9 Shaping Reformed Aristotelianism: Otto Werdmüller's Evaluation of the Nicomachean Ethics in De dignitate, usu et metho
CHAPTER 9
Shaping Reformed Aristotelianism: Otto Werdmüller's Evaluation of the Nicomachean
Ethics in De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis (1545) Luca Baschera An old prejudice of Reformation scholarship concerns the supposed hostility of Protestant theologians to philosophy. The iterated attacks of the reformers against scholastic theology, which was accused of idolatrous confidence in the possibilities of human reason and was reproached for its undue mixing of revealed truth and pagan wisdom, seem to confirm this prejudice. Moreover, the open disqualification of Aristotelian ethics in Martin Luther's Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam (1517) has led some scholars to consider Aristotelian philosophy in general, and his ethics in particular, as simply irreconcilable with the central tenets of Protestant theology.1 It goes without saying that if this idea of a diametrical opposition of Reformation theology and Aristotelian philosophy is accepted, all the authors who later in the sixteenth and seventeenth century made active use of Aristotelian definitions and argumentation patterns in their theological works should be considered as going astray from the original path of the Reformation.2
In the last decades an increasing number of scholars have challenged the validity of this thesis, questioning its very presuppositions.3 On the one hand, such concepts as 'scholasticism' and 'Aristotelianism' have been newly examined and redefined in view of their early modern meaning. On the other, it has been shown how the use of Aristotelian patterns of thought and the construction of a Protestant scholastic theology – that is, a theology organized in order to be taught in schools – did not necessarily bring with them a derogation from the original contents of Reformation theology.
Rather, such means were employed to serve the cause of the Reformation,
giving to its contents a form fitting the needs of students and defending it efficaciously against the attacks of both 'Papists' and Radicals.
A further challenge for the advocates of the traditional view comes from the observation that the interest of Protestants in philosophy, which manifested itself increasingly from the 1560s on, was not a new phenomenon at all. Apart from Philipp Melanchthon's well-known interest in philosophy and especially in ethics early in the 1520s and 1530s – which was never opposed by Luther – there is evidence that philosophy was also held in high esteem at reformed academies. If we look at the Schola
Tigurina, it is first of all Conrad Gessner (1516–65) who merits mention.
Starting in 1541, he taught in Zurich physics, astronomy, mathematics and ethics for 26 years, basing his lectures on Aristotle's works, as well as on compendia of Aristotelian philosophy and on commentaries of contemporary authors.4 Till 1546 he shared these incumbences with Otto
Werdmüller (1513–52), a former student of Melanchthon who had taught in Basel and returned to Zurich in 1541. In contrast with Gessner, whose lectures on the Physics were printed only posthumously,5 Werdmüller published in his lifetime a work on philosophy, more precisely on ethics: De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis, quam Aristoteles ad
Nicomachum filium conscripsit.6
In the remainder of this chapter we will focus on this work of Werdmüller's in order to understand how he qualified the relationship between ethics and other disciplines, such as dialectic, jurisprudence, medicine and especially theology. Our study will show that Werdmüller's
De dignitate represents in fact one of the first fruits of the reception and elaboration of the Aristotelian heritage among the reformed. Werdmüller clearly viewed Aristotle's philosophy as a model of argumentative cogency and regarded it as a reliable source in matters of scientific methodology and logic. Moreover, he specially commended Aristotle's ethics as a complementary – but indispensable – reference towards the development of a systematic account of Christian ethics, a project which was to be pursued by later authors.
Life and Works Otto Werdmüller, second son of Heinrich Werdmüller, a member of the Zurich city council who served afterwards as captain in the Protestant army
during the second Kappel war, was born in 1513.7 He attended the Grossmünster school in Zurich with Oswald Myconius as teacher, whom
Werdmüller referred to later as his 'second father'. Because of his outstanding talents and zeal, in 1532 he was sent to Basel, where Myconius, who in the meantime had succeeded Oecolampadius as antistes (head minister) in that city, prepared him for university studies. After having studied from 1534 to 1536 in Strasbourg Werdmüller moved to the University of Wittenberg and in 1538 became a master of arts under Philipp
Melanchthon. Between 1539 and 1540 he taught at the faculty of liberal arts at the University of Basel, interrupting his teaching in the first half of 1540 in order to spend some time in Paris and Orléans for further study.
Werdmüller's long studies and wide-ranging reading had made of him a competent scholar indebted, however, not only to his teachers, but also to the booksellers from whom he bought year after year the volumes which formed his large private library. It was because of financial problems that Werdmüller returned in 1541 to Zurich, where he immediately began to teach ethics and physics at the Schola Tigurina. The first work he completed in Zurich, an anthology of texts by classical authors on the similitudes between different species of animals, was printed posthumously.8 In 1545 Werdmüller published in Basel his major work on philosophy, De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis. It must be noticed, however, that since his ordination as deacon in 1543 Werdmüller gradually abandoned his philosophical studies in order to dedicate himself thoroughly to theology and the preaching of the gospel. In 1547 he was promoted to the office of archdeacon. In the remaining nine years of his life
– Werdmüller died of the plague at the age of 39 in 1552 – he composed some theological and pastoral works, which were frequently reprinted and even translated in other languages.9
Scope and Purpose of the Work If we now turn our attention to De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis, it appears to us as a work in which the characteristics of a manual and a commentary are mixed together. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics10 forms unmistakably the background to Werdmüller's argumentation in the first part of this work, which is conceived of as an introduction to the study of Aristotle's moral philosophy. In the second part, which is a kind of long
appendix to the main text, Werdmüller offers a detailed summary of the content of each chapter in the NE in order to facilitate the understanding of Aristotle's ethical theory. There is in fact a strong pedagogical concern underlying this whole work by Werdmüller, who in his dedicatory letter to Heinrich Bullinger underlines the necessity for the young to begin early with the study of sound philosophy.11 Moreover, the fact that Werdmüller often inserts long passages from the NE, quoted always first in Greek and then in his own Latin translation, suggests that he probably also conceived of his work as a kind of anthology of the NE, organized in a systematic manner and allowing a direct approach to Aristotle's text.
As the title of this book indicates, Werdmüller wanted to offer a form of apology for ethical studies and for Aristotelian ethics in particular. Actually
Werdmüller tends to identify moral philosophy in general with the Aristotelian one, or even with the very text of the NE, something which can be considered as a sign of the normativity the latter text continued to have in the Renaissance and particularly at Protestant universities and seminars, in spite of Luther's rather destructive criticism some decades before.
Werdmüller's purpose in his De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis is to show how useful a thorough study of Aristotle's moral philosophy can be, first, as a kind of complement to the study of the three main disciplines of theology, jurisprudence and medicine; and secondly, for a better understanding of the principles of dialectic, the instruments and rules of which were applied by Aristotle in the NE. According to Werdmüller, the students of today can therefore look at Aristotle's text as a catalogue of examples for the practical application of dialectical and logical tools.12
Werdmüller's work – or, specifically, the first part of it – opens with a dedicatory letter to Heinrich Bullinger and contains 23 chapters and an epilogue. Chapters two to ten are dedicated to the question of the relationship between ethics and theology, whereas the connections between moral philosophy and jurisprudence as well as medicine are dealt with in a much more cursory way in the eleventh and twelfth chapters. After an excursus on the excellence of Aristotelian philosophy (ch. 15), Werdmüller analyses the positive interactions between the study of the NE and that of dialectic. According to the Ciceronian distinction between inventio and iudicium – revived in early modern times through its application in Rudolph
Agricola's De inventione dialectica13 – Werdmüller shows that in the NE
examples are to be found not only for the use of not less than 22 'common places', but also illuminating applications of apodictical and anapodictical
(that is, non-demonstrative) arguments, such as syllogisms and enthimemes.
