-- B. The authority of Scripture.
became more limited. Calovius and Quenstedt distinguished between affectiones primariae and secundariae; the former included auctoritas, veritas, perfectio, perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas, judicialis potestas and efflcacia, and the latter included necessitas, integritas, puritas, authentia and legendi omnibus concessa licentia. Still simpler was the order many times followed: auctoritas, necessitas, perfectio seu sufficientia, perspicuitas, semet ipsam interpretandi facultas and efflcacia, Hase, Hutterus Rediv. §
43 f. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 27 f. Herzog2 2, 365 f. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 9 f. Voigt, Fundamentaldogm. S. 644 f. But 00k zo there is still simplification to be made. The historical, critical, archaeological material etc. does not belong in the dogmatics, but in the bibliological subjects of theology. The authentia, integritas, puritas, etc. cannot therefore be treated completely in dogmatics; they are only discussed there insofar as the teaching of Scripture also offers some data for its situation. The veritas does not need a separate discussion after inspiration and authority, and would be weakened rather than strengthened by it. The efficacia finds its place in the doctrine of the media gratiae. Thus only the auctoritas, necessitas, perfectio and perspicuitas remain. Among these there is still this distinction, that the auctoritas is not a property which is coordinated with the others, for it is given automatically with the inspiration; the necessitas, perspicuitas and sufficientia, on the other hand, do not flow in the same sense from inspiration. It is not disputed that an infallible Scripture must be supplemented and explained by an infallible tradition. Rome recognizes the authority of Scripture, but denies its other attributes.
B. The authority of Scripture.
3. The authority of Scripture has been recognized at all times in the Christian Church. Jesus and the apostles believed the O. Test to be the word of God and ascribed to it a divine authority. The Christian church was born and raised under the authority of Scripture. What the apostles wrote must be so accepted as if Christ himself had written it, Aug. de cons, evang. And Calvin, in his interpretation of 2
Tim. 3: 16, declares that we owe to Scripture eandem reverentiam as to God. That authority of Scripture stood firm in all churches and among all Christians until the last century. However, between Rome and the Reformation there came a serious difference about the basis on which that authority rests. Church fathers and scholastics still often taught the autopoiesis of Scripture, but the driving force of the Roman principle has increasingly put the church before Scripture.
The Church, so is now the general Roman doctrine, temporally and logically precedes Scripture. She was there before Scripture, and does not owe her origin, existence and authority to Scripture, but exists in and by herself, i.e. through Christ, or the Holy Spirit who dwells in her. The Scriptures, on the other hand, originated in the Church and are now acknowledged, confirmed, preserved, explained, defended, etc. by the Church. So Scripture has the Church, but the Church does not need Scripture. Without the church there is no Scripture, but without Scripture there is a church. The church with its infallible tradition is the original and sufficient means of preserving and communicating revelation; Scripture was added later, is in itself insufficient, but is useful and good as a support and confirmation of tradition. In fact, with Rome, Scripture becomes entirely dependent on the Church. The authenticity, integrity, inspiration, canonicity, authority of Scripture is established by the church. However, this distinction is then made that Scripture does not depend entirely on the church quoad se, but quoad nos. The Church, by her recognition, does not make Scripture inspired, canonical, authentic, etc., but she is nevertheless the only one who can infallibly know these qualities of Scripture. The self testimony of Scripture does not indicate that these books of the Old and New
Testaments, and no others and no less, are inspired; nowhere does Scripture give a catalog of the books which belong to it; the texts which teach inspiration never cover the whole of Scripture, 2 Tim.
3:16 refers only to the Old Test; moreover, an appeal to Scripture for inspiration is always only circular evidence. The Protestants are therefore divided among themselves as to which books belong to the Scriptures; Luther's opinion of James differs from that of Calvin, etc.
