Front matter

Front matter

PETER LOMBARD

The Sentences bsxeye) << | :

On the Incarnation :

Of the Word Translated by oe

GIULIO SILANO-

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Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2022 with funding from Kahle/Austin Foundation https://archive.org/details/sentencesbook1my0000pete

Mediaeval Sources in Translation 45 Peter Lombard, The Sentences Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word

TRANSLATED BY GIULIO SILANO

Peter Lombard's major work, the four books of the Sentences, was written in the mid-twelfth century and, as early as the 1160s, the text was glossed and commented on in the schools. There is hardly a theologian of note throughout the rest of the Middle Ages who did not write a commentary on the Sentences. Yet in spite of its importance in Western intellectual history and its capacity to excite many generations of students and teachers, the Sentences has received little attention in more recent times. Indeed, it has been called "one of the least read of the world's great books."

This volume makes available for the first time in English a full translation of Book 3 of the Sentences, which deals with the mystery of the Word made flesh: Christ's incarnation, passion, and death, the consequent restoration of humankind, and the virtues to be practised in imitation of Christ.

Book 3 is divided into forty Distinctions. The first twenty-two are devoted to Christ's incarnation and his redemptive work, with the first fourteen of these focussing on Christ as God and man and the final seven turning to Christ's suffering and its redemptive role. With the question of whether Christ had the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, a transition is made, in Distinction 23, from Christology to a consideration of the virtues; these belong in this Book principally because the Christian is called to live them in imitation of Christ, who embodies all of them perfectly.

And so the theological virtues are discussed in Distinctions 23-32 and the cardinal ones in Distinction 33; the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which Peter also considers as virtues, are presented in Distinctions 34 and 35. Distinction 36 concludes the treatment of the virtues with the assertion that they are interconnected by charity. The last four Distinctions outline the Decalogue in the context of the two commandments given by Christ regarding the love of God and neighbour; the Book closes by asserting the superiority of the Gospel over the Law of the Old Testament.

The volume contains an introduction to Book 3, a list of the major chapter headings, and a bibliography.

Saint Michael's College Mediaeval Translations General Editors

JOSEPH GOERING

GIULIO SILANO

Mediaeval Sources in Translation 45

PETER LOMBARD

THE SENTENCES

BOOK 3: On the Incarnation of the Word Translated by

GIULIO SILANO

PONTIFICAL INSTITUTE OF MEDIAEVAL STUDIES

This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, through the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris, ca.

1100-1160 The Sentences / Peter Lombard ; translated by Giulio Silano.

(Mediaeval sources in translation, ISSN 0316-0874 ; 42-43, 45) (Saint Michael's College mediaeval translations)

Translation of: Sententiae in IV libris distinctae.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Bk. 1. The mystery of the Trinity — bk. 2. On creation — bk. 3. On the incarnation of the word.

ISBN 978-0-88844-292-5 (bk. 1).— ISBN 978-0-88844-293-2 (bk. 2).

—ISBN 978-0-88844-295-6 (bk. 3) 1. God—Early works to 1800. 2. God—Attributes—Early works to 1800.

3. Trinity—Early works to 1800. 4. Creation—Early works to 1800.

5. Jesus Christ—History of doctrines—Middle Ages, 600-1500. 6. Catholic Church—Doctrines—Early works to 1800. 7. Theology—Early works to 1800.

I. Silano, Giulio, 1955— II. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies III. Title. 1V. Series. V. Series.

B765.P33S46 2007

Zot

C2006-907006-7

Second printing 2010 © 2008 Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies 59 Queen's Park Crescent East Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 2C4

PRINTED IN CANADA

Contents Introduction vil Chapter Headings xli Peter Lombard, The Sentences Book 3: On the Incarnation of the Word

Distinction XxI Distinction I

Distinction XxII Distinction I

Distinction XxIII Distinction I

Distinction XXIV Distinction IV

Distinction XXV Distinction V hes

Distinction XXVI Distinction VL

Distinction XXVII Distinction VII 3]

Distinction XXVIII Distinction VII 37, J2]

Distinction XxIx Distinction Ix

Distinction Xxx Distinction X

Distinction XXXI Distinction XI

J32 Distinction XxxII Distinction XI

Distinction XXxIl Distinction XII

Distinction XXXIV Distinction XIV

Distinction XXXV Distinction XV aie

Distinction XXXVI Distinction XVI

Distinction XXXVI Distinction XVII

LOZ, Distinction XXXVII Distinction XVII

Distinction XXxIxX Distinction XIx

Distinction XL Distinction Xx

Bibliography

English translations of works cited in Book 3

Index of Scriptural and Patristic Authorities

To Francesca Oh quanto ¢€ corto il dire e come fioco al mio concetto! e questo, a quel ch'1' vidi,

€ tanto, che non basta a dicer "poco."

O luce etterna che sola in te sidi, sola t'intendi, e da te intelletta e intendente te ami e arridi!

Quella circulazion che si concetta pareva in te come lume reflesso, da li occhi miei alquanto circunspetta, dentro da sé, del suo colore stesso, mi parve pinta de la nostra effige: per che'! mio viso in lei tutto era messo.

(Paradiso, 33.121-132)

INTRODUCTION

As was discussed in the Introduction to our translation of Book 1 of the work, it is our view that the Sentences of Peter Lombard will be more readily intelligible if it is not approached as if its author had known that it was going to become the standard work for the training of theologians for centuries to come. The enormous success, even the monopoly, which the Sentences came to enjoy in the professional training of theologians in medieval and early modern universities may lead one to anticipate the date at which theology became a profession and sets up unhelpful comparisons between the Sentences and the works of thirteenth-century theologians.

The analogy we have found more attractive to describe Peter's work is the one between it and casebooks meant for the training of experts whose role in the Church and in Christian society was not restricted to the teaching of theology. As a consequence, it seems more useful to consider that, in the Sentences, Peter Lombard was introducing his students to a sort of disciplined reflection on the Christian tradition which could lead to, but was not identical with, the later scientific training of theologians.

The modern reader who keeps this in mind will avoid sterile repetitions of old doubts about the work's systematic nature or lack thereof; more importantly, such a reader will approach the Sentences with a better sense of the fluidity and open-endedness of the academic enterprise in the mid-twelfth century. The distinguishing features of Peter's work may then emerge with greater clarity and joy.

With characteristic and fitting humility, in the first Book of the Sentences, Peter Lombard had attempted, as he himself says, to stammer out something of the mysteries of the divine nature. In the second Book, he

'That Introduction also contains a sketch of Peter's life and works and a discussion of the structure and purposes of the Sentences as a whole, as well as a brief overview of the contents of Book 1. The reader seeking a fuller introduction to Peter Lombard in English will wish to consult the magisterial study by Marcia L. Colish, Peter Lombard, 2 vol. (Leiden, New York, Cologne: E.J. Brill 1994). If the occasional disagreement with a few readings of Peter by Colish is noted below, that is no denial of the great value of her study, particularly in setting Peter's teachings in the context of the school debates of his time. A shorter and engaging introduction to Peter's life and thought, which presumes and complements Colish's more substantial work, is

Philipp W. Rosemann, Peter Lombard (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).

viii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 had turned with greater confidence to treat the creation of the world and the fall of humankind." Now, in Book 3, he has as his subject the mystery of the Word made flesh: Christ's incarnation, passion, and death, the consequent restoration of humankind, and the virtues to be practised in imitation of Christ.'

Book 3 of the Sentences comes to us divided into forty Distinctions.

The first twenty-two are devoted to Christ's incarnation and his redemptive work, with the first fourteen of these focussing on Christ as God and man and the final seven turning to Christ's suffering and its redemptive role. With the question of whether Christ had the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, a transition is made, in Distinction 23, from Christology to a consideration of the virtues; these belong in this Book principally because the Christian is called to live them in imitation of Christ, who embodies all of them perfectly. And so the theological virtues are discussed in Distinctions 23-32 and the cardinal ones in Distinction 33; the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which Peter also considers as virtues, are presented in Distinctions 34 and 35. Distinction 36 concludes the treatment of the virtues with the assertion that they are interconnected by charity. The last four

Distinctions outline the Decalogue in the context of the two commandments given by Christ regarding the love of God and neighbour; the Book closes with the assertion of the superiority of the Gospel over the Law of the Old Testament.

Christology Peter begins his introduction to the convolutedly elaborate ancient and contemporary debates about the nature of Christ with the clear and unambiguous affirmation that human beings care about all this because it was through Christ's coming that, in the fullness of time, salvation became available to them in love by their adoption as children of God (dist. 1, before cl).

Throughout the Sentences, one of Peter's abiding concerns is to remind his students and readers that, for all the distinction of persons in God, divine life is Trinitarian. Similarly, the work of redemption, even if it is usually—and for good reason—discussed as the work of the Son, is

*As was the case in Book 1, the Introduction to Book 2 contains a summary of the Book's contents.

*For a brief and lucid description of the structure of Book 3 and a spirited rebuttal of the view that its organization is less than impressive, see Rosemann, Peter Lombard, pp. 119-121.

Introduction | 1x better seen as the work of the Trinity. The interesting manner in which this point is made at the very beginning of Book 3 is by asking why it should have been the Son, rather than the Father or the Holy Spirit, who took on human flesh and form (cl nl). Three reasons are given. First, since the world was established in the Wisdom which is Christ, it was suitable that the work of reparation should be carried out by that same

Wisdom (cl n2). Second, it was fitting that the Son, who has it from the Father that he is from another from all eternity, should also be sent from another in the incarnation (cl n2). Third, it was elegantly economic that the one who is Son of God according to divinity from all eternity should become son of man according to humanity in time, and should so retain exclusively the title of son even as he extended to human beings the possibility of their becoming sons by adoption (cl n4).

These reasons are in no way meant to suggest that the divine omnipotence was bounded and that the Father and the Holy Spirit could not have become incarnate (c2); in discerning and pointing out the suitability of the Son's incarnation, one is simply delighting in the beauty of the divine choice insofar as one is able to glimpse it. There is equal delight in the unambiguous assertion that the Son's incarnation is the work of the entire Trinity, even as it is the Son alone who takes flesh from the Virgin, and the Holy Spirit alone who appears in the form of a dove, and the voice of the Father alone that is heard to proclaim the sonship of the Son (c3 n2).

Against any inclination to safeguard the divinity of Christ at the cost of minimizing his humanity, Peter next insists that the Son took on human nature in its entirety, soul and flesh, and not just some partial form of it.

The Son came to share the whole nature of humanity so that he could redeem it whole (dist. 2 cl nl). Although Christ is absolutely unique by reason of being both perfect God and perfect man, yet the humanity which he took is a fully human nature, soul and flesh, with the accidents and qualities which pertain to both, so that all these may find in him the cure for the ills which had come to afflict them at the fall (cl nn2-4).

It would not have been suitable for the divine essence to become united to a material body apart from the mediation of the soul (c2). And so, at the very moment of conception, Christ took on soul and body simultaneously; by the work of the Trinity, the Son took on soul and flesh in the Virgin's womb, and so the Word was made flesh (c3).

The insistence on Christ's full humanity might make for the conclusion that his flesh was sinful. But it would have been unsuitable for the Word to take on sinful flesh, and the manner of his conception precluded it. The overshadowing of the Holy Spirit purified the Virgin from all sin

x | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3

and from the urge to sin, even as it prepared the power of begetting the divine Word in her womb without male seed and without concupiscence

(dist. 3 cl). And yet the flesh so wonderfully begotten remains fully human (cl n4). It was in order that she might worthily bear the divine Word that Mary received the wholly singular privilege of being rendered entirely sinless (c2).