Moreover, it is the very structure and style of the NE that, according to Werdmüller, offers an example of order and elegance to be followed:
'Aristotle offers excellent examples of pure, elegant and sound eloquence'.14
The Dignity of Philosophy In the second chapter of De dignitate Werdmüller defines philosophy as 'knowledge of all things human and divine, sofar this can be attained by reason – which is God's gift – through a sound method and apart from the regenerating action of the Holy Spirit'.15 This definition, which draws on a long tradition going back to Stoicism,16 pinpoints both the claim to universality and the limits of philosophical knowledge. On the one hand, the object of philosophical enquiry is the totality of being, which philosophy has to investigate according to the rules of scientific method, in order that the conclusions reached can be certain. On the other hand, the fact that philosophy develops apart from any divine influence points at its constitutive incapacity of grasping the essential doctrines of Chistianity, the knowledge of which is necessary for salvation, but which can be apprehended only by faith through God's inspiration. We see, therefore, that from the very beginning of his enquiry Werdmüller wants to make clear which are the boundaries of philosophy, underlining at the same time its legitimity. For, if philosophy does not contribute as such to the attainment of salvation, it has nonetheless to be considered a gift of God, because the faculty of reason itself was imparted by Him to human beings. This is the reason why Werdmüller can affirm that philosophy, now conceived in a more restricted way as 'explanation of the things created by God', constitutes an 'excellent ornament for Christians'.17
However, before addressing the question about Werdmüller's view of the relationship between philosophy and Christian faith, it is necessary to examine how he justifies the possibility of philosophy in general.
Philosophy has been defined as a true knowledge of the totality of being, and at the same time it has been emphasized that philosophy develops apart from grace. The question is therefore: is it possible that human beings attain
through their autonomous efforts any kind of true knowledge, given the corruption of the human faculties derived from original sin? According to Werdmüller, human nature was not destroyed, but only corrupted by Adam's fall, so that there still remain 'traces' (vestigia) of the original perfection.18 Human beings still possess a 'sound mind' (sana mens) which can attain to a true knowledge of method (via docendi), of civil virtue and of the natural world without any special intervention of God.19 Although
Werdmüller does not mention it explicitly, it is evident that he draws here on a traditional distinction between natural and supernatural gifts which God would have imparted to Adam: whereas the supernatural gifts, such as faith and righteousness, were taken away by the fall, the natural ones – the intellect and the will – were only partially corrupted, but not annihilated.
This distinction, which had been typical for medieval theology and derives probably from Augustine, was borrowed also by reformed theologians, who used it both to affirm that human beings are able to act spontaneously and are therefore responsible for their actions, and to justify – as in the case of Werdmüller – the possibility of philosophy.20 It is interesting to notice, however, that the use of the distinction between natural and supernatural gifts urged Werdmüller also to modify his previous definition of philosophy, accommodating it to the peculiar needs of Christian theology. From a postlapsarian perspective philosophy is indeed possible, but it cannot aspire any more to a universal knowledge 'of things human and divine', and has to content itself with the investigation of logic (via docendi), ethics (civilis virtus) and physics (naturales res), that is, of those realms which the created and fallen intellect of men is still able to explore.
Nonetheless, to affirm in creational perspective that philosophy is possible did not amount yet to a ratification of its legitimacy from a Christian point of view. Werdmüller was indeed conscious that such New
Testament statements as Colossians 2:8 ('See to it that no one takes you captive through philosophy and empty deceit', NRSV) could be interpreted as a complete rejection of any kind of 'human wisdom' and required therefore further examination. Adopting also in this respect a point of view shared by most of his contemporaries, Werdmüller offers a conciliatory reading of Colossians 2:8, restricting the signification of the term
'philosophy' to that of 'sophistry'. In this manner he can interpret Paul's statement as being directed only against undue mixing of profane and sacred wisdom, but not against philosophy as such, which has rather to be
considered as God's gift.21 We can see, therefore, how this ratification of the legitimacy of philosophy entails also a reaffirmation of its limits and, at least implicitly, of its subordination to theology. Philosophy enjoys indeed a certain autonomy in the investigation of logic, civil ethics and nature, but as soon as the results of its enquiry come to clash with the contents of biblical revelation, these are to be rejected as a degeneration of 'sound philosophy' into sophistry. It is therefore hardly surprising that, recommending the study of Aristotelian philosophy to the students of the Schola Tigurina, he revitalized the traditional metaphor of philosophy as 'maiden of theology', in order to underline the subordination of human wisdom to the latter.22
Werdmüller corroborates further his thesis about the legitimacy of philosophical enquiry from a Christian point of view by indicating its usefulness and even indispensableness for theology. First of all, theology – exactly as any other discipline which desires to present itself as a science – needs to be developed according to the rules of scientific method.23 These rules, which govern the construction of any coherent argumentation, must be observed by the theologian in order to clearly present the truth and defend it against the objections of heretics.24 In fact – Werdmüller notices – the rules of scientific argumentation are employed also in the Bible, but their application is not accompanied there by a detailed explanation. This is the reason why Christians need to apprehend those rules from philosophy, and especially from Aristotle, who remains according to Werdmüller the unsurpassed 'master of method'.25 Although Werdmüller reserves for dialectic the label of 'God's most distinguished gift',26 he expresses the conviction that also natural philosophy can turn out to be useful for the theologian. On the one hand Werdmüller thinks that the study of the created world in its different parts, as well as the appreciation of its harmony as a whole, leads almost necessarily to the acknowledgment of the existence of a divine ordaining mind. Even though the mysteries of Christian theology
(the Trinity, the two natures in Christ, the remission of sin) cannot be grasped but by faith, Werdmüller does not exclude the possibility of natural theology, which, moving from a consideration of the series of causes, of the harmony between the different parts of the world and of the eternal conservation of the species, can demonstrate the existence of a wise, just and benevolent God.27 On the other hand he considers the knowledge of natural philosophy as a precondition for a proper exegesis of several biblical texts. Such sciences as astronomy or geography are in fact as
fundamental for the explanation of God's word as the mastery of Hebrew and Greek.28 Therefore, for these reasons philosophy should not be rejected, but rather praised by Christians. As Werdmüller pointedly expresses it,
God's deeds and prophecies cannot be properly investigated but with the aid of philosophy; thus, the contempt of the latter amounts to a contempt of the former.29
Concluding this section on Werdmüller's view of philosophy, it is important to notice that he does not only insist on the usefulness of philosophy in general, but states his decided commitment to Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition. His appreciation of Aristotle can already be observed in what he said about the special merits of the Stagirite in the development of logic and scientific methodology. However, it is in chapter fifteen of De dignitate that Werdmüller addresses the issue of Aristotle's excellence in a more direct and detailed way. On the one hand he emphasizes once more that Aristotle stands out against Socrates, Plato and the Pythagoric tradition for the perspicuity of his style and his straightforward application of the rules of scientific method.30 On the other, he declares Aristotle's philosophy to be the one which most closely corresponds to nature, and hence to divine ordinances.31 Further, Aristotle's moral philosophy is commendable because it avoids the excesses of other ethical systems like that of the Stoics, who condemned every passion and propounded a paradoxical ideal of apatheia as highest good.32
Both in his recognition of the legitimacy of philosophy, under the condition that it deports as a maiden of theology, and in his preference for the Peripatetic tradition, Werdmüller shows plainly the continuity between his approach and that of his former master, Philipp Melanchthon.
