fullness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of
4. As there is an infinite fullness of all possible good in God, a fullness of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happiness. And as this fullness is capable of communication or emanation ad extra; so it seems a thing amiable and valuable in itself that it should be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good should send forth abundant streams, that this infinite fountain of light should, diffusing its excellent fullness, pour forth light all around. And as this is in itself excellent, so a disposition to this in the Divine Being must be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent disposition; such an emanation of good is, in some sense, a multiplication of it; so far as the communication or external stream may be looked upon as anything besides the fountain, so far it may be looked on as an increase of good. And if the fullness of good that is in the fountain is in itself excellent and worthy to exist, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increase, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exist. Thus it is fit, since there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light should shine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and understanding: and as there is an infinite fountain of holiness, moral excellence and beauty, so it should flow out in communicated holiness. And that as there is an infinite fullness of joy and happiness, so these should have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant streams, as beams from the sun.
From this view it appears another way to be a thing in itself valuable, that there should be such things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high esteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: this appears I say in another way, viz. as these things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holiness and joy.
Thus it appears reasonable to suppose that it was what God had respect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fullness of good; or rather it was his last end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fullness of good ad extra, or without himself, and the disposition to communicate himself or diffuse his own fullness, which we must conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as possible to avoid confusion, I observe that there is some impropriety in saying that a disposition in God to communicate himself to the creature, moved him to create the world. For though the diffusive disposition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtless inclines him to communicate himself to the creature when the creature exists; yet this can't be all: because an inclination in God to communicate himself to an object, seems to presuppose the existence of the object, at least in idea. But the diffusive disposition that excited God to give creatures existence was rather a communicative disposition in general, or a disposition in the fullness of the divinity to flow out and diffuse itself. Thus the disposition there is in the root and stock of a tree to diffuse and send forth its sap and life, is doubtless the reason of the communication of its sap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after these exist. But a disposition to communicate of its life and sap to its fruits, is not so properly the cause of its producing those fruits, as its disposition to communicate itself, or diffuse its sap and life in general. Therefore to speak more strictly according to truth, we may suppose that a disposition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fullness, was what excited him to create the world; and so that the emanation itself was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation.
SECTION III.
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED HOW, ON THE SUPPOSITION OF GOD'S MAKING THE FOREMENTIONED THINGS HIS LAST END,
HE MANIFESTS A SUPREME AND ULTIMATE REGARD TO
HIMSELF IN ALL HIS WORKS
IN the last section I observed some things, which are actually the consequence of the creation of the world, which seem absolutely valuable in themselves, and so worthy to be made God's last end in this work. I now proceed to inquire, how God's making such things as these his last end is consistent with his making himself his last end, or his manifesting an ultimate respect to himself in his acts and works. Because this is a thing I have observed as agreeable to the dictates of reason, that in all his proceedings he should set himself highest—therefore I would endeavor to show with respect to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himself his end, so as in all to show a supreme and ultimate respect to himself; and how his infinite love to himself and delight in himself will naturally cause him to value and delight in these things: or rather how a value to these things is implied in his love to himself, or value of that infinite fullness of good that is in himself.2
Now with regard to the first of the particulars mentioned above, viz. God's regard to the exercise and expression of those attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which consist in a sufficiency for these operations, 'tis not hard to conceive that God's regard to himself, and value for his own perfections, should cause him to value these exercises and expressions of his perfections; and that a love to them will dispose him to love their exhibition and
exertment: inasmuch as their excellency consists in their relation to use, exercise and operation; as the excellency of wisdom consists in its relation to, and sufficiency for, wise designs and effects. God's love to himself, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that which is the use, end and operation of these attributes. If one highly esteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wisdom, justice, etc., that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exercise and genuine effects of these virtues: so if God both esteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he can't but value and delight in the expressions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expressions of his perfections, he manifests a delight in his own perfections themselves: or in other words, he manifests a delight in himself; and in making these expressions of his own perfections his end, he makes himself his end.
And with respect to the second and third particulars, the matter is no less plain. For he that loves any being, and has a disposition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, must from the same disposition be well pleased to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, esteemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is opposite to the disapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit that the other should be beloved, and his qualification prized. And therefore thus it will necessarily be, if a being loves himself and highly prizes his own excellencies: and thus it is fit it should be, if it be fit he should thus love himself, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, 'tis fit that he should take delight in his own excellencies' being seen, acknowledged, esteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himself and his own perfections. And in
seeking this, and making this his end, he seeks himself, and makes himself his end.