But if Christ's flesh was free from sin, how can it be said that he took on flesh in order to free it from sin? Peter resolves this conundrum by introducing a distinction between the burdens which human flesh bears because of the guilt of sin and those which arise from the punishment for sin. Though his flesh was guiltless, Christ willingly took on the punishment for sin. By this voluntary assumption, Christ's flesh bore the likeness of sinful flesh and would suffer and die; this same likeness sufficed for the work of freeing human flesh from sin (c4 n1).

A further occasion to affirm the Trinitarian character of Christ's incarnation is offered by the discussion of why, in Scripture, this work is attributed to the Holy Spirit (dist.

4cl nl). A fitting reason for this attribution is that the Spirit is the love and gift of the Father and Son; therefore to call the incarnation a work of the Spirit is to affirm that it is a delightful gift of the loving Trinity (cl nl). It remains a firm hermeneutical principle that the works which Scripture attributes to one of the divine persons are to be usually understood as being the work of the whole Trinity (cl n2). In any case, the assertion that Christ is born of the Holy Spirit and of Mary is not to be taken to mean that he is the son of the Spirit in the same way that he is the son of Mary; the mention of the Spirit here denotes the divine grace at work in the joining of humanity and divinity in Christ (c2 nn1-3). Another reason may be that it was through the work of the Spirit that the humanity of Christ was formed from the Virgin's flesh

(c2 nn4 and 5).

In the first four Distinctions, Peter has raised relatively peaceful and straightforward questions concerning Christ and his saving work. The tone of his interventions and of his authorities has been principally one of delighted piety before the beautiful benignity of the incarnation. But in Distinction 5 the discussion takes a decidedly technical turn as Peter begins to set out the complex issues which have been raised in the tradition and in the schools regarding the union without confusion of divinity and humanity in Christ. Grammatical and logical problems abound here. In attending to these issues, we will do well to remember Peter's commitment to deepening the piety of his students and encouraging in them an intelligently sensitive and respectful reading of Scripture. It is in aid of such

Introduction | xi goals that he strives to set forth in a fair and balanced manner the various and frequently heated debates which have been occurring in the schools.

Respectful of the lawful freedom of his colleagues and students, Peter presents contending views without always choosing from among them; whenever he believes that the evidence is not compelling on one side or another, he will happily leave his readers to their own preference, now enriched by the survey of possibilities set out in his work.

The first of the technical questions raised asks whether, in describing how the Word of God took flesh, one ought to say that a person took on a person, or a nature a nature, or a person a nature, or a nature a person; furthermore, is it appropriate to say that the divine nature became flesh, as it is to say that God became flesh? (dist. 5 cl nl). These questions have their historical roots in the memory of the ancient debates about Adoptionism—whether Christ was Son of God by adoption—a position that makes it easy to reject any formulation suggesting that a person is taken on at the incarnation (cl n2). But the questions retain all their interest because they go to the heart of the Christian's perception of the relationship of the divine and human in Christ, and so also to the heart of the Christian's own relationship with Christ and the divine Trinity. The lovingly delicate glance extended to the constitution of the human Christ brings with it the possibility of an equally delicate attention to the work of the Trinity in each human person.

The easy answer to the questions here raised is that a person took on a nature. Although one cannot say that either a person or a nature took ona person (cl n2), more challenging is whether a nature took on a nature.

In his discussion of this point, Peter stresses that opinions on this have varied among the authorities, and even in one and the same authority (cl n3). For the view that a nature did not take on a nature, Peter cites a Council of Toledo ruling, which held that "the Son alone took human form in the singularity of his person, not in the unity of the divine nature"

(cl n4). That a nature took on a nature, on the other hand, seems to be held by Augustine, who said: "For that nature, which remains forever begotten of the Father, took our nature free from sin in order to be born of the Virgin" (cl n5).* But an even stronger assertion of nature taking on nature is found in statements by Augustine and Hilary about the Son tak- 'Peter professes to be troubled by Augustine's use of 'begotten' here, since he would reserve this term for the Son's person rather than for his nature, which he shares with the other persons of the Trinity (cl n5).

xii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 ing the form of a servant without losing the form of God, with form being taken as the equivalent of nature (cl nn6 and 7).

Wishing to negotiate safely the minefield which he has just described, Peter confesses his assent to the rightly understood teachings of the or_thodox Fathers and Catholic teachers; he then proceeds to express what he regards as their right understanding. He proposes the following careful formulation as the correct synthesis of his authorities:

And so we say that the person of the Son took on a human nature, and that a divine nature was united to a human nature in the Son, and that he united it to himself or took it, so that he is truly called incarnate (cl n10).

The statements about the Son alone taking on servile form are to be read to exclude the other divine persons, but not the divine nature (cl n11).

The Council of Toledo's statement can be read in the same sense, as limiting the union of the divine nature and humanity to the hypostasis of the Son (cl n11). By the use of the term hypostasis here, Peter makes clear his debt to John of Damascus, whom he next cites as the authority who has resolved this issue in the sense just affirmed (cl n12).

With the qualifications expressed throughout the argument, Peter is now ready to make the bold assertion that "the divine nature became incarnate; and so the same nature is truly said to have taken on a human nature" (cl n12). This redounds to the dignity of human nature, since it is obviously a great thing to say that it was taken by the divine nature. The qualifications, on the other hand, make clear that this assumption of human nature does not occur at the expense of the unchangeable perfection of the divine nature. This latter concern helps to explain Peter's refusal, in the absence of scriptural warrant, to say that the divine nature 'became flesh' in the Son, or that the same nature was made man (c2).

In the incarnation, the divine Word assumed human nature, consisting of body and soul, but not a person. There was no pre-existent human

Jesus that was taken on by the Son. In Jesus, God and man, human soul and human flesh became one, and then became one with the divine Word

(c3 nl). Those who hold otherwise do so on the basis of Boethius' definition of person as "a rational substance of an individual nature" (c3 n2).

Peter holds that this definition may adequately describe a human soul or an angel, but not a human person composed of body and soul, and so it is not applicable to the union of divinity and humanity in Christ (c3 n2). As for those scriptural phrases which seem to speak of the Word taking on a person, Peter defines magisterially that they are to be read as referring to the nature of a man and not to the person (c3 nn3 and 4). The conclusion,

Introduction | xiii then, is that in Christ there is one person, the divine person of the Son, who has assumed full humanity by taking a human body and a human soul. Peter is most firm in the counterintuitive view that to deny the existence of a human person in Christ is not at all inconsistent with the affirmation that he is fully human.

The concern that the incarnation not be understood in such a way as to posit change in God, even as the full humanity of Christ is strenuously defended, will continue to exercise Peter for a considerable space.' The next form which this concern takes is to raise the difficult question of how one is to read expressions like 'God was made man,' and 'the Son of God was made son of man,' and whether they indicate that God is made anything which he was not before (dist. 6 cl). In discussing this question,

Peter begins to outline the three principal theories regarding the union of divinity and humanity in Christ, or hypostatic union. These three are usually named the assumptus homo, subsistence, and habitus theories of the hypostatic union.° The differences among these theories can be subtle, for all Peter's view that their proponents differ deeply (cl n2).

The ancient framers of the assumptus homo theory had had as their main concern the countering of Adoptionism, so at the heart of their view is the denial that the divine Word takes on ('adopts') a pre-existent man.

In the incarnation, soul and flesh become united to constitute a man, "la|nd that man began to be God, not indeed by the nature of God, but by the person of the Word; and God began to be that man. They also grant that that man was assumed by the Word and united to the Word, and yet that he was the Word" (c2 nl). In this view, the expression 'God was made man' is used to denote that, in the incarnation, God began to be

"some substance subsisting from a rational soul and human flesh. ... And yet not by the passage of [one] nature into [another] nature" (c2 nl). But the proponents of this theory fail to profess that Christ was composed of two natures, divine and human (c2 n1). In all they say and in all they fail to say, they can claim the support of authorities, and particularly of Augustine (c2 nn2-9).

*Rosemann, Peter Lombard, p. 127, posits the issue in terms of whether God, in becoming man, became other than himself, and he notes that "[t]he Lombard attempts to answer this question by means of the single most extended treatment of a particular point in the entire Book of Sentences."

°F or a useful introduction to these theories and Peter's attitude to them, see Colish,

Peter Lombard, 1.400-417, 424-427, and 427-438 on the virulent debates to which Peter's treatment was to give rise. A shorter introduction to the same issues is found in Rosemann, Peter Lombard, pp. 110-119, 127-133.

xiv | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 The subsistence theory is presented as largely agreeing with the first one, with the modification that it describes Christ as "not composed only of a rational soul and flesh, but also of a divine and human nature, that is, of three substances: divinity, flesh, and soul" (c3 nl). By the incarnation, divinity and humanity combine so that a simple divine person is made into a person composed of divinity, body, and soul, who now subsists in two natures (c3 nl). This theory, too, is bolstered by venerable authorities

(c3 nn2-6).

The third theory seems to differ radically from the other two since it begins with the denial that the incarnation results in a composite person; in this view, human soul and flesh are worn as a garment by the Word of God "in order to appear suitably to the eyes of mortals" (c4 nl). The proponents of this theory see it as a way to avoid positing quaternity in God, which seems to them to follow from the other theories (c4 n2). For all its apparent radicalness, this theory also does not lack for support in the authorities (cc5 and 6). In particular, an extended Augustinian consideration of the various possible meanings of 'habit' is set forth in order to conclude that the meaning of habit as a garment that conforms to its wearer is the most suitable one to denote what happens at the incarnation

(c5, esp. nn3 and 4).

Distinction 6 has served to set out the three theories of the hypostatic union and the authorities which support each of them; Distinction 7 discusses some of the difficulties inherent to the first two in particular. The first theory is open to the objection that it seems to posit change in God by the introduction of a substance which was not always God (cl n2).

The objections made to the second theory are less blunt, but all seem to be concerned with the composition of the person of Christ and the possible confusions which can arise from the way in which its proponents describe that composition (cl nn4-15).'

Peter's discussion of the hypostatic union ends with the firm assertion that, throughout the discussion, he has asserted no position of his own, and will not do so now. He regards the question as open and encourages the reader to consult "other, perhaps better considered and argued, treatments" (c3 n3). But the concerns which have animated his presentation are reiterated in the concluding authority, which stresses once more that, in the incarnation, divinity is not changed and humanity retains its integ- 'So gentle and thorough is Peter's discussion of the subsistence theory that some commentators have concluded that he preferred it over the others; see Rosemann,

Peter Lombard, p. 130.

Introduction | xv rity "because a transformation or changeableness makes for a diminution of nature and the abolition of substance" (c3 n3).

In Distinction 8, Peter briefly disposes of two subsidiary questions concerning the relationship of divinity and humanity in Christ. The first question addresses the propriety of referring to the divine nature as being born of the Virgin; on balance, Peter would not use the expression (cl).

On the other hand, he does not have the same difficulty with saying that God was born twice, according to divinity and according to humanity (c2).

Distinction 9 is concerned with the degree of worship which is to be extended to Christ's humanity, a subject on which Peter's views appear to have undergone evolution.® From earlier debates in Christian history,

Peter and his contemporaries inherit a distinction between a degree of adoration due to God alone (/atria) and the sort of veneration which may be extended to any creature whom God has sanctified (dulia). It seemed to some that to adore Christ's humanity by J/atria was idolatry (cl n1).

Some of the holders of this view preserved the special reverence due to Christ by distinguishing two kinds of dulia, one of which stood between ordinary dulia and /atria and was extended to Christ's humanity alone, which "is to be venerated and loved above all other creatures" (cl n2). A third view held that /atria could be extended to Christ's humanity without fear of idolatry because it was adored for the sake of the Word with whom it was united (cl n3). Peter had come to share this view under the influence of John of Damascus' particularly beautiful formulation of the attitude, which he next reports (cl n4). The formulation strongly intends to engender piety, without risking confusion of natures and without simply subsuming Christ's humanity into his divinity—all criteria which we have seen Peter apply to these questions with great coherence.