Melanchthon was deeply concerned with the foundation of an 'erudite theology', capable of expounding consistently the revealed truth and of answering efficaciously to the objections of adversaries. For him philosophy, considered in its broadest sense as orbis artium, had an indispensable part to play in the realization of this goal. And this was for exactly the same reasons which Werdmüller refers to in De dignitate
(importance of logic for pedagogical and polemical purposes, and of natural philosophy for natural theology and exegesis).33 In addition, Melanchthon made no secret of his preference for Aristotle over against other philosophers. According to him Aristotle's mastering of method and perspicuity make his philosophy more suitable for teaching purposes,34
whereas his ethics, holding to a moderate ideal of metriopatheia, avoids the excesses of Stoicism and proves therefore to be more compatible with Christian doctrine.35 These views of Melanchthon's concerning the relationship of philosophy to theology and the excellence of Aristotle became part of a general consensus among Lutheran, as well as reformed divines. As far as the reformed were concerned, such positions were championed in the second half of the sixteenth century by Girolamo Zanchi,
Peter Martyr Vermigli and Theodore Beza.36 In this regard, indeed, Werdmüller's approach cannot be regarded as either revolutionary or exceedingly original. Nonetheless, if we consider the early date of publication of De dignitate (1545), it seems actually that the Zuricher
Werdmüller was one of the first reformed authors – if not the first – who made Melanchthon's viewpoint his own, thereby acting as intermediary between Wittenberg and the reformed world.
The Study of the Nicomachean Ethics as a Complement to Dialectic, Jurisprudence and Medicine It has already been noted above that Werdmüller's main purpose in writing
De dignitate was to recommend a thorough study of the NE to students of all disciplines, of dialectic as well as of jurisprudence, medicine and theology. Werdmüller's claim about the interdisciplinary relevance of Aristotelian ethics has to be now examined in greater detail. We will treat first the relationship between ethics and dialectic, jurisprudence and medicine; considering its particular importance, the relationship between ethics and theology will be discussed later.
Although the NE cannot be, of course, considered as a manual of dialectic, Werdmüller insists nonetheless on its extreme usefulness as a complement to the study of this discipline. He considers that students will find in it clear examples of the application of those rules which in Aristotle's logical works are presented just in abstract form. Hence, seeing how those rules can be applied in concrete situations, they will also be able to understand them better.37 Indeed, Werdmüller constantly refers to Aristotle as the sole authority in matters of logic, but in his presentation of this subject there is also discernable an influence of humanistic logic, with which he might have come in touch through his master, Philipp
Melanchthon. Thus, Werdmüller divides dialectic in 'invention of
individual things' and 'argumentation', which evidently correspond to inventio and iudicium, the two main parts of dialectic according to both
Rudolph Agricola and Melanchthon.38 Moreover, Werdmüller defines inventio as the identification of those topics (sedes et domicilia), by means of which individual things can be known and explained,39 showing that for him – as well as for Agricola and Melanchthon – dialectic is at the core a topical discipline, concerned with fixing those loci which enable to argue conclusively on any given subject matter.40 As far as 'invention' is concerned, Werdmüller refers to 22 passages from the NE which contain examples for the use of just as many loci.41 If inventio has to do with individual things and concepts, 'argumentation' consists in the connection of different concepts into a coherent discourse, aiming at the clarification of contentious questions.42 Werdmüller shows his dependence on humanist models also in the treatment of this second part of dialectic. For example, although he does not reject altogether the validity and usefulness of syllogistic argumentation, only a small portion of text is devoted to show how this kind of argumentation is used in the NE. Instead, the treatment of different kinds of topical argumentation, all to be found in the NE and each related to a specific locus, covers 13 pages.43
If students of logic may take advantage from the study of the NE, regarding it as a collection of different kinds of definitions and argumentations, an even deeper linkage has to be acknowledged between ethics and jurisprudence. In fact, the interest of logicians in the NE rests only on formal considerations. Lawyers should be concerned with ethics for the more substantial reason that jurisprudence and ethics share to a certain extent the same object, that is, virtue. Of course, there is also a fundamental difference in the way in which both disciplines deal with this common subject matter; ethics being concerned with the 'universal doctrine of virtue', whereas jurisprudence is rather a collection of 'all the precepts leading to virtue'.44 So, for example, it is ethics which determines the conditions upon which an action can be considered voluntary or involuntary, while jurisprudence simply takes up from ethics such concepts as 'voluntary', 'involuntary' or 'coercion', and applies them to specific juridical cases in order to establish whether and how a crime has to be punished.45 Therefore, the difference existing between ethics and jurisprudence is analogous to that between a theory and its application: 'The law applies to different cases those things which moral philosophy – which
has to be regarded as the source of civil laws – generally and synthetically has established'.46 Against this background it becomes obvious that Werdmüller insists on the necessity of ethics as a complement to the study of law because only through the knowledge of ethics is it possible to understand, as it were, the general logic of specific laws.47 At the same time, it is quite evident that Werdmüller's explanation of how jurisprudence and ethics are related to one another suggests a certain superiority of ethics as compared with jurisprudence, as the latter consists for him in a mere accumulation of cases, whereas the former is a 'methodical inquiry' of the very nature of virtue and vice.48
Finally, also the complementarity of the study of ethics to that of medicine rests for Werdmüller on a certain overlapping of the two disciplines as to their object. Relying upon a long tradition going back to Hippocrates and Galenus, and still alive in the Renaissance, Werdmüller expresses the conviction that physical disease derives from an alteration of the natural equilibrium among the humours in the human body.49 Moreover, according to this theory there is a close relationship between alterations of the humours and affections of the soul,50 whereby an excess of certain humours can cause specific affections, and affections exercise in turn an influence on the blend of humours in the body.51 Since this theory admits the possibility of feedback from the affections of the soul to the blend of the body, and since physical health depends primarily on this same blend, it becomes evident in which sense there is for Werdmüller a deep linkage between ethics and medicine. On the one hand, ethics endeavours to moderate the emotions without regard to the state of the body; but in view of the fact that emotions exercise a retroaction on the blend of the body, ethics can also contribute to preserve the physical health of human beings.52
Therefore, this is the reason why Werdmüller recommends the study of the NE to physicians: although medicine as such is concerned only with the health of the body, it must be recognized that ethics, insofar it deals with the moderation of emotions, is relevant also from a medical point of view.53
Ethics and Theology: Werdmüller's Melanchthonian Approach Addressing the issue of the relationship between Aristotelian ethics and theology, Werdmüller offers first of all a definition of moral philosophy, which constitutes a sort of background for his further analysis. According to
him, 'pagan moral doctrine contains, on the one hand, an explanation of those virtues which human reason considers most necessary for the present life; on the other hand [it contains also an explanation] of those vices and misdeeds, against which that same reason advises us – sofar it can'.54
Evidently, the notion of 'reason' plays a central role in this definition, and actually constitutes the very 'organ' of ethics. It is reason that determines what virtue and vice are, laying in this way the foundation for the whole ethical discourse. However, Werdmüller's definition would have remained quite generic, if he had contented himself with such a vague reference to reason as the 'organ' of ethics. He proceeds, therefore, to specify what reason means in ethical context, defining it as that law of nature or faculty of moral judgment, which God engraved in human souls and which still survives in us in spite of Adam's fall.55 The presence of this law of nature in all human beings conveys a sort of innate capacity of distinguishing between good and evil apart from any special influence of the holy Spirit, as well as an immediate knowledge of such general ethical principle as:
'The wicked should be punished', or: 'One should obey the magistrates', or even: 'The deity should be worshipped'.56
It is easy to see how this identification of practical reason with the law of nature provides a creational foundation of philosophical ethics, which amounts at a legitimation of it from a Christian point of view. For, since
Christians believe that all which God created is good, they must consider also ethics as something good, because it grounds on that faculty of moral judgment that God gave to human beings when he created them. Moreover, affirming that ethics develops itself in a natural way apart from any special divine influence, Werdmüller emphasizes its universal validity for Christians and pagans alike. It must be noticed, however, that precisely this universal validity of ethics beyond all religious boundaries hints also at the essential difference between ethics and theology: the former is in itself a mere philosophical discipline, which develops independently from divine revelation and grace, and is therefore devoid of any soteriological relevance.