And with respect to the fourth and last particular, viz. God's being disposed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fullness of good which he possesses in himself; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happiness, in the manner which he does; if we thoroughly and properly consider the matter, it will appear that herein also God makes himself his end, in such a sense as plainly to manifest and testify a supreme and ultimate regard to himself.
Merely in this disposition to diffuse himself, or to cause an emanation of his glory and fullness, which is prior to the existence of any other being, and is to be considered as the inciting cause of creation, or giving existence to other beings, God can't so properly be said to make the creature his end, as himself. For the creature is not as yet considered as existing. This disposition or desire in God must be prior to the existence of the creature, even in intention and foresight. For it is a disposition that is the original ground of the existence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreseen existence of the creature. God's love, or benevolence, as it respects the creature, may be taken either in a larger or stricter sense. In a larger sense it may signify nothing diverse from that good disposition in his nature to communicate of his own fullness in general; as his knowledge, his holiness, and happiness; and to give creatures existence in order to it. This may be called benevolence or love, because it is the same good disposition that is exercised in love: 'tis the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the most proper sense; and it has the same general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being. But yet this can't have any particular present or future created existence for its object; because it
is prior to any such object, and the very source of the futurition of the existence of it. Nor is it really diverse from God's love to himself, as will more clearly appear afterwards.
But God's love may be taken more strictly, for this general disposition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects: love in the most strict and proper sense presupposes the existence of the object beloved, at least in idea and expectation, and represented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the strictest sense, but in consequence of his intending to create them, and so having an idea of future existing angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence strictly taken presupposes an existing object, as much as pity, a miserable suffering object.
This propensity in God to diffuse himself may be considered as a propensity to himself diffused, or to his own glory existing in its emanation. A respect to himself, or an infinite propensity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which causes him to incline to its being abundantly diffused, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, shoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a disposition that terminates in its own complete self. And so the disposition in the sun to shine, or abundantly to diffuse its fullness, warmth and brightness, is only a tendency to its own most glorious and complete state. So God looks on the communication of himself, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himself to belong to the fullness and completeness of himself, as though he were not in his most complete and glorious state without it. Thus the church of Christ (toward whom and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fullness) is called the fullness of Christ: as though he were not in his complete state without her; as Adam
was in a defective state without Eve. And the church is called the glory of Christ, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. 11:7; Is. 46:13, "I will place salvation in Zion, for Israel my glory." Indeed after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to these creatures, in the strictest sense, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exercising his goodness, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the spring of all God's proceedings through the universe; as being now the determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuse himself. Here God's acting for himself, or making himself his last end, and his acting for their sake, are not to be set in opposition; or to be considered as the opposite parts of a disjunction:9 they are rather to be considered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other.2 But yet God is to be considered as first and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard consequentially and by implication as being as it were comprehended in God; as shall be more particularly observed presently.
But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fullness in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fullness of good there is in himself, and the supreme respect and regard he has for himself; and that in making these emanations of himself his end, he does ultimately make himself his end in creation, will more clearly appear by considering more particularly the nature and circumstances of these communications of God's fullness which are made, and which we have reason either from the nature of things, or the Word of God to suppose shall be made.
One part of that divine fullness which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which must be supposed to pertain to God's last end in creating the world, is the creatures'
knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge: and even the faculty of understanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is most properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge which primarily consists in the knowledge of himself. God in making this his end makes himself his end. This knowledge in the creature is but a conformity to God. 'Tis the image of God's own knowledge of himself. 'Tis a participation of the same: 'tis as much the same as 'tis possible for that to be, which is infinitely less in degree: as particular beams of the sun communicated, are the light and glory of the sun in part.
Besides God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; so that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is seen. As therefore God values himself, as he delights in his own knowledge; he must delight in everything of that nature: as he delights in his own light, he must delight in every beam of that light: and as he highly values his own excellency, he must be well pleased in having it manifested, and so glorified.
Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fullness, that is and will be made in consequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holiness to the creature. This is a communication of God's holiness; so that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency, which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he must necessarily delight in the creature's holiness; which is a conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightness of a jewel, held in the sun's beams, is a participation, or derivation of the sun's brightness, though immensely less in degree. And then it must be considered wherein this holiness in the creature consists; viz. in love, which is the comprehension of all true virtue;7 and primarily in love to God, which is exercised in an high esteem of God, admiration of
his perfections, complacency in them, and praise of them. All which things are nothing else but the heart's exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which as I showed before, God necessarily approves of, and is pleased with, as he loves himself and values the glory of his own nature.
