Chap. 7: Reality
CHAP. 7: REALITY
FOR AQUINAS, WHAT WE KNOW TRULY IS REALITY. The study of reality is called metaphysics ("beyond physics"). How reality is viewed is part of one's worldview. Christianity is committed to a specific worldview called theism. Theism has made a commitment to one of the most basic questions asked by metaphysics: Is reality one or many? Aquinas answers that it is many since there is more than one reality. There is the Creator and also all of his creatures. So for the Christian reality is many (pluralism), not one (monism).
Yet, God is really different from his creation. This is fundamental to a Christian view of reality. The way in which Aquinas develops his position is a major contribution to the long-standing debate between monism and pluralism. The essence of his view is found in his early but crucial little book On Being and Essence. It was dedicated to his friar associates, theological students, who desired to understand the essence of Aquinas's position.1
The Challenge of Monism
Monism, in contrast to Christian theism, holds that all reality is one. Parmenides of Elea (fl. ca. 485 B.C.) originally posed the problem with which subsequent thinkers have had to grapple and to which Aquinas gave his unique response. Parmenides' argument laid the groundwork for later responses. Each of the main alternatives can be viewed as a response to his dilemma.
The Historical Context
Parmenides contends that there are two ways of inquiry that are directly contrary:
Come now, and I will tell thee—the only ways of enquiry that can be thought of: the one way, that it is and cannot not-be, is the path of persuasion, for it attends upon Truth; the other, that it is-not and needs must not-be, that I tell thee is a path together unthinkable. For thou couldst not know that which is-not (that is impossible) nor utter it.2
Either a thing is or it is not—there is no middle ground. "For never shall this be proved, that things that are not are."3 "Thus it must either completely be or be not."4 "Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike; nor is there more here and less there . . . but it is all full of what is. So it is all continuous."5 In other words, being is one homogenous, indivisible whole.
The Philosophical Argument
The essence of Parmenides' argument is that there cannot be more than one thing (absolute monism). For if there were two things, then they would have to differ. But for things to differ, they must differ either by being or by nonbeing. But since being is that which makes them identical, they cannot differ by it. Nor, on the other hand, can they differ by nonbeing, for non-being is nothing, and to differ by nothing is not to differ at all. Hence, for Parmenides there cannot be a plurality of beings but only one single indivisible being—a rigid monism.
The Pluralistic Alternatives to Monism
The alternatives to monism are few and painful for pluralists (like Christian theists). Basically, there are four alternatives to monism.6 Each is an attempt to show how there can be many beings. The need for Christians to render an intelligible account of what they believe is critical at this point. For if it is incredible to believe that God is different from his creatures, then the whole Christian system of belief crumbles. Since it is the Christian's duty to render the credible intelligible (see Chap. 5), an answer to monism must be sought. Aquinas provides just such an answer, which grows naturally out of the logical possibilities and historical context of his times. Others before Aquinas had proposed solutions to the problem, but none really succeeded.
The first two forms of pluralism, which we will call atomism and Platonism, affirm that the many beings differ by the principle of nonbeing. The last two views—Aristotelianism and Thomism—hold that the many beings differ in their essence. Only the latter is a satisfactory solution for a Christian theist.
Atomism: Things Differ by Absolute Nonbeing
The ancient atomists, such as Leucippus and Democritus, contended that the principle that separates one being (atom) from another is absolutely nothing (i.e., nonbeing). They called this principle the Void. For them, being is full and nonbeing is an empty void. The atoms, which do not differ at all in their essence, are separated by the different space they occupy in the Void (empty space).7 This difference, however, is merely extrinsic. There is no intrinsic difference in the atoms (beings).
Leucippus regarded the whole as one, motionless, uncreated and limited. . . . He posited innumerable elements in perpetual motion—namely the atoms—and held that the number of their shapes was infinite. . . . The nature of the atoms he supposed to be compact and full; that, he said, was being, and it moved the void, which he called not-being and held to exist no less than being. In the same way his associate Democritus of Abdera posited as principles the full and the void.8
In short, the atomists' response to Parmenides was that there are many beings (atoms) that differ by nonbeing. Each being occupies a different space in the Void that, in itself, is absolutely Nothing. Of course, this is scarcely an adequate answer to Parmenides, since he would simply point out that to differ by absolutely nothing is to have absolutely no difference at all. And to have absolutely no difference is to be absolutely the same! Monism wins the day over atomism.
