-- C. Revelation and Supranaturalism.
under sin that He might be merciful to all, Rom. 5 : 15 v., 11 : 32 ; Gal. 3 : 22.
C. Revelation and Supranaturalism.
7. This organic conception of revelation has been misunderstood in two ways in the Christian Church, both by supranaturalism and by naturalism (rationalism). In the face of both, therefore, it needs to be further elucidated and upheld. First, in the face of supranaturalism, which arose especially in Rome and then continued in various directions within Protestantism. Although Scripture distinguishes between the ordinary course of events and extraordinary works of God, it does not yet make the distinction between natural and supernatural. This only occurs with the church fathers. The special revelation is identified with the supernatural and set against the natural. Clemens Alex., Strom. 2, 2 already speaks of υπερφυής ϋεωρια, which one obtains by faith. Chrysostomus, Hom. 36 in Gen, calls the miracles νπερ φνσιν and φύσει μειζονα. Ambrose , de mysteriis c. 9. contrasts gratia, miraculum, mysterium with the ordo naturae. John Damascene speaks several times of the miracles, such as the reception of Christ, the Eucharist etc. as ύπερ φυσιν, ύπερ λογον και έννοιαν, de fide orthod. IV 12-15. Cf. Denzinger, Vier
Bücher von der relig. Erk. I 82 f. Since then the distinction of natural and supernatural has gained acceptance and citizenship throughout
Christian theology. Without doubt this distinction also has a right to exist. Scripture may not express it in so many words; yet it recognizes an ordinary order of nature and thereby acts and works, which have their cause only in the power of God. Revelation in Scripture supposes that there is another, higher and better world than this nature, and that therefore there is an ordo rerum supra hanc naturam. The concepts of natural and supernatural must therefore be clearly defined. Nature, from nasci, becoming, designates in general that which develops without external power or influence, only according to its internal forces and laws. Nature is then even opposed to art, education, culture, history, which do not arise spontaneously, but are brought about by human intervention.
But the concept of nature is further extended to the whole cosmos, in so far as it moves and develops not from without but from within, through immanent forces and according to its own inherent laws.
Supernatural then is anything which exceeds the powers of natura creata and has its cause not in the creatures but in the omnipotence of God. In this sense, special revelation was understood in Christian theology. Taken as a whole, it had its origin in a special act of God, which had revealed itself not in the ordinary course of nature but in its own, distinct order of things. A further distinction was made between the supernatural in the absolute sense, when something exceeds the power of all creation, and the supernatural in the relative sense, when. It exceeds the power of a certain cause in the given circumstances; and also between the supernatural quoad substantiam, if the fact itself is supernatural, e.g. the raising of a dead person, and the supernatural quoad modum, if only the way of doing it is supernatural, e.g. the healing of an invalid without means,
Thomas, S. c. Gent. III 101.. Even in these distinctions no danger lay in themselves. They must even be defended against a philosophy which denies or weakens the supernatural. The expression supernatural is n. 1. in later theology and philosophy
18 philosophy is often understood in a very modified sense, and alternately equated with the supernatural (Kant), the free (Fichte), the unknown (Spinoza, Wegscheider), the new and original
(Schleiermacher), the religious-ethical, the spiritual (Saussaye), etc.
But such a modification of the supernatural is not enough to justify a change in theology. But such a modification of the fixed and clear meaning of a word leads to misunderstanding. If by supernatural one means nothing other than the supernatural, the ethical, etc., it is better to avoid the term. And the confusion becomes even greater if one mixes up the natural and the supernatural and then gives this fusion the name of the spiritual, the divine, etc. The term nature encompasses all creation. The concept of nature encompasses everything created, not only matter and substance, but also soul and spirit; not only physical but also psychological, religious and ethical life, insofar as it arises naturally from the human disposition; not
only visible, but also unseen, supernatural things. The supernatural is not identical with the original, the genius, the free, the religious, the ethical, etc., but is the clear and definite name only for that which cannot be explained by the forces and by the laws of created things.
