Chapter 17
On the Will
479. What is the will?
According to Locke, "the power or ability to prefer or choose"; according to Edwards,53
"that by which the mind chooses anything"; and according to Dr. Reid,54 "A power to
determine to do or not to do things we conceive to be within our power."
480. In what variety of meaning is the word used?
It is employed in greater or less extent by different persons. Sometimes it is used to
express all the active powers of man in distinction from his intellectual powers; thus, it is
used when the powers of the mind are classed under two heads: will and understanding.
The word will is also employed to signify both the faculty and the act, though the latter is
correctly expressed by the word volition. The definition given by Dr. Reid:
A determination of the mind to do or not, is the most exact and best corresponds with the common use of the word, for we may prefer one of two things when we will neither. I may prefer the life of a sailor to that of a soldier, though I may not will either of them. I choose that my pupils should conduct themselves properly, but I cannot be properly said to will it. The faculty of will belongs to all sentient, active beings, other animals as well as man.
481. What does every act of volition imply?
That we had the power to have acted differently or not to have acted. A necessary
53 [Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) was an American congregationalist divine and philosopher.] 54 [Thomas Reid (1710–1796) was a Scottish philosopher and popularizing proponent of Scottish Common Sense Realism.]
volition is a contradiction in terms. If we are under the necessity of doing a thing, there is
no choice and, of course, no volition. This power of acting or forbearing to act is properly
the liberty of the will. Every man is conscious of this freedom, and therefore no
arguments can destroy his conviction that he possesses it.
The brutes possess this liberty, though in a more confined sense than man. When
the stable door is open, the horse is at liberty to remain in his stable or go out to pasture.
Liberty, therefore, does not constitute an accountable moral agent.
Reason and conscience with liberty are necessary to make a creature capable of a
moral law. The degree of responsibility will be in proportion to the strength of our
rational powers. We are as certain as we can be of anything that we are the authors of our
own actions, and therefore [we] feel that we are accountable for them. It ought not to be,
and is not, as far as I know, a matter of dispute whether the mind makes its own
determinations. They who maintain the self-determining power of the will and they who
insist on the influence of motives equally agree in this.
482. What is the direct object of volition?
1. The direct object of volition is some action of our own.
2. It is some action that we believe to be in our power. However much a man may desire
to fly, he never wills it, nor anything he believes to be impossible. Thus, we see there
is a clear distinction between will and desire.
483. Are will and desire ever opposite?
It has been a question whether these two things may be opposite in relation to the same
object. Mr. Locke and Dr. Reid maintain the affirmative, President Edwards the negative.
The proper answer seems to be that the will may be contrary to many desires
which relate to its object, but never opposite to the prevailing desire. A man who is urged
to eat of a certain dish may desire to comply with the solicitations of his friend, and he
may also desire to eat because he has a strong relish for the food, but he wills not to eat
because he believes it would injure his health. Now the will in this case opposes several
desires, yet is coincident with the desire of health and ease that prevails over the rest.
Though will has for its direct object our own actions of mind or body, yet it may
be some distant action. I may will to go to such a place or to do such a thing a year hence.
484. Do we ever will what we believe to be out of our power?
No, the object of our volition must be something that we believe to be in our power and
to depend upon our will. A man may desire to make a visit to the moon, but he cannot
will or determine to do it, because he knows it is out of his power.
485. What determines the will?
The will is determined by the active principles that exist and prevail in our nature when
the volition is made. And according to this view our volitions are produced by principles
in our own souls and are as much our own as they can be on any other hypothesis.
486. How many theories are there on this subject?
Five:
1. That the will determines itself
2. That the mind or soul determines it
3. That it follows the last dictate of the understanding
4. That the will is invariably determined by the strongest motive then in the view
of the mind
5. That the will is determined by divine agency, which is the efficient cause of our
volitions
But in the view of motives, the great objection to the word motives is that it is ambiguous.
It is often used to signify the same with reasons, external objects suited to our
inclinations. A man is said to have strong motives for doing a particular action when the
reasons in its favor are cogent. A great sum of money is said to be a great motive to
induce a man to swerve from truth and justice, but if there be no love of money it is no
motive at all.
