel (see Acts 5:19; Luke 16).
419. Is there any foundation for the opinion that there are guardian angels?
It appears from the preceding answer that they are often the guardians of the saints.
34 [That is, to ride on the stars?]
420. Has every individual or pious person a guardian angel?
This is a favorite opinion of the papists, and there are two passages of the sacred
Scriptures commonly brought to support the doctrine. The first is Matthew 18:10, where
the angels of little children are mentioned, and the other is Acts 12:15, in which Peter's
angel is mentioned. But this last is only the exclamation of his friends in their surprise,
and not the voice of sacred Scripture.
It may, however, be remarked that this belief is not inconsistent with any truth of
the Bible. Turretin's arguments against it are
1. That there [is] no mention of these particular guardian angels in the sacred
Scriptures, though so much is said of their ministering to the saints.
2. Because one [angel] is said to deliver or protect a great number of persons or a
great many angels [are said] to have charge concerning one individual (Isa. 37;
2 Kings 6:17)
3. Because this sentiment arose from among the heathen
421. Do angels act as our intercessors with God?
No.
1. For He who intercedes for us can be no other than He who died; our advocate
and propitiation are one and the same.
2. To offer the prayers of others to God is a part of the mediatorial office, and
there is but one Mediator between God and man.
3. He only can present our prayers who purifies them.
4. This opinion is delivered from the heathen, among whom the idea of
intermediate deities was so prevalent.
422. Is worship due to angels?
No.
1. As appears first from Colossians 2:18, "Let no man beguile you of your reward
in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels."
2. Because angels themselves reject it, as in Revelation 19:10 and 22:9.
3. Because worship belongs only to God, "You shall worship the Lord your God,
and Him only shall you serve" (Matt. 4:10).
4. The object of worship must be omnipresent.
423. Are the seven spirits mentioned in Revelation 1:4 created spirits?
No, but the Holy Spirit, because
1. They are joined with the Father and Son in the invocation.
2. They are mentioned before the Son, not from priority of nature or existence but
[for] their parts in the plan of redemption.
Perhaps this appellation is in reference to the seven churches, or [it] may contain an
allusion to the variety of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.
Chapter 14
The Covenant of Nature or of Works
424. In how many states may man be considered?
Four:
1. As formed at first
2. As lying in sin
3. As restored by grace
4. As perfected in glory
425. What was the original condition of man?
Happy and holy, thus bearing the image of his Creator, yet under His government and
endowed with liberty to act freely.
426. What was the nature of that liberty with which man was endowed?
It was not the liberty of independence, nor of perfect indifferency of will, but it consisted
in freedom from coaction [compulsion], from physical necessity, and from bondage,
either to sin or misery.
427. Is the liberty of man in a state of sin the same as that in the state of innocence?
No, not altogether, though it is essentially. The liberty of Adam consisted in [the] ability
not to sin; of man in a state of sin, in sinning freely. See Buck A. Will.35
35 [This source could not be identified.]
428. Did Adam before the fall possess the power of believing in Christ?36
The Arminians answer in the negative in order to support their doctrine that a sufficiency
of grace is given to every man37 to enable him to believe in Christ. For if Adam had not
this, then he never lost it; and therefore, God, before He could require this faith of all
men, must bestow the power of exercising it on all. But the arguments in [the] affirmative
are convincing:
1. Adam had strength of believing all God declared, therefore also the gospel.
2. He had the power of loving and obeying God and of perceiving truth, which is
all that is required to faith.
3. Holy angels knew by revelation of the promised Savior and rejoiced in Him
(see 1 Peter 1:11; Eph. 3:11).
429. Did God enter into covenant with Adam when he was created?
Yes. Because we find here all that is requisite for a covenant:
1. Parties
2. Conditions
3. A promise and penalty
God being Creator must be Governor and Legislator; man being a rational creature must
be subject to this government and law. And as there was a promise given on the part of
God in case of obedience on the part of man and a penalty threatened in case of
36 [The question ought to be clarified further: Adam could have had no power to believe in what was unknown to him or what was not offered to him in innocency. However, if Christ was offered to Adam in innocency (to establish him and his race in eternal life, immutably, forever), did Adam have the ability by nature, without a superadded dispensation of the grace of God, to believe in Christ? This is the question that Alexander answers.]
37 [Above and beyond what man has by nature.]
disobedience, a covenant was hereby entered into. This transaction is expressly called a
covenant (Gal. 4:24); the law given to Adam implies a covenant of which the tree of life
was the seal. See Witsius, Covenants, I, v, 3.38
430. What was the nature of this covenant?
It was a mutual agreement or stipulation in which God promised all good to man should
he prove obedient. It is called a legal covenant because its condition on the part of man
was the observance of the law. See App., p. 14.
431. How many covenants are there mentioned in sacred Scripture?
Two. The covenant of works and the covenant of grace, which was made with Christ as
the second Adam, and in Him with all the elect.
432. In what character did God transact with man in the covenant of nature?
As Creator and Legislator possessed of unlimited power and goodness.
433. What was the condition of this covenant?
Perfect obedience in man, and this was general, comprising the knowledge, love, and
worship of God with righteousness to all around him, and special, consisting in
abstaining from the forbidden fruit, in which all was epitomized.
434. What properties were required in the obedience of man?
38 [Timothy] Dwight, [Theology Explained and Defended,] vol. 1, p. 437; [Thomas] Boston on Covenant of Works [in Works, vol. 11. Boston (1676–1732) was an influential, evangelical Church of Scotland minister].
It was to have been sincere and universal; in degree, intense; in duration, perpetual.
435. What was the sanction of this covenant?
The promise of life and happiness everlasting; the threatening of death—temporal,
spiritual, and eternal—comprehending all manner of evil to which transgression might
lead.
436. How can it be proved that the covenant contained the promise of eternal life?
First, because eternal life was annexed to obedience to the law of works. Leviticus 18:5,
"Whosoever does these things shall live in them." Matthew 19:17, "If you will enter into
life keep the commandments."
Second, because Christ procures eternal life for us, and that by fulfilling the
righteousness of the law. Besides, Christ restores what Adam lost.
Third, Adam could not have died had he remained innocent, neither could he
continue always on the earth, for it would soon have become unable to contain his
posterity; therefore, there must have been some other life prepared for him.
437. How does it appear that eternal death was the penalty threatened?
Because man was immortal, and the loss of God's moral image being part of the penalty,
we have here two great constituents of eternal death: sin and immortality.
