ENDNOTES
ENDNOTES
1 This appears to be reconcilable with the insistence that Anselm regarded his argument as an argument or proof, not as the statement of an immediate intuition of God (cf. Prof. Gopleston: A History of Philosophy, II, pp. 338 ff). It can be both without being merely the latter.
2 I.e., Aristotle. Bekker’s pages are quoted in the index for all references to Aristotle’s works except the Ethics, to which references in the text should be sufficiently clear.
3 Scriptural passages are quoted from the Authorized Version, any significant divergences in the text being indicated by footnotes.
4 Aristotle held that the sheer individuality of a particular, its “primary substance,” could never be an object of science because it could never be a predicate. Only the “secondary substance,” or essence, comprising the universals which must apply to a particular of a certain kind, could be known scientifically. Cf. Categories V.
5 See note to 12ae, Q. 82, Art. 1.
6 Cf. 1 Post. An., ch. 3.
7 According to the De Adhaerendo Deo, of Albertus Magnus, the mind should strive to pass entirely beyond the images of sensible things in its contemplation of God. It seems to have been acknowledged, however, that the human mind cannot dispense with such images altogether.
8 According to 1 Post. An., chs. 2, 3, the ultimate grounds of scientific proof must be self-evident principles which are “better known to nature,” i.e., first in the order of nature, and thus naturally prior to the conclusions drawn from them. The order of our knowing is then the same as the order of being, so that we understand things through their causes. This is obviously impossible in the present instance. Cf. Art. 2.
9 See appendix to Q. 4, Art. 3.
10 This paragraph may be compared with Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 7, ch. 1, 242a; bk. 8, ch. 4, 254b, ch. 5, 256a. Cf. also S. Contra Gentiles I, ch. 13, which contains all except the third way. The third way is contained with slight variations in ibid. I, ch. 15, II, ch. 15.
11 Migne: “ . . . and the figure of his substance.”
12 Cf. Aristotle’s distinction between “primary substance” and “secondary” substance,” in Categories V, S:2,1–5.
13 A translation from Proclus, containing references to the Neoplatonic distinction between the Aristoteleian categories which the Neoplatonists regarded as derivative, and the more universal concepts “ens,” “unum,” “verum,” and “bonum.” Aquinas gives a theological application to the latter, “ens” pertaining to essence, and the others to the Persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively. Prof. A. E. Taylor considered that Prantl was in error in describing the work as of Arabian origin, in Geschichte der Logic im Abendlande III, pp. 114, 244–245 (quoted from N. Kemp Smith, Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, p. 73).
14 On Augustine’s view, known as “Exemplarism,” forms are ideas in the mind of God—perfect representations of what things ought to be. They are neither constitutive of what things actually are, nor operative in supporting their existence.
15 Distinguished as separate species of one genus.
16 The Latin word is misericors.
17 Migne: “Give without stint, as Christ hath given to you.”
18 Migne: “mercy riseth above judgment.”
19 Migne: “The things which are of God are ordained.”
20 Migne: “What other hath he set over the earth, or whom hath he put in charge of the world which he hath made?”
21 Migne: “whom he hath despised.”
22 Migne: “non est iniquitas apud Deum.”
23 Cf. De Corrept. et Grat., 8, S:17.
24 Migne “qua.” Augustine “quibus.’’
25 Even the infinite power of God can make only what is made, and what is made is bound to be finite, since its essential form is rendered determinate when received by its material element.
26 Migne: “Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?”
27 A habit is defined as “a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either in respect of form or in respect of operation,” but is distinguished from a “disposition” as being difficult to change. See “The Role of Habitus in the Thomistic Metaphysics of Potency and Act” in Essays in Thomism, Ed. R. E. Brennan.
28 Migne: in peccatis (plural).
29 The “rational” desire which is peculiar to man is elsewhere referred to as “non-natural” (12ae, Q. 30, Art. 3). This does not imply that it is unnatural, but that it is distinct from the “irrational” desire common to man and the animals. Rational desire is natural and proper to man. Being infinite, it is never satisfied in this life, and in its highest form is the desire for blessedness. The inordinate desire for changeable good is thus a corruption of a capacity which ought to lead towards final good if subject to reason.
