in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a

in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a

the suffering, or expectation of it; but also at an age, when parents and friends, who alone can make a good improvement and whom Dr. Taylor supposes alone to be punished by it, suffer least by being bereaved of them; though the infants themselves sometimes suffer to great extremity?

3. To suppose, as Dr. Taylor does, that death is brought on mankind in consequence of Adam's sin, not at all as a calamity, but only as a favor and benefit, is contrary to the doctrine of the gospel; which teaches, that when Christ, as the second Adam, comes to remove and destroy that death, which came by the first Adam, he finds it not as a friend, but an enemy. (1 Cor. 15:22), "For as in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive," with vv. 25 and 26, "For he must reign, till he hath put all enemies under his feet. The last enemy that shall be destroyed, is death."

Dr. Taylor urges, that the afflictions which mankind are subjected to, and particularly their common mortality, are represented in Scripture as the chastisements of our heavenly Father; and therefore are designed for our spiritual good: and consequently are not of the nature of punishments. So in pp. 68, 69, 314, 315.

Though I think the thing asserted far from being true, viz. that the Scripture represents the afflictions of mankind in general, and particularly their common mortality, as the chastisements of an heavenly Father; yet 'tis needless to stand to dispute that matter: for if it be so, it will be no argument that the afflictions and death of mankind are not evidences of their sinfulness. Those would be strange chastisements from the hand of a wise and good Father, which are wholly for nothing; especially such severe chastisements, as to break the child's bones; when at the same time the Father don't suppose any guilt, fault or offense, in any respect, belonging to the

child; but it is chastised in this terrible manner, only for fear that it will be faulty hereafter. I say, these would be a strange sort of chastisements; yea, though he should be able to make it up to the child afterwards. Dr. Taylor tells of representations made by the whole current of Scripture: I am certain, it is not agreeable to the current of Scripture, to represent divine fatherly chastisements after this manner. 'Tis true, that the Scripture supposes such chastenings to be the fruit of God's goodness; yet at the same time it evermore represents them as being for the sin of the subject, and as evidences of the divine displeasure for its sinfulness. Thus the Apostle in 1 Cor. 11:31, 32, speaks of God's chastening his people by mortal sickness, for their good, "that they might not be condemned with the world," and yet signifies that it was "for their sin; for this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep"; that is, for the profaneness and sinful disorder before-mentioned. So Elihu (Job 33:16ff.) speaks of the same chastening by sickness, as for men's good; "to withdraw man from his [sinful] purpose, and to hide pride from man, and keep back his soul from the pit; … that therefore God chastens man with pain on his bed, and the multitude of his bones with strong pain." But these chastenings are for his sins, as appears by what follows (v. 28), where 'tis observed, that when God by this means has brought men to repent, and humbly confess their sins, he delivers them. Again, the same Elihu, speaking of the unfailing love of God to the righteous, even when he "chastens them, and they are bound in fetters, and holden in cords of affliction" (ch. 36:8 etc.), yet speaks of these chastenings as being for their sins (v. 9), "Then he sheweth them their work, and their transgressions, that they have exceeded." So David (Ps. 30), speaks of God's chastening by sore afflictions, as being for his good, and issuing joyfully; and yet being the fruit of God's anger for his sin (v. 5). "God's anger endureth but for a moment." Compare Ps. 119:67, 71, 75. God's fatherly chastisements are spoken of as being for sin (2 Sam. 7:14, 15), "I will

be his father, and he shall be my son. If he commit iniquity, I will chasten him with the rod of men, and with the stripes of the children of men; but my mercy shall not depart away from him." So the prophet Jeremiah speaks of the great affliction that God's people of the young generation suffered in the time of the captivity, as being for their good (Lam. 3:25, etc.). But yet these chastisements are spoken of as being for their sin (see especially vv. 39, 40). So Christ says (Rev. 2:19), "As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten." But the words following shew, that these chastenings from love are for sin that should be repented of: "Be zealous therefore, and repent." And though Christ tells us, they are blessed that are persecuted for righteousness' sake, and have reason to rejoice and be exceeding glad; yet even the persecutions of God's people, as ordered in divine providence, are spoken of as divine chastenings for sin, like the just corrections of a father, when the children deserve them (Heb. 12). The Apostle there speaking to the Christians, concerning the persecutions which they suffered, calls their sufferings by the name of divine rebukes; which implies testifying against a fault: and that they mayn't be discouraged, puts them in mind, that "whom the Lord loveth, he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son that he receiveth." 'Tis also very plain, that the persecutions of God's people, as they are from the disposing hand of God, are chastisements for sin (from 1 Pet. 4:17, 18 compared with Prov. 11:31. See also Ps. 69:4–9).

If divine chastisements in general are certain evidences that the subjects are not wholly without sin, some way belonging to them then in a peculiar manner is death so; for these reasons:

(1) Because slaying, or delivering to death, is often spoken of as in general a more awful thing than the chastisements that are endured in this life. (So, Ps. 118:17, 18), "I shall not die, but live, and declare the works of the Lord. The Lord hath chastened me sore; but he hath

not given me over unto death." So the psalmist in Ps. 88:15, setting forth the extremity of his affliction, represents it by this, that it was next to death. "I am afflicted, and ready to die, while I suffer thy terrors, I am distracted." (So David, 1 Sam. 20:3). So God's tenderness towards persons under chastisement, is from time to time set forth by that, that he did not proceed so far as to make an end of 'em by death (as in Ps. 78:38, 39, and Ps. 103:9 with vv. 14, 15; Ps. 30:2, 3, 9; Job 33:22, 23, 24). So we have God's people often praying when under great affliction, that God would not proceed to this, as being the greatest extremity. (Ps. 13:3), "Consider, and hear me, O Lord my God; lighten mine eyes lest I sleep the sleep of death." (So Job 10:9; Ps. 6:1–5 and 88:9, 10, 11; 143:7).

Especially may death be looked upon as the most extreme of all temporal sufferings, when attended with such dreadful circumstances, and extreme pains, as those with which providence sometimes brings it on infants; as on the children that were offered up to Moloch, and some other idols, who were tormented to death in burning brass. Dr. Taylor says (pp. 359 and 404), "The Lord of all being can never want time and place and power to compensate abundantly any sufferings infants now undergo in subserviency to his good providence." But there are no bounds to such a license, in evading evidences from fact. It might as well be said, that there is not and cannot be any such thing as evidence, from events, of God's displeasure; which is most contrary to the whole current of Scripture, as may appear in part from things which have been observed. This gentleman might as well go further still, and say, that God may cast guiltless persons into hell-fire, to remain there in the most unutterable torments for ages of ages (which bear no greater proportion to eternity than a quarter of an hour), and if he does so, it is no evidence of God's displeasure; because he can never want time, place and power, abundantly to compensate their sufferings

afterwards. If it be so, it is not to the purpose, as long as the Scripture does so abundantly teach us to look on great calamities and sufferings which God brings on men, especially death, as marks of his displeasure for sin, and for sin belonging to them that suffer.