In Distinction 10, he broaches a question which is highly provocative in form: whether Christ, according to his humanity, can be said to be a person, or even anything (cl nl). This question would be said to raise the prospect of Christological nihilism and was to engender much discussion in subsequent years, even giving rise to the possibility of condemning the Sentences because of it.? But the points being made in the Distinction are relatively straightforward and peaceful, given what has already been considered and settled in the earlier Distinctions concerning the hypostatic union.

8Colish, Peter Lombard, 1.428.

*Ibid., 1.427-438; Rosemann, Peter Lombard, pp. 131-133.

xvi | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 Some of Peter's contemporaries had come to the conclusion that Christ, according to his being a man, was not anything. They reached this conclusion as follows: as a man, Christ is either a person, or a substance, or something else. It is only plausible that he be a person, since he is not something else and, if a substance, then a rational one, which is also a person. But if he is a person also as a man, then one is led to assert quaternity in God as a result of the incarnation. To avoid such an unsuitable conclusion, it seems safer to say that, according to his being a man, Christ is not a person or anything (cl nn2 and 3).

Peter appears to have some sympathy with the concerns which underlie this dramatic proposition. And yet he remains convinced that the difficulty is largely due to the inadequate definition of person as rational substance (cl n4).'° If one is not confined by such a definition, then it is still possible to avoid saying that Christ, according to his being a man, is not anything. Indeed, one can affirm that, "even now the soul of Christ is a rational substance, and yet not a person because it does not speak by itself,'' and, indeed, is joined to another thing. But that description of person is not given for those three persons [of the Trinity]" (cl n4). And so it remains possible, as well as necessary, according to Peter, to assert unchanging divinity and whole humanity in Christ, even while firmly denying that there are two persons in him. Corollaries of this position assert that Christ is not to be called an adoptive son according to his being a man (c2), but he may with some qualifications be said to have been predestined according to both his divinity and humanity (c3).

With the most difficult questions out of the way, Peter settles a series of further questions about Christ with greater briskness and assurance.

The first of these concerns whether Christ is to be called made, created, or a creature (dist.

11 cl nl). If there were no risk of impiety, these words could be freely used of Christ's humanity. But experience shows that the careless use of such language does great harm because it ends up misapplying what is true of Christ's humanity to his divinity. Such was the case with the Arians of old (c2). It is better, then, to be aware of the unsuitability of calling Christ a creature (cl nn2 and 3), before one grants grudgingly that one may properly if carefully call Christ a creature ac- 'Rosemann, Peter Lombard, pp. 132-133, reports evidence that Peter, in his oral teaching, may have been more emphatic in expressing the dangers of referring to Christ as being anything according to his being a man.

"'The phrase "does not speak by itself" is a translation of per se sonans, the traditional etymology of the Latin word persona.

Introduction | XVil cording to his humanity (c2). With similar care, one will not say that Christ, or the Son of God, began to be, though this may be said of his human nature (dist. 12 cl). Once more, we discern here Peter's commitment to safeguard the truth of both Christ's divinity and his humanity.

Divine sovereignty is so perfect that the Word of God was under no necessity to take up the particular man Jesus, or even someone from Adam's stock (c2 nl). Although the question strikes Peter as affected, he is willing to grant that God could have taken human form as a woman, but he more suitably chose to take male form and be born of woman so that the liberation of humankind should manifest itself in both sexes, in the Son and in his Virgin Mother (c4).!

Interjected among these topics is also the question of whether the man Christ was able to sin, which is the same as asking whether he was able not to be God (c3 nl). The answer to this requires a distinction. If Christ's human nature had existed without being united to the divine

Word, then it would have been able to sin; in union with the same Word, it is unable to sin (c3 n2). And it is frivolous to suggest that this inability to sin is a limitation of free choice; this is no truer for Christ than for the angels, who "are so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin. And so how much more [free choice did] that man [have] to whom the Spirit was given without measure?" (c3 n3).

But if Christ, even in his humanity, has received the fullness of the Spirit, can he be said to have made progress in wisdom and grace, as the Gospel seems to affirm? (dist. 13 cl nn1-4). In this question, too, we see

Peter's concern with preserving the plausibility of the assertion that Christ was wholly human, even as it is impossible to say that God's wisdom and grace can increase. And so the determination of the question is that, from his conception, Christ was as full of wisdom and grace as it is possible for a human being to be, but there was progress in the manifestation of these gifts to others and for their benefit. Furthermore, as is usual with human nature, he made progress in age from infancy to youth and his gifts became more and more manifest in the course of this progress

(cl n5). As for an authority which seems to hold that Christ made progress in his human understanding, it is to be read in the light of the fact that, although Christ was endowed with a twofold wisdom, the one divine

Colish, Peter Lombard, 1.438, has Peter 'note' that God's incarnation in male form "made sense since, given the morés of His time and place, Christ's mission was facilitated by His incarnation in masculine form." We have failed to find any mention or support of this view in Peter's text.

xviii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 and the other human, these are not two different wisdoms. It follows that it is safer to say that there was progress in the manifestation of Christ's understanding to others, but not in the understanding itself, which was forever perfect (cl nn6-9)."° But is this wisdom of Christ's equal to God's, and does it know all the things that God knows? (dist. 14 cl n2). To those who object that a creature, such as Christ's soul, can never be equated to the Creator (cl n2), Peter answers that, in its union with the divine Word, Christ's soul

"knows all things which God knows, but cannot do all the things that God can do" (cl n3). And yet the creature is not equated to the Creator, even in knowledge, because Christ's soul does not know things as clearly or as worthily and perfectly as God does (cl n3). The discrepancy in power between God and Christ's soul implies also that the latter does not have the power to do everything which it knows how to do (cl n6).

Christ's Redemptive Role Distinction 15 introduces the consideration of Christ's deeds for human salvation. The first of these is Christ's assumption of human defects, that is, of the flesh's capacity to suffer and die. To show that he took a true body, he took the body's defects, such as hunger and thirst; to show that he had a true soul, he took sadness, fear, pain, and similar things (dist. 15 cl nl). But this distinction between defects of the body and of the soul should not be taken too far because even the defects of the body are sensed by the soul using the body as an instrument (cl n2).

The distinction which is more crucial is that between defects that flow from punishment and those that flow from the guilt of sin. Christ took only the former, and only those among them "which it was suitable for him as man to assume and which did not derogate from his dignity" (cl n3). In so doing there was a wondrous exchange, "[f]or he took the ancientness [of our nature] in order to infuse his newness in us. He took a single ancientness, that is, the one of punishment, in order to destroy our twofold one, that is, of punishment and fault" (cl n3).

There are illuminating reflections on this matter in Rosemann, Peter Lombard, pp. 134-135. Less enlightening are the censorious remarks of Colish, Peter Lombard,

1.442-443. Colish regards the Lombard as incoherent in his description of Christ's psychology; although committed to a spirited assertion of the fruitful importance of Christ's humanity, Peter is said to end up unwilling to allow Christ "a fully human psychology of knowledge" (p. 443). This conviction of the inadequacy of Peter's view of Christ's psychology will become a fixed, repetitious, and unhelpful theme in Colish's discussion of Peter's presentation of the virtues.

Introduction | xix Chief among the flaws of human nature which Christ did not take are ignorance and the related difficulty of our weakened will to will and do what is good (cl nn4 and 5). He did not take these defects because they would have been unsuitable for him and unprofitable for us. The general rule regarding the defects which Christ took is that "he took them either to demonstrate his true humanity: such as fear and sadness; or to fulfil the work for which he had come: such as the capacity to suffer and die; or to raise our hope from our despair of immortality: such as death" (cl n7).

In other human beings, the defects which Christ took are present as a consequence of sin; in Christ, who was conceived and born without sin, and who preserved his sinlessness throughout his life, the taking of these flaws flowed entirely from compassion (cl n8). But he took them truly, and his fear and suffering were real; those opinions ought to be rejected which argue that "Christ bore a likeness and semblance of suffering and pain, but did not at all endure pain or suffering [itself]" (cl n9).'*

Some authorities, and scriptural ones in particular, seem to differ on the reality of Christ's suffering, and of his fear and sadness especially.

The apparent contradiction is resolved by the application of a distinction between 'passion' and 'propassion' (c2 nl). These terms are defined using the examples of fear and suffering: in us, their experience can be such

"that the mind's understanding is not as a consequence removed from righteousness or the contemplation of God, and then it is propassion. But at times it is removed or troubled, and then it is passion" (c2 n2). In Christ, who is subject to these defects by his own free compassion and not by the necessity of sin, true fear and sadness are present only according to propassion and in no way affect his righteousness or contemplation of God (c2 nn3 and 4).

A particularly troublesome authority on these matters is Hilary of Poitiers, who, in a number of statements, appears to claim that the blows and wounds inflicted on Christ in the course of his passion did not cause suffering, and that fear did not trouble him (c3 nn1-4). But there is no real conflict between Hilary's statements and what Peter has just been saying since the former can be read in harmony with the distinction between pro144 brief discussion follows, at nn10-12, of authorities attesting to the reality of Christ's suffering, whereas n13 disposes of authorities that seem to attest the contrary.

xx | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3

passion and passion to mean that in Christ there was no necessity to suffer and no necessity to fear (c3 n5)."° But the necessity to suffer and die is not a defect tied to sin, since it is integral to our bodies. Was a similar necessity also in Christ's body?

Moreover, before sin, even the necessity of suffering was not tied to death; was Christ bound only by the capacity for death, or by the necessity for it and its concomitant suffering? If the latter, then he cannot be said to have taken these defects by compassion (dist. 16 cl nl). But Christ took these defects like the others willingly, and not by the necessity of his condition, since he was immune from sin (cl n2). Indeed, it may be said that Christ took something from each of the four states of humankind. From the state of men before sin, he took immunity from sin; from the state after sin and before grace, he took the punishment for sin; from the state of grace, he took the fullness of grace; from the state of glory to come, "he took the inability to sin and the perfect contemplation of God" (c2).

In Distinction 17, Peter tackles the complex question of the coexistence of several wills in Christ, and does so under the guise of asking whether every prayer or will of Christ was fulfilled. The specific prayer at the heart of this question is the fruitfully troublesome one by which Christ asks: "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me. But not my will, but yours, be done" (Mt. 26, 39; dist. 17 cl). This prayer is taken to be evidence of two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human. The human will is refractory before the prospect of suffering and death, but it immediately conforms to the divine will by asking that the Father's will be done. Moreover, in Christ's human will, as in any man's, a distinction can be made between its sensual disposition, by which he wished not to die, and its rational disposition, by which he willed to do the Father's will even unto death (c2 nl). Nor does the Gospel text reveal a struggle between Christ's flesh and his spirit; such a struggle would betray the existence of concupiscence, which has no place in the sinless Christ. The prayer is best seen then as being offered for our sake by God's will so that we should be convinced of the truth of Christ's humanity (c2 n2).

Furthermore, the prayer is exemplary for us, his members, in that it teaches us how we are to meet our own tribulations; we may pray for their removal, but we must also strive to conform our will to God's (c2 n9).

'SWhatever one may think of Peter's reading of Hilary's texts, it is difficult to see how one could say, with Colish, Peter Lombard, 1.444, that "Peter feels impelled to reject flat out the claim of Hilary of Poitiers that Christ was incapable of suffering."

