The One Christ: St. Augustine's Theology of Deification (continued)
142 The Holy Spirit's Indwelling the Father and the Son are related while in no way connoting a dissimilarity in essence.
1 Cor. 1:24 seems to upset this rather helpful linguistic maneuvering. How can a substance term, like power or wisdom, be ascribed particularly to a relationship (that is, to the Son), without casting the Father's claim to be also and equally "power" or "wisdom" into question? Moreover, if the Son is the power and wisdom of the Father, perhaps all divine predicates are ultimately relationship terms. If so, are we forbidden to attribute any "substance" terms to any one of the three divine persons without including all? While this is the line of questioning Augustine treats throughout Book 6, no final answer comes until Book 7.
There he realizes that if attributes such as uirtus and sapientia are relationship terms, why would not other names be similarly relegated? If so, "substance" and even "God" could be predicated only by way of relation and that would mean that not even being itself is being but only relationship: ipsa essentia non sit essentia.19 Knowing this to be wholly illogical, Augustine concludes that scripture often predicates attributes of God without explicitly clarifying how such a name or agency is applicable to each person of the Trinity. So echoing the creedal tradition of the church, Augustine concludes that while "the Father is himself wisdom, and the Son is called the wisdom of the Father in the same way as he is called the light of the Father, that is, as we talk of light from light, and both are one light, so we must understand wisdom from wisdom, and both one wisdom."20 As substance terms, "power" and "wisdom" can be equally predicated of each divine person and as "begotten" the Son can be called the Father's uirtus and sapientia without any threat to their substantial equality.
We have traced the core argument of De Trinitate 5–7 be-
19. Trin. 7.1.2; CCL 50.247. 20. Trin. 7.12; Hill, Trinity, 221.