(2) Another thing, which may well lead us to suppose death, in a peculiar manner, above other temporal sufferings, [is] intended as a testimony of God's displeasure for sin, is that death is a thing attended with that awful appearance, that gloomy and terrible aspect, that naturally suggests to our minds God's awful displeasure. Which is a thing that Dr. Taylor himself takes particular notice of (p. 69). Speaking of death, "Herein," says he, "have we before our eyes a striking demonstration, that sin is infinitely hateful to God, and the corruption and ruin of our nature.… Nothing is more proper than such a sight to give us the utmost abhorrence of all iniquity etc." Now if death be no testimony of God's displeasure for sin, no evidence that the subject is looked upon, by him who inflicts it, as any other than perfectly innocent, free from all manner of imputation of guilt, and treated only as an object of favor, is it not strange, that God should annex to it such affecting appearances of his hatred and anger for sin, more than to other chastisements, which yet the Scripture teaches us are always for sin? These gloomy and striking manifestations of God's hatred of sin attending death, are equivalent to awful frowns of God attending the stroke of his hand. If we should see a wise and just father chastising his child, mixing terrible frowns with severe strokes, we should justly argue, that the father considered his child as having something in him displeasing to him, and that he did not thus treat his child only under a notion of mortifying him, and preventing his being faulty hereafter, and making it up to him afterwards, when he had been perfectly innocent, and without fault, either of action or disposition hitherto.

We may well argue from these things, that infants are not looked upon by God as sinless, but that they are by nature children of wrath, seeing this terrible evil comes so heavily on mankind in infancy. But besides these things, which are observable concerning the mortality of infants in general, there are some particular cases of the death of infants, which the Scripture sets before us, that are attended with circumstances, in a peculiar manner, giving evidences of the sinfulness of such, and their just exposedness to divine wrath. As particularly,

The destroying the infants in Sodom, and the neighboring cities: which cities, destroyed in so extraordinary miraculous and awful a manner, are set forth as a signal example of God's dreadful vengeance for sin to the world in all generations; agreeable to that of the Apostle (Jude 7). God did not reprove, but manifestly countenanced Abraham, when he said, with respect to the destruction of Sodom (Gen. 18:23, 25), "Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked?… That be far from thee, to do after this manner, to slay the righteous with the wicked: and that the righteous should be as the wicked, that be far from thee. Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?" Abraham's words imply that God would not destroy the innocent with the guilty. We may well understand "innocent" as included in the word "righteous," according to the language usual in Scripture, in speaking of such cases of judgment and punishment; as is plain in Gen. 20:4; Ex. 23:7; Deut. 25:1; 2 Sam. 4:11; 2 Chron. 6:23; and Prov. 18:5. Eliphaz says (Job 4:7), "Who ever perished, being innocent? or where were the righteous cut off?" We see what great care God took that Lot should not be involved in that destruction. He was miraculously rescued by angels, sent on purpose; who laid hold on him, and brought him, and set him without the gates of the city; and told him that they could do nothing till he was out of the way (Gen. 19:22). And not only was he

thus miraculously delivered, but his two wicked daughters for his sake. The whole affair, both the destruction, and the rescue of them that escaped, was miraculous: and God could as easily have delivered the infants which were in those cities. And if they had been without sin, their perfect innocency, one should think, would have pleaded much more strongly for them, than those lewd women's relation to Lot pleaded for them. When in such a case, we must suppose these infants much further from deserving to be involved in that destruction, than even Lot himself. To say here, that God could make it up to those infants in another world, must be an insufficient reply. For so he could as easily have made it up to Lot, or to ten or fifty righteous, if they had been destroyed in the same fire; nevertheless it is plainly signified, that this would not have been agreeable to the wise and holy proceedings of the Judge of all the earth.

Since God declared, that if there had been found but ten righteous in Sodom, he would have spared the whole city for their sake, may we not well suppose, if infants are perfectly innocent, that he would have spared the old world, in which there were, without doubt, many hundred thousand infants, and in general, one in every family, whose perfect innocence pleaded for its preservation? Especially when such vast care was taken to save Noah and his family (some of whom, one at least, seem to have been none of the best), that they might not be involved in that destruction. If the perfect sinlessness of infants had been a notion entertained among the people of God of old, in the ages next following the flood, handed down from Noah and his children, who well knew that vast multitudes of infants perished in the flood, is it likely that Eliphaz, who lived within a few generations of Shem and Noah, would have said to Job, as he does in that forementioned Job 4:7, "Who ever perish, being innocent? and where were the righteous cut off?" Especially since in the same discourse (ch. 5:1) he appeals to the tradition of the ancients for a

confirmation of this very point; as he also does in ch. 15:7–10, and 22:15, 16. In which last place, he mentions that very thing, the destruction of the wicked by the flood, as an instance of that perishing of the wicked, which he supposes to be peculiar to them, for Job's conviction; in which "the wicked were cut down out of time, their foundation being overflown with a flood." Where 'tis also observable, that he speaks of such an untimeliness of death as they suffered by the flood, as one evidence of guilt; as he also does, ch. 15:32, 33. "It shall be accomplished before his time; and his branch shall not be green." But those that were destroyed by the flood in infancy, above all the rest were cut down out of time; when instead of living above 900 years, according to the common period of man's life, many were cut down before they were one year old.

And when God executed vengeance on the ancient inhabitants of Canaan, not only did he not spare their cities and families for the sake of the infants that were therein, nor take any care that they should not be involved in the destruction; but often with particular care repeated his express commands, that their infants should not be spared, but should be utterly destroyed, without any pity; while Rahab the harlot (who had been far from innocence, though she expressed her faith in entertaining, and safely dismissing the spies) was preserved, and all her friends for her sake. And when God executed his wrath on the Egyptians by slaying their first born, though the children of Israel, who were most of 'em wicked men, as was before shewn, were wonderfully spared by the destroying angel, yet such first born of the Egyptians as were infants, were not spared. They not only were not rescued by the angel, and no miracle wrought to save 'em (as was observed in the case of the infants of Sodom), but the angel destroyed 'em by his own immediate hand, and a miracle was wrought to kill them.

Here not to stay to be particular concerning the command by Moses, concerning the destruction of the infants of the Midianites (Num. 31:17). And that given to Saul to destroy all the infants of the Amalekites (1 Sam. 15:3), and what is said concerning Edom (Ps. 137:4), "Happy shall he be that shall take thy little ones, and dash them against the stones." I proceed to take notice of something remarkable concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, represented in Ezek. 9, when command was given to them that had charge over the city, to destroy the inhabitants (vv. 1–8). And this reason is given for it, that their iniquity required it, and it was a just recompense of their sin (vv. 9, 10). And God at the same time was most particular and exact in his care that such should by no means be involved in the slaughter, as had proved by their behavior, that they were not partakers in the abominations of the city. Command was given to the angel, to go through the city, and set a mark upon their foreheads, and the destroying angel had a strict charge not to come near any man on whom was the mark; yet the infants were not marked, nor a word said of sparing them: on the contrary, infants were expressly mentioned as those that should be utterly destroyed, without pity. (vv. 5, 6), "Go through the city, and smite: let not your eye spare, neither have ye pity. Slay utterly old and young, both maids and little children: but come not near any man upon whom is the mark."