Another part of God's fullness which he communicates is his happiness. This happiness consists in enjoying and rejoicing in himself, and so does also the creature's happiness. 'Tis, as has been observed of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happiness of the creature consists in rejoicing in God; by which also God is magnified and exalted: joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praise. So that God is all in all, with respect to each part of that communication of the divine fullness which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or something of God: and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and united to him; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or less. And the communication itself is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praise of God consists.
And 'tis farther to be considered that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himself, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumstances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly show how in making this his end, God testifies a supreme respect to himself, and makes himself his end. There are many reasons to think that what God has in view, in an increasing communication of himself throughout eternity, is an increasing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him. And 'tis to be
considered that the more those divine communications increase in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: for so much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and close: and at the same time the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and so the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehensive prospect of the increasing union and conformity through eternity, it must be an infinitely strict and perfect nearness, conformity, and oneness. For it will forever come nearer and nearer to that strictness and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son: so that in the eyes of God, who perfectly sees the whole of it, in its infinite progress and increase, it must come to an eminent fulfillment of Christ's request, in John 17:21, 23: "That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us, I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." In this view, those elect creatures which must be looked upon as the end of all the rest of the creation, considered with respect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as such made God's end, must be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were respected as brought home to him, united with him, centering most perfectly in him, and as it were swallowed up in him: so that his respect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the same with respect to himself. The interest of the creature is, as it were, God's own interest, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the interest of a man's family is looked upon as the same with his own interest, because of the relation they stand in to him, his propriety in them, and their strict union with him. But consider God's elect creatures with respect to their eternal duration, so they are infinitely dearer to God than a man's family is to him. What has been said shows that as all things are from God as their
first cause and fountain; so all things tend to him, and in their progress come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity: which argues that he who is their first cause is their last end.
SECTION IV.
SOME OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST THE REASONABLENESS OF WHAT HAS BEEN SAID
OF GOD'S MAKING HIMSELF HIS LAST END
OBJ. 1. Some may object against what has been said, as inconsistent with God's absolute independence and immutability: particularly the representation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication of his fullness and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this don't well consist with God's being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite and independent good. And that in general to suppose that God makes himself his end, in the creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his own, not easily reconcilable with his being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in himself. If it could be supposed that God needed anything; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit that God should make himself, and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world: and there would be some reason and ground for the preceding discourse. But seeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any respect;
to what purpose should God make himself his end, or seek to advance himself in any respect by any of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things with a view to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and therefore can't now possibly need, nor with any color of reason be supposed to seek?
Ans. 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happiness, as resulting from his absolute self-sufficience, independence, and immutability. Though it be true that God's glory and happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and can't be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet it don't hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure or happiness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in anything he sees in the creature's qualifications, dispositions, actions and state. God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the creature: yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and communicate himself, and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which God has in his creature's happiness can't properly be said to be what God receives from the creature. For 'tis only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature; in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fullness. As the sun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only by a participation of its brightness.
With respect also to the creature's holiness, God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination to communicate of his own excellent fullness. God
may delight with true and great pleasure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expression and manifestation of his own loveliness. And this is so far from himself, that 'tis an evidence that he is happy in himself, or delights and has pleasure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleasure in the expression of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he don't delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happiness and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection. So that if we suppose God has real pleasure and happiness in the holy love and praise of his saints, as the image and communication of his own holiness, it is not properly any pleasure distinct from the pleasure he has in himself; but is truly an instance of it.4
And with respect to God's being glorified in this respect, that those perfections wherein his glory consists are exercised and expressed in their proper and corresponding effects; as his wisdom in wise designs and well-contrived works, his power in great effects, his justice in acts of righteousness, his goodness in communicating happiness; and so his showing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exercised, exhibited, communicated, known, and esteemed: his having delight herein does not argue that his pleasure or happiness is not in himself, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the necessary consequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.
Nor do any of these things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happiness. Though he has real pleasure in the creature's holiness and happiness; yet this is not properly any pleasure which he receives from the creature. For these things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory
expressed in those acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing besides his own act, which he exerts with an absolute and independent power. And yet, in some sense it can be truly said that God has the more delight and pleasure for the holiness and happiness of his creatures: because God would be less happy, if he was less good, or if he had not that perfection of nature which consists in a propensity of nature to diffuse of his own fullness. And he would be less happy, if it were possible for him to be hindered in the exercise of his goodness and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has complete happiness, because he has these perfections, and can't be hindered in exercising and displaying them in their proper effects. And this surely is not thus, because he is dependent; but because he is independent on any other that should hinder him.6
From this view it appears that nothing that has been said is in the least inconsistent with those expressions in the Scripture that signify that man can't be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wisdom and righteousness. For these expressions plainly mean no more than that God is absolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no stock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happiness originates from man.