Besides, if mere temporal death were the penalty of the covenant of works, and
eternal death the penalty of the covenant of grace, then the mission of our Savior has
been an infinite evil to all who perish, changing their punishment from momentary to
everlasting. This opinion also represents the nature of sin as entirely different under the
different covenants.39
39 See Dr. E. Williams, Essay on the Equity + Gov., ch. 5, 13. [Edward Williams (1750–1813) was a Reformed Welsh nonconformist minister. The work referred to is probably An Essay on the Equity of Divine Government and the Sovereignty of Divine Grace (1809).]
Chapter 15
Seals of the Covenant
438. Whence did the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil derive its name?
Not because it possessed or could impart the knowledge of good and evil, but at first
sacramentally, as it was the sign of man's probation and the monitor to warn him lest he
should know evil by experience as he already knew good, and afterward, from the event,
as from eating its fruit man learnt how much good he had lost and evil he had incurred.
439. Why was this tree forbidden to man?
As a peculiar test of his love, as the obligation to obedience here did not result from
anything in the nature of the thing prohibited but from the command of God merely. This
was proper also to remind man that though [he was] constituted lord of the world, he was
not independent, and by having an external symbol his obedience or rebellion would be
rendered more obvious.
440. Why was the Tree of Life so called?
Bellarmine and others of the papists suppose it derived its name from its inherent power
of conferring life, but like the tree of knowledge, it more probably received its title from
its symbolical signification, its being the symbol of man's promised immortality. It was
also a type of eternal life acquired and conferred by Jesus, and of Jesus Himself who is
"the tree of life in the midst of the paradise of God" (Rev. 2:7).
441. Had it any inherent power of communicating or preserving life?
No, except that it might have been very refreshing and nutritious.
442. What was its use?
See in answer #440.
443. Why was man prohibited from use of this tree after the fall?
Because by sin he forfeited his claim to the blessing signified by this sign. The phrase
"lest he eat and live forever" [Gen. 3:22] may refer to Adam's folly in expecting life from
eating what had been prohibited.
444. If man had continued in obedience, would he have been translated to heaven?
It is most probable he would.40
445. What became of the earthly paradise?
Many of the popish writers believe it to be still in being in some unknown land and that
Enoch and Elijah are there, whom they consider as the two witnesses who are come
against Antichrist [Rev. 11:3]. For this, however, there is not the least foundation. It no
doubt suffered the common destruction by the waters of the deluge if it had not long
before that period ceased to be distinguishable.
40 [For a full and persuasive defense of this majority position of Reformed theology from its classical era, see Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, ed. James T. Dennison Jr. (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 1992), 1:583–86, 8th Topic, Question 6.]
Chapter 16
Sin
446. By what names or words is sin expressed in the original languages?
In Hebrew by חטאה, which properly signifies "a missing the mark." The Greek αμαρτια
[sin] from αμαρτανω [to sin] has much the same meaning.
447. What is the simple idea of sin?
"Want of conformity to the divine law."
448. Is sin a mere negative of good, or has it something positive in its nature?
It does consist in privation, but this privation is corrupting so that sin implies a positive as
well as a negative evil, as sickness is more than the absence of health.
449. Is sin a substance or a quality?
A quality; it has no real or essential existence.
450. What is the guilt of sin?
Guilt is the obligation to punishment for previous transgression. This obligation may
mean desert [merit] of punishment or actual exposedness to it. Hence, guilt is of two
kinds: the one inseparable from sin, the other removed by remission.
451. Is ill desert or demerit included in the idea of guilt?
Not in all senses of the term guilt. Sin may be considered either in reference to the
command or precept of the law, or to its sanction or annexed threatening. From its
connection with the first of these it derives its demerit, ανομια [lawlessness]; from the
second, its guilt. In those who are renewed there remains this guilt of demerit, but not of
exposedness to punishment, whereas Christ had the last without the first (Isa. 55:5; 2 Cor.
5:21; 1 Peter 2:22).
452. Is guilt removed by pardon?
Actual guilt is, but not guilt of demerit.
453. What is the stain or pollution of sin?
It is one of its effect[s] on the being that sins, by which the soul is infected. In regard to
this sin is called a plague, a disease, a wound.
454. Is there any foundation for the distinction between the guilt of the fault and the guilt of the
punishment?
The first is that by which the sinner is unworthy of the favor and deserving the
condemnation of God. The second is that by which he is exposed to punishment and
obligated to endure it. The papists say that the latter of these may remain though the
former be removed by Christ, which is certainly improper since no liability [to]
punishment can continue if all fault be taken away.
455. Is the death of believers a part of the penalty of the law?
No. It as well as the pains and afflictions of the present life are consequences of sin but
are intended rather for correction than satisfaction. It is mercifully ordered that believers
should die as well as others, for [otherwise] the death of an individual would then be, to
all who witness it, a certain proof of his perdition. It would also anticipate the work of the
judgment day were believers exempted from death.
456. Is there any ground for the distinction of sins into venial and mortal?
None; there are no venial sins, as is proved
1. From Romans 6:23, "The wages of sin are death" and the "soul that sins shall
die" (Ezek. 18:20)
2. Because it is written "cursed is everyone who continues not in all things written
in the book of the law to do them" (Deut. 27:26)
3. Whosoever "offends in one point is guilty of all" (James 2:10)
4. Because every sin is an offense against an infinitely perfect being and therefore
an infinite evil
5. Christ died for all our sins; therefore, all must be mortal
457. Are all sins equal in malignity and guilt?
No.41 This was the opinion of the ancient Stoics, but [it] is evidently paradoxical.
458. What was the sin of angels by which they fell?
41 [Westminster Larger Catechism, #150: "Are all transgressions of the law of God equally heinous in themselves, and in the sight of God? All transgressions of the law of God are not equally heinous; but some sins in themselves, and by reason of several aggravations, are more heinous in the sight of God than others. John 19:11; Ezek. 8:6, 13, 15; 1 John 5:16; Ps. 78:17, 32, 56."]
There are several opinions on this subject. The two principal are,
First, that it was envy of man, whom it is supposed they knew by revelation was
in Christ to be exalted above them.
The second is that it was pride, which is the most probable of the two
since Paul in 1 Timothy 3:6 says "lest being puffed up with pride he fall into the
condemnation of the Devil"; and we know that Satan is continually striving for
the dominion of this world of which he is called the god (2 Cor. 4:4); and pride
too was the sin to which he tempted Adam. Perhaps becoming rather remiss in
contemplating the divine perfection, his attention was turned from God to himself,
and admiring his powers, [he] conceived too high a love for them, which rose to
pride and eventuated in rebellion.