487. Is indifference essential to the liberty of the will?
By indifference is meant an equilibrium in which the will is without any antecedent
determination or bias to one side or the other, that the determination may be entirely from
itself and owing to its power and sovereignty.
And here we observe that to support this scheme of liberty, the indifference must
be perfect and absolute. There must be a perfect freedom from all antecedent
preponderation or inclination. Because if the will be already inclined before it exerts its
sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself.
Here I would lay down this as an axiom of undoubted truth: "That every free act
is done in a state of freedom and not only after such a state." If an act of the will be an act
in which the soul is free, it must be in a state of freedom and in a time of freedom. It will
not suffice that an act immediately follow a state of liberty: liberty must continue and
coexist with the act; for the very notion of a free act of the soul is an act in which the soul
uses or exercises liberty.
Now the question is whether the soul of man ever puts forth an act of the will
while it yet remains in a state of liberty, that notion of a state of liberty which implies a
state of indifference. Or whether the soul ever exerts an act of choice or preference while
at that very time the will is in a state of equilibrium, not inclining one way more than
another.
The very putting [of] the question is enough to show the absurdity of the
affirmative answer. For how ridiculous would it be for anybody to insist that the soul
chooses one thing before another when at the very moment it is perfectly indifferent with
regard to both! This is the same thing as to say that the soul prefers one thing to another
at the very same time it has no preference.
Choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference than motion can
be in a state of rest. Motion may be the next moment after rest, but [it] cannot coexist
with it in any, even [in] the least degree. So choice may be immediately after a state of
indifference but has not coexistence with it; even the very beginning of it is not in a state
of indifference. Therefore, if this be liberty, no act of the will is ever performed in a state
of liberty or in [a] time of liberty.
488. Does liberty properly belong to the will?
Liberty in common speech is power, opportunity, or advantage that anyone has to do as
he pleases.
Now liberty cannot properly be ascribed to any being or thing but what has such a
faculty, power, or property called "will." For that which is not possessed of will cannot
have power of doing according to its will. And therefore to talk of liberty belonging to
the very will itself is not to speak good sense, for the will itself is not an agent that has a
will. That which has the power of volition is the man or soul, and not the power of
volition itself.55
Liberty is a freedom from restraint. In the popular sense of the word it means that
we can act agreeably to our choices, but in this sense it does not respect the will but the
power of acting consequent on volition. It is doubtful whether liberty can be predicated of
the will itself, as volition cannot be the effect of restraint.56
The truth is, choice supposes the power of embracing one of two or more things,
each of which is in our power; the freedom of the will relates to these objects. A man has
an opportunity of riding, walking, or sitting still. He chooses to ride. There is freedom
and no constraint, as in his volition, for he might have refused to ride. Liberty as applied
to the will therefore properly expresses the idea that belongs to every volition, [in] that he
might have chosen something else.
But in the controversy on the freedom of the will, some apply the word liberty to
the cause of volition. Volition is said to be free because the motives that persuade us to
choose may be resisted. If we conceive a motive so strong acting on the will that it cannot
be resisted, there is an end of liberty, and in proportion as the motives approach to
irresistible force, in the common sense of men, the action is in the same degree excusable.
55 Edwards. 56 Dr. Alexander.
Now this is an important point and deserves serious consideration. Certainly the
doctrine stated above is not universally true, for then the more wicked a man's heart, the
more excusable his crimes, and vice versa, [more] than which nothing can be more
absurd. But in regard to motives of a particular sort, there is some foundation for the
opinion; and it is important that the distinction should be accurately made. I would
therefore lay down the following propositions:
1. Every determination of the will is the effect of some active principle, of some
affection, appetite, sense, or inclination.
2. Some of the active principles that govern the will are sudden and impetuous
and act before there is time for reflection. A man whose temperament is
constitutionally unstable receives from someone a blow in the face which
produces instant pain. In a moment, before there is time for reflection, his
anger is enkindled and his will is powerfully determined to strike the person
from whom the blow came. This volition is produced instantly before he has
time to consider consequences and reflect that the injury was undesigned.
