Scripture most clearly teaches of the nature of 'em, 'tis certain, that
conversion, circumcision of his heart, spiritual baptism, dying to sin and rising to a new and holy life; and unless he has the old heart taken away, and a new heart and spirit given, and puts off the old man, and puts on the new man, and old things are passed away and all things made new.
3. From what is plainly implied in these things, and from what the Scripture most clearly teaches of the nature of 'em, 'tis certain, that every man is born into the world in a state of moral pollution. For spiritual baptism is a cleansing from moral filthiness. (Ezek. 36:25 compared with Acts 2:16 and John 3:25.) So the washing of regeneration or the new birth, is a change from a state of wickedness (Titus 3:3, 4, 5). Men are spoken of as purified in their regeneration (1 Pet. 1:22, 23; see also 1 John 2:29 and 3:1, 5). And it appears, that every man in his first or natural state is a sinner; for otherwise they would then need no repentance, no conversion, no turning from sin, to God. And it appears, that every man in his original state has a heart of stone; for thus the Scripture calls that old heart, which is taken away, when a new heart and new spirit is given (Ezek. 11:19 and 36:26). And it appears, that man's nature, as in his native state, is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and of its own motion exerts itself in nothing but wicked deeds. For thus the Scripture characterizes the old man, which is put off, when men are renewed in the spirit of their minds, and put on the new man (Eph. 4:22, 23, 24; Col. 3:8, 9, 10). In a word, it appears, that man's nature, as in his native state, is a body of sin, which must be destroyed, must die, be buried, and never rise more. For thus the old man is represented, which is crucified, when men are the subjects of a spiritual resurrection (Rom. 6:4, 5, 6). Such a nature, such a body of sin as this, is put off in the spiritual renovation, wherein we put on the new man, and are the subjects of the spiritual circumcision (Eph. 4:21, 22, 23).
It must now be left with the reader to judge for himself, whether what the Scripture teaches of the application of Christ's redemption, and the change of state and nature necessary to true and final happiness, don't afford clear and abundant evidence to the truth of the doctrine of original sin.
PART FOUR
Containing Answers to Objections
CHAPTER I
CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION, THAT
TO SUPPOSE MEN'S BEING BORN IN SIN, WITHOUT THEIR CHOICE, OR ANY
PREVIOUS ACT OF THEIR OWN, IS TO
SUPPOSE WHAT IS INCONSISTENT
WITH THE NATURE OF SIN
SOME of the objections, made against the doctrine of original sin, which have reference to particular arguments used in defense of it, have been already considered in the handling of those arguments. What I shall therefore now consider, are such objections as I have not yet had occasion to take any special notice of.
There is no argument Dr. Taylor insists more upon, than that which is taken from the Arminian and Pelagian notion of freedom of will, consisting in the will's self-determination, as necessary to the being of moral good or evil. He often urges, that if we come into the world
infected with sinful and depraved dispositions, then sin must be natural to us; and if natural, then necessary; and if necessary, then no sin, nor anything we are blameable for, or that can in any respect be our fault, being what we can't help: and he urges, that sin must proceed from our own choice, etc.