And if any should suspect that such instances as these were peculiar to a more severe dispensation, under the Old Testament, let us consider a remarkable instance in the days of the glorious gospel of the grace of God; even the last destruction of Jerusalem; which was far more terrible, and with greater testimonies of God's wrath and indignation, than the destruction of Sodom, or of Jerusalem in Nebuchadnezzar's time, or anything that ever had happened to any city or people, from the beginning of the world to that time: agreeable to Matt. 24:21 and Luke 21:22, 23. But at that time

particular care was taken to distinguish and deliver God's people, as was foretold (Dan. 12:1). And we have in the New Testament a particular account of the care Christ took for the preservation of his followers: he gave them a sign, by which they might know when the desolation of the city was nigh, that they that were in Jerusalem might flee to the mountains, and escape. And as history gives account, the Christians followed the directions given, and escaped to a place in the mountains called Pella, and were preserved. Yet no care was taken to preserve the infants of the city, in general; but according to the predictions of that event, they were involved with others in that great destruction: so heavily did the calamity fall upon them, that those words were verified. (Luke 23:29), "Behold the days are coming, in which they shall say, 'Blessed are the barren, and the wombs that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck.' " And that prophecy in Deut. 32:21–25, which has undoubtedly special respect to this very time, and is so applied by the best commentators. "I will provoke them to jealousy, with those that are not a people: … for a fire is kindled in mine anger, and it shall burn to the lowest hell […]. I will heap mischiefs upon them; I will spend mine arrows upon them. They shall be burnt with hunger, and devoured with burning heat, and bitter destruction.… The sword without, and terror within, shall destroy both the young man and the virgin, the suckling also, with the man of gray hairs." And it appears by the history of that destruction, that at that time was a remarkable fulfillment of that in Deut. 28:53–57, concerning "parents eating their children in the siege … and the tender and delicate woman eating her new-born child." And here it must be remembered, that these very destructions of that city and land are spoken of in those places fore-mentioned, as clear evidences of God's wrath to all nations, which shall behold them. And if so, they were evidences of God's wrath towards infants; who, equally with the rest, were the subjects of the destruction. If a particular kind or rank of persons, which made a very considerable

part of the inhabitants, were from time to time partakers of the overthrow, without any distinction made in divine providence, and yet this was no evidence at all of God's displeasure with any of 'em; then a being the subjects of such a calamity could not be an evidence of God's wrath against any of the inhabitants, to the reason of all nations, or any nation, or so much as one person.

PART TWO

Containing Observations on Particular Parts of the Holy Scripture, Which Prove

the Doctrine of Original Sin

CHAPTER I

OBSERVATIONS RELATING TO THINGS

CONTAINED IN THE THREE FIRST

CHAPTERS OF GENESIS, WITH REFERENCE TO THE DOCTRINE OF

ORIGINAL SIN

SECTION 1. CONCERNING ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS: AND WHETHER OUR FIRST PARENTS WERE CREATED WITH RIGHTEOUSNESS OR MORAL RECTITUDE OF HEART?

THE doctrine of original righteousness, or the creation of our first parents with holy principles and dispositions, has a close connection, in several respects, with the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Taylor was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine, in his book against original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first place remove this author's main objection against this doctrine; and then shew how the doctrine may be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three first chapters of Genesis.

Dr. Taylor's grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this: that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God's absolute power, without our knowledge or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness: that a necessary holiness, is no holiness. So pp. 179, 180, where he observes, "That Adam must exist, he must be created, yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous." (See also pp. 250, 251.) In p. 437 he says, "To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness." And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing to our own choice, and diligent culture.

With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite inconsistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent with Dr. Taylor's own notions of virtue. Therefore, if it be truly so, that to affirm that to be virtue or holiness which is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I shall shew plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.

In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of the minds of men in all nations and ages, not only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but the good choice itself,

from whence that effect proceeds; yea, and not only so, but also the antecedent good disposition, temper or affection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general notion, not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; and so that the act of choosing that which is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition of mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act of choice; and that therefore it is not necessary that there should first be thought, reflection and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the existence of a good disposition of heart, what signifies that choice? There can, according to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetite. And therefore a virtuous temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.

The following things in Mr. Hutcheson's Inquiry concerning moral good and evil, are evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. (Sec. II, pp. 132, 133), "Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always supposed to flow from some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action consequent upon it.… All the actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to flow from some affections towards the Deity: and whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose to flow from affections towards our fellowcreatures.… Prudence, if it is only employed in promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue." In these things Dr.

Turnbull expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcheson, who is his admired author.

If a virtuous disposition or affection is before acts that proceed from it, then they are before those virtuous acts of choice which proceed from it. And therefore there is no necessity that all virtuous dispositions or affections should be the effect of choice: and so no such supposed necessity can be a good objection against such a disposition's being natural, or from a kind of instinct, implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeable to what Mr. Hutcheson says (ibid. Sec. III, pp. 196, 197), "I know not," says he, "for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows from instinct of passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public, or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue, as the instinct towards private happiness?… If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love."

And if we consider what Dr. Taylor declares as his own notion of the essence of virtue, we shall find, what he so confidently and often affirms, of its being essential to all virtue that it should follow choice and proceed from it, is no less repugnant to that, than it is to the nature of things, and the general notions of mankind. For 'tis his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson's, that the essence of virtue lies in good affections, and particularly in benevolence or love: as he very fully declares in these words in his Key: "That the word that signifies goodness and mercy, should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love is the fulfilling of the

law. Goodness according to the sense of Scripture, and the nature of things, includes all moral rectitude; which, I reckon, may every part of it, where it is true and genuine, be resolved into this single principle." If it be so indeed, then certainly no act whatsoever can have moral rectitude, but what proceeds from this principle. And consequently no act of volition or choice can have any moral rectitude, that takes place before this principle exists. And yet he most confidently affirms, that thought, reflection and choice must go before virtue, and that all virtue or righteousness must be the fruit of preceding choice. This brings his scheme to an evident contradiction. For no act of choice can be virtuous but what proceeds from a principle of benevolence or love; for he insists that all genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is resolved into this single principle: and yet the principle of benevolence itself, can't be virtuous, unless it proceeds from choice; for he affirms that nothing can have the nature of virtue but what comes from choice. So that virtuous love, as the principle of all virtue, must go before virtuous choice, and be the principle or spring of it; and yet virtuous choice must go before virtuous benevolence, and be the spring of that. If a virtuous act of choice goes before a principle of benevolence, and produces it, then this virtuous act is something distinct from that principle which follows it, and is its effect. So that here is at least one part of virtue, yea, the spring and source of all virtue, viz. a virtuous choice, that cannot be resolved into that single principle of love.

Here also it is worthy to be observed, that Dr. Taylor (p. 128) says, "The cause of every effect, alone, is chargeable with the effect it produceth, or which proceedeth from it"; and so he argues, that if the effect be bad, the cause alone is sinful. According to which reasoning, when the effect is good, the cause alone is righteous or virtuous; to the cause is to be ascribed all the praise of the good effect it produceth. And by the same reasoning it will follow, that if, as Dr.

Taylor says, Adam must choose to be righteous, before he was righteous, and if it be essential to the nature of righteousness or moral rectitude, that it be the effect of choice, and hence a principle of benevolence can't have moral rectitude, unless it proceeds from choice; then not to the principle of benevolence, which is the effect, but to the foregoing choice alone, is to be ascribed all the virtue or righteousness that is in the case. And so, instead of all moral rectitude, in every part of it, being resolved into that single principle of benevolence, no moral rectitude, in any part of it, is to be resolved into that principle; but all is to be resolved into the foregoing choice, which is the cause.

But yet it follows from these inconsistent principles, there is no moral rectitude or virtue in the first act of choice, that is the cause of all consequent virtue. This follows two ways: 1. Because every part of virtue lies in the benevolent principle, which is the effect; and therefore no part of it can lie in the cause. 2. The choice of virtue, as to the first act at least, can have no virtue or righteousness at all, because it don't proceed from any foregoing choice. For Dr. Taylor insists, that a man must first have reflection and choice, before he can have righteousness; and that it is essential to holiness, that it proceed from choice. So that the first choice of holiness, which holiness proceeds from, can have no virtue at all, because by the supposition it don't proceed from choice, being the first choice. Hence if it be essential to holiness, that it proceeds from choice, it must proceed from an unholy choice; unless the first holy choice can be before itself, or there be a virtuous act of choice before that which is first of all.