Now this passion of anger seems to have been bestowed upon animals to lead them to
defend themselves against sudden assaults. In man it precedes the exercise of reason, and
in proportion as the passion was sudden and violent (in the common sense of men), the
person is excusable for the act produced. The sin in this case consists in not guarding
against this rising of passion and in suffering it to continue when we have time to reflect.
Other motives that are not so sudden in their operation are nevertheless violent
and difficult to be resisted, as hunger and thirst, desire of rest after great fatigue, and the
desire of deliverance from excruciating pain. Now if by any voluntary act these can be
removed, the will is constantly pressed to determine on the act. If there be no counter
motives, this volition will immediately take place, as in animals who have no motives of
any other sort.
But if we cannot obtain relief without committing an immoral act, there will then
be a struggle between those principles and affections that influence us to avoid moral evil
and the strong cravings of these natural appetites. Now the virtue of resistance in these
cases is measured by the strength of the appetites to be overcome, and the sin of yielding
by the same rule. But this is true only in regard to those natural and animal propensities
or passions that act with a blind influence on the will. Yet these are never, strictly
speaking, irresistible; that is, they are never so strong but that principles of piety may be
strong enough to counteract them.
But with respect to passions that are in their own nature sinful, they cannot
excuse. The stronger they are, the more sin. And whether we determine to act or not, their
very existence is sin. Sin does not require an act of the will to bring it into being.
489. Is the will always determined by the state of the soul immediately antecedent?
Dr. Reid says, "That in all important determinations of the mind there must be something
in the preceding state of the mind that disposes or inclines us to that determination." If
such an influence has any share in the business, it may as well be considered as decisive,
for if the latter be inconsistent with liberty, so is the former, and perfect indifference
would alone be consistent with liberty. It is true that the active principles of our nature
incline us to a certain act according to the force of these principles. But after all, the mind
determines, and this determination of the mind we call volition.
490. Has the will a self-determining power?
To prove that the will has no self-determining power, President Edwards observes that it
must do this in the exercise of a power of willing. Therefore, every free act of choice is
determined by a preceding act choosing the act, and this requires an act of choice
preceding it, and so on ad infinitum [to infinity].
Now this appears to me to be a specimen of metaphysical quibbling. A faculty, in
order to exert itself, must not be first supposed to act that it may act. The same reasoning
will prove that the soul cannot act at all. For it may [be] said that the soul cannot act
without exerting its power for this purpose, but the exertion of power is acting and
requires a preceding exertion to produce it, and so on ad infinitum. How causes operate to
produce effects we know not. How active beings are the cause of action we know not.
But this we know, that where there are effects there must be a cause. It is in vain to
search for anything intermediate between an active being and an action, as a faculty
operates in a peculiar way agreeable to its nature and powers without supposing anything
intermediate between the faculty and its operations.
But as to the question, "Does the will determine itself?" it cannot be intended [by
the question] whether an act of the will determines itself. This would be making volition
both cause and effect. An act supposes an agent, a volition, a capability of choosing. But
there is an evident absurdity in supposing that the act or volition determines itself. I
suppose therefore by [the phrase] the will determining itself is meant that the faculty of
will determines the volitions, and by the will is understood all the active power of man or
of the soul; there is nothing absurd in the doctrine.
The answers to this and the preceding question may be correct, but they do not
reach the difficulty. The question returns, "What induces the mind to make the
determination?" Is it regulated by the temper, inclinations, propensities, or appetites that
form the state of the soul antecedent to the act, or is it sovereign and arbitrary, sometimes
coincident with this existing state of mind and sometimes opposed to it?
491. Is the will always determined by the last act of the understanding?
Some maintain that it is, or that the will always follows, the last practical judgment of the
understanding. There is at least some obscurity in this answer. There may be many
judgments of the understanding in relation to the same subject or action viewed in
different aspects. One judgment may be that the action is morally wrong; another, that it
tends ultimately to my ruin; and a third, that it will afford me present pleasure. Now here
are two judgments unfavorable to the action and one in favor of it, and yet this one may
prevail.