So far, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, which has appeared in Christian theology, is perfectly correct, definite, clear, and cutting off all confusion. Except as stated above, special revelation, in its three forms of theophany, prophecy and miracle, is supernatural in the strict sense.
But in Christian theology the concept of the supernatural gradually became more narrowly defined. It was distinguished from creation on the one hand and from the spiritual miracles of rebirth on the other. The first distinction was made because the supernatural does not exist for God, but only for us, and presupposes the ordinary order brought into being by creation. The supernatural can only be spoken of if nature already exists beforehand. And on the other hand, rebirth, forgiveness, sanctification, unio mystica, etc., although considered to be direct acts of God, were not considered to be supernatural revelation, because they were not uncommon and rare, but in the Church belonged to the ordinary ordo rerum. The church itself is supranatural but still not a miracle. The supernatural and the miracle are also distinguished. All the supernatural is not a miracle, but vice versa. Miracles are not only supernatural, but also unusual and rare events in nature or grace. They occur not only praeter ordinem naturae alicujus particularis, but praeter ordinem totius naturae creatae. Angels and devils cannot actually do miracles, but only such things as seem to us to be desirable and take place praeter ordinem naturae creatae nóbis notac, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 110 art.
4. S. c. Gent. I 6. III 112. Voetius, Disp. II. 973 sq. Thomas speaks not only of miracles praeter and supra, but also contra naturam, qu. de miraculis, art. 2 ad 3, Muller, Natur u. Wunder, Strassburg 1892 S.
145. And Voetius said, that miracles though they are not contra naturam universalem sed supra et praeter earn, yet could also sometimes be contra naturam aliquam particularem, Disp. II 973, cf.
Gerhard, Loci Comm. Loc. 22 § 271 sq. And miracles thus had the
following signs: opus immediatum Dei, supra omnem naturam, in sensus incurrens, rarum, ad confirmationem veritatis, Voetius, ib.
II 965. Gerhard, ib. loc. 22 § 271. Now however much good there might be in these provisions and distinctions made by the scholastics, they brought with them no small danger. On the one hand, special revelation was separated from creation and nature; although it was recognized that supernatural revelation had not only taken place now but also before the fall, Calovius, Isag. ad theol. p.
49, and therefore could not in itself be contrary to nature, this was not considered. On the other hand, special revelation was contrasted with spiritual miracles, the works of grace, which constantly take place in the church of Christ and thus are isolated from re-creation and grace. Thus special revelation came to stand entirely on its own, unrelated to nature and history. Its historical and organic character was misunderstood. It did not enter into the world and humanity, but continued to hover outside and above them. It was finally conceived as a doctrine, as a proclamation of misunderstood and incomprehensible mysteries, the truth of which was confirmed by miracles. She was and remained, in a word, a donum superad ditum of the cosmos.
8. In Rome this supranaturalistic and dualistic system was consistently worked out. In God there are two concepts of man, his nature and destiny. Man in puris naturalibus, without the image of God, as he actually still is after the fall, can have a pure knowledge of God through his works, can serve and fear Him and be in a normal, in itself good servant relationship to Him, can practice all the natural virtues, even the natural love of God, and can thus attain a certain state of happiness in this life and in the next. If he does not get that far, it is his own fault and is due to the fact that he did not use, or used badly, the natural powers he was given. But God wants to give mankind a higher, supernatural, heavenly destination. To this end,
He must grant man dona superaddita both before and after the fall.