And with respect to Adam, let us consider how upon Dr. Taylor's principles, it was possible he ever should have any such thing as righteousness, by any means at all. In the state wherein God created

him, he could have no such thing as love to God, or any love or benevolence in his heart. For if so, there would have been original righteousness; there would have been genuine moral recitude; nothing would be wanting: for our author says, "True genuine moral rectitude, in every part of it, is to be resolved into this single principle." But if he were wholly without any such thing as love to God, or any virtuous love, how should he come by virtue? The answer doubtless will be, by act of choice: he must first choose to be virtuous. But what if he did choose to be virtuous? It could not be from love to God, or any virtuous principle, that he chose it; for by the supposition, he has no such principle in his heart: and if he chooses it without such a principle, still, according to this author, there is no virtue in his choice; for all virtue, he says, is to be resolved into that single principle of love. Or will he say, there may be produced in the heart a virtuous benevolence by an act or acts of choice, that are not virtuous? But this don't consist with what he implicitly asserts, that to the cause alone is to be ascribed what is in the effect. So that there is no way can possibly be devised, in consistence with Dr. Taylor's scheme, in which Adam ever could have any righteousness, or could ever either obtain any principle of virtue, or perform any one virtuous act.

These confused inconsistent assertions, concerning virtue and moral rectitude, arise from the absurd notions in vogue, concerning freedom of will, as if it consisted in the will's self-determining power, supposed to be necessary to moral agency, virtue and vice. The absurdities of which, with the grounds of these errors, and what the truth is respecting these matters, with the evidences of it, I have, according to my ability, fully and largely considered, in my Inquiry on that subject; to which I must refer the reader, that desires further satisfaction, and is willing to give himself the trouble of reading that discourse.

Having considered this great argument, and pretended demonstration of Dr. Taylor's against original righteousness; I proceed to the proofs of the doctrine. And in the first place, I would consider, whether there be not evidence of it in the three first chapters of Genesis: or whether the history there delivered, don't lead us to suppose, that our first parents were created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness.

I. This history leads us to suppose, Adam's sin, with relation to the forbidden fruit, was the first sin he committed. Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment of his existence; and consequently, created or brought into existence righteous. In a moral agent, subject to moral obligations, it is the same thing, to be perfectly innocent, as to be perfectly righteous. It must be the same, because there can no more be any medium between sin and righteousness, or between being right and being wrong, in a moral sense, than there can be a medium between straight and crooked, in a natural sense. Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent; and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right action: he was obliged as soon as he existed, to act right. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be inclined to act right. Dr. Taylor says (p. 442), "Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination"; and just for the same reason, he could not do right, without an inclination to right action. And as he was obliged to act right from the first moment of his existence, and did do so, till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have an inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created, or brought into existence, with an inclination to right action, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.

Here it will be in vain to say, 'tis true, that it was Adam's duty to have a good disposition or inclination as soon as it was possible to be obtained, in the nature of things: but as it could not be without time to establish such an habit, which requires antecedent thought, reflection, and repeated right action; therefore all that Adam could be obliged to in the first place, was to reflect and consider things in a right manner, and apply himself to right action, in order to obtain a right disposition. For this supposes, that even this reflection and consideration, which he was obliged to, was right action: Surely he was obliged to it no otherwise than as a thing that was right: and therefore he must have an inclination to this right action immediately, before he could perform those first right actions. And as the inclination to them should be right, the principle or disposition from which he performed even these actions must be good. Otherwise, the actions would not be right in the sight of him who looks at the heart; nor would they answer the man's obligations, or be a doing his duty, if he had done them for some sinister end, and not from a regard to God and his duty. Therefore there must be a regard to God and his duty implanted in him at his first existence. Otherwise, 'tis certain, he would have done nothing from a regard to God and his duty; no, not so much as to reflect and consider, and try to obtain such a disposition. The very supposition of a disposition to right action being first obtained by repeated right action, is grossly inconsistent with itself: for it supposes a course of right action, before there is a disposition to perform any right action.

These are no invented quibbles, or sophisms. If God expected of Adam any obedience or duty to him at all, when he first made him, whether it was in reflecting, considering, or any way exerting the faculties he had given him, then God expected he should immediately exercise love and regard to him. For how could it be expected, that Adam should have a strict and perfect regard to God's

commands and authority, and his duty to him, when he had no love nor regard to him in his heart, nor could it be expected he should have any? If Adam from the beginning did his duty to God, and had more respect to the will of his Creator, than to other things, and as much respect to him as he ought to have; then from the beginning he had a supreme and perfect respect and love to God: and if so, he was created with such a principle. There is no avoiding the consequence. Not only external duties, but internal duties, such as summarily consist in love, must be immediately required of Adam, as soon as he existed, if any duty at all was required. For 'tis most apparently absurd, to talk of a spiritual being, with the faculties of understanding and will, being required to per[form] external duties, without internal. Dr. Taylor himself observes, that love is the fulfilling of the law, and that "all moral rectitude, even every part of it, must be resolved into that single principle." Therefore, if any morally right act at all, reflection, consideration, or anything else, was required of Adam immediately, on his first existence, and was performed as required; then he must, the first moment of his existence, have his heart possessed of that principle of divine love; which implies the whole of moral rectitude in every part of it, according to our author's own doctrine; and so the whole of moral rectitude or righteousness must begin with his existence: which is the thing taught in the doctrine of original righteousness.

And let us consider how it could be otherwise, than that Adam was always, in every moment of his existence, obliged to exercise such regard or respect of heart towards every object or thing, as was agreeable to the apparent merit of that object. For instance, would it not at any time have been a becoming thing in Adam, on the exhibition to his mind of God's infinite goodness to him, for him to have exercised answerable gratitude; and the contrary have been unbecoming and odious? And if something had been presented to

Adam's view, transcendently amiable in itself, as for instance, the glorious perfection of the divine nature, would it not have become him to love, relish and delight in it? Would not such an object have merited this? And if the view of an object so amiable in itself did not affect his mind with complacence, would it not, according to the plain dictates of our understanding, have shown an unbecoming temper of mind? To say, that he had not had time, by culture, to form and establish a good disposition or relish, is not what would have taken off the disagreeableness and odiousness of the temper. And if there had been ever so much time, I don't see, how it could be expected he should improve it aright, in order to obtain a good disposition, if he had not already some good disposition to engage him to it.

That belonging to the will and disposition of the heart, which is in itself either odious or amiable, unbecoming or decent, always would have been Adam's virtue or sin, at any moment of his existence; if there be any such thing as virtue or vice; by which nothing can be meant, but that in our moral disposition and behavior, which is becoming or unbecoming, amiable or odious.

Human nature must be created with some dispositions; a disposition to relish some things as good and amiable, and to be averse to other things as odious and disagreeable. Otherwise, it must be without any such thing as inclination or will. It must be perfectly indifferent, without preference, without choice or aversion towards anything, as agreeable or disagreeable. But if it had any concreated dispositions at all, they must be either right or wrong, either agreeable or disagreeable to the nature of things. If man had at first the highest relish of those things that were most excellent and beautiful, a disposition to have the quickest and highest delight in those things that were most worthy of it, then his dispositions were morally right

and amiable, and never can be decent and excellent in a higher sense. But if he had a disposition to love most those things that were inferior and less worthy, then his dispositions were vicious. And 'tis evident there can be no medium between these.

