Chap. 12: Evil
CHAP. 12: EVIL
AQUINAS DEALT WITH MANY ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF EVIL throughout his writings. In fact, he has a whole book titled On Evil that deals with it comprehensively.1 The treatment here is an extended and more textually based discussion of the topic. We will begin with the question of the reality of evil.
The Reality of Evil
Atheism denies the existence God and affirms the existence of evil. Pantheism affirms the existence of God and denies the existence of evil. Aquinas affirmed the reality of both. However, as we will see next (under "The Nature of Evil"), he did not believe that evil exists in and of itself. Rather, it exists only in another. Evil is not a being, but it is a real privation in a being. For example, even though being maimed is the lack of a limb and not a thing in itself, nevertheless, it is real to be maimed—it is a real lack in a real thing. Likewise, blindness is the lack of sight, but as every blind person knows, blindness is real. It is not an illusion. This leads us to our next point.
The Nature of Evil
What then is the nature of evil? St. Augustine before Aquinas had struggled with the problem of the nature of evil. Coming from a dualistic Manichean cult, Augustine had great difficulty explaining how evil was not a thing (substance). For theists like Augustine and Aquinas, God alone is eternal, and everything He created was good. If so, what, then, is evil? Only pantheists deny the reality of evil,2 but how can a theist explain it?
The Dilemma of Theism about the Nature of Evil
If evil is not something outside of God, and it cannot be anything inside of an infinitely perfect theistic God, then what is it? The problem can be summarized this way: (1) God is the author of everything; (2) Evil is something; (3) Therefore, God is the author of evil.
Now rejecting the first premise leads to dualism which Aquinas rejects (see below). Likewise, denying the second premise leads to illusionism which denies the reality of evil (see above). Neither is acceptable to Aquinas. What, then, is the solution? To say that God did not create all things is to deny God’s sovereignty. To claim that evil is nothing denies its reality. However, to admit that God caused all things and that evil is something is to acknowledge that God caused evil—a conclusion rejected by Aquinas. But this conclusion seems to follow logically from these premises. Hence, unless one rejects the truth of at least one of the premises, it would seem that he must accept the truth of the conclusion.
A Response to the Dilemma: Evil is a Privation in a Good Thing
Aquinas, like Augustine before him, responded that evil is not a thing or substance. Rather it is a lack or privation of a good thing that God made. Evil is a deprivation of some particular good. Aquinas wrote: "Evil precisely as such is . . . a deprivation of some particular good inhering in a particular good."3 But “privation is not an essence, but is non-existence of something in a substance. Therefore evil is not a real essence."4 But he hastens to say that while "Evil denotes the lack of Good. Not every absence of good is an evil." For "Mere negation does not display the character of evil, otherwise non-existents would be evil. . ."5 For "A thing is called evil for lacking a perfection it ought to have; to lack sight is evil in a man, but not a stone."6
Evil, then, is a deprivation of some good that ought to be there. It is not a mere negation. In short, everything God created was good. Evil is a corruption or privation that occurred to things after God created them.
Of course, to say that evil is not a thing, but a lack in things, is not to claim that it is not real. Evil is a real lack in good things, as the blind person knows only so well. As Thomas put it, "Evil cannot exist but in good; sheer evil is impossible."7 So, evil is not a real substance, but it is a real privation in a good substance. It is not an actual entity (thing), but it is a real corruption in an actual entity.
Different Kinds of Privations
Evil as privation comes in different kinds. There are physical privations, such as mutilations and there are moral privations, such as a sexual perversity. Privation can be in substance (what something is) or in relationships (how it relates to others). There are not only bad things but there are bad relations between things. A relationship of love is a good one; hate is an evil one. Likewise, when a creature worships its Creator, this is a good relationship, but blaspheming the Creator is an evil relationship.
Given that evil is a privation or corruption of a good thing, it follows that there is no such thing as something that is totally evil. If it were totally deprived of all good, it would be nothing. But total privation in a metaphysical sense is impossible. For as "Aristotle observes that a wholly evil thing would be self-destructive."8 And a totally incapacitated will could not make any moral actions. So, one must take care not to carry human depravity so far that one destroys the ability to sin. There cannot be a supreme evil, for although evil lessens good, it can never totally destroy it entirely. Nothing can be complete, unmitigated evil. For if all good were entirely destroyed—and this would be required for evil to be complete—evil itself would vanish since its subject, namely good, would no longer be there.
