Chapter 12
Providence
339. What is the meaning of the word providence?
The corresponding Greek word is προνοια [forethought, or provident care] from
προτερον [prior] νοει [perceive], and has been considered as including the
foreknowledge, decree, and government of God. But more properly it belongs to the
execution and direction of what from eternity He had decreed.
340. How does it appear that there is a providence?
1. From the voice of nature and consent of nations
2. From Scripture
3. From the nature of God
4. From the nature of creatures, and so on
341. What opinion did the wiser heathen entertain on this subject?
Plato says, "quod sic currant omnia, parva et magna" ["as all things run along, small and
great"]. Aristotle says, "Whatever a pilot, charioteer, leader, lawgiver, general are in their
respective situations, the same is God in the world." The Stoics held the same opinions.
Seneca7 and Cicero8 both wrote on the subject.
342. What is the doctrine of Scripture on the subject of providence?
7 [Seneca (c. 4 BC–AD 65) was a Roman Stoic philosopher.] 8 [Cicero (106 BC–43 BC) was a Roman statesman, orator, and philosopher.]
The Scriptures uniformly represent God not merely as the creator of all things but as the
constant upholder and director of all things. See particularly Job, from chapters 12 to 41;
Psalms 8, 19, 91, 102 and 107; Proverbs 16 and 20; Matthew 6 and 10; Acts 14 and 17.
This is taught also by three great symbols:
1. Mount Moriah where Isaac was rescued, hence the phrase יחוח יראח [Gen. 22:8,
14, Yahweh provides], dominus providebit [the Lord will provide]
2. Jacob's ladder
3. The wheel of Ezekiel
343. Can any argument be derived from the nature of God in favor of a providence?
Yes, because His interference is as necessary for the support as for the creation of the
world, and from Him all second causes derive their efficacy. The doctrine may also be
inferred from His wisdom, power, and goodness.
344. How can a Providence be demonstrated a posteriori?
1. First, from the nature and condition of creatures, which requires the continued support
and protection of God. Psalm 104:28–29, "You hide your face and they are troubled;
You take away their breath and they die and return to their dust."
2. From the harmony and order observable in the world
3. From the accomplishment of prophecies
4. From the revolutions of states and empires, which prove that it is by the Lord that
kings reign and princes decree justice (Prov. 8:15)
5. From remarkable mercies and judgments
6. From conscience
345. Does not every argument for the existence of God prove His providence?
Yes, they are inseparably connected: if there is a God, He must be everywhere present,
beholding the evil and the good, and if present, must be actively so. Hence, the sacred
writers distinguish the true God from idols by referring to His providence, and they were
considered atheists who denied the one as much as those who denied the other.
346. Does the doctrine of providence destroy contingency?
In theological language, contingency is opposed to necessity, and everything that in the
nature of things might be otherwise than it is, is said to be contingent. This the
providence of God does not remove, because things remain indifferent in relation to
second causes though certain in reference to the first.
347. Does it take away liberty and the use of means?
No, for the certainty it induces is merely hypothetical, arising from the decree of God,
and implies no coaction on the will, which acts inevitably while it acts freely. In respect
to the use of means, the certainty of the end does not destroy but supposes the necessity
of the means, and the concurrence of the first cause does not exclude the concurrence of
second causes but draws them after it.
348. In what way does sin take place in the providence of God?
By His permission and efficacious direction, but it is by no means produced efficiently by
Him.
349. How can the prosperity of the wicked and the calamities of the pious consist with
providence?
Although the justice and providence of God require that it should be well with the
righteous and ill with the wicked, they do not require that it should always manifestly be
thus. For there is great wisdom in permitting some crimes in this world to go unpunished
to show that this is not the state of retribution. Moreover, did we view things aright, we
should not decide that every trial the believer meets with is an evil or that the prosperity
of the wicked is always a good.
350. Does the doctrine of providence involve a fatal necessity?
It does not as this term is generally received.
351. What is fate: physical, mathematical, stoical, and Christian?
The word is derived from fando loquendo [its use in speaking]. The Greeks used the word
ειμας μενη α μςιεω to divide, also πρωμενον ordinatum α περατοω termino. Physical fate
is nothing more than the necessary connection between cause and effect. Mathematical
fate is that [which is] supposed to arise from the influence of the stars. This of course was
held only by believers in astrology. Stoical fate, according to Chrysippus9 is the "natural
connection and order of all things from eternity, one succeeding to others, and this chain
remaining immutable." Cicero calls it the "order or series of causes, etc." Seneca makes it
an irrevocable necessity controlling the course of both human and divine affairs, "so that
9 [Chrysippus (c. 279 BC–c. 206 BC) was a Greek Stoic philosopher.]
the supreme ruler, though he governs continually, obeys."
