originally, which facts and events show that God aimed at it in the
perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.
I should think that these things might incline us to suppose that God has not forgot himself, in the ends which he proposed in the creation of the world; but that he has so stated these ends (however he is selfsufficient, immutable, and independent) as therein plainly to show a supreme regard to himself. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, must be considered afterwards, as also what may be objected against this view of things.
5. Whatsoever is good, amiable and valuable in itself, absolutely and originally, which facts and events show that God aimed at it in the creation of the world, must be supposed to be regarded or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation. For we must suppose from the perfection of God's nature that whatsoever is valuable and amiable in itself, simply and absolutely considered, God values simply for itself; 'tis agreeable to him absolutely on its own account; because God's judgment and esteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing simply, and absolutely, for itself, and on its own account, then 'tis the ultimate object of his value; he don't value it merely for the sake of a further end to be attained by it. For to suppose that he values it only for some further end is in direct contradiction to the present supposition, which is that he values it absolutely, and for itself. Hence it most clearly follows that if that which God values ultimately, and for itself, appears in fact and experience to be what he seeks by anything he does, he must regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he seeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, 'tis an ultimate end of the work of creation. Having got thus far, we may now proceed a step further, and assert