The fact that evil cannot be total in a metaphysical sense by no means implies that it cannot be total evil in a moral sense. A being can be totally depraved morally in the sense that evil has invaded every part of his being and made him incapable of attaining his own salvation. But this moral total depravity can only be extensive, not intensive. It can extend to every part of a person’s being, but it cannot destroy the person’s being. If it destroyed one’s personhood, there would no longer be a morally responsible person there to do evil.
The Four Causes of Evil
Following Aristotle, Aquinas described things in terms of their four causes: (1) efficient (that by which); (2) final (that for which); (3) formal (that of which), and (4) material (that out of which). When applied to evil, Aquinas held "That good is the material cause of evil has already appeared. As regards the formal cause, evil had none; instead it is rather the privation of form. Similarly, it had no final cause, but is rather the privation of due order to the proper end. . . . Evil has an efficient cause; this, however, is indirect, not direct."9 As we will see (below) the direct and immediate cause of evil is free will. For Aquinas concluded, "the action pertaining to the sin is from God, but the sin is not from God."10
The Origin of Evil
For a theist like Aquinas, the origin of evil is a difficult problem. An absolutely good God cannot create evil. Nor, it would appear, can a perfect creature give rise to evil which is an imperfection. How, then, did evil arise? There are two possibilities: (1) Evil could be eternal; (2) Evil arose from good.
Evil is not Eternal
Aquinas concluded that "There is no justification for holding that there are two [eternal] kingdoms, one of good, the other of evil."11 He insisted that "There is not one first principle of evil as there is of good." He offers several reasons. "In the first place, the original principle of things is essentially good. Nothing can be essentially bad. Every being as being is good; evil does not exist except in a good subject."12 "In the second place, the first principle of good things is supreme and perfect good containing all goodness in itself. Now there cannot be a supreme evil, for though evil lessens good, it can never totally destroy good. . . . " For this reason Aristotle observes that a wholly evil thing would be self-destructive."13 "In the third place, the very notion of evil is irreconcilable with the notion of a first principle, because evil is caused by good; also because evil can be a cause only incidentally, and therefore cannot be the first cause, since the accidental is subsequent to the essential."14 Further, "There cannot be an evil entirely apart from good, for it has been proved that evil resides in some good. Therefore, nothing is supremely evil."15 At this point Aquinas would agree with Augustine that good is basic to evil since if we take all the evil away from something, then it is something better. But if we take all the good away from evil, there is nothing left.16
Evil Arises from Good (God) Incidentally
But if evil is not an essential and eternal principle, then it must have arisen from good. But how? Aquinas argues that since evil cannot be caused “by an evil, since evil does not act save by virtue of as good. . . , it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil." For "that which is not, is not the cause of anything. Hence, if evil be caused by something, this must be a good."17
The problem can be put this way: (1) God is absolutely perfect; (2) God cannot create anything imperfect: (3) But perfect creatures cannot do evil; (4) Therefore, neither God nor his perfect creatures can produce evil; (5) But evil has occurred; (6) Hence, either (a) God is not absolutely perfect, or (b) He did not create a perfect creature.
Following St. Augustine, Aquinas challenged the premise number (3). God is good, and He created good creatures with a good power called free will. But unfortunately they used this good power to bring evil into the universe by rebelling against their Creator. So evil did arise from good, not directly but indirectly, by the abuse of a good power called freedom. Freedom in itself is not evil. It is good to be free. But with freedom comes the possibility of evil.
So God is responsible for making evil possible (by creating a good power called free will), but free creatures are responsible for making it actual. God is the primary cause of all actions (including those that fall short of being totally good, namely, evil actions). But simply because "when something moves itself, it is not precluded that it is moved by another from whom it has this very ability by which it moves itself. And therefore it is not contrary to liberty that God is the cause of the act of free will."18
God is the Primary Cause of Free Will which is the Secondary Cause of Evil
Hence, Aquinas distinguished between the Primary Cause of a free action (God) and the secondary cause (a free creature). God gave the power of choice to some creatures. However, God is not responsible for the exercise of that free choice to do evil. God does not perform the free acts for us. Human free choice is not a mere instrumental cause through which God works. Human beings are the efficient, albeit secondary, causes of their own free actions. Thus Aquinas adds, "And for this reason we maintain that the action [power] pertaining to the sin is from God, but the sin is not from God."19
The Nature of Free Will
Aquinas outlines several aspects of what he calls free choice in human beings. The first of these is that free choices are voluntary.