II. This notion of Adam's being created without a principle of holiness in his heart, taken with the rest of Dr. Taylor's scheme, is inconsistent with what the history in the beginning of Genesis leads us to suppose of the great favors and smiles of heaven, which Adam enjoyed, while he remained in innocency. The Mosaic account suggests to us, that till Adam sinned, he was in happy circumstances, surrounded with testimonies and fruits of God's favor. This is implicitly owned by Dr. Taylor when he says (p. 252), "That in the dispensation our first parents were under, before the fall, they were placed in a condition proper to engage their gratitude, love and obedience."

But it will follow on our author's principles, that Adam while in innocency, was placed in far worse circumstances, than he was in after his disobedience, and infinitely worse than his posterity are in; under unspeakably greater disadvantages for the avoiding [of] sin, and the performance of duty. For by his doctrine Adam's posterity come into the world with their hearts as free from any propensity to sin as he, and he was made as destitute of any propensity to righteousness as they: and yet God, in favor to them, does great things to restrain them from sin, and excite them to virtue, which he never did for Adam in innocency, but laid him, in the highest degree, under contrary disadvantages. God, as an instance of his great favor and fatherly love to man, since the fall, has denied him the ease and pleasures of paradise, which gratified and allured his senses and bodily appetites; that he might diminish his temptations to sin: and as a still greater means to restrain from sin, and promote virtue, has

subjected him to labor, toil, and sorrow in the world: and not only so, but as a means to promote his spiritual and eternal good far beyond this, has doomed him to death: and when all this was found insufficient, he, in further prosecution of the designs of his love, shortened men's lives exceedingly, made them twelve or thirteen times shorter than in the first ages. And yet this, with all the innumerable calamities, which God in great favor to mankind has brought on the world, whereby their temptations are so vastly cut short, and the means and inducements to virtue heaped one upon another, to so great a degree, all have proved insufficient, now for so many thousand years together, to restrain from wickedness in any considerable degree; innocent human nature, all along, coming into the world with the same purity and harmless dispositions that our first parents had in paradise. What vast disadvantages indeed then must Adam and Eve be in, that had no more in their nature to keep them from sin, or incline 'em to virtue, than their posterity, and yet were without all these additional and extraordinary means! Not only without such exceeding great means as we now have, when our lives are made so very short, but having vastly less advantages than their antediluvian posterity, who to prevent their being wicked and to make 'em good, had so much labor and toil, sweat and sorrow, briars and thorns, with a body gradually decaying and returning to the dust; when our first parents had the extreme disadvantage of being placed in the midst of so many and exceeding great temptations; not only without toil or sorrow, pain or disease, to humble and mortify 'em, and a sentence of death to wean 'em from the world, but in the midst of the most exquisite and alluring sensitive delights, the reverse in every respect, and to the highest degree of that most gracious state of requisite means, and great advantages, which mankind now enjoy! If mankind now under these vast restraints, and great advantages, are not restrained from general, and as it were universal wickedness, how could it be expected that Adam and Eve,

created with no better hearts than men bring into the world now, and destitute of all these advantages, and in the midst of all contrary disadvantages, should escape it?

These things are not agreeable to Moses' account; which represents an happy state of peculiar favors and blessings before the fall, and the curse coming afterwards: but according to this scheme, the curse was before the fall, and the great favors and testimonies of love followed the apostacy. And the curse before the fall must be a curse with a witness, being to so high a degree the reverse of such means, means so necessary for such a creature as innocent man, and in all their multitude and fullness proving too little. Paradise therefore must be a mere delusion! There was indeed a great shew of favor, in placing man in the midst of such delights. But this delightful garden, it seems, with all its beauty and sweetness, was in its real tendency worse than the apples of Sodom. It was but a mere bait (God forbid the blasphemy) the more effectually enticing by its beauty and deliciousness, to Adam's eternal ruin: which might be the more expected to be fatal to him, seeing that he was the first man that ever existed, having no superiority of capacity to his posterity, and wholly without the advantage of the observations, experiences and improvements of preceding generations; which his posterity have.

I proceed now to take notice of an additional proof of the doctrine we are upon, from another part of the holy Scripture. A very clear text for original righteousness is that in Eccles. 7:29. "Lo, this only have I found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions."

It is an observation of no weight, which Dr. Taylor makes on this text, that the word "man" is commonly used to signify mankind in general, or mankind collectively taken. It is true, it often signifies the

species of mankind: but then it is used to signify the species with regard to its duration and succession from its beginning, as well as with regard to its extent. The English word "mankind" is used to signify the species: but what if it be so? Would it be an improper or unintelligible way of speaking, to say, that when God first made mankind, he placed them in a pleasant paradise (meaning in their first parents) but now they live in the midst of briars and thorns? And 'tis certain, that to speak of God's making mankind in such a meaning, viz. his giving the species an existence in their first parents, at the creation of the world, is agreeable to the Scripture use of such an expression. As in Deut. 4:32: "Since the day that God created man upon the earth." (Job 20:4), "Knowest thou not this of old, since man was placed upon the earth." (Is. 45:12), "I have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens." (Jer. 27:5), "I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power." All these texts speak of God's making man, by the word "man" signifying the species of mankind; and yet they all plainly have respect to God's making man at first, when God made the earth, and stretched out the heavens, and created the first parents of mankind. In all these places the same word "Adam" is used, as here in Ecclesiastes; and in the last of them, used with "he" emphaticum, as it is here; though Dr. Taylor omits it, when he tells us, he gives us a catalogue of all the places in Scripture, where the word is used. And it argues nothing to the doctor's purpose, that the pronoun "they" is used. "They have sought out many inventions." Which is properly applied to the species, which God made at first upright: God having begun the species with more than one, and it being continued in a multitude. As Christ speaks of the two sexes, in the relation of man and wife, as continued in successive generations. (Matt. 19:4), "He that made them at the beginning, made them male and female"; having reference to Adam and Eve.

No less impertinent, and also very unfair is his criticism on the word "jashar," translated "upright." Because the word sometimes signifies "right," he would from thence infer, that it don't properly signify a moral rectitude, even when used to express the character of moral agents. He might as well insist, that the English word "upright," sometimes, and in its most original meaning, signifying "right up," or in an erect posture, therefore it don't properly signify any moral character, when applied to moral agents: and indeed less unreasonably; for 'tis known, that in the Hebrew language, in a peculiar manner, most words used to signify moral and spiritual things, are taken from things external and natural. The word "jashar" is used, as applied to moral agents, or to the words and actions of such (if I have not mis-reckoned) about 110 times in Scripture; and about an 100 of them, without all dispute, to signify virtue, or moral rectitude (though Dr. Taylor is pleased to say, the word don't generally signify a moral character); and for the most part it signifies true virtue, or virtue in such a sense, as distinguishes it from all false appearances of virtue, or what is only virtue in some respects, but not truly so in the sight of God. It is used at least 80 times in this sense. And scarce any word can be found in the Hebrew language more significant of this. It is thus used constantly in Solomon's writings (where 'tis often found) when used to express a character or property of moral agents. And it is beyond all controversy, that he uses it in this place in the 7th of Eccles. to signify a moral rectitude, or character of real virtue and integrity. For the wise man, in this context, is speaking of men with respect to their moral character, inquiring into the corruption and depravity of mankind (as is confessed, p. 184) and he here declares, he had not found more than one among a thousand, of the right stamp, truly and thoroughly virtuous and upright: which appeared a strange thing! But in this text he clears God, and lays the blame to man. Man was not made thus at first. He was made of the right stamp, altogether good in his

kind (as all other things were), truly and thoroughly virtuous, as he ought to be; but "they have sought out many inventions." Which last expression signifies things sinful, or morally evil; as is confessed (p. 185). And this expression, used to signify those moral evils he found in man, which he sets in opposition to the uprightness man was made in, shews, that by "uprightness" he means the most true and sincere goodness. The word rendered "inventions" most naturally and aptly signifies the subtil devices, and crooked and deceitful ways of hypocrites, wherein they are of a character contrary to men of simplicity and godly sincerity; who, though wise in that which is good, are simple concerning evil. Thus the same wise man in Prov. 12:2 sets a truly good man in opposition to a man of wicked devices, whom God will condemn. Solomon had occasion to observe many who put on an artful disguise and fair shew of goodness; but on searching thoroughly, he found very few truly upright. As he says (Prov. 20:6), "Most men will proclaim every one his own goodness, but a faithful man who can find?" So that it is exceeding plain, that by "uprightness," in this place in Ecclesiastes, Solomon means true moral goodness.