459. What was the precise nature of the first sin of man?
This must not be considered as any simple or particular sin but as a general apostasy from
God, including the violation of the whole moral law, as it implies unbelief and contempt
of the divine command, ingratitude, pride, and profanation of God's name; want of
proper affection to his posterity as by that act he ruined both himself; and also
intemperance, sensuality, and theft. Hence appears its enormity.
The commencement of this sin may be placed in want [lack] of consideration of
the interdiction of his Creator and also of His truth and goodness; then incredulity in the
threatened punishment; next, crediting the promises of Satan; then corrupt desire of the
fruit; and then pride and rebellion. Hence, it appears that the first step belongs to the
understanding, and that ever preceded transgression.
460. How can it be accounted for that innocent man should sin?42
It is very difficult to account for the entrance of sin into a holy mind. Yet the mutability
in which man was created supposes the possibility of his fall: the true cause of his sinning
is found in the freedom of his will, which was capable of being so influenced by Satan
that man should freely depart from God.
But we must not consider man even in his innocent state as a simple being, but as
possessed of all those attributes and passions belonging to uncorrupted nature. These will
exert a constant influence on the will, which renders care necessary, that they gain not the
ascendancy. Thus, the appetite of hunger might operate on the will of a person perfectly
holy and crave for indulgence under circumstances where the satisfaction of it would be
improper.
Is it wonderful that a being thus constituted should be led astray? This, however,
is the greatest difficulty attending the system of those who consider the will as
determined by motive. The Arminians, in giving the will a self-determining power, avoid
the difficulty.
461. Was the first sin owing to man's being deserted of God?
The term desertion seems to imply some previous offense in the person deserted and
therefore is not so proper as [the term] negation. Since no grace before given was
withdrawn from Adam, but God, having at first bestowed what was sufficient to enable
him to stand, saw proper not to give what was requisite infallibly to prevent his fall.
42 See Dwight, vol. 1, p. 400. [Timothy Dwight (1752–1817), Theology Explained and Defended, vol. 1, see Sermon 28, "The Temptation and Fall" and possibly Sermon 15, "The Decrees of God."]
462. Could this sin have been avoided?
It was certain in regard to the decree and providence of God but contingent in regard to
Adam. The event was certain though the cause was free.
463. Could God have prevented it consistently with man's freedom?
Yes, by having imparted a greater degree of grace; if this were not the case, then the will
of man is beyond the empire or dominion of God, which cannot be.
464. Did Adam lose the image of God by the first sin?
Yes, for it was a complete apostasy or turning from God as his chief good; it was not a
particular sin but a violation of the whole covenant and law because spiritual death was
the penalty of the law and because man is now born corrupt, which proves that Adam lost
the image of his Creator.
465. How could a single act destroy all holy dispositions?
By its great enormity or by the penalty attached to it, as every sin deserved banishment
from communion with God. Besides, there was something peculiar in this sin as it
violated the covenant.
467. Was the first sin of Adam imputed to all his posterity?
It is, though this doctrine has been rejected by the Pelagians, Remonstrants,43 Socians,44
43 [Those who followed the theology of Jacob Arminius and remonstrated, or protested, against the Reformed doctrines of soteriology in the context of the Synod of Dort and following.]
and many others. Some among the orthodox, to avoid some of the difficulties pressing
this opinion, made the distinction of imputation into immediate and mediate. This was
first done by Placeus,45 who defines immediate imputation to be that by which the sin of
Adam is directly imputed to all his posterity (Christ excepted), as well [as] in the
privation of original righteousness as [it has] exposed men to eternal death, and that
simply because they are his children, antecedent to inherent corruption. Mediate
imputation arises from a view of the hereditary corruption derived from Adam, of which
we all partake and to which we all habitually consent and are therefore considered as
participating in the sin of Adam.
468. Is this imputation mediate or immediate?
Immediate, as imputation is but a simple idea; the phrase "mediate imputation" is hardly
correct.
469. How can this imputation be reconciled with justice?
Whenever the action of one person is imputed to another, it must be on account of some
bond of union between them. This may be of three kinds:
1. Natural, as exists between parents and children
2. Moral or political, as between kings and subjects
3. Voluntary, as between friends
The first two of these constituted Adam our representative, in whose conduct it then
became just that we should be involved. That he was considered as the representative of
44 [Socinians] 45 [Josué de la Place (c. 1596–1655 or 1665) was a French Protestant theologian and professor in the Reformed tradition at the Academy of Saumur.]
his posterity appears from
1. The nature of the covenant existing between him and his Creator
2. The image of God, which he received as belonging to his nature to be preserved
or lost, not only for himself but for those who should partake of his nature
3. The community of punishment between Adam and his posterity
4. The parallel between Christ and Adam
470. By what arguments is it demonstrated?
It is proved
1. From Romans 5:12, "As by one man sin entered into the world and death by
sin, so that death passed on all men for that all had sinned." This death includes
spiritual death, which has passed on all men; therefore, all men must have been
accounted sinners previously.
2. From 1 Corinthians 15:22, "In Adam all died." Then in Adam all must have
sinned.
3. From the sins of parents being visited on their children (Ex. 20:5). See
examples in Achan (Josh. 7:24–25), the Amalekites (1 Sam. 15:2), the sons of
Jews [Matt. 23:34–36; 27:25], and many others.
4. From the propagation of sin; for if the sin of Adam be not imputed, how can we
account for the pollution of depravity of Adam being communicated to his
children?
5. From Adam's being not only the natural but also the moral head of the human
family, in whom they would have been holy had he remained so, and by whose
fall they were made sinners.
6. If we deny the imputation of Adam's guilt, we must also deny the imputation of
Christ's righteousness since the apostle makes them to stand on the same
ground.
471. What is original sin?
Augustine made original sin to consist in concupiscentia, or [the] irregularity of our
desires; Anselm46 in nuditate justitiae [the absence of righteousness]. Scotus47 united the
two, which is correct. That is, original sin is the destitution of original righteousness
together with positive corruption, belonging naturally to all mere men from their
connection with Adam.
472. How do you prove the doctrine of original sin?
1. From Genesis 6:5, "Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart are only evil
continually."
2. From Job 14:4, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?"
3. From Psalm 51:5, "Behold, I was shapened in iniquity and in sin did my mother
conceive me."