Free choice is voluntary. According to Aquinas, free will involves a voluntary act. For "there must needs be something voluntary in human acts."20 This is so "since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found."21
Human Free will has the power of alternate choice. Further, the will has the power of choice "because its power is not limited to one effect; indeed the will has the power to produce this or that effect, and consequently is undetermined to either."22
A free choice is a self-caused action. In response to the question "Whether the will moves itself?" Aquinas answers that "It belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will’s object." So, "the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means."23 Thus, free choice is not determined by another, or undetermined, but it is as self-determinism action. If it were caused by another, then they would be responsible for it. And it is irrational to assume there was no cause of it. Actions and events do not occur without a cause. Therefore, every free choice must be self-caused, that is, caused by the self (person).
Free choice is not of necessity. Thomas states clearly that "Man does not choose of necessity." He affirms that "the reason for this is found in the very power of reason. For the will can tend to do whatever the reason apprehends as good. Now the reason can apprehend as good not only this, viz, to will or to act, but also this, viz., not to will and not to act." Also, "the reason can consider the nature of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the nature of an evil. "Hence, “since choice is not of the end, but of the means. . . , it is not of the perfect good, which is happiness, but of other and particular goods. Therefore, man chooses, not of necessity, but freely."24
Free choice cannot be coerced. Another characteristic of free choice is that it cannot be forced. Violence is contrary to free choice. Thus, irresistible persuasion is also a contradiction in terms. It is just a euphemistic way of saying "forced freedom" which is contradictory. C. S. Lewis agreed, saying, "But you now see that the Irresistible and the Indisputable are the two weapons which the nature of His scheme forbids Him to use. Merely to over-ride a human will . . . would be for Him useless. He cannot ravish. He can only woo."25 Or as he stated elsewhere, "When one says, ‘All will be saved,’ my reason retorts, ‘Without their will, or with it?’ If I say, ‘Without their will,’ I at once perceive a contradiction; how can the supreme voluntary act of self-surrender be involuntary? If I say, ‘With their will,’ my reason replies, ‘How, if they will not give in?’."26
Even though God (as Primary Cause) gives us both the power to choose and is involved in the very action of choosing,27 nonetheless, "The will [secondary cause] contributes something when it is moved by God. And therefore although the movement of the will is from outside as from a first principle, nevertheless it is not coerced."28 For God moves creatures in accordance with their nature, and man is by nature a free being. "Therefore, if God moves man’s will, this is evidently not opposed to freedom of choice, just as God’s activity in natural things is not contrary to their nature."29
Aquinas noted that "some philosophers maintain that man’s will is necessarily moved to choose a thing . . . , But that opinion is heretical, for it destroys the reason for merit and demerit in human acts: for it does not seem to be meritorious or demeritorious for someone of necessity to do what he cannot avoid."30 He adds, unless "it is within our power" to choose and not of necessity, "then praise and blame . . . are nullified."31
Free choice is not destroyed by sin. As for Augustine’s statement that "the man who misuses free will destroys both himself and it,"32 Aquinas replies, "the sinner has lost free will so far as concerns freedom from fault and misery, but not so far as concerns freedom from compulsion."33
In summation, a person (a free agent) is the cause of evil. This free will, even after the Fall of Adam, is voluntary, not of necessity, and free from compulsion. Indeed, even though our wills are moved by God (the Primary Cause), nonetheless, we are not coerced to do anything contrary to our wills.
The Purpose of Evil
According to Aquinas, since God is all-knowing, all-wise and all-good, then He must have a good purpose for everything. Since He foreknew evil would occur, this would mean that God had a good purpose for permitting it. He wrote: "God’s permission of evil in the things governed by Him is not inconsistent with the divine goodness."34
God’s has a Good Purpose for Permitting Evil
No evil is good, but God has a good purpose for permitting evil. "Every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends toward something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must be befitting to it. . . . But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good."35 And since God the ultimate Good is also the ultimate agent, it follows that God must have an ultimate good purpose for which He is permitting evil.
