Chapter 1 (23): 1. After Setting Out The Views And Reporting The Testimonies, He
Distinction VI | 31 5. The same in the book On Faith to Peter: "The Son of God, although he is eternal and true God, was made true and full man for our sake: true, because that God has a true human nature; but full, because he also took on a human flesh and a rational soul."'*—Also: "That emptying of the most high God was nothing else than the taking up of the form of a servant, that is, of human nature. And so each form is in Christ, because each substance," namely the human and the divine, " is true and full in Christ."
6. The same in the book Against Maximinus: "Although he was invisible in himself, he appeared visible in the human form which he deigned to take from a woman."'°—The same in the same: "We believe that Christ the Lord took true human form: in it, he who was invisible appeared visibly to men; in it, he associated with men;"' in it, he bore human things from human beings; in it, he taught men."'*
7. Hilary too, in On the Trinity, book 10, says: "How was the Son of God born of Mary, if not that the Word was made flesh,"" namely that the Son of God, although he was in the form of God, took the form of a servant??? And yet we profess him to be one and the same, not by the loss of divinity, but by the taking of humanity; and that he was found to be in the form of God through the divine nature, and in the form of a servant from the conception of the Holy Spirit according to the habit of a man.""! "That was not nevertheless a man's habit, but as if a man's;" nor was that flesh sinful flesh, but in the likeness of sinful flesh."**—You have heard three views set out according to different proponents, and the testimonies brought forth for each of them.
DISTINCTION VII
Chapter 1 (23)
1. AFTER SETTING OUT THE VIEWS AND REPORTING THE TESTIMONIES, HE
PURSUES THE MEANINGS OF THE PROPOSED EXPRESSIONS ACCORDING TO
EACH VIEW, AND FIRST ACCORDING TO THE FIRST. According to the first, '4Rulgentius, De fide ad Petrum, c2 10.
'STbid., c3 nn20-21.
'Rather, Evodius, De fide contra Manichaeos, ¢22.
"Cf. Baruch 3, 38.
'8Evodius, De fide contra Manichaeos, ¢26.
Jn, 1, 14.
Phil. 2, 6-7.
*IHilary, De Trinitate, bk 10 n22.
"peep hile 2).
Rom. 8, 3.
*4Hilary, De Trinitate, bk 10 n25.
32 | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3
God is said to have been made man, and man to have been made God, because God began to be some rational substance which had not existed before, and that substance began to be God. And Christ had this by grace, not by nature or merits. Hence Christ, insofar as he is a man, is rightly said to be predestined the Son of God.'
2. WHAT OBJECTIONS ARE MADE TO THIS VIEW. The following objection is made to this view: If that substance began to be God, and God to be that substance, then some substance is God which was not always God; and some substance is God which is not the divine substance; and God is something which he not always was.—ORIGEN, ON THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS. Which they also grant, relying on the testimony of Origen, who says: "He was made, undoubtedly, that which he was not before," but adds: "according to the flesh; but according to God he was before, and he was not when he was not.""
3. Objection to their view also can be made in a variety of further ways, but we pass over them, leaving this studious exercise to the reader while we move on to the next view.
4. HERE HE EXPLAINS THE SECOND VIEW AND THE SENSES OF THOSE
SAME EXPRESSIONS. But in the second view, the reason for this statement is as follows: that in saying 'God was made man,' Christ would be understood to have begun to be subsistent from two natures or three substances; and conversely 'man was made God,' because, subsisting in two natures, he began to be God.—Or rather, what is said is "man was made God or vice versa,' because God took on man and the man was taken by God.
Hence Augustine says, in the book On the Trinity: "For that taking was such as to make man God, and God man.'"'—But the meaning is changed in saying 'God is man' and 'man is God.' For God is said to be a person subsisting in and from two natures; and the person subsisting from two natures is said to be God, that is, the Word, or the divine nature. It is possible that a simple person or nature be predicated of a composite person; but, as John of Damascus says, it is not the same to say nature or person.'