Werdmüller further develops this line of thought, addressing directly the question about the relationship between ethics and Christian doctrine as to their respective content. According to him ethics identifies first of all the goal of human life, proceeding afterwards to analyse the means to attain this goal. Therefore, ethics contains a doctrine of happiness (the final aim of
human action) and a doctrine of virtue (the practice of which leads to happiness). As far as happiness is concerned, it is defined by Aristotle as an 'activity of the soul in accordance with virtue',57 or more simply – in Werdmüller's rendering – as the 'practice of virtue' (usus virtutum).58
Further, according to Aristotle this chief good can be attained by human beings through a due moderation of the passions and through contemplation.59
On the background of this sketchy exposition of Aristotle's doctrine, Werdmüller emphasizes that such a definition of happiness can be accepted by Christians only upon one fundamental condition: that the realm of civil life be clearly distinguished from that of theology proper. In the realm of civil life Aristotle's doctrine of happiness can be well applied, because in this sphere virtues are indeed acquired by habituation and human beings can attain through their own efforts some kind of mundane happiness. Instead, the situation changes completely if we address the issue of happiness from a theological point of view. In this case it must be recognized that happiness does not consist in the practice of virtue, but rather in 'redemption through Christ'.60 Moreover, in contrast with civil happiness this specific Christian chief good cannot be attained by human beings, unless they are led to it by God himself.61 However, neither the Christian notion of happiness nor the necessity of God's help in order to attain it could have been grasped by pagan philosophers, because they lacked any knowledge of the sinfulness of human nature, proclaimed in biblical revelation through the doctrine of Adam's fall.62
What distinguishes civil ethics from Christian doctrine is, therefore, their different anthropological starting point. Moving from a negative account of the faculties of the human soul, Christians cannot help considering the teachings of the philosophers in general and of Aristotle in particular, according to whom happiness may be attained through a mere moderation of the passions, as defective. Ethics indeed maintains its validity in the realm of civil life and in this sense does not contradict theology, but the only use it seems to have from a theological point of view is a negative one. Eventually, according to Werdmüller, the study of Aristotelian ethics must be recommended to theologians because it enables them to appreciate the utter incommensurability of pagan moral philosophy and Christian doctrine.63
The way in which Werdmüller has developed his argumentation so far bears witness to the deep influence Melanchthon's ethics exercised on him.
Werdmüller seems to have been well aware of his debts to his former master and actually does not conceal this circumstance. Rather, he acknowledges it, referring explicitly to Melanchthon's Epitome philosophiae moralis as an authoritative ethics handbook and as a source for his own investigations.64 Werdmüller's dependence on Melanchthon comes to the fore first of all in his definition of ethics as an explanation of the law of nature, whereby the latter is identified with that moral faculty which God engraved in human souls at the moment of creation.65 Equally derived from Melanchthon appears the sharp distinction between theology proper and ethics, which is complementary to the creational foundation of the latter.66 Melanchthon had defined moral philosophy as 'that part of God's law which directs external action'67 and therefore pertains to the sphere of civil life in human societies. Hence, ethics is indeed fundamental for the preservation of order in a state, but it is at the same time completely irrelevant from a soteriological point of view, because eternal salvation is brought about only by the Gospel which announces the remission of sins through Christ. Whereas ethics is concerned with the control of external behaviour and is therefore associated with the category of 'Law', the Gospel – which is received by faith – proclaims the efficacy of God's grace apart from any human deed.68 In this way, ethics enjoys indeed universal validity on account of its religious neutrality, but it is at the same time and precisely for this reason completely irrelevant from a theological – that is, soteriological – standpoint. Werdmüller shares therefore with Melanchthon also the fundamental conviction that ethics and theology are utterly incommensurable in view of their respective goals.
Beyond Melanchthon: Christian Ethics and the Positive Use of Aristotle's Doctrine of Virtue However, it would be erroneous to consider Werdmüller's approach as a mere repetition of the views of his master Philipp Melanchthon. Especially in chapter 4 of De dignitate – which significantly bears the title: 'The virtues described in ethics pertain to the theologian' – Werdmüller tries to go beyond Melanchthon's merely negative account of the relationship between theology and moral philosophy, pointing to a positive use of the
second part of ethics (the doctrine of virtue) in theological context. As we saw, the philosophical and the Christian definition of happiness – of the goal of human life – differ essentially according to Werdmüller, so that no positive relationship between the two realms of moral philosophy and theology is possible in this respect. The situation changes, however, when we turn our attention to the philosophical account of virtue.
First of all it must be recognized that the very concept of virtue is not alien to Christian doctrine, for even the Gospel contains several moral precepts. Nonetheless, as Werdmüller notices, this similarity of Christian doctrine with ethics turns out to be quite superficial, as it is confined to a material level: both ethics and theology teach virtue. As soon as the formal determination of 'virtue' in theology and ethics is considered, however, it becomes evident that the account of virtue is rather different in the two contexts. Whereas in pagan ethics virtue constitutes the path leading to happiness, Christian theology conceives the practice of virtue rather as a consequence of the attainment of happiness, whereby the latter coincides – as we saw earlier – with redemption through Christ.69 Moreover, according to pagan ethics human beings should be driven to the practice of virtue by the love of virtue itself, while Christians endeavour to be virtuous to the glory of God.70 The definition of virtuous behaviour as a consequence of redemption mirrors evidently the Protestant doctrine about the relationship of justification and sanctification. Moreover, the special emphasis
Werdmüller lays on it can be considered as evidence of his peculiarly reformed stance. As is well known, other than the Lutherans the reformed gave particular weight to the necessity of good works as a result of the inner renovation which accompanies justification, and insisted that the only true faith is that which bears fruits of righteousness.71
In view of this fundamental divergence in the definition of virtue and apart from the material connection mentioned above, it would seem that also with regard to the doctrine of virtue the differences between pagan ethics and Christian theology outweigh the similarities, impeding any positive relationship.