Further, we have the assurance that evil can never completely destroy the good. For "however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely, since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is good. Therefore, some good must always remain."36
God Will Bring Good Out of Evil
Further, "God governs things by his providence." And "whatever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for the end." So, "whatever has being in any as is an effect of God, and . . . God makes all things for an end which is Himself. Therefore, He uses everything by directing to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God by His providence, is the governor of all."37 This means that evil, which exists in the good, is permitted by God and evil directed by God to His good ends. So, God is so powerful that He can make good even out of evil an evil situation.
Permitting Evil is a Precondition for Achieving Higher Goods.
Aquinas affirmed that "Many good things would be missed if God permitted no evil to exist: fire would not burn unless air was consumed, lions would not thrive unless asses were killed, nor would just retribution be inflicted and long-suffering patience praised but for the iniquity of persecution."38 In short, no pain, no gain. If sin is not permitted, it cannot be defeated. If danger is not allowed, courage cannot be achieved. Without tribulation patience cannot be attained. First order evils are a necessary condition for achieving second order goods.
God’s Providence and the Persistence of Evil
God permits evil, but He controls it by His providence. Aquinas said that "It belongs to the divine providence, not to destroy, but to preserve the nature of things."39 God can do this, even though humans have the free choice to do evil. He can accomplish this because God (the Primary Cause) in His providence "moves all things in accordance with their conditions, in such a way that from necessary causes, through their divine motion, effects follow of necessity, but from contingent causes [like free choice] effect flow contingently."40 So, in either case God’s providence is not hindered.
No evil is sought for the evil in it, but for the good. For "No evil can be desirable, either by natural appetite or by conscious will. It is sought indirectly, namely because it is the consequence of some good. . . . A lion kills for food that means the death of the deer: a fornicator wants pleasure, and incurs the deformity of sin."41
The Ultimate Good (God) is the Ultimate End
The ultimate good toward which creatures are directed is God. "For as nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this s good, it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is supremely good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one supreme good, namely God. . . . Therefore, all things are directed to the highest good, namely, God as their end."42
Further, "since the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are ordered by the first agent to its own end. . . . Therefore, all things are ordered to God as their end."43
This is not the Best World Possible
As for the question of why God did not create a better world than this one, Aquinas rejects Augustine’s view that: "Nothing else but real beings and real natures conspire to the perfection of the universe. Now evil is part of the perfection of the universe. As Augustine says, the admirable beauty of the world is composed of everything; even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, accentuates the goodness of things."44 To this Aquinas replies, "Evil as such does not belong to the perfection of the universe, save accidentally, that is by reason of its incidental conjunction with good."45
Augustine had argued that the evil accents the good the way dark places in a painting accent the light ones. Or, like a mosaic, when one looks at only one jagged piece, it does not look good. But in of the overall mosaic it is part of a total picture of beauty. But Aquinas rejects this view, arguing that evil is evil, and evil does not contribute to the overall good of the universe. Rather, as shown above (under "The Purpose of Evil"), God has a good purpose for allowing evil, namely, to achieve the greater good. But evil itself is not part of an overall good.
The Problem of Physical Evil
The above solution to the problem of moral evil does not appear to solve the problem of natural disasters. It does not suffice to say that the free will of creatures caused all these. How, then, can natural evil be explained? How can God, a perfect Cause, produce these natural evils?
In response to physical evil, Aquinas notes that "we may speak of evil in both senses: that is, by reason of a defect in the things itself (thus blindness is a certain evil in an animal), and by reason of a defect in a creature’s action (thus lameness connotes action with a defect. Evil is an action that is directed to an end in such a way that it is not rightly related to the end, is called fault (peccatum) both in voluntary agents and in natural agents. "For example, "A physician is faulty (peccat) in his action, when he does not proceed in such a way as to procure health. Nature, too, is faulty in its activity when it fails to advance a generated being to its proper disposition and form; this is why monsters occur in nature."46
Physical Evil is not the Result of an Imperfect Cause
Aquinas contended that an absolutely perfect Cause cannot be blamed for physical evil. He wrote: "We have shown that in God there is no defect, but consummate perfection. Hence the evil which lies in defective activity or which is caused by a defective agent does not flow from God as its cause. And this appears in respect both to natural and to voluntary things."47 That is, the defect must be either in the secondary causes (not in God, the Primary Cause) or connect with the material world in which the causality activity is operating.