4. From John 3:6, "For that which is born of the flesh is flesh."
5. From Ephesians 2:3, "And were the children of wrath by nature even as others."
6. From Romans 5:12, "For by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin."
46 [Anselm of Canterbury (1033/34–1109) was a significant philosopher and theologian of the High Middle Ages].
47 [Duns Scotus (1266–1308) is generally considered to be one of the three most important philosophertheologians of the High Middle Ages.]
7. From the necessity of universal death, redemption, regeneration, sanctification, and
from the law of nature that every offspring should be like its parent.
8. From experience, universal corruption requires that there should be a principle of evil
equally extensive.
473. Is the substance of the soul corrupted by sin?48
No, this was the opinion of Flacius Illyricus49 in order more effectually to prove the
imbecility of the human will in conversion. But this cannot be the case, because
1. God created, and does still produce every substance, which must therefore in
essence be pure.
2. The sacred Scripture distinguishes between sin and the sinner.
3. Were this correct, Christ in assuming our nature must have taken our
corruption, and man after his sanctification would be essentially different from
what he was before.
474. How is original sin propagated?
It is impossible to say. There are two answers given to the question: the one general, that
it is by impure generation; the other more particular, placing it in
1. The conception of the body, which must be unclean and corrupted
2. The creation of the soul destitute of original righteousness that is simply not pure,
neither holy nor corrupt
3. The constitution of the man by the union of this negatively pure soul with a polluted
48 [See question #382.] 49 [Flacius Illyricus (1520–1575) was a Lutheran reformer from Istria (present-day Croatia).]
body, which as some say is like an impure vessel tainting the pure liquid that may
be poured into it.50
475. If the soul be created pure, how can it be consistent with goodness or justice to connect it
with a polluted body?
The soul is formed in the body and never had a separate existence. They, from the first
moment of their existence, constitute the human being that fell in Adam and therefore
justly inherit both his sin and corruption. "Who art thou that darkeneth counsel by words
without wisdom?" [Job 38:2].
476. How is actual sin divided?
1. In relation to its object as God or our neighbor
2. In relation to its form as of commission or of omission, as sinful in itself or only in its
mode (per accidens)
3. In relation to its principle or source as of ignorance or of knowledge, of infirmity or of
maliciousness
4. As merely resident or as reigning, as remissible or as unpardonable
477. What is the sin against the Holy Ghost, and why is it unpardonable?
It is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, not merely a sin of the heart, but one completed
by words. Turretin makes it to consist
50 [Alexander limits his answers to those consistent with creationism, that God immediately creates the soul of every newly conceived person. This requires him to explain the issue of how God can create a soul, which from its first existence is sinful, although God, by His pure and righteous nature, cannot immediately create anything evil. The answer of traducianism seems more straightforward on this point: the child receives its corrupted soul from the begetting of the corrupted souls of its parents.]
1. In sinning against the knowledge of the truth, and this knowledge must not only
be theoretical and historical but also founded in conviction
2. In a total apostasy from the truth connected with a malicious rejection and
denial of it, and this not from the fear of death or desire of gain but from hatred
and contempt
3. An obstinate opposition to the truth such as that of the Pharisees and Julian the
Apostate,51 who even when dying exclaimed, "vicisti Galilaee" [You have
conquered, Galilean!]52
4. A confirmed perseverance in the sin to the end
This sin is unpardonable not from any deficiency in the mercy of God or the merit of
Christ but because it is impossible that those who commit it should be renewed unto
repentance (Heb. 6:6), and without repentance there is no forgiveness. This impossibility
of repentance perhaps can only be accounted for by saying God has seen fit to determine
that it should be connected with this enormous crime committed against the Holy Ghost,
by whom alone we are enabled to repent or believe.
478. Can sin be the punishment of sin?
Yes, though sin that is actually sin is no part of the penalty of the law. It may, however,
be either its own punishment or that of some preceding transgression, or of the sin of
some other person. This [is] proved
1. From 2 Samuel 12:11–12, where the sin of David is said to be punished by that
of Absalom
51 [Julius I (331/332–363) was a Roman emperor from AD 361 to 363 and was the last non-Christian ruler of the Roman Empire.]
52 [As quoted in Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History (c. 429), Book III, Ch. 20.]
2. From Romans 1:24 and so on, where God is said to have delivered up the
Gentiles to vile affection on account of their idolatry
3. From 1 Kings 22:20, where a spirit of false prophecy was sent forth, a great sin
in those who received it, [which was] at the same [time] a grievous punishment
to them and the nation.
4. From those passages of sacred Scripture in which the punishment and the crime
are represented as united in the same act, as in the defection of the ten tribes; in
the oppression of the people by the Assyrians [Isa. 10:5–7], and so on (a
punishment of one and a sin of the other); in the numbering of the people; the
hardness of Pharaoh, and so on (see also 2 Thess. 2:11).
Chapter 17
On the Will
479. What is the will?
According to Locke, "the power or ability to prefer or choose"; according to Edwards,53
"that by which the mind chooses anything"; and according to Dr. Reid,54 "A power to
determine to do or not to do things we conceive to be within our power."
480. In what variety of meaning is the word used?
It is employed in greater or less extent by different persons. Sometimes it is used to
express all the active powers of man in distinction from his intellectual powers; thus, it is
used when the powers of the mind are classed under two heads: will and understanding.
The word will is also employed to signify both the faculty and the act, though the latter is
correctly expressed by the word volition. The definition given by Dr. Reid:
A determination of the mind to do or not, is the most exact and best corresponds with the common use of the word, for we may prefer one of two things when we will neither. I may prefer the life of a sailor to that of a soldier, though I may not will either of them. I choose that my pupils should conduct themselves properly, but I cannot be properly said to will it. The faculty of will belongs to all sentient, active beings, other animals as well as man.
481. What does every act of volition imply?
That we had the power to have acted differently or not to have acted. A necessary
53 [Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) was an American congregationalist divine and philosopher.] 54 [Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was a Scottish philosopher and popularizing proponent of Scottish Common Sense Realism.]
volition is a contradiction in terms. If we are under the necessity of doing a thing, there is
no choice and, of course, no volition. This power of acting or forbearing to act is properly
the liberty of the will. Every man is conscious of this freedom, and therefore no
arguments can destroy his conviction that he possesses it.
The brutes possess this liberty, though in a more confined sense than man. When
the stable door is open, the horse is at liberty to remain in his stable or go out to pasture.
Liberty, therefore, does not constitute an accountable moral agent.