From what has been said it appears that the pleasure that God hath in those things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleasure in diffusing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, 'tis no argument of indigence in God that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fullness. 'Tis no argument of the emptiness or deficiency of a fountain that it is inclined to overflow. Another thing signified by these expressions of Scripture is that nothing that is from the creature adds to or alters God's happiness, as though it were changeable either by increase or
diminution. Nor does anything that has been advanced in the least suppose or infer that it does, or is it in the least inconsistent with the eternity, and most absolute immutability of God's pleasure and happiness. For though these communications of God, these exercises, operations, effects and expressions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally present in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearness, certainty and fullness in every respect, as he doth now. They were always equally present, as with him there is no variableness or succession. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, absolutely perfect, unchangeable and independent. It can't be added to or diminished by the power or will of any creature; nor is in the least dependent on anything mutable or contingent.
Ans. 2. If any are not satisfied with the preceding answer, but still insist on the objection: let them consider whether they can devise any other scheme of God's last end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any last end in creating the world, then there was something, in some respect future, that he aimed at, and designed to bring to pass by creating the world: something that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happiness of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be something that God seeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accomplishment of it he is gratified. If the last end which he seeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will), then it is what he takes a real delight and pleasure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how can he have anything future to desire or seek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably
satisfied in himself? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratified by, whose eternal and unchangeable delight is in himself as his own complete object of enjoyment? Thus the objector will be pressed with his own objection, let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to answer but that which has been taken above.
It may therefore be proper here to observe that let what will be God's last end, that he must have a real and proper pleasure in: whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful1 to him in itself; or for something else for which he wills it: and so is his further end. But whatever is God's last end, that he wills for its own sake; as grateful to him in itself: or which is the same thing, it is that which he truly delights in, or in which he has some degree of true and proper pleasure. Otherwise we must deny any such thing as will in God with respect to anything brought to pass in time; and so must deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reason to suppose that God's works in creating and governing the world are properly the fruits of his will, as of his understanding. And if there be any such thing at all as what we mean by acts of will in God, then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleased in the fulfillment of his will: or which is the same thing, he has a pleasure in it. And if he has a real pleasure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happiness. That in which God's delight or pleasure in any measure consists, his happiness in some measure consists. To suppose that God has pleasure in things, that are brought to pass in time, only figuratively and metaphorically, is to suppose that he exercises will about these things and makes them his end only metaphorically.
Ans. 3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himself to be his last end is a doctrine the farthest from having a favorable aspect on God's absolute self-sufficience and independence. It far less agrees therewith than the doctrine against which this is objected. For we must conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end in his desires, aims, actions and pursuits; so that he fails in all his desires, actions and pursuits, if he fails of his end. Now if God himself be his last end, then in his dependence on his end he depends on nothing but himself. If all things be of him, and to him,3 and he the first and the last, this shows him to be all in all: he is all to himself. He goes not out of himself in what he seeks; but his desires and pursuits as they originate from, so they terminate in himself; and he is dependent on none but himself in the beginning or end of any of his exercises or operations. But if not himself, but the creature, be his last end, then as he depends on his last end, he is in some sort dependent on the creature.
Obj. 2. Some may object that to suppose that God makes himself his highest and last end, is dishonorable to him; as it in effect supposes that God does everything from a selfish spirit. Selfishness is looked upon as mean and sordid in the creature! unbecoming and even hateful in such a worm of the dust as man. We should look upon a man as of a base and contemptible character, that should in everything he did be governed by selfish principles; should make his private interest his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then should we be from attributing any such thing to the Supreme Being, the blessed and only potentate! Does it not become us to ascribe to him the most noble and generous dispositions, and those qualities that are the most remote from everything that is private, narrow and sordid?