The proofs of Scripture derived from the Church Fathers, etc., are
not sufficiently fixed and solid; they have great value as motiva credibilitatis, but they give only probability, human and therefore fallible certainty. Only the Church gives divine, infallible certainty, as Augustine said: ego vero Evangelio non crederem , nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas , c. epist. Manich. cap. 5. c. Faustum
1. 28. cap. 2,4,6. The Protestants have therefore also been able to accept and acknowledge Scripture as the word of God, because they received it from the hand of the Church, Bellarminus , de Verbo Dei
IV cap. 4. Perrone, Praelect.
Theol. IX 71 sq. Heinrich, Dogm. I 775 f. Jansen, Theol. I 766 sq. The Vaticanum, sess. 3. cap. 2 recognized the books of the O. and N. T. as canonical, propterea quod Sp. S°. inspirante conscript! Deum habent autorem atque ut tales ipsi ecclesiae traditi sunt. Guided by these thoughts, Home stated at Trent' sess. 4 and in the Vatican sess. 3 cap. 2, included the apocrypha of the Old Testament, following the example of the Greek translation and the practice of the church fathers, and moreover declared the editio Vulgata to be the authentic text, so that it has decisive authority in church and theology.
4. Against this Koomsian doctrine the Reformation set the autopistion of Scripture, Calvin, Inst. I c. 7. Ursinus, Tract. Theol.
1584 p. 8 sq. Polanus, Synt. I c. 23-30. Zanchius, de S. Scriptura, Op. VIII 332-353. Junius, Theses Theol. c. 3-5. Synopsis pur. theol. disp. 2 § 29 sq. Gerhard, Loci theol. I c. 3. etc. In this difference the question was not whether the church did not have a calling to fulfill in relation to the Scriptures. It was generally agreed that the church is of great importance to the Scriptures. Her testimony is of great importance and a motivum credibilitatis. The church of the first centuries has in her testimonies a strong support for the Scriptures. For each human being the church is the guide to the Scriptures. In this sense the word of Augustine is and remains true, that he was moved by the church to believe the Scriptures.
Protestant theologians, Calv. Inst. I 7, 3. Polanus, Synt. p. 30. Turretinus, de S. Scr. auctoritate, disp. 3 § 13 s. Gerhard, Loci theol. I c.
3 § 51 have weakened this word of Augustine, by making it refer only to the past, to the origin of faith. But the reasoning of Augustine t. a. p. is clear. He puts his Manichean opponent in a dilemma: Either you say to me, "Believe the Catholics," but they are the ones who are warning me to believe you, or you don't believe the Catholics, but then you can't appeal to me with the Gospel, quia ipsi Evangelio, catholicis praedicantibus, credidi. For Augustine the Church is indeed a motive of faith, which he uses here against the manichester.
But there is a difference between motive and last ground of faith.
How he sees the Church as a motive of faith, he clarifies elsewhere, C. Faustum lib. 32 c. 19 when he says: cur non potius evangelicae autoritati, tam fundatae, tam stabilitae, tanta gloria diffamatae atque ab apostolorum temporibus usque ad nostra tempora per successiones certissimas commendatae, non te subdis? Cf. de util. cred. c. 14. The church with its dignity, its power, its hierarchy etc. always made a deep impression on Augustine. It continually stirred him to faith, it supported and strengthened him in doubt and struggle, it was the firm hand that always guided him to the Scriptures. But Augustine does not mean by this that the authority of Scripture depends on the Church, that it is the final and deepest ground of his faith. Elsewhere he says clearly that Scripture has authority by itself and must be believed for its own sake, Clausen,
Augustine S. Scr. interpres 1827. p. 125. Dorner, Augustine, Berlin 1873. S. 237 f. Reuter, Augustinische Studiën, Gotha 1887 S. 348 f.
Schmidt, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol. VI 235 f. Hase, Protest. Polemik 5te Aufl. Leipzig 1891 S. 81. Harnack D. G. III 70 f.
