-- C. Inadequacy of general revelation.
distinction between natural and supernatural revelation is not identical with that between general and special. To indicate the two kinds of revelation, which underlie the pagan religions and the religion of Scripture, the latter distinction is preferable to the former.
C. Inadequacy of general revelation.
7. This revelatio generalis, however, is insufficient for several reasons. In this, too, all Christian theologians are unanimous.
Irenaeus adv. haeres. 2 , 28 argues against the Gnostics the limited nature of human knowledge. Justinus Martyr, Dial, c. Tryph., introduction, Tertullian, de an. c. 1. Lactantius, Instit. div. 3, 1. 4, 1.
Arnobius, adv. nat. 1, 38. II, 6. paint the weakness of reason in very strong colors. Augustine does not deny that even among the pagans there is some truth with which Christians can profit, de doctr. chr. 2,
60. It can teach few and only a little, de trin. 13, 12. the civ. 12, 20. the util. cred. 10, 24. She knows the goal, but not the way that leads to the goal, Conf. 5, 5. 7, 26. de civ. 10, 29. Often she leads astray and submerges truth in iniquity, de trin. 13, 24, does not seek it in a pious way, Conf. 5, 4, lacks the love necessary for the knowledge of truth, de civ. 9, 20, is prevented by her own superbia from the knowledge of truth, for only humilitas is the way to life, de civ. 2, 7. Thomas S.
Theol. I qu. 1 art. 1. S. c. Gent. I, 4. argues the necessity of revelation even for the articuli mixti known by reason. The Roman church has clearly expressed the insufficientia of theol. nat. in the preface to the Catech. Romanus, and in the Vaticanum sess. 3 cap. 2 de revelatione, and can. 2,2-4. And the Protest, theologians judged this insufficientia of general revelation no differently, Calv. Inst. I. 5 § 11 sq. and cap. 6.
Heidegger, Corpus Theol. I § 9-13. Trigland, Antapologia cap. 17.
Owen, Θεολογούμενα I cap. 6. Turret. Theol. Elenct. I qu. 4. Moor, Comm, in Marckii Comp. I 61 39. The sufficiency of general revelation and the religio naturalis built upon it, was in earlier times only taught by the Pelagians, who accepted three different ways to salvation, namely, the lex naturae, lex Mosis and lex Christi. There were also always some theologians in the Christian Church who were more favorable to the Heydians and who believed in the possibility of
their salvation, such as Justin, Clemens Alex. Erasmus, Zwingli etc. cf. Vossius, Historia Pelag. 1655 p. 383 sq. But with these, this belief was not usually based on the doctrine of the sufficiency of general revelation, but on the supposition that God also worked with His special grace among the Gentiles, either in or after this life. On the other hand, the perfect sufficiency of general revelation and of natural religion was taught in the 18th century by deists and rationalists such as Cherbury, Tindal, Collins, Rousseau, Kant, etc.
Litt. at Lechler, Gesch. des engl. Deïsmus 1841 and art. Deïsmus in Herzog2. Bretschneider, System. Entw. aller in der Dogm. vork.
Begriffe 1841 S. 35 f. Clarisse, Encycl. 1835 p. 405 sq. Doedes, Inleiding tot de Leer van God 1880 bl. 197 v.
About the insufficientia of general revelation there can be hardly any doubt. In the first place, it is evident from the fact that this revelation at best gives us some knowledge of God's existence and of some of His attributes, such as goodness and justice; but it leaves us completely ignorant of the person of Christ, who alone is the way to the Father, Mt. 11:27. John 14:6, 17:3. Acts 4:12. General revelation, therefore, is inadequate for man as a sinner; it knows of no grace and forgiveness; sometimes it is even a revelation of wrath, Rom. 1:20.
Grace and forgiveness, which should be the essence of religion, is an act of will, not of nature and necessity. General revelation can, at best, make some truths known, but it brings no facts, no history, and therefore changes nothing in being. It enlightens consciousness somewhat and curbs sin, but it does not recreate the nature of mankind and the world. It can instill fear, but not trust and love,
Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 66, 218. In the second place, the knowledge which general revelation can provide is not only slight and insufficient, but it is also uncertain, always mixed with error, and for the vast majority of people unattainable. The history of philosophy has been a history of systems that break down one another; it ended with the Greeks in skepticism, in the Middle Ages in nominalism, and now in agnosticism. The truths most essential to religion, the existence and nature of God, the origin and destiny of mankind and the world, sin and forgiveness, reward and punishment, have been
alternately taught and opposed. In philosophy, no satisfactory certainty can be obtained about all these questions. Cicero, Tusc. 1,5 therefore rightly asks: ex philosophis nonne optimus et gravissimus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare, multa sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? But even though some thinkers came to some true and pure knowledge, it was still mixed with all kinds of error. Every philosophical system has its gaps and defects. Plato, whose system, according to Augustine, Civ. 8,5 is the closest to Christianity, defends the abandonment of weak children, paedophilia, the union of women, etc. Even in morality there is a great deal of error. Even in morality there is great difference and uncertainty; vérité en de^a des
Pyrenées, erreur au dela (Pascal). Nescio quomodo nihil tam absurde dici potest, quod non dicatur ab aliquo philosophorum, Cic. de divin.
2,58. And even if the philosophers had possessed the cleanest and purest doctrine, they would still have lacked the authority to introduce it among the people. In practice, therefore, they often reverted to popular beliefs and morals; or they withdrew with an Odi profanum vulgus et arceo from the people in high places. Their mutual struggle and the contrast between their teaching and life weakened their influence. And even if all this had not been the case, the doctrine of the sages could never have become or remained the religion of the people, because in matters of religion an intellectual clericalism and a scientific hierarchy are intolerable. That is why
Thomas was absolutely right when he said that even in those truths which general revelation makes known to us, revelation and authority are still necessary, because that knowledge is suitable for only a few, would require too long a period of research and would still remain imperfect and uncertain, S. Theol. I qu. 1 art. 1 art. 1, II 2 qu. 2 art. 4. S. contra Gent. 1,4. In the third place the inadequacy of natural revelation is clearly shown by the fact, that no people have been satisfied with the so-called religio naturalis. The general religion of the Deists, the moral Vernunftreligion of Kant, the pietas and obedientia of Spinoza, are all nothing but pure abstractions, which never existed in reality. Even if Herbert's five articles or Kant's rationalist trilogy had been completely certain and scientifically provable, they would still have been incapable of founding a religion,