what God actually did wish, that they should be what they wished; fruitlessly
Book XI 435 wishing to display his wrath and demonstrate his power, and for this reason bearing in much patience with the vessels ofwrath, which have been completed forperdition, in order to make known the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which heprepared beforehandforglory (Rom 9:22-23)? This, you see, is why the one who glories should glory only in the Lord ( 1 Cor 1:31), when he comes to know that it is not from himself but from God that he gets his very being; and what is more, that his well-being also comes only from the one from whom is derived his mere being.
1 1 . And so it is altogether too thoughtlessly crude to say, "They should not exist," about those to whom God would give such a great demonstration of his mercy, ifthe only way for them to exist was for these others also to exist in whom he would vindicate and demonstrate his justice.
9. Why, after all, should not both sorts exist, when in each of them is justly displayed both God's goodness and fairness?
12. But then: "If God wished, these too would be good." How much better is what God actually did wish, that they should be what they wished; fruitlessly good, however, while their being bad would not go unpunished and would thereby be profitable for others! "But he knew beforehand that their will was going to be bad." He certainly did, and because he cannot be mistaken in his fore knowledge, that is why their will, not his, is bad. "So why then did he create them, foreknowing that they were going to be like that?" Because, just as he foreknew what bad things they were going to do, so he also foreknew what good he himselfwas going to do with their bad deeds. He made them, you see, in such a way as to leave to them the means of doing something by which they would discover that however reprehensible their choice, he would make admirable use of them. It is from themselves of course that they have a will that is bad, from him that they have both a nature that is good and a punishment that is just, the place that is their due, providing others with an aid to training in virtue and a salutary example to fear.
10, 13. "But he could have changed even their will," he persists, "for the better, since he is all-powerful." He could have done, certainly. "So why didn't he, then?" Because he didn't want to.
Why he didn't want to is his secret. We ought not, after all, to be more wise than we have to be (Rom 12:3). All the same, I think I showed sufficiently a short while ago8 that even that rational creature is of no small value which shuns evil by a comparison of evils; and this kind of good creature would not exist if God Almighty had changed the bad wills of all people for the better, and did not inflict due punishment on any wickedness; and in this way there would only be the one kind of good rational creature, which makes progress without noting
8. See 8,10 above.