Platonism: Things Differ by Relative Nonbeing
Plato, with the help of Parmenides,9 saw the fallacy of the atomistic position (to which his own earlier view of indivisible Forms [ideas] behind all things was akin),10 Plato believed that all things in this world have an ideal archetype behind them. This Idea (or Form) is the real world. All things in this world of our experience are only "shadows" of the real world by virtue of their participation in this true Form. For example, each individual human being in this world participates in a universal form of humanness in the world of Ideas. Plato later adopted the view that the Forms (or Ideas) are not indivisibly and unrelatably separated by absolute nonbeing, but are related by the principle of relative nonbeing. "We shall find it necessary in self-defense to put to the question that pronouncement of father Parmenides, and establish by main force that what is not, in some respect has being, and conversely that is, in a way is not."11
Thus, by the principle of relative nonbeing (also called the "other"12), Plato believed he could have many different Forms (beings) and thus avoid monism. Each Form differed from other Forms in that it was not that other Form. All determination was by negation.
For example, the sculptor determines what the statue is in relation to the stone by chipping away what is not wanted. Likewise, each Form is differentiated from every other Form by negation. What it is, is determined by what it is not. For example, a chair is distinguished from everything else in the room in that it is not the table, floor, or wall. This does not mean that the chair is absolutely nothing. It is something in itself, but it is nothing in relation to other things. That is, it is not those other things.
Parmenides would not have been impressed by Plato's attempt to evade the horns of his dilemma. For he would simply have asked whether there was any difference in the beings themselves. If not, then he would have noted that all these beings (Forms) must be identical. In short, there are not many beings but only one.
Aristotelianism: Things Differ as Simple Beings
Both the atomist and Platonist took one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma, differentiating things by nonbeing. Aristotle and Aquinas took the other horn of the dilemma, attempting to find a difference in the beings themselves. Both contend that there are many beings that are essentially different. Aristotle maintains that these beings are metaphysically simple, while Aquinas views them as metaphysically composite.13
Aristotle argued that there was a plurality (forty-seven or fifty-five14) of beings or unmoved movers, which are separated from one another in their very being. These beings (movers) cause all the motion in the world, each operating in its own separate cosmic domain. Each is a pure Form with no matter (which is used to differentiate things in this world). This plurality of totally separated substantial Forms has no commonness or community of being whatsoever. They cannot be related to one another,15 and are completely distinct. In Aristotle's own words,
But since that which is moved must be moved by something, and the first mover must be in itself unmovable, and eternal movement must be produced by something eternal and a single movement by a single thing, and since we see that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe, which we say the first and unmovable substance produces, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal . . . each of these movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal just because it is a certain kind of substance, and the mover is eternal and prior to the moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Evidently, then, there must be substances which are the same number as the movements of the stars, and in their nature eternal, and in themselves unmovable, and without magnitude, for the reason before mentioned.16
Of course, Parmenides would ask Aristotle just how simple beings can differ in their very being. Things composed of form and matter can differ in that this particular matter is different from that matter, even though they have the same form. But how do pure Forms (Beings) differ from each other? They have no principle of differentiation. But if there is no difference in their being, then their being is identical. Aristotle's solution does not avoid monism either.
Thomism: Things Differ as Complex Being
The fourth pluralistic alternative to Parmenidean monism is represented by Aquinas, who, in common with Aristotle, seeks the difference within the beings themselves. But unlike Aristotle, who posits simple beings, Aquinas believes that all finite beings are composed in their very beings. Only God is an absolutely Simple Being, and there can be only one such Being (God). There can be other kinds of being, namely, composed beings. Beings can differ in their very being because there can be different kinds of beings.17
God, for example, is an infinite kind of being. All creatures are finite kinds of beings. God is Pure Actuality (Act); all creatures are composed of actuality (act) and potentiality (potency). Hence, finite things differ from God in that they have a limiting potentiality; God does not. Finite things can differ from each other in terms of whether their potentiality is completely actualized (as in angels) or whether it is being progressively actualized (as in humankind). The essence (whatness) and existence (isness) of all creatures are distinct. The essence and existence of God, on the other hand, are identical. Of course, Aquinas was not the first to make the real distinction in finite beings, but "no one prior to Thomas made such constant reference to this truth or employed it in so many ways as the source of other truths."18
GOD