Ans. 1. Such an objection must arise from a very ignorant or inconsiderate notion of the vice of selfishness, and the virtue of generosity. If by selfishness be meant a disposition in any being to regard himself, this is no otherwise vicious or unbecoming, than as one is less than a multitude; and so the public weal is of greater value than his particular interest. Among created beings one single person must be looked upon as inconsiderable in comparison of the generality; and so his interest as of little importance compared with the interest of the whole system: therefore in them, a disposition to prefer self as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account than as it is a disposition that don't agree with the nature of things, and that which is indeed the greatest good. And a disposition in anyone to forego his own interest for the sake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generosity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a prosecuting something most worthy to be prosecuted; an expression of a disposition to prefer something to self-interest, that is indeed preferable in itself. But if God be indeed so great, and so excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and less than nothing, and vanity in comparison of his; and God be omniscient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the most valuable Being;6 then it is fit that his heart should be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending understanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them: and so 'tis fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.
Ans. 2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good: at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That which this person
looks upon as his interest may interfere with or oppose the general good. Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public. But this can't be with respect to the Supreme Being, the Author and Head of the whole system: on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart and vitals of the natural body should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God who is omniscient should apprehend the matter thus; viz. his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole.
Ans. 3. God's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, or any possibility of being so, that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fullness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition that inclines him to delight in his glory causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions and communications of it. This is a natural conclusion. If there were any person of such taste and disposition of mind that the brightness and light of the sun seemed unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself: but they that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffused and communicated through the world.
Here by the way it may be properly considered, whether some writers are not chargeable with inconsistence in this respect, viz. that whereas they speak against the doctrine of God's making himself his
own highest and last end, as though this were an ignoble selfishness in God: when indeed he only is fit to be made the highest end, by himself and all other beings; inasmuch as he is the highest Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others—yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely less worthy of supreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at least) suppose that they necessarily at all times seek their own happiness, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their most virtuous actions: and that this principle, regulated by wisdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and highest happiness, is the foundation of all virtue and everything that is morally good and excellent in them.
Obj. 3. To what has been supposed, that God makes himself his end in this way, viz. in seeking that his glory and excellent perfection should be known, esteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this seems unworthy of God.9 It is considered as below a truly great man to be much influenced in his conduct by a desire of popular applause. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude would be esteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philosopher, in any great and noble enterprise. How much more is it unworthy the great God to perform his magnificent works, e.g. the creation of the vast universe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the dust: that the displays of his magnificence may be gazed at and applauded by those who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meanest rabble are beneath the greatest prince or philosopher.
This objection is specious. It hath a show of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a show, if we consider
Ans. 1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itself, and so to take pleasure in its
existence.
It seems not liable to any doubt that there could be nothing future, or no future existence worthy to be desired or sought by God, and so worthy to be made his end, if no future existence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If when the world was not there was any possible future thing fit and valuable in itself, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the esteem and love of it must be so. Understanding and will are the highest kind of created existence. And if they be valuable, it must be in their exercise. But the highest and most excellent kind of their exercise is in some actual knowledge and exercise of will. And certainly the most excellent actual knowledge and will that can be in the creature is the knowledge and the love of God. And the most true excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence; and the most excellent exercise of the will consists in esteem and love and a delight in his glory. If any created existence is in itself worthy to be, or anything that ever was future is worthy of existence, such a communication of divine glory is worthy of existence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exist, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation.
If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and esteem hereof by others is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a necessary consequence. To make this plain, let it be considered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do so, we shall approve of and like others' esteem of them; and shall disapprove and dislike the contempt of them. If these virtues are truly valuable, they are
worthy that we should thus approve others' esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect to any being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being3 who hath them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded. I desire it may be considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt of himself. If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem and honor of himself.
The matter may be also cleared by considering what it would become us to approve of and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e.g. our nation or country. It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value and seek for himself; that is, on supposition it becomes God to love himself as well as it does men to love a friend or the public, which I think has been before proved.
Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. (1) That in God the love of himself, and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man, because God's being as it were comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to universal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himself must be so likewise. (2) In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, can't be a distinct thing from the love of himself—because5
the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holiness does primarily and chiefly consist, and God's own holiness must primarily consist in the love of himself, as was before observed. And if God's holiness consists in love to himself, then it will imply an approbation of and pleasedness with the esteem and love of him in others. For a being that loves himself, necessarily loves Love8 to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness in himself, he must love it in the creature.
Virtue by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise than as it is implied in or arises from1 this public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public, he necessarily loves Love to the public.
Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect Universal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in or arises from love to the Divine Being. Consequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himself; and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God's virtuous disposition, appearing in love to holiness in the creature, is to be resolved into the same thing with love to himself. And consequently whereinsoever he makes virtue his end he makes himself his end. In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holiness, justice, grace and benevolence are some way or other to be resolved into a supreme and infinite regard to himself: and if so it will be easy to suppose that it becomes him to make himself his supreme and last end in his works.