He must give him a supernatural grace, through which he can know and love God in a different, better, higher way, practice better and higher virtues, and reach a higher destination. That higher
knowledge consists in tides; that higher love in caritas; those higher virtues are the theological, faith, hope, love, which are essentially distinguished from the virtutes cardinales (intellectuales et morales); and that higher destination consists in the childhood of God, the birth of God, the unio mystica, the communion with the divine nature, the θ-"ωσ "ς, the deificatio, the visio Dei, etc. This doctrine is already prepared in some statements of the Church
Fathers, yet it was first developed by the scholastics, especially by Halesius, Summa universae Theol. II qu. 91 m. 1. a. 3. Bonaventura,
Breviloquium V cap. 1. Thomas disp. de verit. qu. 27. S. Theol. I 2. qu. 62 art. 1. In the struggle against Bajus and Jansenius it was ecclesiastically established, Denzinger, Enchir. symbol, et definit. num. 882 sq. and expressly pronounced by the Vatican, Sess. Ill cap.
2 : revelatio absolute necessaria dicenda est, - - quia Deus infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda sc. bona divina, quae humanae mentis intelligentiam superant, appealing to 1 Cor. 2 : 9. Cf. Canones II 3. Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit, 2nd Aufl. 1872 II s 3-151. Denzinger, Vier Bücher von der relig. Erk. I 105 f. II 75 f. Scheeben, Handb. der kath. Dogm. II1878
S. 240 f. Id. Natur u. Gnade Mainz 1861. Schazler, Natur u. Gnade.
Oswald, Religiose Urgeschichte der Menschheit 28 Aufl. 1887 § 1 f.
Now it must be recognized that the difference in the situation before and after the fall does not lie in revelation as such. There was supernatural revelation also in paradise, Gen. 1:28 f.; 2:16 f.; it did not become necessary through sin. Even in the status integritatis there was a revelation of grace, because also then the relation of love, in which God placed himself with mankind, was a demonstration of unrestrained goodness. What sin has made necessary, therefore, is not revelation in itself, but the particular content of revelation, which is the gratia specialis, the revelation of God in Christ, the ενσαρκωσις τον Οεου. Revelation of God has been necessary also for the religion in the status integritatis. But the religio Christiana is based on a special, particular revelation. This is what Paul has in mind when he speaks in 1 Cor. 2 vs. 4-16 of the wisdom of God, which has always been hidden and has not ascended into the heart of man. Rome itself
cannot deny this, unless it accepts the doctrine that, supposing God wished to grant man a finis supernaturalis, the whole supranatural order which now exists in the incarnation, the Church, the sacraments, would also have been necessary without and apart from sin.
This, however, would have completely destroyed the soteriological character of Revelation, deprived the Fall of its significance, and caused no change at all in sin. The doctrine of the finis supernaturalis has therefore always met with much controversy in the Roman Church, with Bajus, Jansenius, Hirscher, Hermes,
Günther; but it is closely connected with the whole Roman system, which is not built on the religious opposition of sin and grace, but on the difference in degrees of goodness, on the classification of creatures and virtues, on hierarchy in a physical and ethical sense.
The Reformation, however, had only one idea, only one conception of mankind, namely, that of the image of God, and this applied to all people. If that image in the narrow sense is lost, then the whole of human nature is violated, and man can no longer have a religion or an ethos that corresponds to God's requirement and his own idea.
Then his religion and his virtue, however beautiful they may seem, are nevertheless rotten at the root. There is no religio naturalis. All religions have become superstitions. But that is why the religio
Christiana is also essentially one with the religio vera in the status integritatis. The Reformed pushed this so far that they said that also
Adam had had the knowledge of the Trinity and the faith, that also then the Logos had been mediator, not reconciliationis but uniomis, that also then the Holy Spirit was the author of all virtue and power, etc. The true thought was that God's will was not arbitrary, alternately forming this and that idea of man; that man's conception, the nature of God's image, and therefore religio must be one. And from this it finally followed that revelation was necessary not absolutely but relatively, not quoad substantiam but quoad modum.
The religio is one before and after the fall; that it is Christiana, however, has become necessary through sin. The religio Christiana is a means, not an end; Christ is a means, but the end is ó &εος τα παντα èv παΰιν, 1 Cor. 15: 28.