Introduction | XXx1 In Distinction 18, Peter begins his treatment of Christ's saving passion with the question of what Christ merited by his suffering and death. Some say that Christ merited nothing for himself, but only for the members of his body, which is the Church (cl nl), for whom "he merited redemption from the devil, from sin, from punishment, and the opening of the kingdom" (cl n2). Despite this view to the contrary, Peter holds that the man

Christ merited for himself the glory of impassibility of soul and immortality of body (cl nn2-5). And yet it was not by his suffering and death that Christ merited these rewards; from the very moment of his conception, and then at all other points of his perfect earthly life, Christ already merited all that he received in glory because of his perfectly obedient adherence to the will of the Father in all that he did (c2 nnl and 2). Nor ought one ever to say that his soul was better and more blessed after his death than it had been before; the most one can say is that perhaps it is now more blessed because of immunity from all misery (c2 n3).

Another benefit, if such it may be called, accruing to Christ by his passion was the exaltation of his name above all other names, that is, that he should be known as God. By this benefit, that which the Son of God has by nature from all eternity is extended to the man Jesus through grace

(c3 nl). By means of the cross, that which the Son of God already had was given by grace to the obedient servant (c3 n2). And yet even this may be doubted, namely that the suffering of Christ merited for him this benefit; it is perhaps better to say that he had this benefit also from the moment of his conception, but that his suffering and death merited the manifesting of his name and power (c3 nn3 and 4). Christ's suffering and death were not required for his acquisition of the three benefits, however.

Since God's power is unbounded, Christ could have taken immediately the glorious body which became his at the resurrection; but having chosen to come as a passible man, he could not come to glory without merit (c4 nl). And yet the merit of his virtues would have been sufficient, so that "through his passion he merited nothing for himself which he had not already merited earlier through his virtues" (c4 n2).

If Peter has belaboured the point of how unnecessary Christ's sufferings were for his own sake, it is so that the reader should be all the more appreciative of Christ's compassionate condescension. For now the question can be asked and the answer given in the following beautiful terms:

To what end, then, did he will to suffer and die, if his virtues were sufficient for him to merit those things? For your sake, not for his own. How for my sake? So that his passion and death should be model and cause to

xxii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 you: the model of virtue and humility, the cause of glory and liberty, the model of being obedient to God even unto death, and the cause of your liberation and blessedness (c5 nl).

By the conditions which God had decreed for himself, Christ's practice of the virtues, then, was sufficient for his own rewards, but did not merit for us "entrance to paradise, and redemption from sin, punishment, and the devil" (c5 nl). It was in order to confer these benefits on us, to bring us redemption and adoption as children of glory, that Christ "was made the victim offered for our liberation" (c5 n1).

At the fall, it had been God's mysterious decree that man be banned from paradise and contemplation of God, "unless so much humility should be found in one man which might suffice for all who follow him, just as in the first man was found such pride as to harm all who followed him" (c5 n2). Although there had been righteous men before Jesus who strove to practice humility, their virtue was barely sufficient for themselves. The fulfillment of all justice occurred in Christ alone, who "was a sufficient and a perfect victim; he was much more humbled in tasting the bitterness of death, than Adam had become proud in his guilty pleasure through his eating of the forbidden tree" (c5 n2). Christ's humble death met all the requirements of God's decree and the gates of heaven's kingdom were opened to all who follow him (c5 n2).

These are wonderfully ineffable matters, but Peter can still judiciously conclude his glorious presentation with the gloriously restrained observation: "See, we have seen to some extent how entry to the kingdom was readied for us by Christ's death" (c5 n3).

After setting out the benefits for humankind of Christ's redemptive work so movingly and elegantly, Peter proceeds to outline the mechanics, as it were, of this greatest of works. How does Christ redeem? By justifying sinful men, that is, releasing them from their sins, which are the devil's bonds (dist. 19 cl nl). This brief allusion to the devil's former power over men is quickly overtaken by the more extended consideration of the great change which Christ's redemption can work in man's ability to love.

In Christ's death, God's charity is revealed so strikingly that "we are moved to, and kindled with, love of God, who has done so much for us; in this way, we are justified, that is, we are released from our sins, and so we are made just. Indeed, Christ's death justifies us, as by it charity is kindled in our hearts" (cl n2). By the awesome example of Christ's love, a conversion of heart can take place which covers up sins and justifies the sinner.

Introduction | XXIli It is in the light of this conversion that the crucified Christ can become the sign of faith to which the sinner can look in the continuing struggle with the devil. Temptation does not end after the incarnation, or even after the redemption, but now man can look to Christ on the cross and find in him freedom from sin and the power to overcome the tempter; if he has accepted Christ into his heart, the one tempted will find that seduction will not follow temptation (cl n3).

In order to vanquish the devil in this way, it was just that a man overcome, as it had been a man who had submitted to the devil in the beginning. But for a man to overcome, he had to be immune from sin, and this could only be with God in him. "And so the Son of God took on passible human form, in which he tasted even death," in order to redeem humankind from slavery to the devil, "that is, from sin (for sin is slavery to the devil), and from punishment" (c2).

The punishment from which Christ frees men by his death is first the eternal one, which was owed for the first sin, and then the temporal one, which he will abolish entirely by the granting of immortality when death itself shall be destroyed (c3). In human souls, this liberation is already partially achieved; man is still subject to the fault of sin, but is no longer dominated by it (c3). And by Christ's bearing of our sins, the temporal punishment due for sin is abolished in baptism; for sin committed after baptism, Christ's merits offer once again relief from such punishment by the sacrament of penance (c4). Furthermore, the redeeming effects of Christ's sacrifice extend even to the just who lived before his coming (c4).

With this, Peter is ready to make the humble claim that now "it has been partially explained how and what Christ, by his death, merited and accomplished for us" (c4). Next follows a brief discussion of whether the title of redeemer ought to be reserved for Christ alone. The issue arises because Scripture refers also to the Father and the Holy Spirit as redeemer. Peter holds that Father and Holy Spirit are termed redeemer "only by reference to the use of power, not as an example of humility and obedience" (c5). In the Son, there were both power and obedience, and so "the Son is properly called redeemer because he both fulfilled in himself those things by which we are justified, and worked the same justification by the power of the Godhead with the Father and the Holy Spirit" (c5). In this brief discussion of a seemingly very technical issue, Peter manages to have his students reflect on the Trinitarian dimension even of what seems most singularly the Son's work. Moreover, the affirmation of the human contribution is not neglected since the Son "is more frequently called re-

xxiv | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 deemer according to his humanity, because according to it and in it he took up and fulfilled those sacraments which are the cause of our redemption" (c5).

The title of mediator is also said to be exclusive to Christ because he alone is placed between God and men in order to reconcile the latter to God (c6 n1). But this is not to be understood in the sense that Christ had to placate God and induce him to love men. This would have been entirely unnecessary because God has never ceased to love humankind from before the creation of the world. It is men that Christ comes to change so that they may cease to make themselves enemies of God by sin (c6 nn2 and 3). And it is according to his humanity that he is mediator (c7).

It was possible for God to work our salvation in any manner that he found pleasing, but none could have been more fitting for human misery than the one which God chose (dist. 20 cl). None other would have been a more effective cure for human despair of immortality and none better able to convert the mind of man than to see the Son of God enter into fellowship with us and bear the evils that afflict us (c2 nl). It was also the case that, in so doing, he overcame the devil by justice, not by power (c2 n2). Aside from the fittingness of vanquishing the devil by the righteousness which he hates most, this means of redemption was an example to men that they ought to love justice more than power (c3 n1).

Peter next asks to whom responsibility should be assigned for Christ's crucifixion; the Father, the Son, Judas, and the Jews are all responsible for the event, but in different ways and for different reasons (c5 nl). The Son handed himself over freely; the Father (indeed, the whole Trinity) willed that he should be handed over and suffer;

Judas betrayed him, and the Jews instigated his death. Although there was only one act of handing over, it was a good act on the part of Christ and the Father because their will was good; the will of Judas and the Jews was evil, and so the same act was evil on their part (c5 n2). This reflection on causation and responsibility ends with the suggestion that the act of the Jews, although evil, may be considered a good thing because Christ's passion, which is a good thing, derived from it (c6).

After completing his consideration of the fittingness and the effects of Christ's suffering and death, Peter next turns to the question of what happened to Christ's soul in the time between his death and his resurrection.

First, he asks whether, at death, Christ's soul and flesh were separated from the divine Word (dist. 21 cl nl). This question, which springs naturally enough from attention to the events of Christ's salvific passion and connects to the issue of the liberation of the just who had lived before

Introduction | xxv Christ's coming, also recalls the earlier discussion of the hypostatic union.

One's perception of the manner of union between divinity and humanity in Christ would tend to dictate how one presents the state of that union during the time in which Christ's body lies in the tomb.

The first view which Peter sets out holds that Christ's flesh, while in the tomb, was separated from both Christ's soul and the divine Word; since the Word and Christ were united through Christ's soul, the separation of the soul from the body (without which there would have been no true death) of necessity involved separation from the Word (cl n2). That this was the case seems to be supported by an assertion of Ambrose that the Godhead had abandoned Christ at his death (cl n3). Peter rejects this opinion, if it requires holding that the Godhead abandoned Christ at some point before his death. He thinks that Ambrose's text can only be construed in the sense that God abandoned Christ in some way that did not involve the dissolution of the union between God and man in him. Indeed, some form of abandonment was necessary, if Christ was to die, since God is life. The solution: "The Godhead severed itself because it took away its protection, but did not dissolve the union; it separated itself outwardly so that it was not there to defend him, but was not absent inwardly in regard to the union" (cl n4).

Peter next sets out the view of those who hold that, at death, the Godhead withdrew from Christ's flesh, otherwise it would not make sense to say, as Athanasius had done, that, at the resurrection, the whole man, whom the Son of God had taken, rose again from the dead (cl n5). Peter criticizes this reasoning because it seems as applicable to Christ's soul as to his flesh (cl nn6 and 7). Peter's own view remains that the soul became severed from the body by divine power, but that there was no separation of the Word of God from either Christ's body or his soul (cl n8).

And it is wrong to say that even Christ's flesh was abandoned in the tomb (cl n9). And yet it remains proper to say that God suffered and died, for it cannot be said that God did not suffer whatever Christ's flesh suffered; in the same way, you cannot be said to have suffered no injury if your clothing is torn, even though you cannot be reduced to your clothing. In this sense, although the Word is able neither to die, nor to suffer, it can be said that God suffers whatever is suffered by the flesh united to the Word

(c2). In summary, "it may rightly be said that God died and did not die, that the Son of God suffered and did not suffer, that the third person suffered and did not suffer, that the Word was crucified and was not crucified. According to the one nature he suffered, and according to the other he was unable to suffer" (c2 n5). The wonders of the hypostatic union!

xxvi | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 A question that gives rise to a certain impatience in Peter is that of whether Christ was a man while he was in the tomb (dist. 22 cl nl).

Those who hold that he was not assert that a dead man is not a man. If he was still a man, then he was neither mortal, since already dead, nor immortal, since not yet risen (cl n2). Peter calls for the simple assertion that "although he was a dead man, yet God was man in death" (cl n3).

Anything else is a philosophical quibble, against which he invokes Ambrose's dismissal: "Put aside your arguments, where faith is required. Let dialectic be silent, even in her own schools. We believe fishermen, not dialecticians" (cl n3).

If Peter becomes indignant at what he regards as quibbles, it is perhaps due to his view that the unity of divinity and humanity in Christ is too crucial a truth to be subject to classroom games and the vain display of cleverness. Right piety and human beatitude hang in the balance, and so one should not be reckless with the matter, even in regard to merely subsidiary questions. And so, he takes up with great earnestness a related subsidiary question of his own having to do with the ubiquity of Christ in death (c2 nl). Since Peter has repeatedly asserted that the union of Christ with the Word continues even while the body rests in the tomb, and given that the Godhead is everywhere, then Christ is ubiquitous even as he lies in the tomb (c2 nl). Although ubiquity can be ascribed to Christ's divinity, it ought not to be said that his humanity was ubiquitous. But his humanity consisted of soul and body, both of which were in union with the divine Wisdom, and the body remained in the tomb while the soul descended to hell, and yet Wisdom remained united with both (c2 nn2-4).