Of course, "the effect of a deficient secondary cause is derived from a non-deficient first cause with respect to what is real and complete there, not to what is defective. For example, all the motion in the act of limping comes from a person’s vitality, but not the ungainliness comes from the crooked leg. Likewise, all that [is] real and active in a bad action comes from God as its cause, yet the defect there arises from a deficient secondary cause."48 It is in this sense that God is said to be not only the cause of the power of free will but also of the actions of free will.49 He is not the cause of the evil in those actions but of the actuality in the actions.
However, "the course of justice, which belongs to the universal order, requires that punishment be visited on sinners. On this count God is the author of the evil which is called penalty, but not of that which is fault. . . ."50 For punishing evil (which God does) is a good action.
Physical Evils Due to the Nature of the Physical World
While God is a perfect cause, the material on which He is producing the effect is not perfect. So, "considering the exigencies of the material from which he is made, death and disease are natural to man; but considering his form, immortality is his right, though the principles of nature alone are not sufficient to ensure this: the appetite is inherent, but the achievement is a gift."51 Even though God is a perfect Cause, evil can occur in two ways in the physical world. For "the incidence of evil is on both; on the former by a withdrawal of form or on an integral part, thus blindness or the lack of a limb; on the latter by a gap in the proper activity, either by non-performance or failure in execution of direction."52 Both account for physical evil in the world. The evil can be in the action of the cause or in the effect. "In the action evil is caused by defect of motive power, as in babies. On the other hand, evil is cause in the effect sometimes by the very energy of the agent—not, however, in the proper effect of the agent—and sometimes by the intractability of the matter."53 For example, "when the privation of one form introduces by the agent, as when fire expels the form of air or water the more energetic the agent the forcibly it impresses itself and destroys the contrary."54
God Causes Physical Evil only Incidentally ,not Directly
Sometimes physical evil is the incidental result of a good causal process. "Destruction comes then from the very strength of the flames; even so the energy is directly bent on mastering, not on destroying, though in effect it is incidentally destructive." So, "the fact that a thing is deficient is incidental to the goodness by which it is active. Hence, it is true to say that evil had naught but an incidental cause; in this sense good is the cause of evil."55 Thus, when Aquinas says "God is the author of physical evil but not of moral evil . . ,” we must understand that God does not cause evil directly but only indirectly or incidentally.56 "The form principally intended by God among created things is the well-being of the general scheme, which requires that some can and will fail. And so in causing a good collective arrangement, God consequently, and as it were indirectly, causes the corruption of things."57 This is how Aquinas understands biblical texts like Deuteronmy 32:39: "See now that I, am he, and there is no god beside me; I kill and I make alive." Exodus 4:11 would fall into this same category: "Who had made man’s mouth? Who makes him mute, or deaf, or seeing, or blind? Is it not I, the Lord?"
God and Gratuitous Evil
From this last point, it seems clear that so-called gratuitous evil would not be against divine providence. Gratuitous evil is evil for which there is no justification or purpose as such. Gratuitous evil is unwarranted evil. It does not result directly from any justifiable divine intention. In a theistic context, it is the kind of evil which, as such, is inconsistent with an all-loving, all-good, and all-powerful God.
Now it would seem that Aquinas’ concept of incidental evil fits into this concept. It is unwarranted as such but is explicable only in terms of a general good intended by good of which it is a byproduct. Hence, God did not intend it as such. Rather, it was necessary byproduct of a good process God did intend. It is inconsistent as such to the character and purpose of God. There was a particular plan for its existence. Rather, it was just a kind of collateral damage that came along with the war on evil. Gratuitous evil actions merely accompany the overall package of good that God has provided for mankind. Hence, God is not the direct cause of it. He is related to it only incidentally and indirectly. In such a world, then, we can expect good and bad fortune within the overall providence of God.
