in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes
PART II.
Section IV.
WHETHER VOLITION CAN ARISE
WITHOUT A CAUSE, THROUGH THE ACTIVITY OF THE
NATURE OF THE SOUL
The author of the Essay on the Freedom of the Will in God and the Creatures, in answer to that objection against his doctrine of a selfdetermining power in the will, (p. 68 -- 69.) That nothing is, or comes to pass, without a sufficient reason why it is, and why it is in this manner rather than another, allows that it is thus in corporeal things, which are, properly and philosophically speaking, passive being; but denies it is thus in spirits, which are beings of un active nature, who have the spring of action within themselves, and can determine themselves. by which it is plainly supposed, that such an event as an act of the Will, may come to pass in a spirit, without a sufficient reason why it comes to pass, or why it is after this manner, rather than another. But certainly this author, in this matter, must be very unwary and inadvertent. For,
1. The objection or difficulty proposed by him seems to be forgotten in his answer or solution. The very difficulty, as he himself proposes it, is this: How an event can come to pass without a sufficient reason