The Church has and will continue to have a rich and deep paedagogical significance for every believer until his death. The cloud of witnesses that surrounds us can strengthen and encourage us in our struggle. But this is quite different from saying that the authority of Scripture would depend on the Church. Rome does not even dare to express this openly. The Vatican recognized the books of the Old and New Testament as canonical, propterea quod Spiritu S inspirante conscripti Deum autorem habent and as such handed down to the Church. And the Roman theologians make a distinction
between the authority of Scripture quoad se and quoad nos. But that distinction cannot apply here. For if the Church is the last and deepest ground on which I believe the Scriptures, then that Church, and not the Scriptures, is αντοττιστος. And now one of the two:
Scripture contains a testimony, a teaching about itself, about its inspiration and authority, and then the church does nothing but accept and confirm that testimony; or Scripture itself does not teach such inspiration and authority, and then the dogma of the church about Scripture is judged for the Protestant. The Roman theologians therefore find themselves in no small contradiction. On the one hand they try to demonstrate the inspiration and authority of Scripture in its teaching; and on the other hand, when they come to the teaching of the Church, they try to weaken these evidences and to show that only the testimony of the Church gives an irrefutable certainty. If, on the other hand, the authority depends quoad se on Scripture itself, it is also quoad nos, the final ground of our faith. The church can only acknowledge what is there; it cannot make what is not there. The accusation that in this way a circle is formed and Scripture is proven by Scripture itself can be levelled at Rome itself, because it proves the Church by Scripture and Scripture by the Church. If Rome points out that in the first case she does not use Scripture as the word of God, but as human, credible and reliable testimony, then the Protestant theologian may also accept this remark: first, inspiration is derived from Scripture as reliable testimony, and then Scripture is proved with it as the word of God. But much more important is the fact that in every scientific discipline, and thus also in theology, the principia are established by themselves. The truth of a principium cannot be argued, but only acknowledged. Principium creditur propter se, non propter aliud. Principii principium haberi non potest nee quaeri debet, Gerhard, Loc. theol.
1 cap. Zanchius, Op. VIII 339 sq. Polanus, Synt. I cap. 23 sq. Turret.
Theol. el. loc. 2 qu. 6. Trelcatius, Schol, et method, loc. comm. S.
Theol. Institutio 1651 p. 26.
The Scriptures themselves, therefore, clearly teach that it is not the church but the word of God, written or unwritten, that is αίτοπιστος.
The Church has always been bound by the Word of God, inasmuch as it existed and in the form in which it existed. Israel received the Law on Horeb, Jesus and the Apostles submitted to the O. T. Scriptures, and the Christian Church from the beginning was bound by the spoken and written word of the Apostles. The word of God is the foundation of the church, Deut. 4:1; Isa. 8:20; Ezek. 20:19; Luke
16:29; John 5:39; Eph. 2:20; 2 Tim. 3 : 14 ; 2 Pet. 1 : 19 etc. The church can testify of the word, but the word is above her. She can give no one the faith of the word of God in their heart. This can only be done by the word of God, through itself and the power of the Holy
Spirit, Jer. 23:29; Mk. 4:28; Luke 8:11; Rom. 1:16; Heb. 4:12; 1 Pet.
1:23. And by this alone the church appears to be below the Scriptures. Therefore, the church and the faithful can learn the inspiration, authority, and canonicity of the Scriptures from itself, but they can never proclaim and establish these on their own. The Reformation preferred some uncertainty to certainty, which could only be obtained by an arbitrary decision of the church. For indeed the Scriptures nowhere give a catalog of the books which they contain. There have been differences of opinion about some of the books in the oldest Christian Church and also later. The text does not possess that integrity which Luther and the Reformed theologians desired so much. But nevertheless the Reformation maintained the autopsy of Scripture against the claims of Rome, subordinated the church to the word of God, and thus saved the freedom of the Christian.