I would here observe by the way that if any insist that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own sake, in such a manner as not to love it from regard to himself; and that it supposeth too much selfishness to suppose that all God's delight in virtue is to be resolved into delight in himself: this will contradict a former objection against God's taking pleasure in communications of himself; viz. that inasmuch as God is perfectly independent and selfsufficient, therefore all his happiness and pleasure consists in the enjoyment of himself.3 For in the present objection it is insisted that it becomes God to have some pleasure, love or delight in virtue distinct from his delight in himself. So that if the same persons make both objections they must be inconsistent with themselves.
Ans. 2. In answer to the objection we are upon, as to God's creatures whose esteem and love he seeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity, I would observe that it is not unworthy of God to take pleasure in that which in itself is fit and amiable, even in those that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condescension in it, yet these are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honor and glory.
They who insist that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world, but that all that he had any ultimate regard to was the happiness of his creatures; and suppose that he made his creatures, and not himself his last end; do it under a color of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures. But if his love to them be so great, and he so highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they suppose; they are not consistent with themselves, in supposing that God has so little value for their love and esteem. For as the nature of love, especially great love, causes him that loves to value the esteem of the person beloved: so, that God should take pleasure in the
creature's just love and esteem will follow both from God's love to himself and his love to his creatures. If he esteem and love himself, he must approve of esteem and love to himself; and disapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he must value and take delight in their mutual love and esteem: because he loves not because he needs them.
Ans. 3. As to what is alleged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and achievements by a regard to the applause of the populace: I would observe, what makes their applause to be worthy of so little regard, is their ignorance, giddiness and injustice. The applause of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any just view and understanding of things, but on humor, mistake, folly and unreasonable affections. Such applause is truly worthy to be disregarded. But 'tis not beneath a man of the greatest dignity and wisdom to value the wise and just esteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, instead of being an expression of greatness of mind, would show an haughty and mean spirit. 'Tis such an esteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for 'tis such an esteem only that is fit and amiable in itself.
Obj. 4. To suppose that God makes himself his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the freeness of his goodness, in his beneficence to his creatures; and from their obligations to gratitude7 for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his fullness, makes himself, and not the creatures, his end; then what good he does, he does for himself, and not for them; for his own sake, and not theirs.
Ans. God and the creature, in this affair of the emanation of the divine fullness, are not properly set in opposition; or made the opposite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the
creature's good to be spoken of as if they were properly and entirely distinct, as they are in the objection. This supposeth that God's having respect to his glory and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: that God's communicating his fullness for himself, and his doing it for them, are things standing in a proper disjunction and opposition. Whereas if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are so much above us, 'tis probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwise: and that these things, instead of appearing entirely distinct, are implied one in the other. That God in seeking his glory, therein seeks the good of his creatures: because9 the emanation of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights in himself and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happiness of his creature. And that in communicating his fullness for them, he does it for himself: because their good, which he seeks, is so much in union and communion with himself. God is their good. Their excellency and happiness is nothing but the emanation and expression of God's glory: God in seeking their glory and happiness, seeks himself: and in seeking himself, i.e. himself diffused and expressed (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fullness), he seeks their glory and happiness.
This will the better appear if we consider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creature's excellency and happiness in his creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happiness during the whole of the designed eternal duration of the world he was about to create: which is in greater and greater nearness and strictness of union with himself, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happiness, in constant progression, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz. with respect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and
the eternally progressive union and communion with him; so the creature must be viewed as in infinite strict union with himself. In this view it appears that God's respect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his respect to himself. Both regards are like two lines which seem at the beginning to be separate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the same center. And as to the good of the creature itself, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progression, it must be viewed as infinite; and so not only being some communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the same thing in its infinite fullness. The nearer anything comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it can't be viewed as a distinct thing from God's own infinite glory.
The Apostle's discourse of the great love of Christ to men, Eph. 5:25 to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Christ to his church as coinciding with his love to himself, by virtue of the strict union of the church with him. Thus "husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it … that he might present it to himself a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himself … even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones."
Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's seeking the good of the creatures, or in his disposition to communicate of his own fullness to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation.
God's disposition to communicate good, or to cause his own infinite fullness to flow forth, is not the less properly called God's goodness, because the good that he communicates, is something of himself; a