Here I would observe in general, that the forementioned notion of freedom of will, as essential to moral agency, and necessary to the very existence of virtue and sin, seems to be a grand favorite point with Pelagians and Arminians, and all divines of such characters, in their controversies with the orthodox. There is no one thing more fundamental in their schemes of religion: on the determination of this one leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with such divines. Nevertheless, it seems a needless task for me particularly to consider that matter in this place; having already largely discussed it, with all the main grounds of this notion, and the arguments used to defend it, in a late book on this subject, to which I ask leave to refer the reader. 'Tis very necessary, that the modern prevailing doctrine concerning this point, should be well understood, and therefore thoroughly considered and examined: for without it there is no hope of putting an end to the controversy about original sin, and innumerable other controversies that subsist, about many of the main points of religion. I stand ready to confess to the forementioned modern divines, if they can maintain their peculiar notion of freedom, consisting in the self-determining power of the will, as necessary to moral agency, and can thoroughly establish it in opposition to the arguments lying against it, then they have an impregnable castle, to which they may repair, and remain invincible, in all the controversies they have with the reformed divines, concerning original sin, the sovereignty of grace, election, redemption, conversion, the efficacious operation of the Holy Spirit, the nature of saving faith, perseverance of the saints, and other
principles of the like kind. However, at the same time I think, this same thing will be as strong a fortress for the Deists, in common with them; as the great doctrines, subverted by their notion of freedom, are so plainly and abundantly taught in the Scripture. But I am under no apprehensions of any danger, the cause of Christianity or the religion of the reformed is in, from any possibility of that notion's being ever established, or of its being ever evinced, that there is not proper, perfect, and manifold demonstration lying against it. But as I said, it would be needless for me to enter into a particular disquisition of this point here; from which I shall easily be excused by any reader who is willing to give himself the trouble of consulting what I have already written: and as to others, probably they will scarce be at the pains of reading the present discourse; or at least would not, if it should be enlarged by a full consideration of that controversy.
I shall at this time therefore only take notice of some gross inconsistencies, that Dr. Taylor has been guilty of, in his handling this objection against the doctrine of original sin.
In places which have been cited, he says, that sin must proceed from our own choice: and that if it does not, it being necessary to us, it cannot be sin, it can't be our fault, or what we are to blame for: and therefore all our sin must be chargeable on our choice, which is the cause of sin: for he says, "The cause of every effect is alone chargeable with the effect it produceth, and which proceedeth from it." Now here are implied several gross contradictions. He greatly insists, that nothing can be sinful, or have the nature of sin, but what proceeds from our choice. Nevertheless, he says, not the effect, but the cause alone is chargeable with blame. Therefore the choice, which is the cause, this alone is blameable, or has the nature of sin; and not the effect of that choice. Thus nothing can be sinful, but the
effect of choice: and yet the effect of choice never can be sinful, but only the cause, which alone is chargeable with all the blame.
Again, the choice, which chooses and produces sin, or from which sin proceeds is itself sinful. Not only is this implied in his saying, "The cause alone is chargeable with all the blame"; but he expressly speaks of the choice as faulty; and calls that choice wicked, from which depravity and corruption proceeds. Now, if the choice itself be sin, and there be no sin but what proceeds from a sinful choice, then the sinful choice must proceed from another antecedent choice; it must be chosen by a foregoing act of will, determining itself to that sinful choice, that so it may have that which he speaks of as absolutely essential to the nature of sin, namely, that it proceed from our choice, and don't happen to us necessarily. But if the sinful choice itself proceeds from a foregoing choice, then also that foregoing choice must be sinful; it being the cause of sin, and so alone chargeable with the blame. Yet if that foregoing choice be sinful, then, neither must that happen to us necessarily, but must likewise proceed from choice, another act of choice preceding that: for we must remember, that "nothing is sinful, but what proceeds from our choice." And then, for the same reason, even this prior choice, last mentioned, must also be sinful, being chargeable with all the blame of that consequent evil choice, which was its effect. And so we must go back till we come to the very first volition, the prime or original act of choice, in the whole chain. And this, to be sure, must be a sinful choice, because this is the origin or primitive cause of all the train of evils which follow: and according to our author, must therefore be "alone chargeable with all the blame." And yet so it is, according to him, this "cannot be sinful," because it don't "proceed from our own choice," or any foregoing act of our will; it being by the supposition, the very first act of will in the case. And therefore it
must be necessary, as to us, having no choice of ours to be the cause of it.
In page 232, he says, "Adam's sin was from his own disobedient will; and so must every man's sin, and all the sin in the world, as well as his." By this, it seems, he must have a "disobedient will" before he sins; for the cause must be before the effect: and yet that disobedient will itself is sinful; otherwise it could not be called disobedient. But the question is, how do men come by the disobedient will, this cause of all the sin in the world? It must not come necessarily, without men's choice: for if so, 'tis not sin, nor is there any disobedience in it. Therefore that disobedient will must also come from a disobedient will; and so on, in infinitum. Otherwise, it must be supposed, that there is some sin in the world, which don't come from a disobedient will; contrary to our author's dogmatical assertions.