This fate differs from Christian necessity because it places the necessity of things
without God, whereas the latter refers it to His eternal decree. It also subjects God
Himself to this necessity, but the other subjects the necessity to God. Again, it confounds
all causes, but the Christian fate distinguishes between natural and free causes, and
preserves both. Christian fate is the order or series of causes, dependent on divine
providence, by which it produces its effects. See App. 13.
352. Ought Christians to retain and use the word fate?
No, for whatever ideas those who use the term may attach to it, it has so long been used
in a sense inconsistent with truth on this subject that it will certainly be misunderstood.
353. Does providence extend to all things, small as well as great?
Yes, because He created all things and therefore cares for all. This is ascribed to God in
the sacred Scriptures: first, generally, as Nehemiah 9:6, "Thou, even Thou art Lord alone;
Thou hast made heaven and the heaven of heavens with all their host, the earth and all
things that are therein, the sea and all that is therein; Thou preservest them all." And
particularly in such passages as Luke 12:7, where the hairs of our heads are said to be
numbered. So in Matthew 10:29 and 6:28, and Psalm 147:9, where the fowls of the air,
the lilies in the field, and even insects are said to be under the care of God.
354. Is an attention to things minute and vile incompatible with the majesty of God?
No, if He saw fit to create them, why not to preserve them? Besides, it exalts our idea of
the wisdom and power of God, which can be exercised with equal ease over the things
the most stupendous and the most minute.
355. How does it appear that fortuitous and contingent events are regulated by providence?
Because in the sacred Scriptures the direction of such circumstances is attributed to God,
such as the falling of an axe head, a falling lot, a random arrow, and so on (Prov. 16:33;
Ex. 21:13; Deut. 19:5).
356. How does it appear that free, voluntary actions are subject to providence?
From Proverbs 16:1, the preparation of the heart and the answer of the tongue are from
God. Proverbs 21:1, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water; He
turns it withersoever He will." Jeremiah 10:23, "It is not in man that walks to direct his
steps." Exodus 12:36, "And the Lord gave the people favor in the sight of the Egyptians."
Numbers 22:23, chapter containing the history of Balaam. Philippians 2:13, "For it is
God that works in you to will and to do of His good pleasure."
357. How many things are included in the doctrine of providence?
Conservation and government.
358. What is meant by conservation and government?
The first implies the upholding all creatures in their particular forms, in their powers of
action and in the actions themselves. The second, His superintendence of all things and
His leading and directing them to their destined ends. And this includes
1. His fixing certain laws or rules
2. His concurrence or cooperation with and directing the motions of His creatures
according to these stated rules and His own purpose
359. Is the concurrence of providence with human actions general and indifferent, or particular
and directive?
Durandus10 and many of the papists thought that nothing more was necessary than that
God should create and uphold the rational agent, without affording any concurrence at the
time of action. The Jesuits maintained that there is a general concurrence but that this was
determined to its particular effect by second causes. But the concurrence contended for
by most orthodox divines consists in
1. God's giving to second causes their efficiency
2. His preserving it
3. His exciting and applying second causes to action
4. Determining them to act
5. Directing them to their appointed ends
The arguments in favor of this particular and directive concurrence are
First, because in the sacred Scriptures the effects or actions of second causes are
ascribed to God. Thus He is said "to have sent Joseph into Egypt" (Gen. 45:7).
The heart of the king is said to be in His hand, and so on [Prov. 21:1]. He is
represented as using the wicked as his sword, rod, and so on (Isa. 10:15, 26; 13:5).
We are said in Him to live and move and have our being (Col. 1:17 [and Acts
17:28]). 10 [Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1275–1332/1334) was a French Dominican philosopher and theologian.]
Second, because God is the governor of the world, and therefore all
actions external and internal, good and bad must be subject to His control.
Third, as the creature has its being, so also it must have its actions in God;
otherwise, the second cause would be coordinate and independent.
Fourth, if God exercises but a general concurrence, it is vain to pray to
Him in regard to anything in reference to which free agents are concerned.