The Relation of God Providence to Fortune and Chance
According to Thomas, "It is evident from what has been said that the divine providence does not remove from the world fortune and chance. Fortune and chance are said of things that happen seldom. . . . Now it would be against the nature of divine providence if all things happened of necessity. . . . Therefore it would also be against the nature of divine providence if nothing happened in the world fortuitously and by chance."58 Further, "chance occurrences are due to concurrence of two or more causes, when some end which was not intended happens from the concurrence of some cause. . . . Therefore it is not against divine providence that there be fortuitous and chance happenings in the world."59
Of course, "An occurrence may be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a lower cause when an effect not intended is brought about, and yet not be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a higher cause. . . . For example, a master may send two servants to the same place, but in such a way that neither is aware of the mission of the other. Their meeting is accidental so far as each of them is concerned, but not as regards the master." So, "if God’s point of view is concerned they are not fortuitous, but foreseen."60
The Relation of God’s Providence to Fate
Aquinas acknowledged that "Many effects are found to occur haphazardly if they are regarded from the standpoint of secondary causes. Some thinkers are unwilling to refer such effects to a high cause that ordains them." But he adds, "Since, however, not only natural things but also human affairs are under divine providence, those events that seem to happen at random in men’s lives must be referred to the ordination of divine providence." In this sense, "those who hold that all things are subject to divine providence, must admit the existence of fate."
However, since the term is often used by unbelievers in a fatalistic sense of events devoid of any involvement of our free choice, we should avoid the word "fate" at least "so far as possible, lest an occasion for going astray be taken by those who do not understand. . . ." Therefore, “Augustine says that if anyone believes in the existence of fate in the second sense [of divine providence], he may keep to his opinion but should correct his language."61
The Ultimate Victory of Good over Evil
Eventually evil will be defeated. For the destructive force of evil are limited and temporal. In the end evil will be punished—forever, and good will be rewarded for all eternity.
The Destructive Affects of Evil are not Total or Permanent
Thomas contended that "However greatly multiplied, evils can never consume the whole of good."62 "But even were the contrary dispositions [of evil] piled up indefinitely [against the soul], the aptness for right action would be indefinitely weakened, not wholly destroyed. The root always remains, namely the substance of the subject."63 So, "the capital of human nature diminished by sin is the natural inclination to virtue instinctive in man as a rational being; to act aright is to act according to reason. Now sin cannot destroy man’s rationality altogether, for then he would no longer be capable of sin."64 For “sin does not strike at the root, since it does not diminish nature itself; what it does is to block the ability from reaching its end; the disability consists in the interposition of a barrier. . . . Yet the instinct for right action always remains radically intact."65
At this point the critic could always ask why a physical world is necessary. Why did not God make spirits, who could not hurt their bodies or die? The answer is: God did; they are called angels. The problem is that, while no angel can die of food poisoning, neither can they enjoy a prime rib. While no angel has ever drowned, neither has any angel ever gone for a swim or enjoyed water skiing. No angel has ever been raped, but neither has any angel ever enjoyed sex or the blessing of having children (Matt. 22:30). In this kind of physical world, we simply must take the concomitant evil along with the good.
What is more, angels for Aquinas are unchangeable in their created nature (except by annihilation). Hence, they cannot be redeemed once they fall. However, human beings, who can change, are therefore redeemable. As the angelic doctor put it (citing Damascene), "Death is to men what the fall is to angles." That is to say, "it is clear that the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission, and forever."66 Why can’t angels have more time to change their minds? First of all, angels are not in time, so, they have no time to change.3 Second, because angels, unlike men, cannot change by their nature. So, "the angel’s will adheres fixedly and immovably."67 Hence, their choice against God was fixed from it very inception of the choice.