Reason and conscience with liberty are necessary to make a creature capable of a
moral law. The degree of responsibility will be in proportion to the strength of our
rational powers. We are as certain as we can be of anything that we are the authors of our
own actions, and therefore [we] feel that we are accountable for them. It ought not to be,
and is not, as far as I know, a matter of dispute whether the mind makes its own
determinations. They who maintain the self-determining power of the will and they who
insist on the influence of motives equally agree in this.
482. What is the direct object of volition?
1. The direct object of volition is some action of our own.
2. It is some action that we believe to be in our power. However much a man may desire
to fly, he never wills it, nor anything he believes to be impossible. Thus, we see there
is a clear distinction between will and desire.
483. Are will and desire ever opposite?
It has been a question whether these two things may be opposite in relation to the same
object. Mr. Locke and Dr. Reid maintain the affirmative, President Edwards the negative.
The proper answer seems to be that the will may be contrary to many desires
which relate to its object, but never opposite to the prevailing desire. A man who is urged
to eat of a certain dish may desire to comply with the solicitations of his friend, and he
may also desire to eat because he has a strong relish for the food, but he wills not to eat
because he believes it would injure his health. Now the will in this case opposes several
desires, yet is coincident with the desire of health and ease that prevails over the rest.
Though will has for its direct object our own actions of mind or body, yet it may
be some distant action. I may will to go to such a place or to do such a thing a year hence.
484. Do we ever will what we believe to be out of our power?
No, the object of our volition must be something that we believe to be in our power and
to depend upon our will. A man may desire to make a visit to the moon, but he cannot
will or determine to do it, because he knows it is out of his power.
485. What determines the will?
The will is determined by the active principles that exist and prevail in our nature when
the volition is made. And according to this view our volitions are produced by principles
in our own souls and are as much our own as they can be on any other hypothesis.
486. How many theories are there on this subject?
Five:
1. That the will determines itself
2. That the mind or soul determines it
3. That it follows the last dictate of the understanding
4. That the will is invariably determined by the strongest motive then in the view
of the mind
5. That the will is determined by divine agency, which is the efficient cause of our
volitions
But in the view of motives, the great objection to the word motives is that it is ambiguous.
It is often used to signify the same with reasons, external objects suited to our
inclinations. A man is said to have strong motives for doing a particular action when the
reasons in its favor are cogent. A great sum of money is said to be a great motive to
induce a man to swerve from truth and justice, but if there be no love of money it is no
motive at all.
487. Is indifference essential to the liberty of the will?
By indifference is meant an equilibrium in which the will is without any antecedent
determination or bias to one side or the other, that the determination may be entirely from
itself and owing to its power and sovereignty.
And here we observe that to support this scheme of liberty, the indifference must
be perfect and absolute. There must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent
preponderation or inclination. Because if the will be already inclined before it exerts its
sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself.
Here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth: "That every free act
is done in a state of freedom and not only after such a state." If an act of the will be an act
in which the soul is free, it must be in a state of freedom and in a time of freedom. It will
not suffice that an act immediately follow a state of liberty: liberty must continue and
coexist with the act; for the very notion of a free act of the soul is an act in which the soul
uses or exercises liberty.
Now the question is whether the soul of man ever puts forth an act of the will
while it yet remains in a state of liberty, that notion of a state of liberty which implies a
state of indifference. Or whether the soul ever exerts an act of choice or preference while
at that very time the will is in a state of equilibrium, not inclining one way more than
another.
The very putting [of] the question is enough to show the absurdity of the
affirmative answer. For how ridiculous would it be for anybody to insist that the soul
chooses one thing before another when at the very moment it is perfectly indifferent with
regard to both! This is the same thing as to say that the soul prefers one thing to another
at the very same time it has no preference.
Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference than motion can
be in a state of rest. Motion may be the next moment after rest, but [it] cannot coexist
with it in any, even [in] the least degree. So choice may be immediately after a state of
indifference but has not coexistence with it; even the very beginning of it is not in a state
of indifference. Therefore, if this be liberty, no act of the will is ever performed in a state
of liberty or in [a] time of liberty.
488. Does liberty properly belong to the will?
Liberty in common speech is power, opportunity, or advantage that anyone has to do as
he pleases.
Now liberty cannot properly be ascribed to any being or thing but what has such a
faculty, power, or property called "will." For that which is not possessed of will cannot
have power of doing according to its will. And therefore to talk of liberty belonging to
the very will itself is not to speak good sense, for the will itself is not an agent that has a
will. That which has the power of volition is the man or soul, and not the power of
volition itself.55
Liberty is a freedom from restraint. In the popular sense of the word it means that
we can act agreeably to our choices, but in this sense it does not respect the will but the
power of acting consequent on volition. It is doubtful whether liberty can be predicated of
the will itself, as volition cannot be the effect of restraint.56
The truth is, choice supposes the power of embracing one of two or more things,
each of which is in our power; the freedom of the will relates to these objects. A man has
an opportunity of riding, walking, or sitting still. He chooses to ride. There is freedom
and no constraint, as in his volition, for he might have refused to ride. Liberty as applied
to the will therefore properly expresses the idea that belongs to every volition, [in] that he
might have chosen something else.
But in the controversy on the freedom of the will, some apply the word liberty to
the cause of volition. Volition is said to be free because the motives that persuade us to
choose may be resisted. If we conceive a motive so strong acting on the will that it cannot
be resisted, there is an end of liberty, and in proportion as the motives approach to
irresistible force, in the common sense of men, the action is in the same degree excusable.
55 Edwards. 56 Dr. Alexander.
Now this is an important point and deserves serious consideration. Certainly the
doctrine stated above is not universally true, for then the more wicked a man's heart, the
more excusable his crimes, and vice versa, [more] than which nothing can be more
absurd. But in regard to motives of a particular sort, there is some foundation for the
opinion; and it is important that the distinction should be accurately made. I would
therefore lay down the following propositions:
1. Every determination of the will is the effect of some active principle, of some
affection, appetite, sense, or inclination.
2. Some of the active principles that govern the will are sudden and impetuous
and act before there is time for reflection. A man whose temperament is
constitutionally unstable receives from someone a blow in the face which
produces instant pain. In a moment, before there is time for reflection, his
anger is enkindled and his will is powerfully determined to strike the person
from whom the blow came. This volition is produced instantly before he has
time to consider consequences and reflect that the injury was undesigned.