Fifth, He is then no more the author of good than of evil. But James 1:17
says, "Every good and every gift is from above," and 1 Corinthians 4:7, "What
have you that you did not receive"; Romans 11:36, "For of Him and through and
to Him are all things."
Sixth, on the supposition of a mere general concurrence, God could not be
said to direct the falling of a sparrow or of the lot, to give rain and snow and
winds, or to provide food for the young ravens, and so on (Job 38:41; Ps. 147;
1 Sam. 2:7–9, etc.)
Lastly, this would render the decrees of God uncertain and His
foreknowledge fallible; it would withdraw the operations of the will from His
dominion; it would make the creature more efficient than God and destroy the
principal foundation of piety, which is the dependence of our will to the will of
God.
360. What is the difference between moral and physical concurrence?
Moral concurrence is that in which he that concurs operates as a moral cause by
persuading or dissuading of fixing or removing objects or occasions. Physical
concurrence implies an efficacious and real influence in the production of the effect by a
positive influence.
361. What is the difference between mediate and immediate concurrence?
Each of these are of two kinds: quoad suppositum [which has been supposed] and quoad
virtutem [according to the power]. Immediate concurrence of the first kind is when no
other substance intervenes between the cause and the effect to receive the action of the
cause, as when water chills. Of the second kind is when the cause acts by its own peculiar
virtue or power, as when fire burns. Mediate concurrence of the first kind is when some
substance intervenes between the cause and the effect, as between writing and the writer.
Of the second when the cause acts not by its own virtue, as the shining of the moon.
362. Does the concurrence of the deity extend only [to] the preservation of the principle of action
or also to the action itself?
Turretin says it extends to both. God is the author and preserver of all creatures and gives
them all their power and affords them whatever is necessary to every individual act, but
no man knows the mode of the divine cooperations. All we can do is to avoid all opinions
that tend to take away accountability from man or to make God the author of sin. The
soul is essentially active, acts from its nature, and acts of itself. [So] Dr. Alexander.
363. What is the difference between previous and simultaneous concurrence?
Previous concurrence is that by which God is said to influence causes, to excite creatures
and induce them to act, and also to direct this action to one thing rather than another.
Simultaneous is that by which He produces the act as to its entity or substance. These
differ not essentially from each other, the latter being merely the form continued.
364. How does it appear that a previous concurrence takes place in the operations and actions of
creatures?
First, the nature of the first cause and the subordination of second causes: the first cause
[God] is the first mover in every action; second causes must be acted upon in order to act,
otherwise they cease to be second causes.
Second, from this, that what is of itself indifferent to many actions to act or not to
act cannot be determined but by some other.
Thirdly, when two free causes [God and persons] are united in the production of
the same effect, they either must both be excited and directed to act at the same time by
some superior cause, or both from their nature determined to act, or the one must be
determined by the other. In the case under consideration, the two first cannot be admitted,
therefore the last must or there can be no simultaneous concurrence.
Fourthly, if God from eternity has decreed all these free actions, He must in time
predetermine the will to these actions, otherwise His decrees might be frustrated.
365. Does not such a concurrence infringe the liberty of the creature?
No, for there is no physical necessity imposed upon the will, but it is determined
agreeably to its nature to act. In a separate or divided sense, indifference as to the event is
not removed from the will, though it is as considered united with the first cause. This
motion of God is consistent with the mode of operating belonging to the will.
366. Does it not make God the efficient cause of all events?
The actions of the second causes are said to belong to God efficentis [efficiently], but to
creatures both efficientis et formaliter [efficiently and formally] and are denominated
from them.
367. How can such a concurrence take place in evil actions and God not be the author of sin?
This concurrence extends only to the entity of the act and not to its character and moral
quality. The act itself must be distinguished from its evil, which is but a circumstance.
368. How can such a concurrence previous as well as simultaneous be reconciled with liberty
and contingency?
It is attempted to reconcile these in some measure on the following grounds, that is, from
the order of the causes among themselves and from the mode of acting proper to them,
which is explained thus:
First, the concurrence of providence and the human will is not of equal and
collateral causes, but of unequal and subordinate.
Second, God concurs with second causes agreeably to their nature as His
decree is concerned both in determining the event and the causes that produce it,
so His providence secures the event without violating the nature of those causes.
Third, this concurrence is rational, so influencing the will that it
determines itself.
Fourth, this concurrence is different in respect to good and evil actions: in
the former it produces both the entity and the moral quality of the act; in the latter
merely the entity.
369. Is it possible clearly to understand this subject? See App. 13.
It is not in our present state.