Nor ought one to hold that parts of Christ are present in each of these places or everywhere; it is always the whole Christ who is present "at the same time in hell, in heaven, and everywhere" (c3 nl). But although he is whole everywhere, he is not wholly everywhere, for he is present everywhere as God, but not as man (c3 n2).

The Virtues Peter's presentation of the crucifixion as the ultimate call to conversion of heart has already served to alert his readers to the extent to which all

Christ's work serves to engage human freedom in the direction of love.

The exemplary character of Christ's life and death means that anyone moved to respond to Christ's call to love will find in that life and in that death the ways and means by which to attempt such a response. To aid in the framing of a loving response, Peter proceeds immediately from his consideration of Christ's passion to the enucleation of Christ's practice of

Introduction | xxvii the virtues. With his gaze fixed upon Christ's virtues, the Christian will be better able to strive to imitate his exemplar.

The treatise on the virtues begins with the question of whether Christ can rightly be said to have had the fullness of grace, unless he had faith and hope as he had charity (dist. 23 cl nl). The resolution of this question will require a definition of its terms, and so it becomes the occasion to initiate a discussion of the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity.

Faith is defined as the virtue by which unseen things pertaining to religion are believed (c2). The term may also denote that which is believed and that through which belief in other things occurs (c3 n1). Faith is only a virtue if it is accompanied by love because there can be no virtue without charity, the mother of all virtues (c3 n2). If faith is accompanied by love, then it is the unchangeable foundation upon which our salvation rests because it allows Christ to live in the hearts of those who practice it

(c3 n3). But if faith is unaccompanied by love, even the devil can be said to have faith (c3 n4).

In relation to God, faith cannot be reduced to asserting that he exists and speaks the truth; evil men and devils can believe in this sense, without benefit to themselves or to others. True belief in God consists in loving by believing, in seeking union with him in his Church through faith.

This is the faith that justifies sinners and enables them to produce works of love (c4 nl). In demons and bad Christians, faith has not acquired the form which charity alone can give to it; and yet even this larvated faith can be called a gift of God (c4 n2). It may be that this is the very faith that becomes formed as a virtue, if a bad Christian turns toward God in charity (cS).

Faith is said to be one with regard to its content because all Catholic faithful believe the same thing (c6 nn1 and 2). Faith in the sense of that through which belief occurs is also one, but by reason of likeness and not identity (c6 n3). Properly speaking, faith can concern only unseen things; visible things are the object of knowledge (c7 n1). Faith itself, while invisible to others, is visible intellectually to the one who has it (c7 n4).'° It provides conviction and proof "that there are some things which do not appear, since faith only concerns things that do not appear" (c7 n4).

Reflecting further on the scriptural text which is at the heart of his definition of faith (Hebr. 11, 1), Peter notes that the unseen things which 6Colish, Peter Lombard, 1.498, misreads the text here, attributing to Peter the view that what is known by faith is known intellectually.

xxviii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 are the object of faith are also called the things to be hoped for; these things, which begin to be in the Christian by faith, are those that he hopes will ultimately be in him through experience in glory (c8 nl). And although one might complain that this manner of putting things risks confusing faith and hope, the risk is perhaps worth running, if it points out the necessary unity of faith, hope, and love; faith cannot exist without hope and is useless without love (c8 n2). But it remains the case that faith needs to precede hope, for "nothing can be hoped for which is not believed" (c8 n3).

It is because of this precedence of faith that it alone is "called the foundation of all virtues and good works" (c9 nl). But it does not enjoy priority over, and so is not called the foundation of, charity, which is the Holy Spirit and the cause of all the virtues, and which excels all gifts

(c9 n2).

There are instances in Scripture in which the term faith is used with reference to things seen (dist. 24 cl nl). Although this usage is common enough ('I believe my own eyes!'), yet this is not the most appropriate use of the term. This apparent digression may be intended to convey that faith, by looking for things unseen, sees more deeply and more important realities than what one's eyes perceive. Both the Apostle Peter and a Jewish bystander witnessed the suffering of Christ, and both could believe what their eyes perceived, but Peter alone knew by faith that it was

God who suffered (c2 nl). The perception that Christ was suffering gained no merit; faith that God was suffering gained merit (c2 n2).

But if faith concerns only things unseen, does it deal only with unknown things of which we are ignorant? (c3 nl). The question in this form confuses exterior and interior perception; it also treats faith as if it were a bodily sense. Faith is best regarded as an ability of the heart to perceive a resonance between something of which it is not wholly ignorant and a proposal which is set before it by hearing in an interior way

(c3 n2). This knowledge of the heart is not limited by what one is able to understand by natural reason; indeed, there are things which one will not understand, unless one has first believed them (c3 n3). Even in the case of things whose understanding precedes faith, "they are better understood through faith, by which hearts are cleansed, because unless God is loved through faith, the heart is not cleansed to know him" (c3 n4).

Peter turns next to the question of what degree of faith is sufficient for salvation before the coming of Christ and after (dist. 25 cl nl). The minimal faith required for salvation appears to be belief that God exists and that he rewards those who hope in him (cl nl). But a number of author-

Introduction | xxix ities seem to hold that no one, even before Christ's coming, is saved without faith in the mediator; after Christ's incarnation, faith in what is contained in the Creeds is required (cl n2). But the just men of old could be, and were, saved by their faith in the mediator who was to come (cl nn3-5).''? Even simple persons among the Jews, who did not have the privilege of the sort of revelation that was made to Abraham and Moses, could assent simply to those revelations and gain salvation (c2). The same happens now in the Church, where the simple may not be able to explain the content of the Creed which they firmly believe, and yet their humble faith suffices (c2 n2).

To conclude his discussion of faith, Peter reiterates that, for all the usefulness of analysing the virtues distinctly, they operate conjointly and are, in some fundamental sense, equal in this life, because, as Gregory says, "[f]or so long as we are in this life, we find that in us faith, hope, charity, and work are equal to each other because we love as much as we believe, and insofar as we love we are certain of our hope" (c5 nl). And if charity is sometimes termed greater, it is because it shall remain after the others become unnecessary (c5 nl). And yet charity cannot come to anyone without faith and hope, while these can exist, if to no good effect, without charity (cS n2).

In comparison with the extended discussion of faith, hope gets short shrift. It is defined as "the virtue by which spiritual and eternal goods are hoped for, that is, they are awaited with trust" (dist. 26 cl). Eternal blessedness is the great object of hope, which looks to it in expectation because of merits and God's grace; such a hope will not exist without charity (cl). Like faith, hope has invisible things as its object (c2). But whereas faith is concerned with things which are good and bad, present, past, and future, and how these touch on anyone, so long as they are concerned with religion, hope looks only to those good future things which touch on the one who hopes (c3).

Peter strives next to answer the question with which he began his discussion of the virtues, namely whether faith and hope were in Christ. The short answer is that, although Christ believed and hoped, he did not have

"Colish, Peter Lombard, 2.498-499, seems wildly misleading in representing the Lombard as saying that Israel's faith before the coming of Christ "since it knew nothing of Christ, was not sufficient to save them."

xxx | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 the virtues of faith and hope because they were unnecessary to him (c4)."*

In Christ, as in the saints in heaven, faith and hope appear to be forms of knowledge rather than virtues. On the other hand, the ancients who awaited Christ in hell can be said to have had the virtues of faith and hope because they believed and hoped, but, until Christ's passion, the direct knowledge of God was not available to them (c5).

Peter's extended discussion of charity begins with the movingly pious and touching assertion of the degree to which charity was most perfectly embodied and exemplified in Christ:

Although Christ did not have faith and hope, yet as a man he had such love than which there can be no greater; it was due to his most excellent charity that he gave his life for his friends and for his enemies. He also had in his heart that charity which he showed to us by deed, so that by the form of his showing he might instruct us in love (dist. 27 cl).

This beautifully simple and loving bow toward Christ's love serves also to evoke in the reader the appropriate attitude for the consideration of this most sublime of topics.

Peter defines charity as "the love by which God is loved for his own sake, and our neighbour is loved for the sake of God or in God" (c2 n1).

He then reports Christ's summation of the Law in the two commandments to love God and neighbour (c2 n2). In glossing these commandments, he asks whether God and neighbour are loved by one love or by two distinct ones. The answer is that there is only one love, and it is the Holy Spirit

(c3). In this manner, the Christian life is presented as participation in the very life of the Trinity.'"

Christ gave two commandments to love by the one love because of its two objects, namely God and neighbour. And of the two commandments, the first is greater and the second lesser (c4 n2). As to the manner of loving, God is to be loved for his own sake with the whole heart, the neighbour is to be loved in the same way in which one is to love oneself, that is, "in goodness and for the sake of God" (c5 nl). Anyone who fails to love himself for the sake of God can be said to hate himself (c5 n2).

Alternatively, it can be said that one is to love one's neighbour as Christ ''Colish, Peter Lombard, 2.499-500, is thoroughly puzzling on this issue. Without any evidence whatsoever, she imputes to Peter a desire to argue that Christ had the virtues of faith and hope. Her discussion of this issue seems thoroughly misguided.

"Colish, Peter Lombard, 2.501, contends that Peter "seeks to avoid a participatory or immanental view of the mission of the Holy Spirit."

Introduction | xxxi loves, namely so that one's neighbour and oneself may "become children

[of God] and have life" (c5 n3). As for the love of God, one may also say that he is to be loved with one's whole intellect, will, and memory, so that one brings one's whole self to God (c5 n4).

Daunting as Christ's two commandments are, man is called to attempt to keep them in this life in the awareness that they cannot be fulfilled here. So long as concupiscence remains in man's heart, his love will remain partial and imperfect; it follows that charity will find its perfection in heaven, where charity alone shall remain and be fulfilled (c6 nl). And yet, though unattainable, these commandments serve the purpose of setting out the goal of the whole Christian life (c6 n2).

Distinction 28 concerns the command to love our neighbour and shows how the term 'neighbour' extends to ourselves and our bodies. All manner of things are commanded to be loved by the two commandments, including God, ourselves, our neighbour, and our bodies; the second and fourth of these did not need to be specifically commanded, in part because they are contained within love of neighbour (dist. 28 cl). The definition of neighbour moves on to the question of whether our love ought to extend to the angels (c2). Because the term 'neighbour' includes even enemies, to whom there is an obligation to show mercy, and since, in turn, those who show mercy to us are also our neighbours, angels and Christ according to his humanity fall within the definition (c3).

Since our love can and must have so many objects, the question arises of how our loves are to be ordered (dist. 29 cl nl). Right order requires that not everything be loved and that not all objects of our love be loved equally. A man is not to be loved insofar as he is a sinner, but he is to be loved for God's sake insofar as he is a man. God is to be loved for his own sake and more than one's own self. A neighbour is to be loved more than our own body, since he is capable of enjoying God with us (cl n2).

Our neighbours can be loved with equal affection, but with unequal manifestation of respect. More of the latter is to be shown to those who have been placed close to us and who, in some measure, share our destiny

(c2 n2). Fellow Christians, for example, are to be loved by a special love (c2 n2). Several authorities support the view that we are to love with a graduated affection "God before all, ourselves second, parents third, then children and siblings, then members of our household, and finally enemies" (c2 n6). This hierarchy may be subject to revision, if any of its members prove to be evil (c2 n10).

It may serve to avoid discouragement to be reminded that charity has degrees within its own development, "for there is a beginning charity, a

xxxii | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 progressing one, a perfect one, and a most perfect one" (c3 nl). The perfection of charity consists in laying down one's life for one's friends, and also for one's enemies in order to make them friends (c3 n2).