Now this passion of anger seems to have been bestowed upon animals to lead them to
defend themselves against sudden assaults. In man it precedes the exercise of reason, and
in proportion as the passion was sudden and violent (in the common sense of men), the
person is excusable for the act produced. The sin in this case consists in not guarding
against this rising of passion and in suffering it to continue when we have time to reflect.
Other motives that are not so sudden in their operation are nevertheless violent
and difficult to be resisted, as hunger and thirst, desire of rest after great fatigue, and the
desire of deliverance from excruciating pain. Now if by any voluntary act these can be
removed, the will is constantly pressed to determine on the act. If there be no counter
motives, this volition will immediately take place, as in animals who have no motives of
any other sort.
But if we cannot obtain relief without committing an immoral act, there will then
be a struggle between those principles and affections that influence us to avoid moral evil
and the strong cravings of these natural appetites. Now the virtue of resistance in these
cases is measured by the strength of the appetites to be overcome, and the sin of yielding
by the same rule. But this is true only in regard to those natural and animal propensities
or passions that act with a blind influence on the will. Yet these are never, strictly
speaking, irresistible; that is, they are never so strong but that principles of piety may be
strong enough to counteract them.
But with respect to passions that are in their own nature sinful, they cannot
excuse. The stronger they are, the more sin. And whether we determine to act or not, their
very existence is sin. Sin does not require an act of the will to bring it into being.
489. Is the will always determined by the state of the soul immediately antecedent?
Dr. Reid says, "That in all important determinations of the mind there must be something
in the preceding state of the mind that disposes or inclines us to that determination." If
such an influence has any share in the business, it may as well be considered as decisive,
for if the latter be inconsistent with liberty, so is the former, and perfect indifference
would alone be consistent with liberty. It is true that the active principles of our nature
incline us to a certain act according to the force of these principles. But after all, the mind
determines, and this determination of the mind we call volition.
490. Has the will a self-determining power?
To prove that the will has no self-determining power, President Edwards observes that it
must do this in the exercise of a power of willing. Therefore, every free act of choice is
determined by a preceding act choosing the act, and this requires an act of choice
preceding it, and so on ad infinitum [to infinity].
Now this appears to me to be a specimen of metaphysical quibbling. A faculty, in
order to exert itself, must not be first supposed to act that it may act. The same reasoning
will prove that the soul cannot act at all. For it may [be] said that the soul cannot act
without exerting its power for this purpose, but the exertion of power is acting and
requires a preceding exertion to produce it, and so on ad infinitum. How causes operate to
produce effects we know not. How active beings are the cause of action we know not.
But this we know, that where there are effects there must be a cause. It is in vain to
search for anything intermediate between an active being and an action, as a faculty
operates in a peculiar way agreeable to its nature and powers without supposing anything
intermediate between the faculty and its operations.
But as to the question, "Does the will determine itself?" it cannot be intended [by
the question] whether an act of the will determines itself. This would be making volition
both cause and effect. An act supposes an agent, a volition, a capability of choosing. But
there is an evident absurdity in supposing that the act or volition determines itself. I
suppose therefore by [the phrase] the will determining itself is meant that the faculty of
will determines the volitions, and by the will is understood all the active power of man or
of the soul; there is nothing absurd in the doctrine.
The answers to this and the preceding question may be correct, but they do not
reach the difficulty. The question returns, "What induces the mind to make the
determination?" Is it regulated by the temper, inclinations, propensities, or appetites that
form the state of the soul antecedent to the act, or is it sovereign and arbitrary, sometimes
coincident with this existing state of mind and sometimes opposed to it?
491. Is the will always determined by the last act of the understanding?
Some maintain that it is, or that the will always follows, the last practical judgment of the
understanding. There is at least some obscurity in this answer. There may be many
judgments of the understanding in relation to the same subject or action viewed in
different aspects. One judgment may be that the action is morally wrong; another, that it
tends ultimately to my ruin; and a third, that it will afford me present pleasure. Now here
are two judgments unfavorable to the action and one in favor of it, and yet this one may
prevail.
If it be meant that previously to determining on this act my judgment must be that
upon the whole it is best, this is not true, for I may have an intimate conviction that upon
the whole it will be hurtful. But if I prefer present pleasure to greater permanent good, is
it not my practical judgment that this temporary gratification is to be preferred to that
distant good, and do I not therefore view it as the best?
The only difficulty here arises from compounding judgment with inclination. I am
most inclined to seize the present pleasure, and therefore I choose it and determine on it;
but it cannot be said correctly that my judgment or understanding decides that it is best. I
may be deeply convinced that I am sacrificing a great, though distant, good for a
gratification of no real value, but appetite or passion is strong and has been accustomed to
be indulged, therefore I yield.
As every act of the will must have an object, and as it belongs to the
understanding to apprehend objects of every kind, so it follows that every act of the will
must be preceded by some operation of the intellect. In this sense the will always follows
the understanding, but this has no bearing on the subject: for when I determine, that
which I refuse is in view of the understanding as well as that which I choose. It seems to
me, therefore, to say that the will always follows the last practical judgment of the
understanding, is not true, or it furnishes no satisfactory answer to the question.
The will of man is sometimes spoken of as the moral part of man's nature, and it
is true that in all moral acts the will is concerned, but so is the understanding also. But if
it be meant that the will is moral in all its acts, it is a great mistake. The will is often
exercised where there is nothing moral, as any other faculty. There is nothing moral or
immoral in choosing a peach in preference to an apple. It is an act of the will by which I
lift up one foot before the other, but there is nothing moral in this. If all acts of the will be
moral, then every animal has a moral nature, for every animal has will. The acts of
children, before reason is in exercise, would be moral, for they exercise will.
The will in a large sense may be considered as the seat of moral actions. But in
this sense it includes the exercise of reason and conscience, for let man be deprived of
reason and the morality of the exercise of his will ceases. A madman can perform no
moral acts. Every act of the will which is of a moral nature supposes and includes the
exercise of reason. President Edwards says,
That in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense
as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension and not merely what is called judgement or reason. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant, what reason declares is most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of his duration; it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.
492. Is the will determined by the strongest motive?
Here two questions require to be previously settled. First, "What is meant by 'motives?'"
and second, "What constitutes the strength of a motive?"
Mr. Edwards defines a motive to be "everything that moves, excites or invites the
mind to volition." Again, everything that is properly called a motive "has some degree
and sort of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." That which has a greater
degree of tendency is called the "stronger motive" and that which has the less the
"weaker motive." "Whatever is a motive must be extant in the view or apprehension of
the understanding." This seems to be accurately and correctly stated.