In page 442, he says, "Adam could not sin without a sinful inclination." Here he calls that inclination itself sinful, which is the principle from whence sinful acts proceed; as elsewhere he speaks of the disobedient will, from whence all sin comes: and he allows, that "the law reaches to all the latent principles of sin"; meaning plainly, that it forbids, and threatens punishment for those latent principles. Now these latent principles of sin, these sinful inclinations, without which, according to our author, there can be no sinful act, can't all proceed from a sinful choice; because that would imply great contradiction. For, by the supposition, they are the principles from whence a sinful choice comes, and whence all sinful acts of will proceed; and there can be no sinful act without 'em. So that the first latent principles, and inclinations, from whence all sinful acts proceed, are sinful; and yet they are not sinful, because they don't proceed from a wicked choice, without which, according to him, "Nothing can be sinful."
Dr. Taylor, speaking of that proposition of the Assembly of Divines, wherein they assert, that "man is by nature utterly corrupt, etc." thinks himself well warranted by the supposed great evidence of these his contradictory notions, to say, "Therefore sin is not natural to us; and therefore I shall not scruple to say, this proposition in the Assembly of Divines is false." But it may be worthy to be considered whether it would not have greatly become him, before he had clothed himself with so much assurance, and proceeded, on the foundation of these his notions, so magisterially to charge the Assembly's proposition with falsehood, to have taken care, that his own propositions, which he has set in opposition to them should be a little more consistent; that he might not have contradicted himself, while contradicting them; lest some impartial judges, observing his inconsistency, should think they had warrant to declare with equal assurance, that "they shall not scruple to say, Dr. Taylor's doctrine is false!"
CHAPTER II
CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE DOCTRINE OF NATIVE CORRUPTION, THAT TO SUPPOSE MEN
RECEIVE THEIR FIRST EXISTENCE IN
SIN, IS TO MAKE HIM WHO IS THE
AUTHOR OF THEIR BEING, THE AUTHOR OF THEIR DEPRAVITY
ONE argument against men's being supposed to be born with sinful depravity, which Dr. Taylor greatly insists upon, is, "That this does in
effect charge him who is the Author of our nature, who formed us in the womb, with being the author of a sinful corruption of nature; and that it is highly injurious to the God of our nature, whose hands have formed and fashioned us, to believe our nature to be originally corrupted, and that in the worst sense of corruption."
With respect to this, I would observe in the first place, that this writer, in his handling this grand objection, supposes something to belong to the doctrine objected against, as maintained by the divines whom he is opposing, which does not belong to it, nor does follow from it: as particularly, he supposes the doctrine of original sin to imply, that nature must be corrupted by some positive influence; "something, by some means or other, infused into the human nature; some quality or other, not from the choice of our minds, but like a taint, tincture, or infection, altering the natural constitution, faculties and dispositions of our souls. That sin and evil dispositions are implanted in the foetus in the womb."3 Whereas truly our doctrine neither implies nor infers any such thing. In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such as is anything properly positive. I think, a little attention to the nature of things will be sufficient to satisfy any impartial considerate inquirer, that the absence of positive good principles, and so the withholding of a special divine influence to impart and maintain those good principles, leaving the common natural principles of self-love, natural appetite, etc. (which were in man in innocence) leaving these, I say, to themselves, without the government of superior divine principles, will certainly be followed with corruption, yea, the total corruption of the heart,
without occasion for any positive influence at all: and that it was thus indeed that corruption of nature came on Adam, immediately on his fall, and comes on all his posterity, as sinning in him and falling with him.