30 Migne: “All that is made manifest is light.”
31 Migne: “It is of man to prepare the soul.”
32 I.e. a habit which is a gift of grace. Cf. Art. 9, infra.
33 Migne: “for no one can correct one whom he hath despised.”
34 The Latin words for “grace,” “favour,” “freely,” “thanks,” “gratitude,” all have the same root—gratia, gratis, gratias agere, gratiarum actio.
35 For the distinction between final, formal, efficient, and material cause, see 22ae, Q. 27, Art. 3; cf. Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 2, ch. 3 (194b), ch. 7 (198a); also Metaph. A, ch. 3 (983a), D, ch. 2 (1013a-b).
36 Peter the Lombard, to whom the title refers throughout this volume; generally known as “Magister Sententiarum,” or the “Master of Sentences,” from his work Libri Sententiarum.
37 The Latin phrases are gratia gratum faciens, and gratia gratis data.
38 Migne: “The things which are of God are ordained” (ordinata—ordered).
39 In full, Contra Pelagios ad Bonifacium. Leonine Ed. implies that Aquinas did not give this reference.
40 qui operatur.
41 Migne: “It is of man to prepare the soul.”
42 Migne: “All that is made manifest is light.”
43 Migne: “No man knoweth whether he is worthy of hate or of love.”
44 Migne: “By mercy and faith sins are purged.”
45 Migne adds: “ . . . according to the purpose of God’s grace.”
46 Migne: “and this is all the fruit, that his sin should be taken away.”
47 Cf. De Corrept. et Gratia, 6, S:10. The petition referred to is “Hallowed be thy name.”
48 I.e., the Nicene Creed.
49 Cod. Alcan. et Camer.: “to see that the things believed are.” In margin Alcan.: “to see that the things believed are true.”
50 I.e., understood through their cause, so as to be demonstrable.
51 Migne: “I am the God of Abraham; the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob; and my name Adonai have I not shown unto them.”
52 The sensitive power operates through a corporeal organ, through which it perceives things which are actually present. The cogitative power perceives and preserves the “intention” or practical significance of particular things present or absent, by means of collating ideas. It is also called the “particular reason.”
53 Migne: “thou hast sent forth.”
54 Migne: “of that faith and hope which is in you.”
55 Cf. supra, 22ae, Q. 2, Art. 5.
56 or “proportionately.”
57 12ae, Q. 49. A habit is necessary whenever a power, in spite of possessing its form to the full, may tend to diverse objects, such as good and evil.
58 Migne: “Hope in the Lord.”
59 Cf. 22ae, Q. 19, Art. 1.
60 Migne: “charity makes all things to be loved.”
61 Migne: “will perfect it.”
62 Migne: “that ye may be saved.”
63 Cf. 22ae, Q. 27, Art. 3, infra.
64 Nicolaius: materiae (for naturae).
65 The object of fear is a future evil which is not easily avoided. The evil of guilt is consequently an object of fear only in so far as it may be brought about through some external cause, such as the company of wicked men, not in so far as it may be directly due to a man’s own will, which is its proper cause.
66 Migne: “ . . . in hope of the glory of the children [filiorum] of God.”
67 Migne: “My iniquity is greater than that I should merit pardon.”
68 To sin through malice is to sin against the Holy Spirit when it involves rejection, through contempt, of the protection from the choice of evil which is the effect of the Holy Spirit. (22ae, Q. 14, Art. 1).
69 Added in some editions.
70 communicatio.
71 societas.
72 Cod. Tarrac.: “on divine virtue.”
73 See Q. 27, Art. 3, infra.
74 Aristotle meant simply that an essence is more truly itself than are the particulars wherein it is exhibited.
75 Cf. Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 2, ch. 3 (194b); ch. 7 (198a); Metaphysics A, ch. 3 (983a); D, ch. 2 (1013a-b). The final cause is the end for the sake of which a thing is. The formal cause is the formula for the essence of a thing. The efficient cause is the source of the change through which a thing comes to be what it is. The material cause is the material element out of which a thing is made.