But when we come to consider what these are which have a tendency to move or
excite the will, we find a good deal of explanation necessary. Those things that have a
tendency to move the will consist commonly of an external object and a desire,
inclination, or appetite for that object. Now it ought to be considered that an external
object, however excellent intrinsically, has no sort of tendency to move the will unless
there be some inclination to it. The whole strength of motives depends on the strength of
these internal affections, appetites, or inclinations. Food is placed before me; if I have no
appetite or wish for it, the food is no motive for me to eat. It exerts no power, sends forth
no influence, and has no tendency to determine my will.
But if I am hungry, the food being suited to this appetite, I feel [a] strong
tendency from the cravings of this appetite to take the food and eat it. Improperly, it may
be said the food induces me to eat, but strictly it is this internal desire. Now if no contrary
inclination or appetite opposes the act of the mind, it will inevitably be determined.
But suppose I am informed that there is poison mingled with the food; however
great my hunger, I will not eat, because the desire of living and the fear of dying are
sufficient to counteract the desire of food. Or suppose I am forbidden to eat by someone
whom I am under obligations to obey; suppose I cannot eat without violating my
conscience and offending a superior. My decision now will depend on my desire to keep
a good conscience and the fear and attachment I feel toward this superior. Suppose again
that this food would injure my health, that by waiting some time I can be supplied with
some [food] that will be wholesome, and that this is the only consideration or motive to
counteract the appetite. The determination will then depend upon the strength of the
appetite and the disposition I may possess to prefer a greater, though distant, good to a
present gratification.
The doctrine of the strongest motive prevailing is true if we mean by motive not
the object but the desire of the object, which is in the mind itself, and thus we come to the
old conclusion that the mind determines its own volitions.
493. Can there be volition without motive?
Here Dr. Reid asserts two things that appear to me to be incorrect: first, that the mind
often wills without any motive, and second, that it often wills contrary to the strongest
motive. He divides motives into rational and animal, and considers the contest to [be]
between these two sorts of motives in common cases.
Now as this last distinction is a radical [fundamental] principle in his system, we
will first consider it. Animal appetites solicit us to do a certain act; they impel us by a
blind impulse. The understanding is not otherwise concerned in their operation than as it
apprehends the objects of these propensities. But on the other hand, reason decides that
the act which we are solicited to perform is injurious or is inconsistent with duty. Here
are two influences but of entirely different kinds. The mind determines between them by
a sovereign act and thus is free and master of itself.
This, if I mistake not, is a fair view of Dr. Reid's opinion. But I would answer that
reason considered by itself can never be considered as a motive to action. If there were no
active principles in the mind inclining it to embrace the objects reason brings to view, the
strongest reasons would never counteract the gentlest cravings of appetite. I have no
objection to this distinction of motives into rational and animal; nay, I think it correct.
But rational motives suppose rational principles in our nature, that is, active principles
guided by reason. And when there is a conflict between animal and rational motives, the
determination will depend on their relative strength, and though the mind determines and
determines freely, yet this determination is produced by the antecedent state of the mind
as it regards the force of these opposite motives or principles.
For example, a man is urged to eat or drink something he knows will be injurious
to him. The influence on his will is direct and urgent, but as he has reason and
experience, he foresees the distant consequence and determines not to comply. Now I
ask, had this man no regard to his health and comfort, would he refrain? Is it not
obviously his strong desire of health that prevails over the cravings of appetite? Again, if
a certain fruit be forbidden by our Creator, if appetite and other animal desires urge to eat
and we refuse because it is forbidden by such a Being, is not the determination produced
by fear of offending or the love we have to holiness? If there were no such principles,
would mere reason, however clear, have any effect? I think not.
494. What advantage would occur from the power of willing without motive or [willing]
contrary to the strongest motive?
Suppose a man, the temper of whose soul is virtuous; he loves his Creator and fears to
incur the accusations of his own conscience. These are his strongest motives in the
moment when, by passion or appetite, he is solicited to transgress; but exerting his power
of will, he determines against the strongest motive to violate his duty. Is such a power a
perfection of his nature? Is he more accountable for such an act than if produced by
habitual malignity? Dr. Reid himself admits that in all important determinations of the
will, there is something in the antecedent state of the mind that leads to them. If we
choose sometimes without motives and sometimes contrary to all motives, such a choice
must be very irrational and such a power very inconsistent and dangerous.
A man has no inclination leading him to possess his neighbor's property but
[rather] a strong desire to act justly, and yet he wills to steal something within his reach.
Suppose such a volition in such circumstances; is the man accountable for it? He might
say, "I know not whence this volition proceeded. There is nothing I am persuaded in my
principles on in the antecedent state of my mind which could have produced such a
determination, for I am habitually averse to everything of the kind. It must be attributed
to the extraordinary power I have of willing without motives and contrary to them."
If it be said that we never will without motives but in trivial cases, then certainly
such a power is of little consequence. And the reason why Dr. Reid thinks he wills
without motives, often everyday, is because the acts are of too little consequence to
engage his attention and the motives pass unnoticed or make no impression on the
memory. Dr. Reid says that "if a man could not act without a motive, he would have no
power at all." Also, "that any action done without a motive can neither have merit [n]or
demerit, is a self-evident proposition." He says moreover, "If we may act without
motives, this power may enable us to act against the strongest in compliance with the
weaker"; but on acknowledged principles such an act would have neither merit nor
demerit and therefore [would be] of no consequence.
495. All things being the same precisely (both external and internal), can the volition be
different?
This is the ultimate question respecting the will. Supposing all motives and circumstances
external and internal to be the same, with the same person at different times, is it possible
that the volition might be different? [Imagine] if a man has a strong appetite for
intoxicating liquor in a place where it is offered, and at the time his disposition to reflect,
his fear of God, and the consequences of sin are too small to counteract this restless
appetite, so that he is led to drink to intoxication; suppose at another time the motives and
circumstances [are] precisely the same: would he act differently?
Those who would decide in the affirmative might say that the man at one time
calls up and exercises a resolution in resisting evil, which at other times he does not. That
we are conscious of such power, that often the mind rejects thoughts and the most
pleasing objects by virtue of this inherent power, now these things are true; but the
question still is, "What induces the mind to exert its power in resistance?" Is it a blind,
inconsiderate act? Or does the importance of acting well and the bad consequence of
yielding to temptation so strike the mind at this moment above what it did before that it
becomes resolute in resisting evil? The latter is undoubtedly true.