The case with man was plainly this: when God made man at first, he implanted in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, which may be called natural, being the principles of mere human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appetites and passions, which belong to the nature of man, in which his love to his own liberty, honor and pleasure, were exercised: these when alone, and left to themselves, are what the Scriptures sometimes call flesh. Besides these, there were superior principles, that were spiritual, holy and divine, summarily comprehended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which are called in Scripture the divine nature. These principles may, in some sense, be called supernatural, being (however concreated or connate, yet) such as are above those principles that are essentially implied in, or necessarily resulting from, and inseparably connected with, mere human nature; and being such as immediately depend on man's union and communion with God, or divine communications and influences of God's Spirit: which though withdrawn, and man's nature forsaken of these principles, human nature would be human nature still; man's nature as such, being entire without these divine principles, which the Scripture sometimes calls spirit, in contradistinction to flesh. These superior principles were given to possess the throne, and maintain an absolute dominion in the heart: the other, to be wholly subordinate and subservient. And while things continued thus, all things were in excellent order, peace and beautiful harmony, and in their proper and perfect state. These divine principles thus reigning, were the dignity, life, happiness, and glory of man's nature. When
man sinned, and broke God's Covenant, and fell under his curse, these superior principles left his heart: for indeed God then left him; that communion with God, on which these principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that divine inhabitant, forsook the house. Because it would have been utterly improper in itself, and inconsistent with the covenant and constitution God had established, that God should still maintain communion with man, and continue, by his friendly, gracious vital influences, to dwell with him and in him, after he was become a rebel, and had incurred God's wrath and curse. Therefore immediately the superior divine principles wholly ceased; so light ceases in a room, when the candle is withdrawn: and thus man was left in a state of darkness, woeful corruption and ruin; nothing but flesh, without spirit. The inferior principles of self-love and natural appetite, which were given only to serve, being alone, and left to themselves, of course became reigning principles; having no superior principles to regulate or control them, they became absolute masters of the heart. The immediate consequence of which was a fatal catastrophe, a turning of all things upside down, and the succession of a state of the most odious and dreadful confusion. Man did immediately set up himself, and the objects of his private affections and appetites, as supreme; and so they took the place of God. These inferior principles are like fire in an house; which, we say, is a good servant, but a bad master; very useful while kept in its place, but if left to take possession of the whole house, soon brings all to destruction. Man's love to his own honor, separate interest, and private pleasure, which before was wholly subordinate unto love to God and regard to his authority and glory, now dispose and impel man to pursue those objects, without regard to God's honor, or law; because there is no true regard to these divine things left in him. In consequence of which, he seeks those objects as much when against God's honor and law, as when agreeable to 'em. And God still continuing strictly to require supreme regard to himself, and
forbidding all gratifications of these inferior passions, but only in perfect subordination to the ends, and agreeableness to the rules and limits, which his holiness, honor and law prescribe, hence immediately arises enmity in the heart, now wholly under the power of self-love; and nothing but war ensues, in a constant course, against God. As, when a subject has once renounced his lawful sovereign, and set up a pretender in his stead, a state of enmity and war against his rightful king necessarily ensues. It were easy to shew, how every lust and depraved disposition of man's heart would naturally arise from this privative original, if here were room for it. Thus 'tis easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, without God's putting any evil into his heart, or implanting any bad principle, or infusing any corrupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity. Only God's withdrawing, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel-man, being as it were driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's natural principles being left to themselves, this is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God.
And as Adam's nature became corrupt, without God's implanting or infusing any evil thing into his nature; so does the nature of his posterity. God dealing with Adam as the head of his posterity (as has been shewn) and treating them as one, he deals with his posterity as having all sinned in him. And therefore, as God withdrew spiritual communion and his vital gracious influence from the common head, so he withholds the same from all the members, as they come into existence; whereby they come into the world mere flesh, and entirely under the government of natural and inferior principles; and so become wholly corrupt, as Adam did.