What our author urges concerning many inventions being spoken of, whereas Adam's eating the forbidden fruit was but one invention, is of as little weight as the rest of what he says on this text. For the many lusts and corruptions of mankind, appearing in innumerable ways of sinning, are all the consequences of that sin. The great corruption men are fallen into by the original apostacy, appears in the multitude of wicked ways they are inclined to. And therefore these are properly mentioned as the fruits and evidences of the greatness of that apostacy and corruption.

SECTION 2. CONCERNING THE KIND OF DEATH, THREATENED TO OUR FIRST PARENTS, IF THEY SHOULD EAT OF THE

FORBIDDEN FRUIT

DR. TAYLOR in his observations on the three first chapters of Genesis, says (p. 7), "The threatening to man in case of transgression was, that he should surely die.… Death is the losing of life. Death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed. Now the death here threatened can, with any certainty, be opposed only to the life God gave Adam, when he created him (v. 7). Anything besides this must be pure conjecture, without solid foundation."

To this I would say, 'tis true, "death is opposed to life, and must be understood according to the nature of that life, to which it is opposed"; but does it therefore follow, that nothing can be meant by it but the loss of life? Misery is opposed to happiness, and sorrow is in Scripture often opposed to joy: but can we conclude from thence, that nothing is meant in Scripture by sorrow, but the loss of joy? Or that there is no more in misery, than the loss or absence of happiness? And if it be so, that the death threatened to Adam can, with certainty, be opposed only to the life given to Adam, when God created him; I think, a state of perfect, perpetual and hopeless misery is properly opposed to that state Adam was in, when God created him. For I suppose, it won't be denied, that the life Adam had, was truly a happy life; happy in perfect innocency, in the favor of his Maker, surrounded with the happy fruits and testimonies of his love: and I think it has been proved, that he also was happy in a state of perfect righteousness. And nothing is more manifest, than that it is agreeable to a very common acceptation of the word "life" in Scripture, that it be understood as signifying a state of excellent and happy existence. Now that which is most opposite to that life and state Adam was created in, is a state of total confirmed wickedness, and perfect hopeless misery, under the divine displeasure and curse;

not excluding temporal death or the destruction of the body, as an introduction to it.

And besides, that which is much more evident, than anything Dr. Taylor says on this head, is this, viz. that the death, which was to come on Adam as the punishment of his disobedience, was opposed to that life which he would have had as the reward of his obedience, in case he had not sinned. Obedience and disobedience are contraries; and the threatenings and promises, that are sanctions of a law, are set in direct opposition: and the promised rewards, and threatened punishments, are what are most properly taken as each other's opposites. But none will deny, that the life which would have been Adam's reward, if he had persisted in obedience, was eternal life. And therefore we argue justly, that the death which "stands opposed to that life" (Dr. Taylor himself being judge, p. 396) "is manifestly eternal death, a death widely different from the death we now die," to use his own words. If Adam, for his persevering obedience, was to have had everlasting life and happiness, in perfect holiness, union with his Maker, and enjoyment of his favor, and this was the life which was to be confirmed by the tree of life; then doubtless the death threatened in case of disobedience, which stands in direct opposition to this, was a being given over to everlasting wickedness and misery, in separation from God and in enduring his wrath.

And it may with the greatest reason be supposed, that when God first made mankind, and made known to them the methods of his moral government towards them, in the revelation he made of himself to the natural head of the whole species; and let him know, that obedience to him was expected as his duty, and enforced this duty with the sanction of a threatened punishment, called by the name of death; I say, we may with the greatest reason suppose in such a case,

that by death was meant that same death which God esteemed to be the most proper punishment of the sin of mankind, and which he speaks of under that name, throughout the Scripture, as the proper wages of the sin of man, and was always from the beginning understood to be so in the church of God. It would be strange indeed, if it should be otherwise. It would have been strange, if when the law of God was first given, and enforced by the threatening of a punishment, nothing at all had been mentioned of that great punishment, ever spoken of under the name of death (in the revelations which he has given to mankind from age to age) as the proper punishment of the sin of mankind. And it would be no less strange, if when the punishment which was mentioned and threatened on that occasion was called by the same name, even death, yet we must not understand it to mean the same thing, but something infinitely diverse, and infinitely more inconsiderable.

But now, let us consider what that death is, which the Scripture ever speaks of as the proper wages of the sin of mankind, and is spoken of as such by God's saints in all ages of the church, from the first beginning of a written revelation, to the conclusion of it. I'll begin with the New Testament. When the apostle Paul says (Rom. 6:23), "The wages of sin is death," Dr. Taylor tells us (p. 396) that "this means eternal death, the second death, a death widely different from the death we now die." The same Apostle speaks of death as the proper punishment due for sin (in Rom. 7:5 and 8:13; 2 Cor. 3:7; 1 Cor. 15:56). In all which places, Dr. Taylor himself supposes the Apostle to intend eternal death. And when the apostle James speaks of death, as the proper reward, fruit and end of sin (Jas. 1:15), "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death," 'tis manifest, that our author supposes eternal destruction to be meant. And the apostle John, agreeable to Dr. Taylor's sense, speaks of the second death, as that which sin unrepented of will bring all men to at last (Rev. 20:6,

14 and 21:8 and 2:11). In the same sense the apostle John uses the word in his first epistle (ch. 3:14), "We know, that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren: he that hateth his brother, abideth in death." In the same manner Christ used the word from time to time, when he was on earth, and spake concerning the punishment and issue of sin. (John 5:24), "He that heareth my word, and believeth … hath everlasting life; and shall not come into condemnation: but is passed from death unto life." Where, according to Dr. Taylor's own way of arguing, it can't be the death which we now die, that Christ speaks of, but eternal death, because it is set in opposition to everlasting life. (John 6:50), "This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die." (ch. 8:51), "Verily, verily, I say unto you, if a man keep my saying, he shall never see death." (ch. 11:26), "And whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." In which places 'tis plain, Christ don't mean that believers shall never see temporal death. (See also Matt. 10:29 and Luke 10:28). In like manner, the word was commonly used by the prophets of old, when they spake of death as the proper end and recompense of sin. So, abundantly by the prophet Ezekiel (Ezek. 3:18), "When I say unto the wicked man, thou shalt surely die." In the original, "dying thou shalt die."—The same form of expression, which God used in the threatening to Adam. We have the same words again (ch. 33:18). In ch. 18:4 it is said, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." To the like purpose are ch. 3:19, 20 and 18:4, 5, 10, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 28; ch. 33:8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 20. And that temporal death is not meant in these places, is plain, because it is promised most absolutely that the righteous shall not die the death spoken of. (Ch. 18:21), "He shall surely live, he shall not die." (So, vv. 9, 17, 19 and 22 and ch. 3:21.) And 'tis evident, the prophet Jeremiah uses the word in the same sense. (Jer. 31:30), "Every one shall die for his own iniquity." And the same death is spoken of by the prophet Isaiah. (Is. 11:4), "With the breath of his lips shall he slay the