But supposing a power in varying our volitions, in precisely the same
circumstances, I ask, "What privilege or advantage [does] this give to man above what he
is supposed to have on the other theory?" No other than this, that he may without reason
or motive have acted differently from what he has done. The other theory supposes a
power of changing but connects this change with an alteration in the view and
inclinations of the mind at the moment. But if the volitions of the mind will always be the
same in the same circumstances, how does it happen that we are conscious that we have
done wrong, that we could have acted differently? But the question returns, "Does not
this suppose a different state of the soul antecedent to the action?"
A man regrets that under the influence of passion he reproached his friend. He is
conscious he could have avoided it. But how? By such considerations as would have
moderated his anger, or if he had taken a moment's time to think of the consequences.
Thus we shall find in every case in which we believe we could have acted differently, we
suppose a change in the antecedent state of the mind.
496. What would be the effect of equal motives?
It is argued correctly that the motives being the same, the volitions will be the same also.
But have we not power to change the influence of motives by directing our thoughts to
other objects? Undoubtedly this is the case, but it has no direct bearing on the question.
For changing the direction of our thoughts is the effect of volition, and we are led to it by
some motive that did not exist, or at least not in the same force [as] before.
A man has been overcome once and again by a particular temptation; the
consequences have been distressing to him. He is assailed anew by the same temptation.
It operates on him as before, but recollecting the pain [that] yielding has brought on him,
he makes an exertion to change the direction of his thoughts. He calls in solemn
considerations, and the snare is broken. Divine grace more commonly helps us in these
cases.
The power that the mind has over the train of our thoughts is limited: sometimes
we cannot exclude certain thoughts from our minds, we can only introduce others, and
that with difficulty. A man who is on the rack or in a fit of the gout cannot exclude the
thoughts of pain, nor a hungry man the thoughts of food from his mind. The
consequences of equal motives coexisting in the mind would be that no act of the will
would take place. But such a case never did, nor ever can, occur.
497. Is there a proper distinction between animal and rational motives?
There is, and on one account [it is] very important. Animal motives, consisting in natural
propensities seated in the body, act blindly and urge the will by a certain force that is
proportionate to their strength. Now this influence may be so powerful as to render it
extremely difficult to oppose it, and in proportion to this difficulty the guilt of complying
will be diminished.
For example, the desire of relief from racking pain is one of the strongest we
experience. If a man tortured on the rack has deliverance offered him upon condition of
his speaking some false word or performing some improper action, the motive is not
irresistible, or his guilt would be annihilated; but in proportion as it approached an
impossibility to resist, his guilt in yielding is diminished. The same is the case with all
other animal motives.
But the strength of rational principles on affections of the mind [which are] in
their nature evil, so far from lessening, are the cause of guilt, which is in proportion to
their strength. The animal motives are in their nature indifferent. The others partake of a
moral nature in all their stages.
498. Can they be compared as to their strength?
There may be as just a comparison between animal and rational motives as between any
other. Rational motives, contrary to what Dr. Reid supposes, affect all the active
principles of the mind as well as the judgment, and as much so as animal motives.
Therefore, they may be compared as to their relative strength. [So] Dr. Alexander.
499. Can mere reason ever be a motive to volition?
Dr. Reid says it can. By reason he means that calm, cool principle which has an influence
on our action directly contrary to passion or mere animal motives. Animal appetites impel
us by a blind impulse. Reason decides what ends are most worthy of being pursued and
how far appetites and passion are to be indulged and when they are to be resisted.
But I would reply that reason considered in itself can never be considered as a
motive to action. If there were no active principles in the mind leading us to embrace the
objects reason brings to view, the strongest reason would never counteract the weakest
animal motive. President Edwards says,
That reason is one of the ingredients of the compound influence which moves and induces the will, that it is one thing to be estimated in considering the degree of the appearance of good which the will always follows. When it concurs with other things, its weight is to be put into the scale, but when against them, it is a weight in the opposite scale when it resists them; yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, so that the act of the will is determined in opposition to reason. And of course mere reason can never be a motive to volition.
500. What is it that ultimately determines our volitions to be what they are?
The answer to this question will best appear after recapitulating what has been said on
this subject:
1. Strictly, the will is a determination to exert our power over our mind or body
and is limited by the supposed power that we possess. I will to sit, to stand, to
walk; I will to think of former scenes, to recollect what I have learned, and so
on.
2. Will in a larger sense is choice or preference. I prefer a free to a despotic
government; I choose a mild climate rather than a severe one. But the term will
is not so properly used here; for I could not say, "I will a free government or
mild climate," these things not being within my power.
3. Will is used again to signify all the active powers, as when the faculties of the
soul are distinguished into understanding and will.
4. Will belongs to all animals, and in them is regulated and determined by animal
propensities. Where there is but one propensity, the volition is inevitable; when
there are two or more, the strongest prevails.
5. Will in man is influenced by animal propensities as in inferior creatures, but he,
being endowed with reason and conscience, has other principles of action and
also has other natural desires. He can, moreover, compare and reflect and
consider, but when he determines, his will is coincident with the antecedent
state of his mind.
6. The power that determines the will is not an act of the soul, but [rather is] in it.
External motives and reasons have no force that they do not derive from the
temper and inclinations of the soul. The soul therefore determines its own acts
of will, but according to its own nature or the prevailing inclination at the time
of making the volition. This makes us as much masters of our volitions as by
any other hypothesis; for if we could determine to act contrary to all our
principles, it would only be a power to act absurdly. Such an action could
never be good, though the matter of it be correct.
Every volition must have an object; therefore, the exercise of the intellect
precedes that of the will, but the will does not follow the last dictate of the
understanding, but contrary to this yields itself to appetite, which it finds is
most agreeable to indulge. But at the same time [it] knows that it is rejecting
the greatest good. The will is not, therefore, as the greatest apparent good in
view of the understanding57 unless the mere strength of appetite is made the
criterion of the degree of good.
No acts of the will are necessary, for necessity and liberty are
incompatible. Yet the connection between volition and its causes is certain. Dr.
57 [That is, the will does not follow simply the greatest apparent good in view of the understanding.]
Watts58 and Dr. Reid advocate the doctrine of the will's self-determining
power; Mr. Locke and President Edwards the opposite and correct doctrine,
that it is determined by motives.
The two cardinal points in this subject are
1. Our volitions are produced by ourselves
2. The motives of them exist in our own nature; these are necessary to make man
a free agent
The End
58 [Isaac Watts (1674–1748) was an English nonconformist minister and philosopher, known best today for his popularization of hymns.]