370. Are sinful actions under the direction and government of providence?
Yes, and that neither by merely being permitted as Pelagians11 maintain, nor by being
efficiently produced, but in being efficaciously ordered and directed.
371. How many things may be distinguished in sinful actions?
Three:
1. The entity of the act
2. The evil of the act
3. The adjunct of the act, that is, the consequent judgment or punishment
372. What is meant by the permission of sin?
This permission is not moral (as opposed to prohibition and [that] which implies
approbation)12 but physical (as opposed to production13). Secondly, it is not merely
negative, supposing only a cessation of the divine will and providence in reference to evil
11 [Named from Pelagius (c. AD 360–418), who debated Augustine. Pelagianism held that Adam's original sin did not taint human nature and that humans' wills are capable of choosing good or evil without special divine aid.]
12 [That is, it is not a moral permission that condones the thing permitted or tolerated.] 13 [That is, physically permitting something is to be distinguished from physically producing something.]
actions,14 but also positive as He not only did not will to prevent sin but willed not to
prevent it.
373. Is sin ever the direct object of the divine will?
No, good alone can be the object of the will of God; in regard to sin His will terminates in
the permission of it, which is good.15
374. Is sin properly speaking a mean[s] of promoting God's glory?
No, it is not a causal or effective mean[s] of honoring God, but the reverse, though it is
the occasion of the illustration of His glory.
375. Why did God permit sin to enter into the world?
We cannot tell. The Arminians16 think one principal reason was that He did not wish to
interfere with the free agency of man. This permission of sin was not contrary to justice,
since He was not bound to prevent it, nor to His wisdom because the condition of the
creature was mutable according to His will (He was not obliged to counteract or destroy
this mutability), nor to His goodness since He loved His creatures as long as they retained
their integrity and as He has taken occasion hence to display His justice, mercy, wisdom
and love. This [question] refers to permission of sin at first when creatures were holy.
As to its permission among fallen men, reasons are evident:
1. As it is a punishment
14 [This distinguishes the Reformed view from other views, such as in Arminianism, Lutheranism, and so on.]
15 [In that it is for a good ultimate end.] 16 [Named after Jacob Arminius (1560–1609), whose system of theology was answered at the Dutch Synod of Dort (1618–1619).]
2. As it instructs believers in the knowledge of themselves
3. As examples
376. Is desertion included in the idea of the permission of sin?
It is, and this desertion is of two kinds:
First, privative, when it consists in the withdrawing of grace before enjoyed, but
which had been abused.
Second, when it implies only the not affording the grace necessary to
preserve from sin.
Or desertion in another view may be considered as threefold:
1. First, that of trial, to see what was in man, as was the case in regard to Adam,
Hezekiah, and so on
2. That of correction, as toward the church: Isaiah 54:7; Psalm 12:3
3. That of punishment, which is a judicial desertion: 2 Kings 21:14; Jeremiah
7:29; Romans 1:24
377. Does God ever employ a positive influence in the production of evil?
Many suppose that besides the permission and desertion already mentioned, there is a
certain efficacious operation in regard to evil that belongs to the Holy God. This opinion
is grounded on those passages of sacred Scripture where this agency appears to be
expressed, as when He is said to have hardened Pharaoh's heart [Ex. 4:21, etc.], to have
commanded Shimei to curse David (2 Sam. 16:10), to have put a lying spirit in the
mouths of the false prophets (1 Kings 22:23), to give a strong delusion that men might
believe a lie (in 2 Thess. 2:11), and so on. They confess, however, their inability to
conceive of the mode of this operation, though [they] divide [it] into the three following
particulars:
1. The offering of occasions of sinning
2. Delivering to Satan
3. A certain immediate operation on the heart, and this may be done by some
internal proposition of objects by which the will is moved or by the impression
of thoughts in themselves good, which the wickedness of men pervert
378. How is providence concerned with sin as to its beginning, progress, and end?
First, as to its beginning: in permission, desertion and a certain efficacious operation of
providence. As to its progress in restraining it within proper bounds: so that it should not
be greater in degree, more extensive in its operation or lasting in its duration than is for
the best. And this is effected either by an internal illumination of the mind and repressing
of evil principles or by an external removing of the occasions to evil and restraining of
Satan. As to its end: in its wise ordering and direction so as out of evil to elicit good.
"You thought it for evil, but God thought it for good." See Isaiah 10:5–7; Job 1:20–22;
Acts 3:13–15.