The next question asks whether it is better or more meritorious to love one's friends or one's enemies (dist. 30 cl nl). An answer to this troubling question may, in particular cases, require the weighing of degrees of difficulty and fervour (cl nl). But Augustine holds that loving an enemy is a rarely fulfilled achievement; despite the frequently repeated promise in the Lord's prayer to forgive one's debtors, most petitioners achieve only the ability to extend forgiveness to those enemies who seek it. This is the very minimum which is required by the command to love one's neighbour (cl n2).

Fittingly, reflection on the enduring character of charity begins to conclude Peter's discussion of this subject. The reflection hinges on Paul's assertion that "charity shall never fall away" (1 Cor. 13, 8). Does this mean that, once one has charity, one can never lose it, and that one not predestined for salvation can never have it? (dist. 31 cl nl). After setting out authorities appearing to hold that charity, once had, can never be lost

(cl nn2-5), Peter argues that, in any case, the authorities say nothing about those to be damned never having charity (cl n6). Furthermore, reason and other authorities make it evident that some people are good for a time and then fall away (cl n7). The verse from Paul refers not to charity as it appears or disappears in a particular person, but to the fact that "it shall exist here and in the future; but faith and hope shall be made void, as will knowledge" (cl n8). The authorities may also be read to refer to perfect charity, which once had is not lost, whereas lesser degrees of it can be acquired and lost (cl n9). Even in its less than perfect state, charity "does not allow the one who has it to sin criminally" (cl n10).

Since the discussion of the virtues began with the question of whether Christ had them, Peter now asks whether Christ, in his love, observed the right order and loved everyone like his own self. If he did and willed salvation for all, how is it that not all are saved? (c3 nl). But to frame the question in this way is to presume that Christ had charity as those do who are not yet in the fatherland. Christ's charity however was always perfect, as of one who was already in heaven, where only those are loved whom

God has predestined for salvation. It follows that "Christ loved the elect alone like himself and desired their salvation" (c3 n2).

After discussing so fully the love which human beings are to practice, Peter turns briefly to the question of the love by which God loves us, noting that it "is nothing else than the love by which we love him. For God's

Introduction | xxxiii love is the divine usia, and it is by the same love that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit love each other and us" (dist. 32 cl nl). Since it is the divine substance itself, this love is unchangeable and eternal. And yet it is unequal. Although this love extends to all that he has made, he loves only what is good in his creatures, and so "he loves rational creatures more; and of these, he loves more those that are members of his only-begotten, and much more the only-begotten himself" (cl n2). This difference in the degree to which God loves even the elect does not indicate mutability in the divine will, but the variety of goods which he has willed to confer on the variety of his members from all eternity (c2).

This difference of degree in divine love is more safely understood, if one remembers that God's love can be considered in two ways: according to essence and efficacy. Variety is only relevant to efficacy, that is, to the greater or lesser good that God prepared for each one (c3 nl). As for the reprobates, one ought not to say simply that God loved them from all eternity; it is safe to say that God "loved them insofar as they were to be his work, that is, he loved what and of what kind he was going to make them" (c5).

Closing his reflections on charity with this charming image of the divine craftsman who loves his craft, Peter briefly outlines the four cardinal virtues of justice, fortitude, prudence, and temperance (dist. 33 cl nl).

His presentation of these virtues is entirely consistent with that of the theological virtues. He has chosen not to distract his students with irrelevant philosophical considerations, placing these virtues, too, squarely within the Christian pursuit of the imitation of Christ."°

A brief definition of these virtues as they apply in this life is taken from Augustine: "Justice consists in helping the wretched, prudence in guarding against treacheries, fortitude in bearing troubles, temperance in controlling evil pleasures" (cl n2). These virtues allow one to live well in this life and to come to eternal life (cl n3). Moreover, they were present in their perfection in Christ, who exercised them primarily as they will be in eternity (c2). It follows that these virtues can be practised in imitation of Christ.

As is already implicit in what has been said of Christ's practice of them, these virtues shall probably not cease in eternity, but they will have a different use (c3 nl). Justice will certainly survive and be made perfect

See Colish, Peter Lombard, 2.504-505, on the alternative schemes of presentation by Peter's contemporaries that made more use of philosophical approaches in discussing these virtues.

xxxiv | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 in that it will acknowledge the beauty of the divine nature and become fully subject to it (c3 n2). As for the other three, it may be that they will also continue, but with other functions, since the ills which they counter in this life have no place in heaven, and so "there it will pertain to prudence to prefer or equate no other good to God; and to fortitude to adhere to him with the greatest steadfastness; and to temperance to take pleasure in no harmful defect" (c3 n3). In effect, this formulation seems to be little more than a charming confirmation that love alone will last.

There is authority for including the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit among the virtues, and so Peter next turns to these (dist. 34 cl). That they are virtues is attested by Ambrose, who notes that they exist also in the angels, and so will not cease in eternity (c2 nl). But they are better thought of as sanctifications of the Holy Spirit, that is, the various ways in which the Holy Spirit sanctifies the minds of the faithful (c2 nnl and 2).

That these gifts were in Christ is attested by Isaias (11, 2-3), who is taken to describe Christ as endowed with the spirit of wisdom, understanding, counsel, fortitude, knowledge, piety, and the fear of the Lord (c2 n2).

The inclusion of the fear of the Lord among the gifts seems problematic. There is good authority for the view that there shall be no fear in heaven, so how can this gift and the others be said to continue in eternity?

(c3 nn2 and 3). The answer lies in the changed use of these virtues, too, in heaven. In this life, filial fear is a combination of fear of separation and reverence; in eternity, there is no fear of separation, "but only reverence, which is love mixed with submission" (c3 n4).

But since the issue of fear has been raised, Peter proceeds to a fuller treatment of the subject, perhaps because of its intimate connection to love in human experience. Fear is distinguished into worldly, human, servile, initial, and chaste or filial or friendly. By worldly or human fear, we fear the loss of worldly goods or the dangers of the flesh, and this fear leads to sin. By servile fear, we refrain from sin out of fear of hell; although insufficient, this fear is good and leads to an elementary practice of justice. Initial fear succeeds to the servile one when love begins to be the motive for doing the good. By chaste or friendly fear, we begin to fear separation from the Bridegroom: this is the fear that makes perfect and will endure for eternity (c4 n1).

The question remains as to whether fear and love can coexist. The answer appears to be that they can, so long as the fear is chaste, because such fear is entirely concerned with the Beloved and the possibility of the loss of his presence, so that "you embrace him and you long to enjoy him" (c5 n3).

Introduction | xxxv Like the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, fear was also in Christ, but according to the use which it has in heaven, since "Christ did not fear to be separated from, or to offend, God, but he revered him before all things"

(c8 n2). As for the fear of suffering which Christ seemed to express before his passion, it does not fall among the fears listed above and "may be called natural or human, which exists in all men, by which death makes one shiver and pain engenders fear" (c9 n2). In effect, this fear is only proof that Christ is perfectly human.

Among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit, Peter chooses to focus exclusively on the distinction and connection of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding, asking first how wisdom and knowledge differ (dist. 35 cl nl). Consideration of a variety of Augustinian statements leads to the conclusion that wisdom is concerned with divine things and knowledge with human ones (cl nn2-6). Understanding occupies a middle place between wisdom and knowledge, since it is concerned not only with eternal things, but also with the appearance of invisible and spiritual things in time. Wisdom contemplates the Creator alone; understanding looks also to the creature. But it is wisdom that engenders delight (c2 nl). An alternative summary of the relationship of these three gifts is to say that "knowledge is effective for the right administration of temporal things and for good relations among the wicked; understanding for enquiry about the Creator and invisible creatures; but wisdom for the contemplation of, and delectation in, eternal truth alone" (c2 n2).

Peter concludes his discussion of these gifts with the caveat that the gifts of understanding and knowledge are not to be confused with their natural counterparts that go under the same names. The latter are all from God by the benefit of creation, but these gifts come from the Holy Spirit and are given to the faithful for righteousness so that they may reform and assist their natural faculties (c3 nl). And as for the gift of wisdom, it is of God, but it is not the same wisdom by which God is wise (c3 n2).

The completion of the work of distinguishing the various virtues evokes next the question of whether they may be possessed separately

(dist. 36 cl nl). The answer appears to be that they cannot because ail the virtues are the fruit of charity, and whoever has all the charities cannot but have all the virtues. They will grow in him as charity does (cl nn1 and 2), and they will be equal in him in the mind, but not in exterior acts (c2).

xxxvi | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 The Ten Commandments The reaffirmation of the primacy of charity leads next to the question of how the whole Law may be said to hang from it; this in turn serves as a transition to the treatment of the ten commandments (c3 n1). If the whole

Law and the Prophets hang from the commandment of love, why are many ceremonial precepts of the Old Testament no longer observed?

They are not observed because they were not given for the sake of justification, which is the fruit of charity, "but as a prefiguring of what was to come, and they were imposed as a burden; once truth came shining out, they ceased as if a shadow" (c3 nl). The spiritual understanding of the ceremonial precepts continues to be valid, and the same is true of the moral commandments. But all that is of enduring value in all these precepts issues from and is summarized in the ten commandments, which in turn can all be referred to the two commandments of love, so that they can only be fulfilled in love and must have love as their end (c3 n1). If time should be lacking to read the Bible or sermons, it more than suffices to preserve charity, from which all the commandments depend, "because it is the perfection and end of them all" (c3 n2).

That the ten commandments are contained within Christ's two commandments to love God and neighbour is shown by their distribution on their two tablets: "the three which are on the first tablet pertain to God, namely to the knowledge and love of the Trinity; the seven which are on the second tablet pertain to the love of neighbour" (dist. 37 cl nl).

The first commandment forbids the worship of other gods and the making of graven things or likenesses (cl n2). The second forbids the taking of God's name in vain. The allegorical content of this commandment is that Christ be held to be equal to the Father (c2 n3). The third commandment commands the sanctification of the Sabbath. Allegorically, the command is "that you hope for rest—here from vices and in the future in contemplation of God—from the Holy Spirit, that is, from God's charity and gift" (c2 n4). This brief outline of the first three commandments concludes with a reaffirmation of their Trinitarian character because "the first, which is about the worship of the one God, pertains to the Father, in whom is unity or authority; the second to the Son, in whom is equality; the third to the Holy Spirit, in whom is the fellowship of both" (c3 n2).

The other seven commandments, of the second tablet, pertain to love of neighbour (c4 nl). The first of these refers to the father according to the flesh, commanding the honouring of one's father and mother. This honour consists in reverence and the provision of necessities (c4 n2). The second commandment forbids killing—literally, only homicide is forbid-

Introduction | xxxvii den by it; spiritually and in light of an evangelical emendation, even the will to kill is forbidden by it (c4 n3). Mention of this emendation provides the occasion to reflect that even the letter of the Gospel expresses a spiritual understanding for a spiritual people, whereas the letter of the old

Law expresses a carnal understanding for a carnal people, and so was in need of correction (c4 n4).

The third commandment of the second tablet forbids adultery, by which is now understood any use of the sexual organs outside of marriage

(c4 n5). The fourth forbids theft and sacrilege, and every form of rapine and usury (c5 nn1-3). But the commandment would not have forbidden the pillaging of the Egyptians in which the children of Israel engaged before their exodus; they took the goods of the Egyptians at the command of God, the giver of the Law, and so committed no sin (c5 n4).