5. In addition to this difference between Rome and the Reformation concerning the authority of Scripture, in the 17th century there was in the Protestant churches themselves an important struggle concerning the nature of that authority. It was agreed that Scripture, because it had God as its author, was entitled to an auctoritas divina.
This authority was further defined by the fact that Scripture had to be believed and obeyed by all, and was the only rule of faith and life.
This description, however, led naturally to the distinction between an
auctoritas historica and an auctoritas normativa. The revelation of God is given in the form of a history; it has passed through various ages. Not everything that is recorded in Scripture has normative authority for our faith and life. Much of what was commanded and instituted by God, or prescribed and ordained by prophets and apostles, no longer concerns us directly and related to earlier living persons. The commandment to Abraham to sacrifice his son, the commandment to Israel to slay all Canaanites, the ceremonial and civil laws in force in the days of the O. T., the regulations of the synod at Jerusalem and so much more are certainly still useful as history for teaching and admonishing, but they cannot and must not be obeyed by us anymore. And not only that, but revelation has recorded in its description not only the good works of the saints but also the evil deeds of the wicked. So there are many words and actions in Scripture which are presented as historically true but not as normative; so far from being the rule for our faith and life, they should rather be rejected and disapproved of. The sins of the saints, of Abraham, Moses, Job, Jeremiah, Peter, etc., are also given as warnings, not as examples. And finally, with many persons, with the patriarchs, Deborah, the judges, the kings, the friends of Job, Hanna,
Agur, the mother of Lemuel, the poets of some psalms, such as the curse psalms ps. 73 : 13, 14, 77 : 7-9, 116 : 11, and further with Zechariah, Simeon, Mary, Stephen, etc., the question must be asked, whether their words were inspired only formally, as regards their conception, or also factually, as regards their content. Voetius judged that many of these persons, like Job and his friends, could not be counted among the prophets, and maintained this opinion against Maresius, Voetius, Disp. I 31, 40-44. V 634-640. Maresius,
Theologus paradoxus p. 83-87, and further Maccovius, Loci Comm. p. 31-32, Cloppenburg, de canone theol. disp. 3 Op. II 18-23. Witsius,
Misc. Sacra I 316-318. Moor, Comm. in Marckii Comp. I 131-134.
Carpzovius, Critica S. Vet. Test. I c. 2 § 3. This question, though it had no further consequences, was nevertheless important in many respects. It first brought into clear consciousness that there is a distinction between the word of God in a formal and the word of God in a material sense, and forced us to consider the relationship
between the two. Now, that relationship was certainly considered too dualistic by most of the above-mentioned theologians. The auctoritas historiae and the historia normae cannot be separated in Scripture in such an abstract way. The formal and material meaning of the word of God are far too closely related. Also in the lying words of Satan and the evil deeds of the wicked God has something to say to us.
Scripture is not only useful for teaching but also for warning and exhortation. It teaches and corrects us, both by deterring ׳and by exhorting, both by shaming and by comforting. But this distinction made it clear that Scripture cannot and must not be understood as a code of articles. Appeal to a text out of context is not enough for a dogma. Revelation, laid down in Scripture, is a historical and organic whole. That is how it should be read and explained. And therefore the dogma, which comes to us with authority and wants to be the rule for our faith and life, must be based on and derived from the whole organism of Scripture. The authority of Scripture is different from that of a state law.
6. The nature and basis of the authority of Scripture, however, have been the subject of discussion, especially in the newer theology. In former times the authority of Scripture rested on its inspiration and was given by that inspiration. But when inspiration was relinquished, the authority of Scripture could no longer be maintained. Various attempts were made, but it was necessary to change both the basis and the character of the authority of the Scriptures. The authority of Scripture, in so far as it was still recognized, was founded on the fact that it is the authentic record of Revelation; that it expresses the Christian idea most purely, just as the water is purest at its source; that it is the fulfilment of the Old Testament idea of salvation, and that it contains the Christian doctrine entirely, though also in its germ; and that it is the beginning and constant renewal of the Christian spirit in the church. These and similar considerations for the authority of Scripture can be found in theologians of the most diverse persuasions, such as Scholten. L.H.K. I 78 v. Saussaye, my theol. of Ch. d. 1. S. 53 v. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 129 f. Rothe, Zur
Dogm. S. 166 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 193 f. Biedermann, Dogm. § 193 f.
