course be instructed before they can be moved. And perhaps
140 ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. [bOOK IV.
teaching should not suppose that he has said what he has to say as long as he is not understood ; for although what he has said be intelligible to himself, it is not said at all to the man who does not understand it. If, however, he is understood, he has said his say, whatever may have been his manner of saying it. But if he wishes to delight or persuade his hearer as well, he will not accomplish that end by putting his thought in any shape no matter what, but for that purpose the style of speaking is a matter of importance. And as the hearer must be pleased in order to secure his attention, so he must be persuaded in order to move him to action. And as he is pleased if you speak with sweetness and elegance, so he is persuaded if he be drawn by your promises, and awed by your threats ; if he reject what you condemn, and embrace what you commend ; if he grieve when you heap up objects for grief, and rejoice when you j)oint out an object for joy ; if he pity those whom you present to him as objects of pity, and shrink from those whom you set before him as men to be feared and shunned. I need not go over all the other things that can be done by powerful eloquence to move the minds of the hearers, not telling them what they ought to do, but urging them to do what they already know ought to be done.
28. If, however, they do not yet know this, they must of course be instructed before they can be moved. And perhaps the mere knowledge of their duty will have such an effect that there will be no need to move them with greater strength of eloquence. Yet when this is needful, it ought to be done. And it is needful when people, knowing what they ought to do, do it not. Therefore, to teach is a necessity. For what men know, it is in their own hands either to do or not to do. But who would say that it is their duty to do what they do not know ? On the same i)rincii)le, to persuade is not a necessity : for it is not always called for ; as, for example, when tlie hearer yields his assent to one who simply teaches or gives pleasure. For tliis reason also to persuade is a trium])]!, because it is possible tliat a man may be taught and deliglited, and yet not give his consent. And what will be the use of gaining the first two ends if we fail in tlie third ? Neither is