However, it is precisely the recognition of another fundamental difference between theology and ethics which gives occasion to an important shift in Werdmüller's discourse. The philosophical and the theological accounts of virtue differ not only formally, but also with regard to method. Holy Scripture contains indeed moral precepts, but does not
offer a complete theory of virtue. Aristotle, instead, deals in the NE with the very nature and the causes of virtue, giving detailed definitions of important concepts, which Werdmüller considers very useful towards a better understanding of biblical morals. Therefore – writes Werdmüller – 'we hold that the young should study Aristotle, because he does not deal scantily with vices and virtues, as holy scripture does, but treats every single virtue and vice in a structured and detailed way'.72
It is at this point that Werdmüller seems most clearly to depart from Melanchthon's model, in order to delineate an alternative understanding of the relationship of pagan ethics to theology. According to him, the philosophical doctrine of virtue, as it is contained in the NE, can and even should fulfil an ancillary function in view of the foundation and development of a system of Christian ethics. For example, Christians find in the Bible such precepts as: 'Do not swerve to the right or to the left; turn your foot away from evil' (Proverbs 4:27, NRSV). Werdmüller discerns a fundamental agreement between that precept and Aristotle's definition of virtue as the golden mean between two vicious extremes and is therefore convinced that also the description of different virtues and vices the Stagirite offers may help the theologian developing a thorough system of Christian ethics.73 Equally helpful and 'most true' in philosophical as well as in theological context are Aristotle's definitions of such concepts as 'voluntary', 'involuntary' and 'choice'. Among others, they lead Christians to understand that what matters in moral action is, above all, the intention and not the action itself. This is the reason why Jesus regarded the alms of the poor widow as greater than those of the rich (Luke 21:1–4).74
Indeed, there remains always a margin of difference between moral philosophy and Christian doctrine. As an example Werdmüller refers to the fact that, according to Aristotle's doctrine, original sin could not be imputed to human beings after Adam and Eve, because nobody apart from them perpetrate it actually and 'voluntarily'. This, of course, must not be considered as a proof of the non-imputability of original sin, but only as a demonstration that the Aristotelian concept of 'voluntary' is too narrow.75
The recognition of such discrepancies between Aristotle's moral philosophy and Christian doctrine, however, should not induce to a total rejection of the former. Theologians can further on take profit from Aristotle's ethics, although they must bear in mind that there is no perfect coincidence between revelation and philosophy.
As we see, Werdmüller holds that the contents of Christian ethics – that is, the single precepts, as well as the definition of the goal of human life – must be derived exclusively from Holy Scripture. Nonetheless, the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue retains, on account of his 'scientificity', a fundamental role for a better understanding of the moral precepts contained in the Bible. In this sense the function of moral philosophy in relationship with Christian ethics is comparable with that which Werdmüller ascribed to it in relationship with jurisprudence. Just as the collections of Roman laws contain the rules for the administration of justice, but no explanation of them, Holy Scripture provides, as it were, the contents of Christian ethics, whereas it is the task of philosophy to convey those definitions and conceptual explanations which are necessary for a thorough understanding of them. It is important to notice, however, that contrary to his account of the relationship between ethics and jurisprudence Werdmüller does not conclude to any – not even relative – eminence of moral philosophy over Holy Scripture. Rather, he carefully emphasizes that, although philosophy is indeed very useful for the explanation of theological issues, it must always be considered inferior to theology, as a maiden is with respect to her mistress.76
Conclusion Otto Werdmüller's De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis can be regarded as one of the first works, in which a reformed author reflected on the legitimacy of philosophical studies, in order to provide a directory for the pursuit of liberal arts at a Protestant educational institution. In order to illustrate the usefulness of philosophy, Werdmüller chose to focus on the Nicomachean Ethics, recommending its study to on-going jurists, physicians and theologians. In his evaluation of both philosophy in general and of ethics in particular, Werdmüller proves to be first of all a loyal disciple of Philipp Melanchthon. Especially in terms of his high estimation of philosophical studies, he took up the views of his former master, which were to become part of an extended consensus among both Lutheran and reformed theologians.77 Regarding the issue of the relationship between Aristotelian ethics and theology, instead, he moved even beyond the Melanchthonian position of a thorough separation of the two realms of moral philosophy and Christian soteriology.
Although also Werdmüller emphasized – as any Protestant author did – the exclusivity of grace as the only ground for our salvation, he refused to confine ethics to the sphere of external action and civil life, but insisted on the close relationship between redemption and actual renewal, which must result in the practice of virtue. Moreover, Werdmüller regarded Aristotle's doctrine of virtue as a very helpful model towards the development of a Christian ethics, because in the NE it can be found such detailed explanations and definitions of the causes and the nature of virtue, which constitute a sort of complement to the catalogues of moral precepts contained in the Scriptures. A similar approach can be found later in Peter
Martyr Vermigli. In his own Commentary on the NE Vermigli admitted the possibility of a theological application of Aristotle's doctrine of virtue, though restraining it to those virtues the believers develop as a consequence of their inner renewal through the Holy Spirit.78 Even Lambert Daneau, who in the Ethices christianae libri tres (Geneva: Eustache Vignon, 1577) tried to present his system of Christian ethics simply as a 'concretion of God's law as it is summarized in the decalogue',79 drew de facto to a great extent on the Aristotelian tradition, which he appropriated among others through the mediation of Melanchthon's textbooks.80
From this point of view, therefore, Werdmüller's work as a Christian moral philosopher can be considered to stay at the beginning of a process which led during the remnant of the sixteenth century to the formation of a distinctively reformed ethics. Of course, the reformed recognized the existence of boundaries between ancient moral philosophy and Christian doctrine, but were at the same time open to the possibility of letting
Aristotle, and philosophy in general, interact with the Bible towards the development of a systematic account of Christian ethics. That the development of such a system was for them a priority is clearly demonstrated by the emphasis reformed divines always laid on the essential nexus of Gospel and Law, an emphasis which cannot be found, on the contrary, either in Melanchthon nor in Lutheran theology in general.
1 See Ronald N. Frost, 'Aristotle's Ethics: The Real Reason for Luther's Reformation?', Trinity
Journal 18 (1997), pp. 223–41.
2 This thesis has been exemplarily championed by Basil Hall, 'Calvin against the Calvinists', in Gervase E. Duffield et al., John Calvin (Appleford: Sutton Courtenay Press, 1966), esp. pp. 25–30.
3 See first of all Richard A. Muller's Post Reformation's Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book
House, 2003), as well as his collection of essays After Calvin. Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). See also Carl R. Trueman and R.S.
Clark (eds), Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment (Carlisle: Pater Noster Press, 1999);
Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker (eds), Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical
Enterprise (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2001).
4 In his physics classes Gessner used for example along with Aristotle's Physics also Ermolao
Barbaro's Naturalis scientiae totius compendium, and appreciated also the Commentary on Physics by Jakob Schegk (1511–87). Gessner praises this work as outstanding for its erudition, method and clarity. Cf. Conrad Gessner, Bibliotheca universalis (Zurich: Christoph Froschauer the Elder, 1545), fol. 362r: 'Hos libros ego in gymnasio nostro Tigurino adolescentibus propono, cum nullius in hunc diem scripta viderim hoc in genere, quorum vel eruditio vel methodus et brevitas et sermonis honestas istis anteferri debeant'. See also Alfredo Serrai, Conrad Gesner (Rome: Bulzoni, 1990), pp.
41–3.
5 Conrad Gessner, Physicarum meditationum, annotationum et scholiorum lib[ri] (Zurich:
Officina Froschoviana, 1586).
6 Otto Werdmüller, De dignitate, usu et methodo philosophiae moralis (Basel: Hieronymus
Curio, 1545).
7 The only modern account of Werdmüller's life is Leo Weisz, Die Werdmüller: Schicksale eines alten Zürcher Geschlechtes, vol. 1 (Zurich: Schulthess, 1949), pp. 60–72.