Now, for God so far to have the disposal of this affair, as to withhold those influences, without which nature will be corrupt, is not to be the author of sin. But, concerning this, I must refer the reader to what I have said of it in my discourse on the Freedom of the Will. Though, besides what I have there said, I may here observe; that if for God so far to order and dispose the being of sin, as to permit it, by withholding the gracious influences necessary to prevent it, is for him to be the author of sin, then some things which Dr. Taylor himself lays down, will equally be attended with this very consequence. For, from time to time, he speaks of God's giving men up to the vilest lusts and affections, by permitting, or leaving them. Now, if the continuance of sin, and its increase and prevalence, may be in consequence of God's disposal, by withholding his grace, that is needful, under such circumstances, to prevent it, without God's being the author of that continuance and prevalence of sin; then, by parity of reason, may the being of sin, in the race of Adam, be in consequence of God's disposal, by withholding his grace, needful to prevent it, without his being the author of that being of sin.
If here it should be said, that God is not the author of sin, in giving men up to sin, who have already made themselves sinful, because when men have once made themselves sinful, their continuing so, and sin's prevailing in them, and becoming more and more habitual, will follow in a course of nature—I answer, let that be remembered, which this writer so greatly urges, in opposition to them that suppose original corruption comes in a course of nature, viz. that the course of nature is nothing without God. He utterly rejects the notion of the "course of nature's being a proper active cause, which will work and go on by itself, without God, if he lets or permits it." But affirms, "That the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing; […] and that the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than at first produce
itself, is absolutely impossible." These strong expressions are his. Therefore, to explain the continuance of the habits of sin in the same person, when once introduced, yea, to explain the very being of any such habits, in consequence of repeated acts, our author must have recourse to those same principles, which he rejects as absurd to the utmost degree, when alleged to explain the corruption of nature in the posterity of Adam. For, that habits, either good or bad, should continue after being once established, or that habits should be settled and have existence, in consequence of repeated acts, can be owing only to a course of nature, and those laws of nature which God has established.
That the posterity of Adam should be born without holiness, and so with a depraved nature, comes to pass as much by the established course of nature, as the continuance of a corrupt disposition in a particular person, after he once has it; or as much as Adam's continuing unholy and corrupt, after he had once lost his holiness. For Adam's posterity are from him, and as it were in him, and belonging to him, according to an established course of nature, as much as the branches of a tree are, according to a course of nature, from the tree, in the tree, and belonging to the tree; or (to make use of the comparison which Dr. Taylor himself chooses and makes use of from time to time, as proper to illustrate the matter) "just as the acorn is derived from the oak." And I think, the acorn is as much derived from the oak, according to the course of nature, as the buds and branches. 'Tis true, that God, by his own almighty power, creates the soul of the infant; and 'tis also true, as Dr. Taylor often insists, that God, by his immediate power, forms and fashions the body of the infant in the womb; yet he does both according to that course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish. The course of nature is demonstrated, by late improvements in philosophy, to be indeed what our author himself says it is, viz. nothing but the established
order of the agency and operation of the Author of nature. And though there be the immediate agency of God in bringing the soul into existence in generation, yet 'tis done according to the method and order established by the Author of nature, as much as his producing the bud, or the acorn of the oak; and as much as his continuing a particular person in being, after he once has existence. God's immediate agency in bringing the soul of a child into being, is as much according to an established order, as his immediate agency in any of the works of nature whatsoever. 'Tis agreeable to the established order of nature, that the good qualities wanting in the tree, should also be wanting in the branches and fruit. 'Tis agreeable to the order of nature, that when a particular person is without good moral qualities in his heart, he should continue without 'em, till some new cause or efficiency produces them: and 'tis as much agreeable to an established course and order of nature, that since Adam, the head of the race of mankind, the root of that great tree with many branches springing from it, was deprived of original righteousness, the branches should come forth without it. Or, if any dislike the word "nature" as used in this last case, and instead of it choose to call it a "constitution," or established order of successive events, the alteration of the name won't in the least alter the state of the present argument. Where the name "nature" is allowed without dispute, no more is meant than an established method and order of events, settled and limited by divine wisdom.