Aquinas argues that "existence is something other than essence or quiddity, unless perhaps there be something the quiddity of which is its very existence."19 This is so because "every essence or quiddity can be conceived aside from the condition that something be known concerning its existence" but "no essence can be conceived without those things which are parts of essence."20
Of course, God must be one and unique because it is impossible that a multiplication of anything should be affected except by virtue of the addition of some difference. . . . But if some thing is posited which is existence alone such that the existence itself is subsisting, this existence does not receive an addition of difference, since then it would not be existence only but existence and beyond that some form.21
From this "it follows necessarily that in anything whatever except this (unique pure existence) its existence must be one thing and its quiddity or nature or form another."22
It is on this basis that Aquinas builds a proof for the existence of God. Namely, all that belongs to anything is either caused from principles of its nature . . . or accrues to it through some extrinsic principle. . . . But it cannot be that existence itself should be caused by the form or quiddity of the thing, caused, I say, as by means of an efficient cause, because thus something would bring its very self into existence, which is impossible. Therefore it follows that everything such that its existence is other than its nature has existence from another.23
ANGELS
Only God is Pure Actuality; in him there is no (passive) potency at all. Thus, he is simply one with no multiplicity at all. On the other hand, "since potency and act are posited in intelligences [angels] it will not be difficult to find a multitude of intelligences, which would be impossible if there were no potency in them."24 Hence, the only way one angel differs from another "is according to their grade (measure) of potency and act, so that a superior intelligence which is more proximate to the first (being) has more of act and less of potency, and so for others."25 The human soul as the lowest intelligence has the most potency of any intelligence and for this reason is compared "to a tablet upon which nothing is written."26
Aquinas's angels are like Aristotle's pure Forms. They have no matter in them, yet they differ from one another. But unlike Aristotle, Aquinas maintains that these angelic Forms are composed of essence and existence. Their essence (form) is simple, but this form is composed of actuality and potentiality. They are not Pure Actuality (like God). Angels have the potentiality not to be, whereas God cannot not be. Therefore, unlike Aristotle's Forms (unmoved movers), Aquinas's angels can differ in their being. Each has its own act of being, because each has its own potentiality. Pure Actuality cannot differ from Pure Actuality, but anything composed of actuality and potentiality can differ both from Pure Actuality and from other actualities with different potentialities.
HUMAN BEINGS
For Aquinas, "some substances are . . . simple and others are composite, and in both there is an essence."27 But the essences of "simple substances have a more exalted existence [esse]."28 In an individual human essence there is a composition of form (soul) and matter (body).
Moreover it cannot be said that either of these alone is called essence. For it is evident that matter alone is not the essence of the thing, because it is by means of its essence that the thing is both known [knowable] and ordered in its species and genus. . . . From what has been said it is clear that essence is what is signified by the definition of the thing.29
That is, "in composite substances the name of essence signifies that which is composed of matter and form."30 "Whence it follows that the essence by virtue of which a thing is called being is not form alone, nor matter alone, but both."31 It is what the Greeks called ousia.
Now in things composed of form and matter "the principle of individuation is matter." Not matter in general, "but only signated [de-signated] matter," that is, this matter as opposed to that matter. Hence, it is "thisness" that distinguishes one material thing from another. For example, humankind as such has flesh and bones but John is this flesh and these bones. Humankind as such has flesh and bones absolutely, whereas an individual human being does not. "Accordingly, it is clear that the essence of Socrates and the essence of man do not differ except according to signate and nonsignate."32
It follows from this that humankind considered in the generic sense is neither one nor many. For if plurality were essential to the nature of humanity, there could never be one human. "Similarly, if unity were to belong to its ratio [notion], then would it be one and the same of Socrates and of Plato, nor could it be multiple as many."33 From this it follows that "it is false to say that the essence of man, inasmuch as he is man, has existence in this singular, because if existence in this singular applied to man as man, then (man) would never exist outside this singular."34
So God has no finite Form; angels are simple finite forms; and humans are a composite of form and matter. But the form of both angels and humans is composed of essence and existence. God, on the other hand, has no composition. His essence is his existence, that is, it is of his essence to exist. Hence, God cannot be multiple, but creatures can. God and creatures, then, can differ in their very beings, since they are different kinds of beings. One creature can differ from another in that they have differing potentialities. In this unique way Aquinas provides an answer to the age-old dilemma posed by monism. Things do differ in their being because there are different kinds of beings. Parmenides was wrong because he assumed that "being" is always understood univocally. Aquinas, on the other hand, sees that being is analogous, being understood in similar but different ways. All beings are the same in that they are all actual. Finite beings differ from an infinite Being in that they have differing potentialities that have been actualized.