The Eternal Blessedness of Saints in Heaven
Eventually, God will redeem us from all physical evil too, giving us immortal and incorruptible bodies. Further, it will provide a beatific vision for all believers who, once they see the very essence of God, will never be able to sin again. For as Aquinas declared, "the intellect that sees God cannot but rejoice in the vision of Him. Besides, God is goodness itself, and goodness is the cause of love. Hence goodness must necessarily be loved by all who apprehend it."68 This will signal the ultimate defeat of evil. But such an experience is provided only for those who willingly submit to God. No one is coerced against their will (see discussion on free will above). However, like falling in love gradually and freely we will ultimately reach a point of no return. So, in heaven we will be so overwhelmed by the Blessed vision of an Absolute Good (God) that we will no longer be able to sin. In short, we will experience the ultimate freedom like God has—the freedom from sin. We will no longer have the lesser kind of freedom which is the freedom to sin which we have here below.
The Eternal Punishment of Sinners in Hell
God loves all and wants to save all. However, He knew there would be casualties. He knew His grace of salvation would not be accepted by all. Hence, for the reprobate God’s Justice must be satisfied. Thus, "The suffering of eternal punishment is in no way opposed to divine justice," wrote Aquinas.69 To the criticism that eternal punishment for temporal sins is overkill, Aquinas responded: "For the crime of adultery or murder, either of which may be committed in a brief span of time, human law may prescribe life-long exile or even death, by both of which the criminal is banned forever from the society of the State."70 And "clearly, the greater the person, the more grievous is the offense. He who strikes a soldier is held more accountable that if he strikes a peasant; and his offense is much more serious if he strikes a prince or a king. Accordingly, since God is infinitely great, an offense committed against Him is in a certain respect infinite; and so a punishment that is in a certain respect infinite is duly attached."71 As long as there is an eternal Just God, there must be eternal justice. Sin cannot be defeated forever unless the sinner is banished forever.
A Brief Summary of Aquinas’s View on Evil
First of all, Aquinas rejected Augustine’s best of all possible worlds hypothesis which was later adopted by Leibniz. When one thinks of all the horrible evils in the world, he would have agreed with Voltaire’s satire of the Augustinian-Leibnizian thesis that this is the best of all possible worlds. The horrid evils of child torture, rape, and the holocaust are not transformed from evil to good simply by making them part of a broader picture!
Second, Aquinas view on the nature of free will and its relation to God’s providential governance of the world in instructive. His insight on the relation of Primary and secondary causality is key to this. Indeed, even some Calvinistic authorities have made use of it. The Westminster Confession of Faith, for example, affirms that: "God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil" (Westminster Confession of Faith, Chap. 9, emphasis added). "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (Westminster Confession of Faith, Chap. 5, emphasis added).
Third, another point worth mentioning is Aquinas’s stress on some of natural evil as a byproduct of a good purpose or process. This fits well with the contemporary understanding of some of the processes of nature as, for example, earth quakes being necessary to renew the minerals on earth to sustain life. Further, tornados are a spinoff of good things like hot air, cold air and moisture. Also, lightening that kills people also puts liquid fertilizer into the soil, and so on.
Fourth, Aquinas’s view of incidental and fortuitous evil is helpful in answering what is a pressing aspect of the problem of evil. It preserves the overall providence of God while it relieves the apologist of the need to explain what appears to be obvious examples of gratuitous evil in the world.
Select Works on Aquinas and Evil
Augustine, On the Morals of the Manicheans. in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Editor, Philip Schaff, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952.
———, The City of God in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Edited by Philip Schaff, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952.
———, On the Nature of the Good, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers. Ed. Philip Schaff, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1952.
Albert Camus, The Plague. Trans. by S. Gilbert, NY: Modern Library, 1948.
Mary Baker Eddy, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures. Boston: The First Church of Christ Scientist, 1971.
Norman L. Geisler and Win Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, Second Edition. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1988.
———, If God, Why Evil? Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 2011.
———, Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal. Eugene, or: Wipf and Stock, 1992.
Leibniz, Gottfried. Theodicy Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of Evil. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1952.
C. S. Lewis, The Great Divorce. NY: Macmillan, 1946.
———, The Problem of Pain. NY: Macmillan, 1940.
Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977.
Thomas Aquinas, Compendium of Theology. London: B. Herder, 1952.
———, Summa contra Gentiles. Trans. Anton Pegis. Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1955.
———, Summa Theologica. Trans. Thomas Gilby. NY: Random House, 1944.
———, On Evil. Trans. John and Jean Oesterle. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1955.
F. M. Voltaire, Candide, Zadig, and Selected Stories. NY: New American Library, 1961.