If any should object to this, that if the want of original righteousness be thus according to an established course of nature, then why are not principles of holiness, when restored by divine grace, also communicated to posterity? I answer, the divine laws and establishments of the Author of nature are precisely settled by him, as he pleaseth, and limited by his wisdom. Grace is introduced among the race of mankind by a new establishment; not on the foot
of the original establishment of God, as the Head of the natural world, and Author of the first creation; but by a constitution of a vastly higher kind; wherein Christ is made the root of the tree, whose branches are his spiritual seed and he is the head of the new creation; of which I need not stand now to speak particularly.
But here I desire it may be noted, that I don't suppose, the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; 'tis also owing to the just judgment of God. But yet I think, it is as truly, and in the same manner, owing to the course of nature, that Adam's posterity come into the world without original righteousness, as that Adam continued without it, after he had once lost it. That Adam continued destitute of holiness, when he had lost it, and would always have so continued, had it not been restored by a Redeemer, was not only a natural consequence, according to the course of things established by God, as the Author of nature; but it was also a penal consequence, or a punishment of his sin. God, in righteous judgment, continued to absent himself from Adam, after he became a rebel; and withheld from him now those influences of the Holy Spirit, which he before had. And just thus, I suppose it to be with every natural branch of mankind: all are looked upon as sinning in and with their common root; and God righteously withholds special influences and spiritual communications from all, for this sin. But of the manner and order of these things, more may be said in the next chapter.
On the whole, this grand objection against the doctrine of men's being born corrupt, that it makes him who gave us our being, to be the cause of the being of corruption, can have no more force in it, than a like argument has to prove, that if men by a course of nature continue wicked, or remain without goodness, after they have by vicious acts contracted vicious habits, and so made themselves
wicked, it makes him who is the cause of their continuance in being, and the cause of the continuance of the course of nature, to be the cause of their continued wickedness. Dr. Taylor says, "God would not make anything that is hateful to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to make such a thing." But if this be good arguing in the case to which it is applied, may I not as well say, "God would not continue a thing in being that is hateful to him; because, by the very terms, he would hate to continue such a thing in being"? I think, the very terms do as much (and no more) infer one of these propositions, as the other. In like manner, the rest that he says on that head, may be shewn to be unreasonable, by only substituting the word "continue" in the place of "make and propagate." I may fairly imitate his way of reasoning, thus: "To say, God continues us according to his own original decree, or law of continuation, which obliges him to continue us in a manner he abhors, is really to make bad worse: for it is supposing him to be defective in wisdom, or by his own decree or law to lay such a constraint upon his own actions, that he cannot do what he would; but is continually doing what he would not, what he hates to do, and what he condemns in us; viz. continuing us sinful, when he condemns us for continuing ourselves sinful." If the reasoning be weak in the one case, it's no less so in the other.
If any shall still insist, that there is a difference, between God's so disposing things as that depravity of heart shall be continued, according to the settled course of nature, in the same person, who has by his own fault intoduced it, and his so disposing as that men, according to a course of nature, should be born with depravity, in consequence of Adam's introducing sin, by his act, which we had no concern in, and cannot be justly charged with: on this I would observe, that it is quite going off the objection, which we have been upon, from God's agency, and flying to another. It is then no longer insisted on, that simply for him, from whose agency the course of
nature and our existence derive, so to dispose things, as that we should have existence in a corrupt state, is for him to be the author of sin: but the plea now advanced is, that it is not proper and just for such an agent so to dispose in this case, and only in consequence of Adam's sin; it not being just to charge Adam's sin to his posterity. And this matter shall be particularly considered, in answer to the next objection; to which I now proceed.
CHAPTER III
THAT GREAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE
IMPUTATION OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS
POSTERITY CONSIDERED
THAT SUCH IMPUTATION IS UNJUST AND UNREASONABLE, INASMUCH AS ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY ARE NOT ONE AND THE SAME. WITH A BRIEF REFLECTION SUBJOINED, ON WHAT SOME HAVE SUPPOSED, OF GOD'S IMPUTING THE GUILT OF ADAM'S SIN TO HIS POSTERITY, BUT IN AN INFINITELY LESS DEGREE, THAN TO ADAM HIMSELF
THAT we may proceed with the greater clearness in considering the main objections against supposing the guilt of Adam's sin to be imputed to his posterity, I would premise some observations with a view to the right stating of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's first sin; and then shew the reasonableness of this doctrine, in opposition to the great clamor raised against it on this head.