5. IN WHAT SENSE THEY CALL CHRIST PREDESTINED. These say that Christ is predestined insofar as he is a man, that is, insofar as he is subsistent from two substances, namely soul and flesh; for insofar as the nature of the divinity is concerned, he is not predestined. And so it is not insofar as he subsists in it or by it that he is predestined; but insofar as he subsists in the other two substances, that is, in soul and flesh, that is, insofar as he is man.
'Cf. Rom. 1, 4.
*Origen, /n Epistolam ad Romanos 1, n5; cf. Rom. 1, 3.
'Augustine, De Trinitate, bk 1 c13 n28.
"John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, bk 3 ¢4.
Distinction VII | 33
6. HOW THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FIRST VIEW WHICH APPEAR TO RUN
COUNTER TO THIS SECOND VIEW ARE EXPOUNDED. They also determine the authorities which agree with the first view, and which appear to contradict this one, as when we read 'that man, assumed in the singularity of person by the Word,' or 'made one person with the Word,' this is understood of the human nature which is united to the Word in singularity of person, that is, in such a way that the same person which was before and was simple, remained without increase of number and unchanged, although [now] composite. But they say that the reason for this composition is other than what obtains in other men, because this man's composition proceeds from three substances, while that of others proceeds from two.
7. They also deny that the human nature is a person or the Son of God; and just as they say that man and God are one and the same, both the son of man and the Son of God are also one and the same, and not two different things, just as they are not two different beings.
8. HE SETS OUT SOME TEXTS WHICH APPEAR TO CONTRADICT THE FORE-
GOING. But these appear to be contradicted by what is contained in the chapters below. For Augustine, in On John, says: "The Word of God is one thing, the man another. But the Word was made flesh, that is, man; and so it is not the case that there is one person of the Word, another of the man, because Christ is both and one person.'"°—The same, To Felicianus: "The Son of God is one thing, the son of man another thing, but not another being."'—Also: "The Son of God is one thing from the Father, another from the Mother.'"*—The same, in On the Trinity, book 1:
"Although the Son is both God and man, one substance is God and another substance is man."
9. HOW THEY RESPOND TO THESE [ARGUMENTS]. And they determine these [arguments] in the following way: that in saying 'the Word of God is one thing, the man another,' or 'one substance is God, another man,'
Christ is signified to be of one nature insofar as he is man, and of another insofar as he is God; and one thing by the nature by which he is man, another thing by the nature by which he is God.—JOHN OF DAMASCUS.
For, as John of Damascus says, "the two natures are mutually united without conversion or alteration; the divine nature does not depart from its proper simplicity, nor is the human one either changed into the nature of the divinity or reduced to non-existence, nor is one composite nature made from the two. For a composite nature cannot be homousia (that is, consubstantial) with either of the natures from which it is composed, but "Jae 14:
°Augustine, /n Joannem, tr. 69 n3.
'That is, Vigilius of Thapse, Contra Felicianum Arianum de unitate Trinitatis, c11.
'Chr ibid: ic lz, *Augustine, De Trinitate, bk 1 c10 n20.
34 | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3
makes something else out of the other two, just as the body, which is composed of the four elements, is not called fire, nor air, nor earth, nor water, nor is it said to be homousion with any of these. And so if, as the heretics say, Christ was of one composite nature after the union, he was changed from a simple nature into a composite one, and is neither of the same simple nature as the Father, nor of the same substance as the Mother; and he will be called neither God nor man, but only Christ. And this name, namely Christ, will not be the name of the person itself, but, they say, of the one composite nature. But we do not teach that Christ is of one composite nature. And this name, namely Christ, we say of the person; it is not said monotropically (that is, in one way), but as signifying the two natures, namely divinity and humanity. For we confess that, from divinity and humanity, he is and is to be called perfect God and perfect man, from two natures and in two natures."'°—And so the Son of God is said to be one thing, the son of man another thing, because he is of one substance or nature insofar as he is Son of God, of another insofar as he is son of man, not because the same Son of God and man is those two different things, that is, two different natures.
