J. Common Commitments: Duplex Iustitia
J. Common Commitments: Duplex Iustitia
One way to describe the doctrines of Newman and Vermigli on justification is in terms of a “two-fold righteousness,” imputed and actual. This commitment grows out of their desire to ground justification in a forensic righteousness while also promoting the formation of actual righteous works. In Newman’s words, it is the twin movements of “pardon and renovation.”947 Such a position seeks to avoid a legal fiction, which might drive a wedge between the two, thus bringing the Protestant categories of justification and sanctification into a closer relationship.
Holtzen is correct to point out that Newman’s doctrine of justification is not a duplex iustitia if one strictly defines the position by two equal formal causes:
Despite the assertion of “two formal causes,” Newman does not hold to a strict theory of a duplex iustitia; that is a theory of two equal formal causes of justification. Rather, when he speaks of “two formal causes” of justification he distinguishes what he calls a proper formal cause and an improper formal cause (or proper form or improper form).948
While Newman does not posit two equal formal causes, he does include two distinct forms of righteousness in his overall doctrine of justification, a position that has an equally legitimate claim on the term duplex iustitia. Along this line, it is noteworthy that, in his appendix, Newman highlights how his position “very nearly resemble[s] Bucer’s, among the Protestants, and that of Pighius, Mussus, and many others of the Roman School.”949 In this context, he likens the logic of his doctrine of justification, which insists upon both “holiness and works,” with the position of these outstanding exemplars of the duplex iustitia.950
When Newman speaks of “two formal causes” (one proper—the forensic imputation of Christ’s righteousness, and the other improper—the actual righteousness in the Christian, though not “of” him, mediated by the indwelling of the Spirit), he insists that both are fundamental to justification.951 Holding these actions together, Newman maintains that the improper (internal) is derived and dependent on the proper (external) form of righteousness. In this sense, Newman’s position meaningfully resembles Vermigli’s doctrine, as he indirectly indicates,
Now it happens that this doctrine appears to have been held by Bucer as distinct from the other Reformers; it is also the doctrine of the Canons of Cologne in their Antididagma of 1544; it was held by Pighius, Seripando, and others, at the Council of Trent. . . . In this then I conceive to lie the unity of the Catholic doctrine on the subject of justification, that we are saved by Christ’s imputed righteousness, and by our own inchoate righteousness at once.952
As we have argued, Peter Martyr’s doctrine of justification, even in its most mature form, remained fundamentally consistent with that of Bucer. And with regard to the basic contours of the duplex iustitia, we are arguing that it resembles Newman’s. Take for instance the conclusion of Newman’s statement quoted above, “[W]e are saved by Christ’s imputed righteousness, and by our own inchoate righteousness at once.” In a similar vein, Vermigli asserts, “But now, delivered [from our sin which results in condemnation] by the grace of God, we are joined with Christ by the Spirit, to Christ himself being raised from the dead. By this union we may bring forth fruit to God, and no more death and damnation.”953 “For Vermigli, the proper understanding of the nature of justification is that it includes both the act and its consequences; its cause and effects and indeed, eternal consequences,” James helpfully summarizes. “Justification is thus an event necessarily accompanied by a process.”954
Given their commitment to imputed and actual righteousness, and despite significant differences in how their doctrines hang together, Newman and Vermigli maintain positions on justification that are appropriately described as duplex iustitia.