The fifth commandment forbids the bearing of false witness and is taken to include a general prohibition on lying and perjury (c6 nl), subjects on which Peter will engage in a detailed analysis because "the question regarding lying is a great one, and cannot be explained hurriedly"

(c6 n2). Three different kinds of lies can be distinguished: to help someone, for amusement, or for malice. The first two are slight faults, especially in those who are not perfect; the third kind is awful for all (dist. 38 cl nl). Examples of lying to protect someone are those of the Hebrew midwives in Exodus, who lied in order to save the lives of children, and of Raab, who lied to help the Hebrew spies. Both of these committed a sin, but it was venial and forgiven because of the good that followed. But this form of reasoning is risky and should not be extended to other sins, otherwise detestable evils may follow (cl n3).

A more detailed classification of lies is offered from Augustine's On Lying, in which eight types of lies are distinguished. The first and most serious, which all ought to avoid, is lying in the teaching of religion. The second is a lie that hurts someone without aiding anyone. The third aids someone, but hurts another person. The fourth is lying for its own sake.

The fifth is a flattering lie. All these ought to be avoided. The sixth is a lie to thieves looking for someone else's money. The seventh is a lie to avoid betraying a man to someone who wishes to kill him. The eighth is a lie to preserve someone from sexual sin. The list arranges the variety of lies in decreasing gravity of sin, but even the last will be avoided by anyone who wishes to avoid self-deception (c2).

After such a comprehensive survey of lies, the time seems ripe for a definition, again borrowed from Augustine: "A lie is a false signification of speech with the intention of deceiving" (c3). A lie, then, requires ob-

xxxviii_ | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 jective falsehood and subjective intention to deceive by uttering the falsehood. From the perspective of the liar, on the other hand, the objective element is not required; it is sufficient that he intend to deceive, even if what he believes to be a lie is, in fact, true (c4 nl). A classic example of this sort of discrepancy is the one of the Jew who says that Christ is God, not believing it in his heart; he is a liar who utters the truth (c4 n2).

Every lie is a sin, but it matters much whether one lies to help or to do harm, and whether one misleads another as to an earthly or a heavenly matter (c5 nl). And every lie is wrong not only because a man ought to say what is in his soul, but also because lying corrupts and does violence to language, which is meant for human sociability and communication

(c5 n2). And so a lie is a sin, even if it helps or does no other harm (c5 nn3 and 4). But not every lie seems to be forbidden by the commandment and the amusing lie has not been discussed (c5 n5).

Since lying gives rise to error, it is worth noting that not every error is equally dangerous. To engender or cultivate error with regard to the obtaining of the kingdom of God is the most serious offence; other errors can be trifling sins (c6 nl). But ignorance and error are not to be confused, even if the one often gives rise to the other, and ignorance is not always a bad thing (c6 n2).

Finally, Peter cites the case of Jacob, who passed himself off to his blind father as Esau, his older brother. On the authority of Augustine,

Jacob is excused because he carried out the fraud in obedience to his mother, who had commanded him to do so on the counsel of the Holy

Spirit (c6 n3). Aside from providing a key in which to read an important scriptural story, this consideration of Jacob's case has the effect of reminding the reader about the risks of rushing to judgement without knowing all the circumstances of a case.

Perjury is a lie made under oath (dist. 39 cl). It is a debated question whether one who swears to a lie unwittingly is guilty of perjury (c2). The better view seems to be that perjury is incurred in such a case because the person was careless in affirming under oath something of whose truth he had not made certain (c3 nn1 and 2).

Is it evil to swear oaths at all? Not if they are necessary to achieve some good, such as to assert one's innocence, to make peace, or to persuade others of something which is good for them (c4 nl). But the Lord forbids the swearing of unnecessary oaths (c4 nn3 and 4).

If one has to swear an oath, is it preferable to swear by creatures or by the Creator? In the Old Testament, weak people were allowed to swear by the Creator, lest they extend undue honour to the creature, but those firm

Introduction | xxxix in faith were allowed to swear even by creatures; in the Gospel, Christ forbade swearing by a creature (c5). Certainly, to swear by God is more binding (c6). And the effect of swearing by God is to call God as a witness (c6), and sometimes has the effect of binding over some goods or persons before God as a pledge of the truth of what is being sworn (c7 nn3 and 4). Although a Christian may not swear by false gods, he may rely on the good oath of another who does so (c9 n1).

Not every oath is to be kept. An oath sworn against faith or charity, if it would make for a bad outcome, is to be changed, not fulfilled (c9 n1).

Impious oaths may be rescinded, since they bind one to sin (c9 n2). Even merely careless oaths ought not to be kept, if keeping them will make for a worse outcome; perjury should be incurred to avoid a greater crime (c9 n3). One who swears carelessly commits a grave sin, but the observance of an oath that turns out to be unjust would add a second grave sin, and this ought to be avoided (c9 n4).

Artfulness in swearing is also not to be practised. If clever wording is used to say one thing and mean another, the oath is to be interpreted in the sense in which it is understood by the one who receives it (cl1). Finally, one should not compel another to swear an oath, if he knows that the other will lie; to do this is akin to murder (c12).

Returning to his outline of the commandments, Peter lists the last two on the second tablet, which forbid desire for a neighbour's wife and coveting a neighbour's goods. These prohibitions might have been taken as included under the earlier prohibitions against adultery and theft, but they are listed separately to brand as evil not only the deed, but also the desire

(dist. 40 cl nl). This brief reflection nicely closes the discussion of all that has gone before concerning the virtues with a reminder that, in the practice of virtue and the avoidance of vice, the person's inner disposition is always as relevant as the outward action.

This long reflection on the Law evokes for Peter a final pondering on its relationship to the Gospel. He has no hesitation in concurring in the judgement that even the Decalogue, which he has just expounded, can be termed the letter that kills because its prohibition of sin has the effect of increasing concupiscence and transgression, in the absence of grace,

"which grace is not as abundant in the Law as it is in the Gospel." (c2).

The Gospel is superior to the Law because it promises heavenly things rather than earthly ones. And the sacraments of the Gospel confer grace, while those of the Law only signified it. The moral commandments of the Law remain in the Gospel, but more fully (c3 nl). This rather cool evaluation of the Law sets the stage for the next Book of the Sentences,

xl | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3

concerned principally with the grace-bearing sacraments of the new dispensation, which can take the sting away from the literalness of the Law.

To close his third Book, Peter yields to the poetic temptation to affirm once more the primacy of charity, here with regard to the commandments:

You have heard the ten chords of the lute which have been imposed on both sexes; they are to be plucked with charity, so that the wild beasts of the vices may be killed (c3 n2).

* * * The third book of the Sentences, for a variety of reasons (at some of which Dante hints in the dedication), has been the most congenial in which to become immersed, and so it is perhaps the hardest to let go. Without Jean

Hoff's unfailingly gracious encouragement to release it, in a version which owes to her more than I can properly acknowledge, I might still be holding it firmly in my grasp. I renew my thanks to the Frati Editori di

Quaracchi, for the "placet" to translate the Sentences from Fr. Brady's edition. Professor Joseph W. Goering, of St. Michael's College and the University of Toronto, has continued in his role of benevolent censor: he says all the right things about the importance of the project (as his socii in the classroom purportedly attest) and gently ensures that, however giacially, the thing moves on. Fred Unwalla, as ever, is to be thanked for the glorious colour scheme.

This third book of the Sentences is dedicated to Francesca, third of my children. Like her brothers, Francesca has not shown any marked inclination to commune with the Lombard, but the topics of the book are ones with which she has been wrestling in a variety of interesting contexts of her own. With my jaundiced eye, I cannot but think that, in this, she is an indirect beneficiary of Peter's work, so it is a special pleasure to present her with this sign of my paternal affection.

Giulio Silano St. Michael's College, Toronto Exaltation of the Holy Cross, 2008

Chapter Headings

HERE BEGIN THE CHAPTERS

OF THE THIRD BOOK

[DISTINCTION I]

Ch. 1 Why the Son took on flesh, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit.

2 Whether the Father or the Holy Spirit could have become incarnate.

3 Whether the Son, who alone took on flesh, did something that the Father or the Holy Spirit did not do.

[DISTINCTION II]

Ch. 1 (4) Why he took the whole human nature, and what is understood by the term nature.

2 (5) On the union of Word and flesh through the soul.

3 (6) That the Word took on flesh and soul at the same time, nor was the flesh conceived before it was taken on.

[DISTINCTION III]

Ch. 1 (7) On the flesh that was taken, what it was like before.

2 (8) That no one here is without sin, apart from the Virgin.

3 (9) Why Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham, as Levi did.

4 (10) For what reason Christ's flesh is said not to have been sinfui, but like sinful flesh.

[DISTINCTION IV]

Ch. 1 (11) Why the incarnation is attributed to the Holy Spirit, even though it is the work of the whole Trinity.

2 (12) For what reason Christ is said to have been conceived and born of the Holy Spirit.

3 (13) Why the Apostle says that Christ was made, but we profess that he was born.

[DISTINCTION V]

Ch. 1 (14) Whether a person or nature took on a person or nature, and whether God's nature became incarnate.

2 (15) Whether the divine nature ought to be said to have been made flesh.

xlii_ | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 3 (16) Why [the Word] did not take the person of a man, even though it took a man; but some strive to prove the contrary.

[DISTINCTION VI]

Ch. 1 (17) On the meaning of these expressions: God is man, God was made man, etc. He sets out three opinions.

2 (18) The first is the opinion of those who say that, in the incarnation, some man was constituted from soul and flesh, and that man was made

God, and God was made that man; and he sets out the authorities on the strength of which they say this.

3 (19) The second is the opinion of those who say that that man was constituted of three substances or two natures, and they profess this to be one person: only one simple person before the incarnation, and a composite one at the incarnation; and he sets out the authorities by which these defend themselves.

4 (20) The third is the opinion of those who not only deny [the existence of] a person composed of natures, but also disavow that there was any man or any substance there composed of soul and flesh. They say that these two things, namely soul and flesh, were united to the Word, not so that any substance or person was composed from those two things, but so that God might be clothed with those two as with clothing in order to appear to the eyes of mortals. These understand the order of the incarnation according to habit.

5 (21) Then he sets forth the authorities by which this opinion is strengthened.

6 (22) Four kinds of habit are distinguished.

[DISTINCTION VII]

Ch. 1 (23) Next, he sets out the reasons that seem to go against each of those opinions.

2 (24) In what sense Christ is called predestined.

3 (25) That he is not to be called the Lord's man.

[DISTINCTION VIII]

Ch. 1 (26) Whether the divine nature ought to be said to be born of the Virgin.

2 (27) On the twofold birth of Christ, who was born twice.

[DISTINCTION IX]

Ch. 1 (28) On the adoration to be shown to Christ's humanity.

Chapter Headings | xiliii

[DISTINCTION X]

Ch. 1 (29) Whether Christ, according to his being a man, is a person or anything.

2 (30) Whether Christ is an adoptive son according to his being man.

3 (31) Whether the person or the nature was predestined.

[DISTINCTION XT]

Ch. 1 (32) Whether Christ is a creature or was made.

2 (33) On the perfidy and punishment of Arius.

[DISTINCTION XII]

Ch. 1 (34) Whether that man always was.

2 (35) Whether God could have taken some other form or from other than the stock of Adam.

3 (36) If it would have been possible for that man to sin or not be God.

4 (37) If God could have taken human form in the female sex.

[DISTINCTION XII]

Ch. 1 (38) Concerning Christ's wisdom and grace as a man, and whether he could have made progress in them.

[DISTINCTION XIV]

Ch. 1 (39) Whether the soul of Christ had wisdom equal to God's and whether it knows all things that God knows.

2 (40) Why God did not give to that soul the power over, as well as the knowledge of, all things.

[DISTINCTION XV]

Ch. 1 (41) Of man's defects which Christ took on.

2 (42) On the propassion and passion of fear or sadness.