10. HE CONFIRMS THE DETERMINATION BY AUTHORITY. For Hilary says clearly, in On the Trinity, book 9: "Since the son of man is not one thing and the Son of God another thing: for the Word was made flesh;'' and since he who is Son of God is also son of man, who, I ask, is glorified in this son of man."' He clearly says that the Son of God is not one thing and the son of man another thing; from this, the above determination is strengthened and approved.
11. IN ORDER TO MAKE A DETERMINATION, HE ALSO NOTES SOME OTHER
WORDS OF THE AUTHORITIES. And what was said earlier, 'Christ is both and one person,''' may trouble the reader; as also that which Augustine says in On the Trinity, book 1: "Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God, both are man; but both God because it is God who takes, and both man, because it is man who is taken."''* And that which the same says in the book On the Good of Perseverance: "He who is faithful believes that, when in Christ God the Word took a true human nature, he so raised it up that the one who took and that which he took were one person in the Trinity; by that taking, he ineffably brought about the truth of one person in God and man."'° But if he who took and that which he took is one person, then the human nature is one person with the Word.
"J ohn of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, bk 3 c3.
Jn ea "Hilary, De Trinitate, bk 9 n40; Jn. 13, 31-32.
'3 Above, n8.
'Augustine, De Trinitate, bk 1 c7 n14.
''Augustine, De dono perseverantiae, c24 n67.
Distinction VI | 35
12. HERE HE MAKES USE OF AN AUTHORITY TO CONFIRM THE DETER-
MINATION. But they hand down that all these things would have been said in the following sense: that Christ is said to be both and one person, because one Christ and one person subsist in both. And the taker is said to be one person with what is taken, because what is taken is joined to the taker in unity of person, that is, in such a way that the unity of person persisted, but not in such a way that flesh and soul are God. For as Jerome says, "the Word is God, not the flesh that was taken."'® And Ambrose, in On the Holy Spirit, book 3, says: "The taker is one thing, and what was taken is something else."''"
13. HERE HE SETS OUT AN AUTHORITY WHICH APPEARS TO BE MUCH
OPPOSED TO THEIR VIEW. There is also another text which appears to run very much counter to this view. For Augustine says, in the book Against Maximinus: "Christ is one person of twofold substance, because he is both God and man. And God or man cannot be said to be part of this person: otherwise the Son of God was not wholly God before taking the form of a servant, and he attained that stature when man joined his divinity."'®
See, he says that God is not part of that person; and so it appears that that person is not comprised of God and man.
14. THEIR RESPONSE, WITH A DETERMINATION. To which also they say that that person does not consist from God and man as if a whole from its parts. For the parts of some whole come together in such a way that what was not before is composed of them. But it is not in such a way that the human and divine nature are united in Christ: for the order of this union, which is not a union of parts, is inexplicable—ANOTHER SOLUTION. But some hold that the term 'God' there signifies person, because [Augustine] was speaking of the three persons, none of whom he said was a part of the Trinity, just as God is not a part of this person. But if it is understood of a person, then it is obvious, because a person is not a part of a person.
15. We have diligently set out the second view and the explanation for it. No objection, or almost none, arises to the second view from the authorities which are brought forward in the third view, to which we must now turn.
16. WHAT THE MEANING OF THE AFORESAID PROPOSITIONS IS ACCORD-
ING TO THE THIRD VIEW. And so, in this view, 'God was made man' is said because he took human form; and 'man' is said because he has human form or because he is one who has human form; and 'man was made God,' because he was taken by God; and 'man is God,' because the one who has taken human form is God.
'Jerome, Epistola 9 (ad Paulam et Eustochium), n12.
'7 Ambrose, De incarnationis dominicae sacramento, c6 n6l.
'SAugustine, Contra Maximinum, bk 2 c10 n2.