wicked." (See also ch. 61:1–6 with v. 24.) Solomon, who we must suppose was thoroughly acquainted with the sense in which the word was used by the wise, and by the ancients, continually speaks of death as the proper fruit, issue and recompense of sin, using the word only in this sense. (ch. 11:19), "As righteousness tendeth to life, so he that pursueth evil, pursueth it to his own death." (So ch. 18:32; 10:21; 14:12; 19:16; 1:18, 32; 5:5, 6, 23; 7:22, 26, 27; 9:18; 11:19; 15:10; 18:21; 21:16 and 23:13, 14.) In these places he cannot mean temporal death; for he often speaks of it as a punishment of the wicked, wherein the righteous shall certainly be distinguished from 'em: as in Prov. 12:28, "In the way of righteousness is life, and in the pathway thereof is no death." (So in ch. 10:2, 11:4; 13:14; 14:27 and many other places.) But we find, this same wise man observes, that as to temporal death, and temporal events in general, there is no distinction, but that they happen alike to good and bad (Eccles. 2:14, 15, 16; 8:14 and 9:2, 3). His words are remarkable in Eccles. 7:15: "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness; and there is a wicked man that prolongeth his life in his wickedness." So we find David in the book of Psalms uses the word "death" in the same sense, when he speaks of it as the proper wages and issue of sin. (Ps. 34:21), "Evil shall slay the wicked." He speaks of it as a certain thing. (Ps. 139:19), "Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, O God." And he speaks of it as a thing wherein the wicked are distinguished from the righteous. (Ps. 69:28), "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, and not be written with the righteous." And thus we find the word "death" used in the Pentateuch, or books of Moses: in which part of the Scripture it is, that we have the account of the threatening of death to Adam. When death, in these books, is spoken of as the proper fruit and appointed reward of sin, it is to be understood of eternal death. (So, Deut. 30:15), "See, I have set before thee this day, life and good, and death and evil." (v. 19), "I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death,

blessing and cursing." The life that is spoken of here, is doubtless the same that is spoken of in Lev. 18:5, "Ye shall therefore keep my statutes and my judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." This the Apostle understands of eternal life; as is plain by Rom. 10:5 and Gal. 3:12—but that the death threatened for sin in the law of Moses meant eternal death, is what Dr. Taylor abundantly declares. (So in his Note on Rom. 5:20), "Such a constitution the law of Moses was, subjecting those who were under it to death for every transgression; meaning by death eternal death." These are his words. The like he asserts in many other places. When it is said, in the place now mentioned, "I have set before thee life and death, blessing and cursing," without doubt, the same blessing and cursing is meant which God had already set before them with such solemnity, in the 27th and 28th chapters [Deut.]; where we have the sum of the curses in those last words of the 27th chapter, "Cursed is everyone, which confirmeth not all the words of this law to do them." Which the Apostle speaks of as a threatening of eternal death; and with him Dr. Taylor himself. In this sense also Job and his friends, spake of death, as the wages and end of sin, who lived before any written revelation, and had their religion and their phraseology about the things of religion from the ancients.

If any should insist upon it as an objection against supposing that death was intended to signify eternal death in the threatening to Adam, that this use of the word is figurative: though this should be allowed, yet it is by no means so figurative as many other phrases used in the history contained in these three chapters: as when it is said, "God said, 'Let there be light'; God said, 'Let there be a firmament,' " etc. as though God spake such words with a voice. So when it is said, "God called the light, day: God called the firmament, heaven, etc., God rested on the seventh day": as though he had been weary, and then rested. And when it is said, "they heard the voice of

God walking"; as though the deity had two feet, and took steps on the ground. Dr. Taylor supposes, that when it is said of Adam and Eve, "Their eyes were opened, and they saw that they were naked"; by the word "naked" is meant a state of guilt (p. 12). Which sense of the word "naked" is much further from the common use of the word, than the supposed sense of the word "death." So this author supposes the promise concerning the seed of the woman's bruising the serpent's head, while the serpent should bruise his heel, is to be understood as the "Messiah's destroying the power and sovereignty of the devil, and receiving some slight hurt from him" (pp. 15, 16). Which makes the sentence full of figures, vastly more beside the common use of words. And why might not God deliver threatenings to our first parents in figurative expressions, as well as promises? Many other strong figures are used in these chapters.

But indeed, there is no necessity of supposing the word "death," or the Hebrew word so translated, if used in the manner that has been supposed, to have been figurative at all. It does not appear but that this word, in its true and proper meaning, might signify perfect misery, and sensible destruction; though the word was also applied to signify something more external and visible. There are many words in our language, such as "heart," "sense," "view," "discovery," "conception," "light," and many others, which are applied to signify external things, as that muscular part of the body called "heart"; external feeling called "sense"; the sight of the bodily eye called "view"; the finding of a thing by its being uncovered, called "discovery"; the first beginning of the foetus in the womb, called "conception"; and the rays of the sun, called "light"; yet these words do as truly and properly signify other things of a more spiritual internal nature, as those: such as the disposition, affection, perception and thought of the mind, and manifestation and evidence to the soul. Common use, which governs the propriety of language,

makes the latter things to be as much signified by those words, in their proper meaning, as the former. 'Tis especially common in the Hebrew, and I suppose, other Oriental languages, that the same word that signifies something external, does no less properly and usually signify something more spiritual. So the Hebrew words used for "breath," have such a double signification; "Neshama" signifies both "breath" and the "soul"; and the latter as commonly as the former: "ruach" is used for "breath" or "wind," but yet more commonly signifies "spirit." "Nephesh" is used for "breath," but yet more commonly signifies "soul." So the word "lébh," "heart" no less properly signifies the "soul," especially with regard to the will and affections, than that part of the body so called. The word "shalom," which we render "peace," no less properly signifies prosperity and happiness, than mutual agreement. The word translated "life" signifies the natural life of the body, and also the perfect and happy state of sensible active being; and the latter as properly as the former. So the word "death" signifies "destruction," as to outward sensibility, activity and enjoyment: but it has most evidently another signification, which, in the Hebrew tongue, is no less proper, viz. "perfect, sensible, hopeless ruin and misery."

'Tis therefore wholly without reason urged that death properly signifies only the loss of this present life: and that therefore nothing else was meant by that death which was threatened for eating the forbidden fruit. Nor does it at all appear but that Adam, who from what God said concerning the seed of the woman, that was so very figurative, could understand, that relief was promised, as to the death which was threatened (as Dr. Taylor himself supposes, p. 18), understood the death that was threatened, in the more important sense; especially seeing temporal death, as it is originally, and in itself, and is evermore, excepting as changed by divine grace, an introduction or entrance into that gloomy dismal state of misery,

which is shadowed forth by the dark and awful circumstances of this death, naturally suggesting to the mind the most dreadful state of hopeless, sensible ruin.