8 Similitudines ab omnium animalium genere desumtae, appended to Johannes Fabricius
Montanus, Differentiae animalium quadrupedum secundum locos communes (Zurich: Andreas and Jakob Gessner, 1555).
9 It was Miles Coverdale (1488–1569), bishop of Exeter from 1551 to 1553, who was responsible for translating two treatises of Werdmüller's into English: A spiritual and most precious perle, teachynge all men to love and imbrace ye crosse (London: Gwalter Lynne, 1550), originally published as Ein Kleinot von trost und hilff in allerley truebsalen (Zurich: Christoph Froschauer the Elder, 1548), and A moste frutefull, pithye and learned treatise, how a christen ma[n] ought to behave himself in the dau[n]ger of death (Wesel: Hugh Singleton, 1555), originally published as Der
Tod. Wie sich ein Christ in seinen und anderer todsnoeten halten [soll] (Zurich: Augustin Fries,
1549). The English translation of the former treatise was reprinted in 1844 in a volume of Coverdale's works issued by the Parker Society, cf. Myles Coverdale, Writings and Translations, ed.
George Pearson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1844), pp. 91–194.
10 Quoted in the following as NE.
11 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 3: 'Cum multa divinitus a Tigurini collegii proceribus ad Dei gloriam et utilitatem ecclesiae instituta sunt, tum nihil praeclarius quam quod non solum Evangelii syncera doctrina publice proponitur, sed etiam ad id munus consecrati philosophia et honestis disciplinis a tenera aetate imbuuntur'.
12 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 143: 'Ad multa disserendi praecepta foelicius intelligenda conducere X Ethicorum libros'.
13 On Rudolph Agricola's logic see Wilhelm Risse, Logik der Neuzeit, vol. 1 (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1964), pp. 14–58; Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann, Topica
Universalis (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983), pp. 3–15.
14 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 204: 'Egregium exemplum est apud Aristotelem puri, elegantis et proprii sermonis'.
15 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 11: 'Philosophia divinarum et humanarum rerum atque adeo totius universitatis notitiam significat … quantam humana ratio per legitimam methodum suis viribus a Deo donatis, hoc est sine renovatione Spiritus sancti comparari potest'.
16 The definition of philosophy as 'science of things human and divine' is to be found in Cassiodorus' Institutiones without specification of any source, but was attributed by Aetius in his
Placita philosophorum to the Stoics. Cf. Cassiodorus, Institutiones divinarum et saecularium litterarum 2,3,5, ed. R.A.B. Mynors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 110,15–16; Aetius,
De placitis philosophorum 874E, ed. Guy Lachenaud (Paris: Les belles lettres, 1993), p. 69.
17 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 10: 'Philosophia, quae ducem sequitur humanam rationem nec aliud quam a Deo conditarum rerum explicationem continet, egregium Christiani decus et ornamentum existit'.
18 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 11: 'Haec ratio vel mens hominis … non tamen prorsus est deleta, ut nullum extet vestigium pristinae mentis'.
19 Ibid.: 'Adhuc enim sana mens, qualis qualis est, per se intelligit de via docendi, de civilibus virtutibus, de naturalibus rebus plurima eaque dignissima'.
20 John Calvin wrote in his Institutes (2,2,12): 'Ac illa quidem vulgaris sententia quam sumpserunt ex Augustino, mihi placet, naturalia dona fuisse corrupta in homine per peccatum, supernaturalibus autem exaninanitum fuisse' (John Calvin, Opera selecta, eds Peter Barth and Wilhelm Niesel, vol. 3 [Munich: Kaiser, 1928], p. 254,30–32). Probably he had a place from Peter
Lombard's Sentences in mind: 'Vulneratus quidem [homo] in naturalibus bonis, quibus non est privatus … spoliatus vero gratuitis, quae per gratiam naturalibus addira fuerunt' (Peter Lombard,
Sententiae in IV libris disctinctae, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae ad Claras Aquas, vol. 1
[Grottaferrata, 1971], p. 465,9–12). On Calvin's use of this distinction see also Dewey J. Hoitenga,
John Calvin and the Will: A Critique and Corrective (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1997), pp. 70–73. The same distinction is also present in Theodore Beza, cf. Jeffrey Mallinson, Faith,
Reason, and Revelation in Theodore Beza (1519–1605) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp.
115–18. See also Luca Baschera, 'Total Depravity? The Consequences of Original Sin in John Calvin and Later Reformed Theology', in Calvinus Clarissimus Theologus: Papers of the Tenth
International Congress of Calvin Research, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht, 2012), pp. 37–58.
21 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 32f.: 'Si Paulum de philosophia loquentem philosophiae peritus legat, quid Apostolus ibi reprehendat, clarius animadvertit, videlicet quod methodum docendi, operum Dei cognitionem, virtutes in hac vita necessarias aliasque philosophiae partes, Dei dotes eximias in Aristotelis scriptis eminentes, haudquaquam improbet, iudicium vero de Dei erga nos voluntate, de maximis in religione locis minime ex philosophia … sed e sacra scriptura sumendum esse moneat'. Similar readings of Col 2:8 are to be found in Melanchthon, Bullinger, Zanchi, and Calvin, cf. Luca Baschera, Tugend und Rechtfertigung: Peter Martyr Vermiglis Kommentar zur
Nikomachischen Ethik im Spannungsfeld von Philosophie und Theologie (Zurich: Theologischer
Verlag Zürich, 2008) (Zürcher Beiträge zur Reformationsgeschichte 26), p. 21.
22 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 207: 'Quantum ergo possum, adhortor omnes, qui ad veram et solidam eruditionem adspirant, Dei gloriam et salutem hominum provehere conantur, ut religioni velut dignissimae reginae philosophiam Aristotelis velut commodissimam famulam adiungant'.
23 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 12f.: 'Quamvis autem res ipsae, quas ethnici et christiani tradunt, toto coelo differant, non tamen est in via methodo discrimen, sed eadem methodus habet usum in omnium rerum inquisitione et explicatione' (my emphasis). Cf. Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 143:
'Necessariam esse cognitionem methodi, quam dialectica tradit, utpote sine qua nihil recte vel disci vel doceri queat in divinis et humanis rebus'.
24 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 12: 'Cum ipse de poenitentia, fide, charitate aut alia re concioneris, iterum tenere viam necesse est, quae quid proprie vel extrinsecus adhaereat rebus velut digito monstret; unde argumenta quoque ad vera munienda et falsa destruenda promuntur'.
25 Ibid.: 'Hanc vero methodum … non disces ex sacris literis, sed ex Aristotele perceptam in sacris literis deprehendes … Nec hodie quicquam extat de eadem re, quod non aut ab Aristotele desumptum aut ad Aristotelem melius intelligendum conscriptum videatur'.
26 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 13: 'Docendi methodum numerari debere inter Dei munera praestantissima'.
27 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 18: 'Tametsi nanque philosophia praecipuos christianae doctrinae locos de Trinitate, de Messiae duabus naturis, de remissione peccatorum, de vera in Deum fiducia penitus ignorat, tamen ex eleganti serie causarum, mirabili harmonia partium mundi et sempiterna conservatione specierum piissime ratiocinatur non solum existere Deum seu aeternam mentem, sed eandem quoque ineffabili virtute, sapientia, iustitia et benevolentia erga genus humanum esse praeditam'. The first two manners of demonstrating God's existence Werdmüller mentions are redolent of Thomas Aquinas' second and fifth 'ways', cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia q. 2 a. 3 co., in: S. Thomae Aquinatis opera omnia, ed. Roberto Busa, vol. 2 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt:
Frommann-Holzboog, 1980), p. 187f.