If it be meant that previously to determining on this act my judgment must be that
upon the whole it is best, this is not true, for I may have an intimate conviction that upon
the whole it will be hurtful. But if I prefer present pleasure to greater permanent good, is
it not my practical judgment that this temporary gratification is to be preferred to that
distant good, and do I not therefore view it as the best?
The only difficulty here arises from compounding judgment with inclination. I am
most inclined to seize the present pleasure, and therefore I choose it and determine on it;
but it cannot be said correctly that my judgment or understanding decides that it is best. I
may be deeply convinced that I am sacrificing a great, though distant, good for a
gratification of no real value, but appetite or passion is strong and has been accustomed to
be indulged, therefore I yield.
As every act of the will must have an object, and as it belongs to the
understanding to apprehend objects of every kind, so it follows that every act of the will
must be preceded by some operation of the intellect. In this sense the will always follows
the understanding, but this has no bearing on the subject: for when I determine, that
which I refuse is in view of the understanding as well as that which I choose. It seems to
me, therefore, to say that the will always follows the last practical judgment of the
understanding, is not true, or it furnishes no satisfactory answer to the question.
The will of man is sometimes spoken of as the moral part of man's nature, and it
is true that in all moral acts the will is concerned, but so is the understanding also. But if
it be meant that the will is moral in all its acts, it is a great mistake. The will is often
exercised where there is nothing moral, as any other faculty. There is nothing moral or
immoral in choosing a peach in preference to an apple. It is an act of the will by which I
lift up one foot before the other, but there is nothing moral in this. If all acts of the will be
moral, then every animal has a moral nature, for every animal has will. The acts of
children, before reason is in exercise, would be moral, for they exercise will.
The will in a large sense may be considered as the seat of moral actions. But in
this sense it includes the exercise of reason and conscience, for let man be deprived of
reason and the morality of the exercise of his will ceases. A madman can perform no
moral acts. Every act of the will which is of a moral nature supposes and includes the
exercise of reason. President Edwards says,
That in some sense the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding. But then the understanding must be taken in a large sense
as including the whole faculty of perception or apprehension and not merely what is called judgement or reason. If by the dictate of the understanding is meant, what reason declares is most for the person's happiness, taking in the whole of his duration; it is not true that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.
492. Is the will determined by the strongest motive?
Here two questions require to be previously settled. First, "What is meant by 'motives?'"
and second, "What constitutes the strength of a motive?"
Mr. Edwards defines a motive to be "everything that moves, excites or invites the
mind to volition." Again, everything that is properly called a motive "has some degree
and sort of tendency or advantage to move or excite the will." That which has a greater
degree of tendency is called the "stronger motive" and that which has the less the
"weaker motive." "Whatever is a motive must be extant in the view or apprehension of
the understanding." This seems to be accurately and correctly stated.
But when we come to consider what these are which have a tendency to move or
excite the will, we find a good deal of explanation necessary. Those things that have a
tendency to move the will consist commonly of an external object and a desire,
inclination, or appetite for that object. Now it ought to be considered that an external
object, however excellent intrinsically, has no sort of tendency to move the will unless
there be some inclination to it. The whole strength of motives depends on the strength of
these internal affections, appetites, or inclinations. Food is placed before me; if I have no
appetite or wish for it, the food is no motive for me to eat. It exerts no power, sends forth
no influence, and has no tendency to determine my will.
But if I am hungry, the food being suited to this appetite, I feel [a] strong
tendency from the cravings of this appetite to take the food and eat it. Improperly, it may
be said the food induces me to eat, but strictly it is this internal desire. Now if no contrary
inclination or appetite opposes the act of the mind, it will inevitably be determined.
