-- A. Concept of revelation.
-- A. Revelation and Scripture.
-- B. The doctrine of inspiration.
-- C. The inspiration according to the Scriptures.
-- D. Concept of inspiration.
-- E. Objections to inspiration.
4. PROPERTIES OF SCRIPTURE
-- A. The properties of Scripture in general.
-- B. The authority of Scripture.
-- C. The necessity of Scripture.
-- D. The clarity of Scripture.
-- E. The sufficiency of Scripture.
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1. GENERAL REVELATION.
A. Concept of revelation.
1. Religion, examined in its essence and origin, leads itself to the concept of revelation. The history of religions makes us know this concept as the necessary correlate of all religion. The philosophy of religion can no longer pass over this concept in silence. But the way in which revelation is understood in theology and philosophy is not always in harmony with the concept itself. The concept of revelation brings with it a certain content, which must be recognized in its truth in order to continue to speak of revelation. It may not be used as a flag that covers a false charge. In the first place, revelation is a thoroughly religious concept; it is not philosophy but religion, not reason but history that offer it to us. Science and philosophy must therefore be denied the right to define this concept a priori and to tailor to it the historical and religious phenomena which are summarized under the name of revelation. It goes without saying that philosophical systems such as pantheism and materialism cannot recognize this concept in its true sense. In these systems there is no place for revelation. Both are by virtue of their principle incapable of judging the value of revelation and thus also of judging the religion to which it is inextricably bound. If -God does not exist and, as Feuerbach says in Wesen des Christenthums, 2nd ed. 401, the secret of theology is anthropology, then religion and revelation are automatically judged and nothing but a hallucination of the human mind. And similarly, pantheism, by its very nature, cannot attribute any reality to revelation. If God and man are one in substance, a relation of man to God, as established in religion, is no longer possible. Religion is then at best the coming to self-awareness of God in mankind, the return of the Absolute to Himself in human consciousness. Revelation can here be nothing else than a name for religion in mankind, seen from its objective side. Thus says e. g. Ed. von Hartmann, Religionsphilosophie II 71, 75 u. s. w., that revelation objectively and faith subjectively are one and the same act, understood from the divine and from the human side. There is then no external, objective revelation. Revelation is nothing but the living and working of God in every human being. Leaving aside the question whether there is any truth in this, and whether objective revelation must not subjectively complete itself in the illusion, it is
nevertheless clear that revelation according to the idea which religion and the history of religions make known to us, is hereby entirely lost. Religion is always a relation of man to a divine person, whose objective and real existence is beyond doubt for the religious consciousness. As soon as man begins to doubt the distinct and independent existence of the object of his worship, his religion is finished. This relation of mankind to God in religion is of an ethical nature (supra note 193). Religion is not a physical or metaphysical community of God and man, as is so often said. It does not exist in a unity of being, a unio or communio physica of mankind with God. It is not the substance of man, and does not constitute his being, his essentia. Religion always presupposes that God and man, although related, are nevertheless distinct. And religion itself does not exist in a relation of God to man, for God has no religion, but in a relation of man to God. This relationship is of course not physical, metaphysical, realis, but ethical, moral in nature. It consists in that man knows and loves God and lives for Him, Denzinger, Vier Bücher von der religiösen Erkenntniss, Würzburg 1856 I S. 1-10. Hoekstra,
Wis. Religious Theory I 57 v. 64. Religion does presuppose that God and man are related to each other and in a good sense also in community with each other, but is itself not two-sided but one-sided.
However closely religion and revelation may be connected, they are still two; they are not two sides of the same thing, but are essentially and objectively different from one another. Just as the eye and the light, the ear and the sound, the logos within us and the logos outside us are related and yet distinct, so it is with religion and revelation. It is the same in the religious field as in any other field. We come into the world naked and bring nothing with us. We receive all our food, both in the spiritual and in the natural sense, from outside. And also in religion the contents come to us from outside by means of revelation.
2. Revelation, as this term is used in religion, and taken here in its broadest sense, is all action emanating from God to bring mankind into that peculiar relationship with Him which is indicated by the name of religion. It is important, first of all, to understand this
revelation always and everywhere as an action, an act of God. God never does anything unconsciously; He does everything with a thought and has a purpose in everything. Revelation is never an unconscious emanation, an involuntary appearance of God in His works; but always a conscious, free, active making Himself known to mankind. Religion and revelation both rest by their nature on the foundation of theism, i.e. on the belief that God and man are not separate but distinct. In strong terms, revelation always presupposes that there are two worlds, a supernatural and a natural one, a heavenly and an earthly one. And revelation is any effect that emanates from the other unseen world into this visible world, to make man think of the things that are above. The ways and forms in which God reveals Himself can differ, just as one human being can make Himself known to another in different ways. God can reveal
Himself directly and immediately; and He can do so by ordinary or extraordinary means. These forms are, in a certain sense, of secondary, if not instructional, significance. But always the revelation, whether it comes to us in an ordinary or in an extraordinary way, is an act of God. Whoever understands it in this way is in principle a supranaturalist; he may or may not accept the possibility of a miracle. The question of naturalism and supranaturalism is not first decided at the time of so-called supernatural revelation, but in fact already here at the entrance, at the concept of revelation in the general sense. Deism is untenable.
There is only a choice between theism and pantheism (materialism).
Pantheism has no revelation and therefore no religion. Theism is naturally supranaturalistic, not in the historical sense of the word, but in the sense that it recognizes an ordo supra hanc naturam and assumes an operation of the outside world in it. Religion, revelation, supranaturalism, theism stand and fall with each other. The purpose of revelation is no other than to awaken and cultivate religion in the man. Everything that serves this purpose is revelation in the true sense. Revelation coincides with all God's works of nature and grace.
It encompasses the whole of creation and re-creation. Everything that exists and happens is a means for the pious to lead them to God.
The usual definitions that Revelation consists of the communication