28 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 22f.: 'Haud absimiliter ad intelligenda reliqua verba citata, primum peritiae linguae requiritur … Mox perinde necessariae partes philosophiae rem ipsam docentes … quorum omnium doctrina, quantam humana mens assequi potest, apud physicos, astronomos, geographos et, ut summatim dicam, apud philosophos eosque solos invenitur'.
29 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 23: 'Adeo non obest igitur religioni philosophia sana, cuius patrocinium suscepimus, ut singulis ipsius partibus sine detrimento carere non liceat, et philosophiam contemnens, opera et oracula Dei contemnere videatur'.
30 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 133f.: 'Fatendum est tamen figurata dictione, Socraticis inductionibus, Pythagoricis numeris Platonem philosophiae suae nebulas offundere. A quibus
Aristoteles alienus, perspicuam magis et methodicam philosophiam composuit'.
31 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 136f.: 'Tametsi multi philosophi multa recte tradiderunt, unam tamen Aristotelis doctrinam ex omni genere philosophorum esse relictam, quae sanae rationi, quae naturae, id est divinae ordinationi, plusimum maximeque consentanea videatur'.
32 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 135f.: 'Huiusmodi falsas et sophisticas hyperbolas non docet
Peripateticus noster, sed modis omnibus repugnat impudentibus et monstrosis paradoxis … Similiter in reliquis permotionibus naturalem praecipit modum Aristoteles minimeque gentium approbat
Stoircorum apatheian, quae cum ipsa natura atque adeo cum Deo naturae authore (qui dedit organa quorundam affectionum) e diametro pugnat'.
33 Cf. Philipp Melanchthon, Oratio de philosophia, in Corpus Reformatorum, eds Karl Gottlieb
Bretschneider et al. (Berlin et al.: Schwetschke, 1834ff.) [cited as CR], vol. 11, col. 281: 'Magno instrumento destitutus est theologus, qui nescit illas eruditissimas disputationes de anima, de sensibus, de causis appetitionum et affectuum, de noticia, de voluntate … Omnino est orbis quidam artium, quo inter se devinctae copulataeque sunt omnes, ut ad singulas percipiendas multa ex aliis accipere oportet. Quare ecclesiae opus est toto illo doctrinarum orbe' (my emphasis).
34 Philipp Melanchthon, Oratio de Aristoteles, in CR, vol. 11, col. 348: 'Aristoteles … discentium utilitati consulere et scholas iuvare voluit. Haec voluntas etiam in philosopho magnam laudem meretur. Integre complexus est artes dialecticen, physicen et ethicen, et duas res adhibet, quae lumen afferunt in docendo, methodum et proprietatem sermonis … Platonica illa licentia in disputando parit incertas et ambiguas opiniones, non secus ac pictores ludentes pingunt chimeras aut centauros'.
35 Cf. Philipp Melanchthon, Philosophiae moralis epitome, in CR, vol. 16, cols 50–56.
36 Zanchi praised Aristotle in his preface to a Greek edition of Aristotle's Physics, quoting also
Melanchthon to corroborate his positive judgment of the Stagirite, cf. Girolamo Zanchi, De naturali
auscultatione (Strasbourg: Windelin Rihel, 1554), fols b7v–c1v. On his turn, Vermigli taught ethics in Strasbourg from 1554 to 1556, basing his lactures on the NE. His commentary was edited by his famulus Giulio Santerenziano and published in Zurich in 1563, cf. Petrus Martyr Vermigli,
Kommentar zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles, eds Luca Baschera and Christian Moser
(Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011) (Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions 158; Texts and Sources 1). Finally Theodore Beza did not hesitate to name Aristotle 'the sharpest of all the philosophers' (Mallinson, Faith, p. 53). On Beza's Aristotelianism see Mallinson, Faith, pp. 53–63.
37 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 143f.: 'Ad multa disserendi praecepta foelicius intelligenda conducere X Ethicorum libros institui declarare. Etsi prudenti consilio Philosophus in Organo saepe literis a, b, g exemplorum vice utitur, aliquoties autem significantibus quidem vocibus, verum succinta brevitate expressis, alia quoque exempla rudioribus ex tota philosophia proponi debent. Ac sane cum Aristoteles tot seculorum consensu summus docendi artifex iudicetur et Ethica in populari quadam atque omnibus prope exposita materia versetur, ex Aristotelis Ethica valde idonea depromuntur exempla methodi, qua et simplices et compositae res breviter, perspicue, artificiose tractentur'.
38 See Risse, Logik der Neuzeit, vol. 1, pp. 18 and 89f. Melanchthon did make also use of another classification of logic in definitio, divisio, and argumentatio, designating the distinction between inventio and iudicium as vetus divisio. Cf. Philipp Melanchthon, Erotemata dialectices 4, in CR, vol.
13, col. 641.
39 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 144: 'Certas constituunt dialectici sedes et domicilia, e quibus eruit Aristoteles, quae ad simplicis rei explicationem pertinent, omnia'.
40 Cf. Rudolph Agricola, De inventione dialectica 2,1, ed. Lothar Mundt (Tübingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1991), p. 196,14–18: 'Dialectices munus … duabus comprehensum est partibus: quarum una excogitandi argumenti viam docet, quam inveniendi vocat, cui parti omnis de locis destinatur disputatio'. Melanchthon, Erotemata dialectices 4, in CR, vol. 13, col. 641: 'Haec ars [inventrix] vocatur topike, id est doctrina locorum, qui sunt veluti indices rerum vel investigandarum vel eligendarum'.
41 See Werdmüller, De dignitate, pp. 144–67. The loci which Werdmüller refers to are: definitio, divisio, proprium, coniugata, adiacentia, subiectum, materia, efficiens, finis, destinata, effectus, tempus, connexa, contingentia, nomen, pronunciata, exempla, similia, dissimile, opposita, collationes and cognata.
42 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 167f.: 'De simplicium inventione recitatis exemplis, aliquot argumentationes, quibus integrae quaestiones confirmantur, adducemus'.
43 See Werdmüller, De dignitate, pp. 172–84. Werdmüller mentions the following loci: a definitione, a genere ad speciem, a speciebus ad genus, a partibus ad totum, a proprio, a coniugatis, ab actibus, a subiecto, a materia circa quam, ab efficiente, a fine, a posteriori vel experientia, a destinatis, a tempore, a pronunciatis, ab etymologia, ab exemplis, a pari, a maiori ad minus, a simili, a differentibus, a contrariis.
44 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 95: 'Scopus idem ac finis et ethicae et iurisprudentiae adparet, illa tamen universalem de virtutibus doctrinam continet, haec universalia virtutum praecepta'.
45 See Werdmüller, De dignitate, pp. 106–9.
46 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 112: 'Illic [in the field of ius] ad varios casus ea, quae philosophia moralis, origo civilium legum, paucis et universaliter disseruit'.
47 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 111f.: 'In summa, quae scripsit Aristoteles libro 3. de voluntario, involuntario, mixto, electione, et libro 5. de tribus vel quatuor gradibus delictorum, mirifice conducunt ad ea dexterius intelligenda, quae in iure civili de dolo, lata culpa, levi, levissima, casu fortuito passim inveniuntur'.