But suppose I am informed that there is poison mingled with the food; however
great my hunger, I will not eat, because the desire of living and the fear of dying are
sufficient to counteract the desire of food. Or suppose I am forbidden to eat by someone
whom I am under obligations to obey; suppose I cannot eat without violating my
conscience and offending a superior. My decision now will depend on my desire to keep
a good conscience and the fear and attachment I feel toward this superior. Suppose again
that this food would injure my health, that by waiting some time I can be supplied with
some [food] that will be wholesome, and that this is the only consideration or motive to
counteract the appetite. The determination will then depend upon the strength of the
appetite and the disposition I may possess to prefer a greater, though distant, good to a
present gratification.
The doctrine of the strongest motive prevailing is true if we mean by motive not
the object but the desire of the object, which is in the mind itself, and thus we come to the
old conclusion that the mind determines its own volitions.
493. Can there be volition without motive?
Here Dr. Reid asserts two things that appear to me to be incorrect: first, that the mind
often wills without any motive, and second, that it often wills contrary to the strongest
motive. He divides motives into rational and animal, and considers the contest to [be]
between these two sorts of motives in common cases.
Now as this last distinction is a radical [fundamental] principle in his system, we
will first consider it. Animal appetites solicit us to do a certain act; they impel us by a
blind impulse. The understanding is not otherwise concerned in their operation than as it
apprehends the objects of these propensities. But on the other hand, reason decides that
the act which we are solicited to perform is injurious or is inconsistent with duty. Here
are two influences but of entirely different kinds. The mind determines between them by
a sovereign act and thus is free and master of itself.
This, if I mistake not, is a fair view of Dr. Reid's opinion. But I would answer that
reason considered by itself can never be considered as a motive to action. If there were no
active principles in the mind inclining it to embrace the objects reason brings to view, the
strongest reasons would never counteract the gentlest cravings of appetite. I have no
objection to this distinction of motives into rational and animal; nay, I think it correct.
But rational motives suppose rational principles in our nature, that is, active principles
guided by reason. And when there is a conflict between animal and rational motives, the
determination will depend on their relative strength, and though the mind determines and
determines freely, yet this determination is produced by the antecedent state of the mind
as it regards the force of these opposite motives or principles.
For example, a man is urged to eat or drink something he knows will be injurious
to him. The influence on his will is direct and urgent, but as he has reason and
experience, he foresees the distant consequence and determines not to comply. Now I
ask, had this man no regard to his health and comfort, would he refrain? Is it not
obviously his strong desire of health that prevails over the cravings of appetite? Again, if
a certain fruit be forbidden by our Creator, if appetite and other animal desires urge to eat
and we refuse because it is forbidden by such a Being, is not the determination produced
by fear of offending or the love we have to holiness? If there were no such principles,
would mere reason, however clear, have any effect? I think not.
494. What advantage would occur from the power of willing without motive or [willing]
contrary to the strongest motive?
Suppose a man, the temper of whose soul is virtuous; he loves his Creator and fears to
incur the accusations of his own conscience. These are his strongest motives in the
moment when, by passion or appetite, he is solicited to transgress; but exerting his power
of will, he determines against the strongest motive to violate his duty. Is such a power a
perfection of his nature? Is he more accountable for such an act than if produced by
habitual malignity? Dr. Reid himself admits that in all important determinations of the
will, there is something in the antecedent state of the mind that leads to them. If we
choose sometimes without motives and sometimes contrary to all motives, such a choice
must be very irrational and such a power very inconsistent and dangerous.
A man has no inclination leading him to possess his neighbor's property but
[rather] a strong desire to act justly, and yet he wills to steal something within his reach.
Suppose such a volition in such circumstances; is the man accountable for it? He might
say, "I know not whence this volition proceeded. There is nothing I am persuaded in my
principles on in the antecedent state of my mind which could have produced such a
determination, for I am habitually averse to everything of the kind. It must be attributed
to the extraordinary power I have of willing without motives and contrary to them."