I think, it would go far towards directing us to the more clear and distinct conceiving and right stating of this affair, if we steadily bear this in mind; that God, in each step of his proceeding with Adam, in relation to the covenant or constitution established with him, looked on his posterity as being one with him. (The propriety of his looking upon them so, I shall speak to afterwards.) And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, yet it was as the head of the whole body, and the root of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if they had been then existing in their root.
From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in, as head or root of the whole, and being first and most immediately dealt with, and most immediately acting and suffering. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended, at the same instant, with the same steps and alterations throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think, this will naturally follow on the supposition of there being a constituted oneness or identity of Adam and his posterity in this affair.
Therefore I am humbly of opinion, that if any have supposed the children of Adam to come into the world with a double guilt, one the guilt of Adam's sin, another the guilt arising from their having a corrupt heart, they have not so well conceived of the matter. The guilt a man has upon his soul at his first existence, is one and simple: viz. the guilt of the original apostacy, the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled against God. This, and the guilt arising from the first corruption or depraved disposition of the heart, are not to be
looked upon as two things, distinctly imputed and charged upon men in the sight of God. Indeed the guilt, that arises from the corruption of the heart, as it remains a confirmed principle, and appears in its consequent operations, is a distinct and additional guilt: but the guilt arising from the first existing of a depraved disposition in Adam's posterity, I apprehend, is not distinct from their guilt of Adam's first sin. For so it was not in Adam himself. The first evil disposition or inclination of the heart of Adam to sin, was not properly distinct from his first act of sin, but was included in it. The external act he committed was no otherwise his, than as his heart was in it, or as that action proceeded from the wicked inclination of his heart. Nor was the guilt he had, double, as for two distinct sins: one, the wickedness of his heart and will in that affair; another, the wickedness of the external act, caused by his heart. His guilt was all truly from the act of his inward man; exclusive of which the motions of his body were no more than the motions of any lifeless instrument. His sin consisted in wickedness of heart, fully sufficient for, and entirely amounting to, all that appeared in the act he committed.
The depraved disposition of Adam's heart is to be considered two ways. (1) As the first rising of an evil inclination in his heart, exerted in his first act of sin, and the ground of the complete transgression. (2) An evil disposition of heart continuing afterwards, as a confirmed principle, that came by God's forsaking him; which was a punishment of his first transgression. This confirmed corruption, by its remaining and continued operation, brought additional guilt on his soul.
And in like manner, depravity of heart is to be considered two ways in Adam's posterity. The first existing of a corrupt disposition in their hearts is not to be looked upon as sin belonging to them, distinct from their participation of Adam's first sin: it is as it were the
extended pollution of that sin, through the whole tree, by virtue of the constituted union of the branches with the root; or the inherence of the sin of that head of the species in the members, in the consent and concurrence of the hearts of the members with the head in that first act. (Which may be, without God's being the author of sin; about which I have spoken in a former chapter.) But the depravity of nature, remaining an established principle in the heart of a child of Adam, and as exhibited in after-operations, is a consequence and punishment of the first apostacy thus participated, and brings new guilt. The first being of an evil disposition in the heart of a child of Adam, whereby he is disposed to approve of the sin of his first father, as fully as he himself approved of it when he committed it, or so far as to imply a full and perfect consent of heart to it, I think, is not to be looked upon as a consequence of the imputation of that first sin, any more than the full consent of Adam's own heart in the act of sinning; which was not consequent on the imputation of his sin to himself, but rather prior to it in the order of nature. Indeed the derivation of the evil disposition to the hearts of Adam's posterity, or rather the coexistence of the evil disposition, implied in Adam's first rebellion, in the root and branches, is a consequence of the union, that the wise Author of the world has established between Adam and his posterity: but not properly a consequence of the imputation of his sin; nay, rather antecedent to it, as it was in Adam himself. The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that sin, are both the consequences of that established union: but yet in such order, that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent; as it was in the case of Adam himself.
