agreeable to reason which would truly imply or infer any indigence,
about this matter, those objections, which have chiefly been made use of against what I think the Scriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reason—I would in the first place soberly consider in a few things, what seems rational to be supposed concerning this affair; and then proceed to consider what light divine revelation gives us in it.
As to the first of these, viz. what seems in itself rational to be supposed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reason:
1. That no notion of God's last end in the creation of the world is agreeable to reason which would truly imply or infer any indigence, insufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happiness. Because it is evident, by both Scripture and reason, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy: that he stands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive anything from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the subject of any sufferings or impair of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not stand to produce the proofs of God's being such a one, it being so universally allowed and maintained by such as call themselves Christians.
The notion of God's creating the world in order to receive anything properly from the creature is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconsistent with the notion of creation; which implies a being's receiving its existence, and all that belongs to its being, out of nothing. And this implies the most perfect, absolute and universal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it possible that it should have