If it be said that we never will without motives but in trivial cases, then certainly
such a power is of little consequence. And the reason why Dr. Reid thinks he wills
without motives, often everyday, is because the acts are of too little consequence to
engage his attention and the motives pass unnoticed or make no impression on the
memory. Dr. Reid says that "if a man could not act without a motive, he would have no
power at all." Also, "that any action done without a motive can neither have merit [n]or
demerit, is a self-evident proposition." He says moreover, "If we may act without
motives, this power may enable us to act against the strongest in compliance with the
weaker"; but on acknowledged principles such an act would have neither merit nor
demerit and therefore [would be] of no consequence.
495. All things being the same precisely (both external and internal), can the volition be
different?
This is the ultimate question respecting the will. Supposing all motives and circumstances
external and internal to be the same, with the same person at different times, is it possible
that the volition might be different? [Imagine] if a man has a strong appetite for
intoxicating liquor in a place where it is offered, and at the time his disposition to reflect,
his fear of God, and the consequences of sin are too small to counteract this restless
appetite, so that he is led to drink to intoxication; suppose at another time the motives and
circumstances [are] precisely the same: would he act differently?
Those who would decide in the affirmative might say that the man at one time
calls up and exercises a resolution in resisting evil, which at other times he does not. That
we are conscious of such power, that often the mind rejects thoughts and the most
pleasing objects by virtue of this inherent power, now these things are true; but the
question still is, "What induces the mind to exert its power in resistance?" Is it a blind,
inconsiderate act? Or does the importance of acting well and the bad consequence of
yielding to temptation so strike the mind at this moment above what it did before that it
becomes resolute in resisting evil? The latter is undoubtedly true.
But supposing a power in varying our volitions, in precisely the same
circumstances, I ask, "What privilege or advantage [does] this give to man above what he
is supposed to have on the other theory?" No other than this, that he may without reason
or motive have acted differently from what he has done. The other theory supposes a
power of changing but connects this change with an alteration in the view and
inclinations of the mind at the moment. But if the volitions of the mind will always be the
same in the same circumstances, how does it happen that we are conscious that we have
done wrong, that we could have acted differently? But the question returns, "Does not
this suppose a different state of the soul antecedent to the action?"
A man regrets that under the influence of passion he reproached his friend. He is
conscious he could have avoided it. But how? By such considerations as would have
moderated his anger, or if he had taken a moment's time to think of the consequences.
Thus we shall find in every case in which we believe we could have acted differently, we
suppose a change in the antecedent state of the mind.
496. What would be the effect of equal motives?
It is argued correctly that the motives being the same, the volitions will be the same also.
But have we not power to change the influence of motives by directing our thoughts to
other objects? Undoubtedly this is the case, but it has no direct bearing on the question.
For changing the direction of our thoughts is the effect of volition, and we are led to it by
some motive that did not exist, or at least not in the same force [as] before.
A man has been overcome once and again by a particular temptation; the
consequences have been distressing to him. He is assailed anew by the same temptation.
It operates on him as before, but recollecting the pain [that] yielding has brought on him,
he makes an exertion to change the direction of his thoughts. He calls in solemn
considerations, and the snare is broken. Divine grace more commonly helps us in these
cases.
The power that the mind has over the train of our thoughts is limited: sometimes
we cannot exclude certain thoughts from our minds, we can only introduce others, and
that with difficulty. A man who is on the rack or in a fit of the gout cannot exclude the
thoughts of pain, nor a hungry man the thoughts of food from his mind. The
consequences of equal motives coexisting in the mind would be that no act of the will
would take place. But such a case never did, nor ever can, occur.
497. Is there a proper distinction between animal and rational motives?
There is, and on one account [it is] very important. Animal motives, consisting in natural
propensities seated in the body, act blindly and urge the will by a certain force that is
proportionate to their strength. Now this influence may be so powerful as to render it
extremely difficult to oppose it, and in proportion to this difficulty the guilt of complying
will be diminished.
For example, the desire of relief from racking pain is one of the strongest we
experience. If a man tortured on the rack has deliverance offered him upon condition of
his speaking some false word or performing some improper action, the motive is not
irresistible, or his guilt would be annihilated; but in proportion as it approached an
impossibility to resist, his guilt in yielding is diminished. The same is the case with all
other animal motives.