The first existence of an evil disposition of heart, amounting to a full consent to Adam's sin, no more infers God's being the author of that evil disposition in the child, than in the father. The first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam, was by God's
permission; who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his spirit, as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold: and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will presume to say, it was not in perfect consistence with God's holiness and righteousness, notwithstanding Adam had been guilty of no offense before. So root and branches being one, according to God's wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness, answerable changes of effects through all the branches coexist with the changes in the root: consequently an evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam's posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise, than in not exerting such an influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what was observed in the former chapter.
But now the grand objection is against the reasonableness, of such a constitution, by which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt with accordingly, in an affair of such infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be made sinners by his disobedience, and come into existence with the same depravity of disposition, and be looked upon and treated as though they were partakers with Adam in his act of sin. I have not room here to rehearse all Dr. Taylor's vehement exclamations against the reasonableness and justice of this. The reader may at his leisure consult his book, and see them in places referred to in the margin. Whatever black colors and frightful representations are employed on this occasion, all may be summed up in this, that Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents. But with respect to this mighty outcry made against the reasonableness of any such constitution, by which God is supposed to treat Adam and his posterity as one, I would make the following observations.
I. It signifies nothing, to exclaim against plain fact. Such is the fact, most evident and acknowledged fact, with respect to the state of all mankind, without exception of one individual among all the natural descendants of Adam, as makes it apparent, that God actually deals with Adam and his posterity as one, in the affair of his apostacy, and its infinitely terrible consequences. It has been demonstrated, and shewn to be in effect plainly acknowledged, that every individual of mankind comes into the world in such circumstances, as that there is no hope or possibility of any other than their violating God's holy law (if they ever live to act at all, as moral agents), and being thereby justly exposed to eternal ruin. And it is thus by God's ordering and disposing of things. And God either thus deals with mankind, because he looks upon them as one with their first father, and so treats them as sinful and guilty by his apostacy; or (which won't mend the matter) he, without viewing them as at all concerned in that affair, but as in every respect perfectly innocent, does nevertheless subject them to this infinitely dreadful calamity. Adam by his sin was exposed to the calamities and sorrows of this life, to temporal death, and eternal ruin; as is confessed. And 'tis also in effect confessed, that all his posterity come into the world in such a state, as that the certain consequence is their being exposed, and justly so, to the sorrows of this life, to temporal death, and eternal ruin, unless saved by grace. So that we see, God in fact deals with them together, or as one. If God orders the consequences of Adam's sin, with regard to his posterity's welfare, even in those things which are most important, and which do in the highest degree concern their eternal interest, to be the same with the consequences to Adam himself, then he treats Adam and his posterity as in that affair one. Hence, however the matter be attended with difficulty, fact obliges us to get over the difficulty, either by finding out some solution, or by shutting our mouths, and acknowledging the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in innumerable other
cases, where apparent and undeniable fact, in God's works of creation and providence, is attended with events and circumstances, the manner and reason of which are difficult to our understandings. But to proceed,
II. We will consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: first, that such a constitution is injurious to Adam's posterity. Secondly, that it is altogether improper, as it implies falsehood; viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but entirely distinct.
First difficulty, that the appointing Adam to stand in this great affair, as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is injurious to them, and tends to their hurt. To which I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being injurious and hurtful to Adam's posterity, or tending to their calamity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, very much of a contrary tendency, and was attended with a more eligible probability of an happy issue, than the latter would have been: and so is a constitution truly expressing the goodness of its author. For here the following things are to be considered.
1. 'Tis reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on account of his capacity and natural talents, to persevere in obedience, as his posterity (taking one with another), if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing, that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill consequence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.