Schweizer, Christi. Gl. I S. 178 f. Hofmann, Weiss, u. Erf. III 98 f.
Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. II 5 f. 9 f. etc. Yet all these grounds are not solid enough, to carry an authority, as religion needs. They may qualify as motiva credibilitatis, but as grounds they are untenable.
For in the first place, by distinguishing between revelation and its record, between the word of God and Scripture, they render the authority of Scripture entirely illusory. For if not Scripture as a whole, but only the word of God within it, the religious-ethical, the revelation, or whatever one wishes to call it, has authority, then each one has to determine for himself what that word of God in Scripture is, and each one determines this as he sees fit. The centre of gravity is transferred from the object to the subject; Scripture does not criticize man, but man judges Scripture; the authority of Scripture depends on man's good will; it exists only insofar as one is willing to acknowledge it, and is therefore annulled altogether. But even if all these grounds could find some authority for Scripture, it would still be none other than a purely historical authority. And this is insufficient in religion. Here historical, i. e. human and fallible authority is not enough. Since religion touches our salvation and is connected with our eternal interests, nothing less than divine authority is sufficient for us. We must not only know that Scripture is the historical record of our knowledge of Christianity, and that it contains and represents most purely the original Christian ideas; but in religion we must know that Scripture is the word and truth of God.
Without this certainty there is no comfort in living and in dying. And not only does every Christian need this assurance, but also the church itself as an institution cannot lack this certainty. For if a preacher lacks conviction of the divine truth of the word he proclaims, his preaching looses all authority, influence and power. If he has no divine message to bring, who gives him the right to perform for people of the same movements as he? Who gives him the freedom to place himself above them in the pulpit, to occupy them with the highest interests of the soul and of life and even to announce to them an eternal good or an eternal evil? Who would dare to do so, and who would be able to do so, except he who has the word of God to proclaim? Christian faith and Christian preaching both require a
divine authority on which they rely. Titubabit fides, si divinarum scripturarum vacillat auctoritas, Aug. de doctr. Christ. I 37.
Hence it cannot meet with approval either, when the nature of the authority of Scripture is described as moral. Lessing began by saying that something is not true because it is in the Bible, but because it is true. Since his plea for deliverance from the authority of the letter and the paper pope, belief on authority has been ridiculed in all kinds of ways. Christian theologians have allowed themselves to be influenced by this and modified or opposed the belief in authority.
Doedes, for example, Inl. tot de leer van God, 1880 bl. 29-40 wants to know nothing of believing on authority and speaks only of moral authority in religion. Saussaye, My Theol. of Ch. d. 1. S. 53 v. explains that there is no other but moral authority and that the moral is entirely authority. There is no intellectual authority, but moral authority is morality, religion itself. One does not believe the truth on authority, but the truth has authority, i.e. the right to obey it. This idea, however, suffers from a confusion of concepts. Truth has authority, certainly; no one denies it. But the question is: what is truth in the religious sphere, and where can it be found? There are only two possible answers to this question. Either what the truth is, or who Christ is, as the apostles and Scriptures tell us, or it is determined by the judgment, reason and conscience of each individual. In the latter case, there is no longer any authority of the Scriptures; they are entirely subject to the criticism of the subject.