48 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 112f.: 'Nam et leges praecipiunt omnia honesta et vetant omnis generis vitia … Sed Aristoteles integra methodo propositum exequitur, to dioti complectens
honestorum officiorum; leges vero civiles sunt circiter 12.707, uno atque altero verbo consignatae, rationibus et causis earum plerumque omissis … Iam quia reparari non potest illa iactura, methodi nomine iuris scientiae praeferimus Aristotelem, apud quem haud deprehenduntur meri centones, sed breves et integri tractatus'.
49 Cf. Raymond Klibansky et al., Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural
Philosophy, Religion and Art (London: Nelson, 1964), pp. 8–10.
50 The Latin technical term is affectus, which can also be translated as 'passion' or 'emotion'.
51 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 115: 'Quod enim acris dolor, fervens ira, effusa laetitia, anxius timor et alia pathe modum transgressa corporis vires debilitent et interdum extinguant, ex
Hippocrate, Platone, Aristotele, Galeno declarabitur'. On Galen's opinion about the influence of emotions on the blend of the body cf. Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic
Agitation to Christian Temptation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 255.
52 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 121f. quotes Galenus on this point: 'In primis enim oportet nativum calorem intra sines sanitatis custodire, custoditur autem moderatis exercitiis tum corporis tum animi … Nos etiam quotannis haud paucos aegrotos immodicis motibus animi solis emendandis persanavimus'.
53 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 114f.: 'Eandem philosophiae partem [ethicam] medicis expedire absurdum videtur ignoranti moderationem affectuum in ethicis doceri, qua neglecta sanitas quoque minuitur'. See also ibid., p. 122: 'Satis ergo iam apparet et medicum et philosophum de vita moribusque solicitus esse, hunc propter virtutem et honestatem potissimum per se colendam, illum ob valetudinem prosperam et reparandam et conservandam'.
54 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 24: 'Ethnici doctrina de moribus explicationem continet virtutum, quas humana ratio in hac vita summe necessarias iudicat; simulque vitiorum et scelerum, a quibus eadem ratio, quantum potest, dehortatur'.
55 Ibid.: 'Rationem hic appello naturae legem vel iudicium post Adami trangressionem hominibus insitum, a Spiritu sancto non illustratum denuo'.
56 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 25.
57 NE 1,7, 1098a 16–17.
58 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 26.
59 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 33: '[Aristoteles] moderationem affectuum et nescio quarum rerum contemplationem sufficere imaginetur ad bene beateque vivendi'.
60 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 29: 'Prophetae et Apostoli … foelicitatem proprie in Christi redemptione proponunt'.
61 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 30: 'Christianus … quamvis videat disciplinam, assuefactionem et industriam hominis multum valere in civilibus virtutibus acquirendis, in his tamen ipsis et maxime spiritualibus parandis et augendis divinam gratiam implorat, quam adesse certo novit omnibus ex animo flagitantibus'.
62 Ibid.: 'Quae christianum a probo Ethnico virtutes, quae vere foelicem a vere infoelici separant, hae non ut modo dictae ab humana ratione percipiuntur, imo supra, extra, contra captum hominum constitutae sunt. Christianus natura se filium irae nasci confitetur, quod non intelligit ullus ethnicus'.
63 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 33: 'Hunc igitur primum dicimus fructum, quem ex Aristotelis doctrina percipimus, quod in ea versati longe dexterius christianam fidem circunscribimus ab humana virtute, utpote diversa, non adversa distinguentes'.
64 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 25: 'Porro haec [de moribus doctrina] in Epitome philosophiae moralis … explanavit d[ominus] Philippus Melanchthon, praeceptor meus omni laude dignissimus'.
The first edition of Melanchthon's Epitome was printed at Strasbourg in 1538.
65 Melanchthon, Philosophiae moralis epitome, in CR, vol. 16, col. 23: 'Nam lex divina hominum mentibus impressa est, sed in hac imbecillitate naturae obscurata est … Sed manet iudicium de
honestis actionibus exterioribus, idque nobiscum nascitur, quod ipsum tamen est lex naturae et pars legis divinae'.
66 On Melanchthon's creational foundation of ethics and its distinction from theology see Henning
Ziebritzki, 'Tugend und Affekt. Ansatz und Problematik von Melanchthons Tugendethik', in Der
Theologe Melanchthon, ed. Günter Frank (Stuttgart: Jan Thorbecke, 2000) (Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten 5), pp. 363–5.
67 Melanchthon, Philosophiae moralis epitome, in CR, vol. 16, col. 21: 'Philosophia moralis est pars illa legis divinae, quae de externis actionibus praecipit'.
68 Cf. Jill Kraye, 'Melanchthon's Ethics Commentaries and Textbooks', in Jill Kraye, Classical
Traditions in Renaissance Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate Variorum Reprints, 2002), p. 5f.
69 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 34: 'Divus sane Paulus ad Romanos, integram religionis methodum informans, postquam graviter accusavit omne genus hominum et veram iustitiam per fidem in Christum explicuit, tandem velut fructus fidei, de honestis moribus varia praecepta subiicit'.
70 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 35: 'Hoc discrimen animadvertendum, quod probus Ethnicus amore virtutis excitatur ad illa praestanda, christuanus vero mentem altius extollens, propter fidem ad
Dei gloriam in primis respicit'.
71 See on this point Alister E. Mc Grath, Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 32–9. For an account of Calvin's doctrine of justification and sanctification see John H. Leith, John Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), pp. 87–106; Cornelis P.
Venema, Accepted and Renewed in Christ: The 'Twofold Grace of God' and the Interpretation of Calvin's Theology (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007).
72 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 37: 'Aristotelem igitur interpretandum existimamus adulescentiae, propterea quod de vitiis et virtutibus haud strictim, ut sacrae literae, sed integros singulorum continet tractatus'.
73 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 93: 'Quemadmodum Moses et Iosue hortantur populum, ut mediam viam ingrediatur neque declinet ad dextram aut sinistram … ita Aristoteles virtutes collocat inter excessum et defectum adeoque diligenter et pie secernit a cognatis vitiis, ut pleraque theologus hinc mutuari possit, quoties de civili iustitia, temperantia, liberalitate, fortitudine et his oppositis sermonem inducit'.
74 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 90: 'Verissime scribit idem de voluntario, involuntario, electione.
Nam et Christus non tam honesta facta, quam animum et voluntatem propensam respicit. Ideoque pauperem viduam, quae multo minus quam divites in gazofylakion reposuit, magis commendat'.
75 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 91: 'In utroque Testamento peccatum latius patet, ut non solum significet voluntarium, sed originis vitium comprehendat, propter quod infantes omni iudicio carentes, obnoxii sunt peccato'.
76 Werdmüller, De dignitate, p. 89: 'In theologia plurimi loci ex ipsa philosophia ornari et illustrari possunt ac debent. Ex solis tamen sacris libris oportet iudicium et solida religionis argumenta depromere'.
77 On this point see Markus Friedrich, Die Grenzen der Vernunft: Theologie, Philosophie und gelehrte Konflikte am Beispiel des Helmstedter Hofmannstreits und seiner Wirkungen auf das
Luthertum um 1600 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004) (Schriftenreihe der Historischen
Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 69), pp. 223 and 235–8.
78 Vermigli, Kommentar, eds Baschera and Moser, p. 436.
79 Christoph Strohm, 'Melanchthon-Rezeption in der Ethik des frühen Calvinismus', in Melanchthon und der Calvinismus, eds Günter Frank and Herman J. Selderhuis (Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2005) (Melanchthon-Schriften der Stadt Bretten 9), p. 149.
80 Cf. Strohm, 'Melanchthon-Rezeption', p. 151.