But the strength of rational principles on affections of the mind [which are] in
their nature evil, so far from lessening, are the cause of guilt, which is in proportion to
their strength. The animal motives are in their nature indifferent. The others partake of a
moral nature in all their stages.
498. Can they be compared as to their strength?
There may be as just a comparison between animal and rational motives as between any
other. Rational motives, contrary to what Dr. Reid supposes, affect all the active
principles of the mind as well as the judgment, and as much so as animal motives.
Therefore, they may be compared as to their relative strength. [So] Dr. Alexander.
499. Can mere reason ever be a motive to volition?
Dr. Reid says it can. By reason he means that calm, cool principle which has an influence
on our action directly contrary to passion or mere animal motives. Animal appetites impel
us by a blind impulse. Reason decides what ends are most worthy of being pursued and
how far appetites and passion are to be indulged and when they are to be resisted.
But I would reply that reason considered in itself can never be considered as a
motive to action. If there were no active principles in the mind leading us to embrace the
objects reason brings to view, the strongest reason would never counteract the weakest
animal motive. President Edwards says,
That reason is one of the ingredients of the compound influence which moves and induces the will, that it is one thing to be estimated in considering the degree of the appearance of good which the will always follows. When it concurs with other things, its weight is to be put into the scale, but when against them, it is a weight in the opposite scale when it resists them; yet its resistance is often overcome by their greater weight, so that the act of the will is determined in opposition to reason. And of course mere reason can never be a motive to volition.
500. What is it that ultimately determines our volitions to be what they are?
The answer to this question will best appear after recapitulating what has been said on
this subject:
1. Strictly, the will is a determination to exert our power over our mind or body
and is limited by the supposed power that we possess. I will to sit, to stand, to
walk; I will to think of former scenes, to recollect what I have learned, and so
on.
2. Will in a larger sense is choice or preference. I prefer a free to a despotic
government; I choose a mild climate rather than a severe one. But the term will
is not so properly used here; for I could not say, "I will a free government or
mild climate," these things not being within my power.
3. Will is used again to signify all the active powers, as when the faculties of the
soul are distinguished into understanding and will.
4. Will belongs to all animals, and in them is regulated and determined by animal
propensities. Where there is but one propensity, the volition is inevitable; when
there are two or more, the strongest prevails.
5. Will in man is influenced by animal propensities as in inferior creatures, but he,
being endowed with reason and conscience, has other principles of action and
also has other natural desires. He can, moreover, compare and reflect and
consider, but when he determines, his will is coincident with the antecedent
state of his mind.
6. The power that determines the will is not an act of the soul, but [rather is] in it.
External motives and reasons have no force that they do not derive from the
temper and inclinations of the soul. The soul therefore determines its own acts
of will, but according to its own nature or the prevailing inclination at the time
of making the volition. This makes us as much masters of our volitions as by
any other hypothesis; for if we could determine to act contrary to all our
principles, it would only be a power to act absurdly. Such an action could
never be good, though the matter of it be correct.
Every volition must have an object; therefore, the exercise of the intellect
precedes that of the will, but the will does not follow the last dictate of the
understanding, but contrary to this yields itself to appetite, which it finds is
most agreeable to indulge. But at the same time [it] knows that it is rejecting
the greatest good. The will is not, therefore, as the greatest apparent good in
view of the understanding57 unless the mere strength of appetite is made the
criterion of the degree of good.
No acts of the will are necessary, for necessity and liberty are
incompatible. Yet the connection between volition and its causes is certain. Dr.
57 [That is, the will does not follow simply the greatest apparent good in view of the understanding.]
Watts58 and Dr. Reid advocate the doctrine of the will's self-determining
power; Mr. Locke and President Edwards the opposite and correct doctrine,
that it is determined by motives.
The two cardinal points in this subject are
1. Our volitions are produced by ourselves
2. The motives of them exist in our own nature; these are necessary to make man
a free agent
The End
58 [Isaac Watts (1674–1748) was an English nonconformist minister and philosopher, known best today for his popularization of hymns.]