Then it is of no avail, to say with Rothe, Zur Dogm. 287, that the Bible is the perfectly adequate instrument for arriving at a pure knowledge of God's revelation. For there is no objective standard in Scripture by which that revelation can be judged and found. Indeed, there is only one ground on which the authority of Scripture can rest, and that is its inspiration. If this is lost, the authority of Scripture is also lost. It then contains only human writings, which as such have no title to be normative for our faith and life. And with Scripture, for the Protestant, all authority in religion falls. All attempts to find some authority again, e.g., in the person of Christ, in the church, in religious experience, in reason or conscience, end in disappointment,
Stanton, The place of authority in matters of religious belief, London Longmans 1891. James Martineau, The seat of authority in religion,
London Longmans 1891. C. A. Briggs, The authority of H. Scriptures.
Inaugural address, 4 ed. New-York Scribner, 1892. L. Monod, Le problème de Tautorité, Paris Fischbacher 1892. E. Doumergue,
L'autorité en matière de foi, Lausanne Payot 1892. E. Ménégoz, L'autorité de Dien, reflexions sur l'autorité en matière de foi. Paris
Fischbacher 1892. G. Godet, Vinet et l'autorité en matière de foi, Revue de théol. et de philos. Mars 1893 p. 173-191. They only prove, that a religion without authority cannot exist. Religion is essentially distinct from science. It has a certainty of its own; not such a one as is based on insight, but one that exists in faith, in trust. And this religious faith and trust can only rest in God and His Word. In religion, a testimonium humanum and a fides humana are insufficient; here we need a testimony of God on which we can rely in life and death. Inquietum est cor nostrum, donee requiescat in Te!
Rightly then also says Harnack, D. G. III 73, es hat in der Welt keinen starken religiösen Glauben gegeben, der nicht an irgend einem entscheidenden Punkt sich auf eine aussere Autoriteit berufen hatte. Nur in den biassen Ausführungen der Religionsphilosophen oder in den polemischen Entwürfen protestantischer Theologen wird ein Glaube construirt, der seine Gewissheit lediglich den eigenen inneren Momenten entnimmt. Cf. also P. D. Chantepie de la
Saussaye, Certainty and Doubt 1893 p. 138 v. The right and value of authority in religion is slowly being recognized again.
7. But, even if religion alone can suffice with an auctoritas divina, the nature of that authority still needs to be further examined. Generally speaking, authority is the power of someone who has something to say; the right to have a say in some matter, hence in Dutch "geweld",
"macht", "Woordenboek der Ned. Taal s. v." There can only be authority between unequals; it always expresses a relationship between a superior and his inferior, between a superior and his inferior. Because there is no equality among people but all kinds of difference, there can be authority among them. And because that inequality is so great and so manifold, authority occupies a very wide
place among men. It is even the foundation of human society.
Whoever undermines it, works towards the destruction of society. It is therefore foolish and dangerous to put faith in authority in a ridiculous light. Augustine already asked: Si quod nescitur credendum non est, quomodo serviant parentibus liberi eosque mutua pietate diligant, quos parentes suos esse non credant Multa possunt afferri quibus ostendatur, nihil omnino humanae societatis incolume remanere, si nihil credere statuerimus, quod non possumus tenere perceptum, de util. cred. 12. In every area we live by authority. Under authority we are born and brought up in housefamily, society and state. Parents have authority over their children, the master over his pupils, the government over its subjects. In all these cases authority is clear. It expresses a power that belongs to one person over another by right. It therefore acts with orders and laws, demands obedience and submission, and in the case of rebellion even has the right of coercion and punishment.
But we extend this concept of authority further and also apply it to science and art. Here too there is a distinction between gifts, and the relationship between superiors and subordinates, between magistri and discipuli, arises. There are men who have acquired mastery in one area or another through their genius and diligent work, and who can therefore speak with authority in this area. From the discoveries of these magistri the lesser, the laymen, live and learn. Yes, because of the incredible expansion of science, even the best can only be magister in a very small area; in everything else he is a disciple and must rely on the research of others. This authority in science and art, however, is of a different nature from that of parents, teachers and government; it is not legal, but ethical; it cannot and should not coerce, it has no right to punishment. The persons who act with authority here may be so distinguished and important; their testimony is only as valid as the grounds on which they can give it.