As to that objection which some have made, that the phrase, "dying thou shalt die," is several times used in the books of Moses to signify temporal death, it can be of no force. For it has been shewn already, that the same phrase is sometimes used in Scripture to signify eternal death, in instances much more parallel with this. But indeed nothing can be certainly argued concerning the nature of the thing intended, from its being expressed in such a manner. For 'tis evident, that such repetitions of a word in the Hebrew language, are no more than an emphasis upon a word in the more modern languages, to signify the great degree of a thing, the importance of it, or the certainty of it, etc. When we would signify and impress these, we commonly put an emphasis on our words: instead of this, the Hebrews, when they would express a thing strongly, repeated or doubled the word, the more to impress the mind of the hearer; as may be plain to everyone in the least conversant with the Hebrew Bible. The repetition in the threatening to Adam, therefore only implies the solemnity, and importance of the threatening. But God may denounce either eternal or temporal death with peremptoriness and solemnity, and nothing can certainly be inferred concerning the nature of the thing threatened, because 'tis threatened with emphasis, more than this, that the threatening is much to be regarded. Though it be true, that it might in an especial manner be expected that a threatening of eternal death, would be denounced with great emphasis, such a threatening being infinitely important, and to be regarded above all others.

SECTION 3. WHEREIN IT IS INQUIRED, WHETHER THERE BE ANYTHING IN THE HISTORY OF THE THREE FIRST CHAPTERS

OF GENESIS, WHICH SHOULD LEAD US TO SUPPOSE, THAT GOD, IN HIS CONSTITUTION WITH ADAM, DEALT WITH MANKIND IN GENERAL, AS INCLUDED IN THEIR FIRST FATHER, AND THAT THE THREATENING OF DEATH, IN CASE HE SHOULD EAT THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT, HAD RESPECT NOT ONLY TO HIM, BUT HIS POSTERITY?

DR. TAYLOR, rehearsing that threatening to Adam, "Thou shalt surely die," and giving us his paraphrase of it (pp. 7, 8), concludes thus; "Observe, here is not one word relating to Adam's posterity." But it may be observed in opposition to this, that there is scarcely one word that we have an account of, which God ever said to Adam or Eve, but what does manifestly include their posterity in the meaning and design of it. There is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in that threatening, as there is in those words of God to Adam and Eve (Gen. 1:28), "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it"; and as much in events, to lead us to suppose Adam's posterity to be included. There is as much of a word of his posterity in that threatening, as in those words (v. 29): "Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed … and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed," etc. Even when God was about to create Adam, what he said on that occasion, had not respect only to Adam, but to his posterity. Gen. 1:26, "Let us make man in our image, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," etc. And, what is more remarkable, there is as much of a word said about Adam's posterity in the threatening of death, as there is in that sentence (Gen. 3:19), "Unto dust shalt thou return." Which Dr. Taylor himself supposes to be a sentence pronounced for the execution of that very threatening, "Thou shalt surely die": and which sentence he himself also often speaks of as including Adam's posterity. And, what is much more remarkable still, is a sentence which Dr. Taylor himself often speaks of, as including his posterity,

as a sentence of condemnation, as a judicial sentence, and a sentence which God pronounced with regard to Adam's posterity, acting the part of a judge, and as such condemning them to temporal death. Though he is therein utterly inconsistent with himself, inasmuch as he at the same time abundantly insists, that death is not brought on Adam's posterity, in consequence of his sin, at all as a punishment; but merely by the gracious disposal of a father, bestowing a benefit of the highest nature upon them.

But I shall shew that I don't in any of these things falsely charge, or misrepresent Dr. Taylor. He speaks of the sentence in ch. 3:19 as pronounced in pursuance of the threatening in the former chapter, in these words (pp. 17, 18): "The sentence upon the man, v. 17, 18, 19, first affects the earth, upon which he was to subsist: the ground should be incumbered with many noxious weeds, and the tillage of it more toilsome: which would oblige man to procure a sustenance by hard labour, till he should die, and drop into the ground, from whence he was taken. Thus death entered by sin into the world, and man became mortal, according to the threatning in the former chapter." Now, if mankind becomes mortal, and must die, according to the threatening in the former chapter, then doubtless the threatening in the former chapter, "Thou shalt die," had respect not only to Adam, but to mankind, and included Adam's posterity. Yea, and Dr. Taylor is express in it, and very often so, that the sentence concerning dropping into the ground, or returning to the dust, did include Adam's posterity. So, pp. 19, 20, speaking there of that sentence, "Observe," says he, "that we their posterity are in fact subjected to the same affliction and mortality, here by sentence inflicted upon our first parents." P. 42, "But yet men, through that long tract, were all subject to death, therefore they must be included in the sentence." The same he affirms in innumerable other places, some of which I shall have occasion to mention presently.

The sentence which is founded on the threatening, and (as Dr. Taylor says) "according to the threatening," extends to as many as were included in the threatening, and to no more. If the sentence be upon a collective subject, infinitely, as it were, the greatest part of which were not included in the threatening, nor were ever threatened at all by any threatening whatsoever, then certainly this sentence is not according to the threatening, nor built upon it. If the sentence be according to the threatening, then we may justly explain the threatening by the sentence: and if we find the sentence spoken to the same person, to whom the threatening was spoken, and spoken in the second person singular, in like manner with the threatening, and founded on the threatening, and according to the threatening; and if we find the sentence includes Adam's posterity; then we may certainly infer, that so did the threatening: and hence, that both the threatening and sentence were delivered to Adam as the public head and representative of his posterity.

And we may also further infer from it, in another respect directly contrary to Dr. Taylor's doctrine, that the sentence which included Adam's posterity, was to death as a punishment to that posterity, as well as to Adam himself. For a sentence pronounced in execution of a threatening, is to a punishment. Threatenings are of punishments. Neither God nor man are wont to threaten others with favors and benefits.

But lest any of this author's admirers should stand to it, that it may very properly be said, God threatened mankind with bestowing great kindness upon them, I would observe, that Dr. Taylor often speaks of this sentence as pronounced by God on all mankind as condemning them, speaks of it as a sentence of condemnation judicially pronounced, or a sentence which God pronounced on all mankind acting as their judge, and in a judicial proceeding: which he affirms

in multitudes of places. In p. 20 speaking of this sentence, which he there says, subjects us, Adam's and Eve's posterity, to affliction and mortality, he calls it a judicial act of condemnation. "The judicial act of condemnation," says he, "clearly implies, a taking him to pieces, and turning him to the ground, from whence he was taken." And pp. 28, 29, "In all the Scripture, from one end to the other, there is recorded but one judgment to condemnation, which came upon all men, and that is, Gen. 3:17, 18, 19. 'Dust thou art.' " P. 40, speaking of the same, he says, "All men are brought under condemnation." In pp. 27, 28, "By judgment, judgment of condemnation, it appeareth evidently to me, he (Paul) means the being adjudged to the forementioned death; he means the sentence of death, of a general mortality, pronounced upon mankind, in consequence of Adam's first transgression. And the condemnation inflicted by the judgment of God, answereth to, and is in effect the same thing with, being dead." P. 30, "The many, that is mankind, were subject to death by the judicial act of God." (p. 31), "Being made sinners, may very well signify, being adjudged, or condemned to death … for the Hebrew word, etc. signifies to make one a sinner by a judicial sentence, or to condemn." Paraphrase on Rom. 5:19 in his Exp. of the epistle, "Upon the account of one man's disobedience, mankind were judicially constituted sinners; that is, subjected to death, by the sentence of God the judge." And there are many other places where he repeats the same thing. And 'tis pretty remarkable, that in pp. 48, 49, immediately after citing Prov. 17:15, "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, are both an abomination to the Lord"; and when he is careful in citing these words, to put us in mind, that it is meant of a judicial act; yet in the very next words, he supposes that God himself does so, since he constantly supposes that Adam's posterity whom God condemns, are innocent. His words are these, "From all which it followeth, that the judgment, that passed upon all men to condemnation, is death's coming upon all men, by

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