To summarize: There is a threefold way of having an essence in substances. One way is like God, whose essence is His very existence. . . . According to the second mode essence is found in created intellectual substances in which essence is other than their existence, although their essence is without matter. . . . And therefore in such substances there is not found a multitude of individuals in one species. . . . In the third mode essence is found in substances composed of matter and form. .. . And therefore . . . in them a multiplication of individuals in one species is possible, because of the division of signated matter.35
The Superiority of Aquinas's Position
The value of Aquinas's view is manifest by both its own rationality and the implausibility of its alternatives. Parmenides' position, by contrast, does violence to our experience of a differentiated yet interrelated multiplicity of beings. But if a rigid monism is unacceptable, there seem to be only four basic pluralistic alternatives.
Atomism attempts to explain multiplicity by affirming that absolute nonbeing—the Void—is that which separates one being from another. But surely this answer is insufficient. For as Parmenides painfully points out, to differ by that which is absolutely nonexistent is not to differ at all. And if there is no real distinction, then there is no distinction in reality at all. All is one.
Platonism uses relative nonbeing as the principle of differentiation. That is, while admitting that things differ by nonbeing, Platonism holds that non-being in some way exists, even though it is "other" than being. That is, differentiation is by negation. One being is distinct from another not by what it is but by what it is not—different not by being but by nonbeing. In other words, the differentiating factor is not within being but is outside of being—it is neither real nor actual. But nothing that is external to being can be the principle of differentiation within being. But if there is no actual difference within the nature of things, then there is actually no difference between them at all—the old Parmenidean dilemma in a different form.
The Aristotelian multiplicity of simple, separated substances has no principle of individuation at all. Aristotle calls on neither absolute nor relative nonbeing to explain how there can be many simple, separate beings. Not only is this view without a principle of differentiation, but, as Plotinus noted, it is without any principle of unification. That is, there is nothing to coordinate the separate operations of the many prime movers.
Thomism argues that multiplicity is possible because there are different kinds of being. This is possible because there is a real distinction between existence and essence. That is to say, being is not a homogenous, undifferentiated whole. Rather, created being is a dynamic composition of essence and existence, that is, of the correlative principles of potency and act. The question is not "to be" or "not to be" but "what kind of being?" Hence, things differ from one another by the kind of being or actuality they are. Being is not predicated of things univocally, for then all would be one. Nor is it predicated of things equivocally, for then all would be totally different and isolated. Rather, being is predicated of things analogically—each essence has being in its own distinct way. Each thing has its one mode of be-ing. In other words, "essence," the principle of differentiation, is real. It is "part" of the very being of things, a co-constitutive principle. This is not to say that essence is real prior to its connection to existence or independent of it.36 The reality of essence is in its correlativity with existence. Thus an existing essence is real.
In brief, the real distinction within being (ens) between essence (essentia) and existence (esse) seems to be the only satisfactory answer to the Parmenidean problem of unity and plurality. Without an analogy of being there is no way to account for multiplicity. In univocity of being things are either unrelated or identical. Further, if being is taken univocally then there can only be one being; all being is then identical (entire sameness leaves no room for any difference in being). Furthermore, if being is taken equivocally, then there can be no more than one being. For if this is being and everything else is totally different from it, then everything else is nonbeing. For what is totally different from being would be nonbeing. The only way to avoid the monistic conclusion that follows from either an equivocal or a univocal view of beings is to take an analogical view. And the only way being can be analogical is if there is within being both the principle of unification and the principle of differentiation. Aquinas calls these, respectively, esse and essentia, which are related as actuality is to potentiality. Since finite beings have different potentialities (essences), these finite beings can be differentiated in reality when these potentialities are actualized or brought into existence in different kinds of being.
What is being? Being is that which is. Being can be either simple (Pure Actuality) or complex (actuality and potentiality). There cannot be two absolutely simple beings. A simple being (having no potentiality) can—indeed, must—differ from complex beings. Therefore, there can be only one Being pure and simple, but there are many beings with a mixture of act and potency. Only one is Being; everything else has being. In this way Aquinas provides the only adequate answer to monism.
Should old Aquinas be forgotten? If so, then old Parmenides must be remembered, since no one else adequately challenges his argument for monism, and, thus, there would be no rational way to believe in Christian theism. If old Aquinas's answer to monism should never be brought to mind, then old Parmenides' argument for monism will be. In the realm of metaphysics, it looks very much like it is either Aquinas or Parmenides. Of the two, the view of Aquinas alone takes account of our senses and intellect.