The authority therefore does not rest in the persons, so that an ipse dixit would be sufficient, but rests in the evidence on which their claim is based. And since all men have received some understanding and judgment, blind faith is impermissible here and the pursuit of independent insight, in so far as necessary and possible, is a duty.
This is also true of history. The knowledge of history is actually based entirely on authority, on the testimony of others, but these testimonies need not be believed blindly. In a word, in scientiis tantum valet auctoritas humana, quantum rationes.
We finally find this concept of authority also in religion and theology.
Here authority is needed not to a lesser degree but to a much greater degree than in family and society, in science and art. Here it is a necessity of life. Without authority and faith, religion and theology cannot exist for a moment. But authority here has a character all of its own. It must of course be an auctoritas divina. And already this distinguishes it from authority in society and the state, in science and art. It differs from the latter mainly in that in science and art one's own judgement may be exercised and decisions taken. But in a divina auctoritas this is not appropriate. When God has spoken, all doubt is gone. The divina auctoritas is therefore not moral, at least not in the sense in which we speak of the moral supremacy of a person, because religion is not a relationship of an inferior to his superior, but of a creature to his Creator, of a subject to his Sovereign, of a child to his
Father. God has the right to command man and to demand unconditional obedience from him. His authority rests in his being, not in the rationes. In this respect, the respect of God and His Word corresponds to that of the government in the state and of the father in the family. And there is nothing humiliating in it, and nothing that in any way diminishes man's freedom, if he listens childishly to the word of God and obeys it. To take God at his word, i.e., on authority, is as little in conflict with man's dignity as it is dishonoring for a child to rely on the word of his father with unlimited confidence. And so much the better, that the Christian should gradually grow beyond this authority, Schweizer, Christi. Glaub. I 186 f., that he will take
God at his word, denying all his own wisdom. Here on earth the believer never surpasses the point of faith and authority. The more he grows in faith, the more firmly he clings to the authority of God in His Word. But on the other hand there is also a great difference between the authority of God in religion and that of a father in his family and of a government in the state. A father, if necessary, forces
his child and brings it to submission by punishment; and the government does not carry the sword in vain. Coercion is inseparable from the authority of earthly government. But God does not compel.
His revelation is a revelation of grace. And in it He does not come to man with commandments and demands, with coercion and punishment, but with an invitation, with an exhortation, with the plea to be reconciled with Him. God could act as Sovereign towards mankind. One day He will judge as Judge all those who have disobeyed the Gospel of His Son. But in Christ He comes down to us, becomes like us in all things, deals with us as rational and moral beings; and then, again, in the face of hostility and unbelief, resumes
His sovereignty, executes His counsel and prepares to receive glory from all creation. The authority with which God acts in religion is thus entirely peculiar. It is not human but divine. It is sovereign and yet works in a moral manner. It does not compel, and yet it knows how to maintain itself. It is absolute and yet is resisted. It demands and prays, and yet is invincible.
And such is the authority of Scripture. As the word of God it stands high above all authority of men in state and society, in science and art. For it everything else must give way. For one must obey God' more than men. All other authority is limited within its circle and applies only to its own domain. But the authority of Scripture extends over the whole of mankind. It is above reason and will, above heart and conscience; it is not to be compared with any other authority. Its authority is absolute, because it is divine. It has the right to be believed and obeyed by everyone at all times. In its majesty it far exceeds all other powers. But it does not call upon anyone to help it gain recognition and rule over itself. It does not need the strong arm of the government. It does not need the support of the Church. It does not call upon the sword and the Inquisition. It does not want to rule by force or violence. It wants free and willing recognition. And therefore she brings about that herself, in a moral way, by the working of the Holy Spirit. Scripture guards its own authority. That is why people used to speak of an auctoritas causativa