3 (43) On some rather obscure chapters of Hilary which appear to remove the sufferings of the passion from Christ's flesh.

4 (44) On Christ's sorrow and its cause according to the same.

[DISTINCTION XVI]

Ch. 1 (45) Whether in Christ there was the necessity to suffer and die, which is a general defect.

2 (46) Of the states of man, and what Christ took from each of them.

[DISTINCTION XVII]

Ch. 1 (47) Whether every prayer or will of Christ was fulfilled.

2 (48) On the wills of Christ according to his two natures.

xliv | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 3 (49) On some chapters of Ambrose and Hilary where Christ's doubt and fear are discussed.

[DISTINCTION XVIII]

Ch. 1 (50) Whether Christ merited for himself and for us, and what for himself, what for us.

2 (51) That Christ merited for himself the same things from his conception as through his passion.

3 (52) Concerning that text: He gave to him the name which is above all other names.

4 (53) Whether Christ could have had those things without any merit which he obtained by his merit.

5 (54) On the cause of the passion and death of Christ.

[DISTINCTION XIX]

Ch. 1 (55) How, by his death, Christ redeemed us from the devil and sin.

2 (56) Why God man and dead.

3 (57) How Christ redeemed us from punishment.

4 (58) How he bore our punishment.

5 (59) Whether Christ alone is to be called redeemer, as he alone is to be called mediator.

6 (60) On the [title] mediator.

7 (61) According to which nature is he mediator.

[DISTINCTION XX]

Ch. 1 (62) That he could have freed us in some other manner.

2 (63) Why rather in this manner.

3 (64) By what righteousness was the devil overcome.

4 (65) On the litigation among God, man, and the devil.

5 (66) On the handing over of Christ done by Judas, God, and the Jews.

6 (67) Whether Christ's passion is the work of God or of the Jews.

[DISTINCTION XX]]

Ch. 1 (68) Whether at Christ's death the soul or flesh was separated from the Word.

2 (69) For what reason Christ is said to have died or suffered.

[DISTINCTION XXII]

Ch. 1 (70) Whether Christ was a man in death.

2 (71) Whether in death Christ is a man wherever he is.

3 (72) That the whole Christ is everywhere, yet not wholly, just as he is whole man or God, yet not wholly.

Chapter Headings | xlv 4 (73) Whether those things which are said of God or of the Son of God can be said of that man or of the son of man.

[DISTINCTION XXII]]

Ch. 1 (74) Whether Christ had faith and hope, as he had charity.

2 (75) What is faith.

3 (76) In how many ways the term faith is used.

4 (77) What it is to believe God, or in a God, or in God.

5 (78) Of that formless quality of mind which is in the evil Christian.

6 (79) In what sense faith is said to be one.

7 (80) That faith properly concerns things which are not seen, and yet it is itself seen by the one in whom it is.

8 (81) Description of faith.

9 (82) Why faith alone is called the foundation.

[DISTINCTION XXIV]

Ch. 1 (83) How that text: 'When it comes to pass, you may believe' is to be understood.

2 (84) Whether Peter had faith in the passion when he saw that man suffer.

3 (85) Whether some things are known which are believed.

[DISTINCTION XXV]

Ch. 1 (86) On the faith of the ancients.

2 (87) On the faith of the simple.

3 (88) What it was sufficient to believe before [Christ's] coming.

4 (89) On the faith of Cornelius.

5 (90) On the equality of faith, hope, charity, and work.

[DISTINCTION XXVI]

Ch. 1 (91) On hope, what it is.

2 (92) With what is hope concerned.

3 (93) In what hope and faith differ.

4 (94) Whether faith or hope was in Christ.

5 (95) Whether the just in hell had faith and hope.

[DISTINCTION XXVIII]

Ch. 1 (96) On the charity toward God and neighbour which is in Christ and in us.

2 (97) What is charity.

3 (98) Whether God and neighbour are loved by the same love.

4 (99) Why there are said to be two commandments of charity.

5 (100) On the manner of loving.

xlvi | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 6 (101) On the fulfillment of that commandment: You shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart.

7 (102) That the one mandate is contained in the other.

8 (103) What things are to be loved in charity.

[DISTINCTION XXVIII]

Ch. 1 (104) Whether we are commanded to love all of our neighbour and our whole selves.

2 (105) That the love of angels is included in the love of neighbour.

3 (106) What is our neighbour.

4 (107) In what ways the term neighbour is used.

[DISTINCTION XXIX]

Ch. 1 (108) On the order of loving: what [comes] before, what after.

2 (109) Whether all men are to be loved equally.

3 (110) On the degrees of charity.

[DISTINCTION XXX]

Ch. 1 (111) Whether it is better to love enemies than friends.

[DISTINCTION XXXI]I]

Ch. 1 (112) Whether charity, once had, may be lost.

2 (113) Why faith, hope, and knowledge are said to be made void, and not charity, even though it too is only in part.

3 (114) Whether Christ observed the same order of charity as we do.

[DISTINCTION XXXII]

Ch. 1 (115) On God's charity.

2 (116) How God is said to love this one more and that one less.

3 (117) That God's love is to be regarded in two ways.

4 (118) Whether one is loved more or less by God at one time than at another.

5 (119) Whether God loved the reprobate from all eternity.

[DISTINCTION XXXIII]

Ch. 1 (120) On the four principal virtues.

2 (121) Whether these virtues were in Christ and are in the angels.

3 (122) On their uses.

[DISTINCTION XXXIV]

Ch. 1 (123) On the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

2 (124) Whether they are virtues and whether they are in the angels.

3 (125) Whether they were in Christ.

Chapter Headings | x\vii 4 (126) On the distinction of fears.

5 (127) On chaste, servile, and initial fear.

6 (128) How chaste and servile fear differ.

7 (129) That servile and initial fear are called the beginning of wisdom, but differently.

8 (130) How chaste fear remains forever.

9 (131) Whether the fear of pain, which was in Christ, was servile or initial.

[DISTINCTION XXXV]

Ch. 1 (132) How wisdom and knowledge differ.

2 (133) In what wisdom differs from understanding.

3 (134) Whether the understanding and knowledge which are numbered among the gifts [of the Holy Spirit] are the ones which man has naturally.

[DISTINCTION XXXVI]

Ch. 1 (135) On the connection of the virtues which are not separated.

2 (136) Whether all the virtues are equally present in anyone in whom they are.

3 (137) How the whole Law hangs from charity.

[DISTINCTION XXXVII]

Ch. 1 (138) On the ten commandments: how they are contained in the two [commandments of charity].

2 (139) How an idol is said to be nothing in the world.

3 (140) Why remission of sins is properly said to be done in the Holy Spirit.

4 (141) On the spiritual and carnal senses of the Law.

5 (142) On theft.

6 (143) On lying.

[DISTINCTION XXX VIII]

Ch. 1 (144) On the threefold kind of lying.

2 (145) On the eight kinds of lying.

3 (146) What is lying.

4 (147) What is it to lie.

5 (148) That every lie is a sin, whether it is of help or not, and why.

6 (149) In what is it dangerous to err, in what not.

[DISTINCTION XXXIX]

Ch. 1 (150) On perjury.

xlviii_ | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3 2 (151) Whether there can be a perjury which is not a lie.

3 (152) On the triple manner of perjury.

4 (153) Whether it is an evil to swear oaths.

5 (154) On the oath which is sworn by creatures.

6 (155) Which oath is more binding, whether the one done 'by God,' or 'by creatures,' or 'by the Gospel.'

7 (156) What it means to say: By God.

8 (157) Concerning those who swear by false gods.

9 (158) That an oath or promise made against God is not to be kept.

10 (159) Whether he is a perjurer, who does not do what he has incautiously sworn.

11 (160) Concerning those who swear with verbal artfulness.

12 (161) Concerning him who compels another to swear.

[DISTINCTION XL]

Ch. 1 (162) Why the Law is said to restrain the hand, but not the spirit.

2 (163) What is the letter that kills.

3 (164) On the difference between the Law and the Gospel.

The Sentences, Book 3 On the Incarnation of the Word

HERE BEGINS THE THIRD BOOK

On the Incarnation of the Word Let us now readily attend, with the whole consideration of our mind, to understanding and treating those things which pertain to the mystery of the Word made flesh, so that, with God revealing, we may be able to utter some little thing on these ineffable matters.

THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME ARE PRESENTED IN A SUMMARY WAY.

—In the first book, through the unassailable witness of the saints, we said something on the inexplicable mystery of the most high Trinity. Then, in the second book, observing the certain rules of authority, we indicated the order of the creation of things and the fall of man. Now, the order of reason requires that, in the third and fourth books, we discuss the restoration of man accomplished through the grace of the mediator of God and men,' and the sacraments of human redemption, by which man's bruises are bound up' and the wounds of sins are cured. In this way, the Samaritan may come to the one who is wounded,' the physician to the one who is sick,* grace to the one who is miserable.

DISTINCTION I

And so, as the Apostle says: When the fullness of time came, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the Law, so as to redeem those who were under the Law, that we might receive adoption as sons of God.'

Now, the time of fullness is called the time of grace, which took its beginnings from the coming of the Saviour. This is the time of mercy' and the year of benignity,' in which grace and truth was made through Jesus

Merlerime 2, 5; Gals 3,20.

2C{oPs. 146, 3.

°>Cf. Lk. 10, 33-34.

"Cf. Mt..9, 12.

'Gal. 4, 4-5.

*Psa101,14, *Ps. 64, 12.

4 | THE SENTENCES, BOOK 3

Christ:' grace, because through charity is fulfilled what was commanded in the Law; truth, because by Christ's advent is exhibited and achieved the promise of human redemption made of old. And so the sending of the Son is the incarnation itself.° For he was sent so that he appeared visible to the world in the form of a man, about which we have already spoken sufficiently.° Chapter |

1. WHY THE SON TOOK ON FLESH, AND NOT THE FATHER OR THE HOLY

SPIRIT. But it is to be diligently noted why the Son took on flesh, and not the Father or the Holy Spirit: for the Son alone took on human form.

2. FIRST REASON. Which God's wisdom did by an entirely suitable order and high counsel, so that God, who had established the world in his wisdom, according to the text: You made all things in wisdom, Lord,' should in the same wisdom restore the things which are in the heavens and those which are on earth.' This wisdom is the woman of the Gospel who lights the lamp and finds the tenth coin which had been lost,' namely the Wisdom of the Father, which lit the lamp of human weakness with the light of its divinity and restored man, who was lost, marked with the name and image of the king.

3. SECOND REASON. And so also the Son was sent, and not the Father, because it was more fitting that the one be sent who is from another, than the one who is from no one; and the Son is from the Father, but the Father is not from anyone else. —AUGUSTINE. For as Augustine says, in the book

On the Trinity: "He has no one from whom to be. ... Therefore, just as the Father begot and the Son was begotten, so also suitably the Father sent, the Son was sent.

... For the Word of God is aptly sent by him whose Word he is; he is sent by him of whom he was born; what was begotten is sent; but the Father, who sent, is from no one." And so the Father is not sent lest, if he be sent, he be thought to be from another.

4. THIRD REASON. And so the Son, who is from the Father alone, was sent first; then also the Holy Spirit, who is from the Father and the Son; but the Son alone was sent in the flesh, not the Holy Spirit, just as not the Father. And this was done so that he who was Son of God in divinity should become son of man in humanity. Neither the Father nor the Holy pyre ge °*Augustine, /n Joannem, tr. 40 n6; De Trinitate, bk 2 c5 n8.

°Bk | dist. 15, esp. in cc2 and 4.

'Ps, 103, 24.

2Cf. Eph. 1, 10.

'Cf Lk. 15, 8-9, "Augustine, De Trinitate, bk 4 c20 nn28-29.

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