379. Does not this concurrence with sin affect the purity of providence?
Not in the least, [not] any more than the rays of the sun are defiled by falling on things
impure and corrupt. And though the same work is often ascribed to God and Satan or
wicked men, yet it is in widely different respects. In one it is most holy, springing from a
holy principle and directed to a holy end. But in the other, [it is] a most evil work in its
principle, means, and end. As a judge may use lions and other savage beasts as
instruments of punishment, and a physician things evil in themselves as means of healing,
so a holy God may employ sinful actions for holy ends.
380. Does it furnish any excuse for the sinner?
No, as it does not destroy his liberty nor spontaneity.
381. Does not the blame of an action belong to the principal cause rather than to the instrument?
This principle holds in regard to homogenous17 causes (when both are positive and
physical or both [are] privative and moral, as when we say that the Word sanctifies,
therefore much more the Holy Spirit) but not in heterogeneous causes (the one being
physical or positive, the other moral or privative, as because the sword which slays a man
is an innocent cause, it does not follow that he that used it is also innocent).
Second, it is true in regard to entire and irrational instruments but not in regard to
metaphorical or mixed instruments, as the man who spurs a lame horse is not the cause of
his limping. But sinners are instruments of the latter kind.18
Third, the axiom is correct when the action of the principal cause is the same
morally with that of the instrument, as because the disciple of Pelagius holds erroneous
sentiments, therefore Pelagius himself did; but [the axiom] is not correct where the action
17 [Things having the same nature.] 18 [For instance, if God spurs a sinners, the spurring is not inherently wrong, and may be good, yet the sinner's consequent sinful response according to his nature, which God permits, is wrong and the evil is wholly of himself.]
is not the same morally, though it may be so materially.
382. Is not the cause of any cause also the cause of the effects of the last cause?
Yes, in regard to adequate causes when no true and proximate cause intervenes between
the thing caused and the second cause. And also in regard to essential and necessarily
subordinate causes, as He who caused the sun is the cause of light and heat.
But this is not the case where the cause of the inferior cause is so per se [of itself]
and of the thing caused only per accidens.19 Therefore, though the human will is the
cause of sin and God [is] the cause of the human will, it does not follow that God must be
the cause of sin, since the will is not necessarily or per se the cause of sin, but only by
defect or per accidens.20
383. Does God ever tempt men to sin?
Temptation is twofold. The one for trial, the other of seduction; the one good, the other
evil. In the latter sense, James says, "God tempts no man" [James 1:13]. When we pray
that our heavenly Father would not lead us into temptation, it is in reference to the
temptation of seduction, meaning that He would not deliver us to Satan to be tempted by
him to evil. In the former sense He tempts, or rather tries, all His children.
384. Does not the permission of sin fall under the rule not to do evil that good may come [Rom.
3:8]?
No, for there is a great difference between the doing and permitting of evil.
19 ["By accident" in the Aristotelian sense, in that it is not necessary by the thing's essence.] 20 [See question #473.]
385. Have any maintained that God was the author of sin?
Yes, some among both the ancient and modern sects, as Priscillianists,21 and so forth.
386. Do they attribute anything of the blame or evil of sin to Him?
No, for then they must have believed that God was not a perfect being.
387. How do men abuse the doctrine of providence in relation to things past?
First, by murmuring against it as unjust; and in the pious there is often too much
impatience, opposed to the humble submission becoming children. See examples of this
resignation in Job 1:21; 2:10; Psalm 39:[9–]10; 1 Samuel 3:18. Second, by despair, as
Cain, which is opposed to that firm trust and confidence the saints should possess.
388. How is this doctrine abused in relation to things future?
First, by too much confidence and security, leading to the neglect of the proper means for
effecting their ends. Second, by anxiety and distrust. Thirdly, by placing too great or too
little reliance on second causes.
389. What use should be made of the doctrine of providence?
1. Holiness, because the eye of a holy God, it teaches, is always upon us
2. Gratitude in prosperity
21 [Named after Priscillian († c. 385), a wealthy nobleman of Roman Hispania. Priscillianism was a form of Christian asceticism, holding to gnostic-Manichaean doctrines including that matter and nature were evil.]
3. Patience and humility in trials (Ps. 39:[9–]10; Luke 22:42; 2 Sam. 16:10)
4. Repentance
5. Consolation in peace and tranquility of mind, as we lie in the bosom of our God,
assured that all things shall work together for our good