E. Justification’s Formal Cause and the Duplex Iustitia
E. Justification’s Formal Cause and the Duplex Iustitia
Unlike Newman, who dedicates an entire lecture (number two) and a full appendix to the “formal cause” of justification, Vermigli only gives the terminology passing attention. The passage in which he explicitly addresses it is in proposition one, as he counters the claims of the Council of Trent.389 After citing the Council’s position on the “final,” “efficient,” and “meritorious” causes of justification, he analyzes its definition of the “formal” cause. Martyr affirms the forensic character of the Catholic position, which goes so far as to count one just through the extension of forgiveness. However, Vermigli strongly disagrees with the Catholic assertion that the actual righteousness of a believer, even though it is understood to be empowered by the Holy Spirit, also constitutes a ground of justification. Such a view, he argues, contradicts the teaching of Paul, David, and Abraham, each of whom posit imputation as justification’s formal cause.390 “Therefore,” Martyr concludes, “we say that justification cannot consist in that righteousness and renewal by which we are created anew by God. For it is imperfect because of our corruption, so that we are not able to stand before the judgment of Christ.”391 For Peter Martyr, the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is the only formal cause.392
Vermigli’s intensive Augustinianism, as we have already seen, underlies his conviction that justification is properly grounded in the imputation of Christ’s righteousness apart from meritorious works.393 “‘Christ is of no advantage to you,’” he summarizes, “for if you have justification as the fruit of your works, then Christ’s coming, death, and shedding of blood would not have been necessary.”394 Throughout his locus, Martyr repeats this essential point, repudiating the notion that good works can serve as the formal cause;395 whether such works consist in the observance of ceremonial laws,396 moral admonitions,397 or in virtues such as love, they all inevitably fall short.398 Simply put, Martyr understands good works to be an effect of justification and not a cause.399
Since a positive statement of Vermigli’s doctrine of justification would essentially replicate what we have offered above with regard to his forensic framework (i.e., imputatio, coram deo, extra nos, forense, absolutio, dei favor), we should approach the subject from a different angle, one that also addresses the question with which we concluded the previous section: what is the relationship between the imputation of Christ’s righteousness accessed by sola fide (the formal cause) and the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit which creates a habit of grace (which he calls a “different kind of justification”)?400
One way to describe the relationship of forensic imputation and the actual righteousness wrought by the Spirit is in terms of a duplex iustitia. Klaus Sturm, for instance, makes this proposal when he evaluates Vermigli’s doctrine of justification against the background of Italian Evangélisme. “In the final analysis,” Sturm concludes, “it seems to me that Martyr’s doctrine of justification concurs with that of Contarini.”401
There is good historical reason for evaluating Vermigli’s doctrine of justification in light of the duplex iustitia commonly associated with Contarini. After the Colloquy of Regensburg concluded (July 29, 1541), Contarini traveled to the Italian city of Lucca to attend a summit between Emperor Charles V and Pope Paul III.402 Arriving for its start on September 7, Contarini found lodging at Vermigli’s monastery of San Frediano.403 Simler indicates that, during these days, “Martyr and Contarini held daily discussions about religion” which revolved around the Regensburg debate.404 McNair has little doubt that the specific topic of discussion was the duplex iustitia.405
In his chapter entitled “The Complex of Justification: Peter Martyr Vermigli Versus Albert Pighius,” James acknowledges that the duplex iustitia of Contarini and other members of Italian Evangélisme influenced the early stages of Vermigli’s doctrine of justification.406 James argues, however, that a parallel between Vermigli and Contarini and the Spirituali with reference to duplex iustitia is “overdrawn”407 and in danger of obscuring the Protestant character of Martyr’s position.408 According to James, after traveling north of the Alps in 1542, Vermigli eventually distanced himself from the doctrine of two-fold righteousness, which he had imbibed from such people as Contarini and Valdés in Italy, in exchange for Bucer’s tres partes conception of justification, which he encountered in Strasbourg during the subsequent five years (1542–47).409 While much of James’s argument is persuasive, we shall argue that it is unwarranted to so sharply distinguish the Protestant Vermigli from the duplex iustitia. It is our contention that the Neapolitan influence not only established the foundation of Martyr’s doctrine; it continued to define its shape into its most mature form. Thus, even though Peter Martyr doesn’t explicitly describe his position with the term duplex iustitia, nevertheless, two-fold righteousness continues throughout his life to be the essential substructure of his doctrine of justification.410
James position deviates from both Sturm411 and Donnelly,412 who portray Vermigli’s doctrine of justification as that of a “Reformkatholik.”413 One reason for their assertion is the close proximity of forensic justification with regeneration and sanctification in Vermigli’s three-fold schema. Indeed, Sturm goes so far as to assert that it is “difficult to determine whether Martyr’s doctrine of justification would be justifiably condemned on the basis of Trent’s canons on justification.”414 But James rejects the Reformkatholik label, and explains convincingly why Vermigli’s doctrine of justification is best understood as “thoroughly Protestant.”415 Furthermore, James is correct to emphasize the development of Vermigli’s complex of justification in basic agreement with Bucer. The problem with his argument is the way he seeks to distance the Italian reformer from the doctrine of duplex iusitia by means of pitting Vermigli against Albert Pighius.
In Peter Martyr’s view, Pighius was “the chief spokesman for the Roman Catholic theology of grace, original sin, and free will,” and, therefore, as we have noted, Martyr’s Romans commentary engages him by name dozens of times.416 More to the point, Vermigli regarded Pighius as the “champion of contemporary Pelagians,”417 as did Calvin,418 and Pelagianism was an error that they could not allow to go unopposed. In his argument against Sturm, James is quite insistent that it is the Augustinian anthropology of Vermigli that motivates him to refute Pighius’s Pelagianism.419
Pighius’s argument against sola fide challenges the notion that faith is considered the sole instrumental cause.420 He contends that “love (caritas), instead of faith, justifies, because love is more noble and excellent virtue.”421 Vermigli elucidates the heart of this disagreement when he writes, “Here lies the whole controversy: to which of these virtues is justification to be chiefly ascribed?”422 In no uncertain terms Martyr identifies faith over love as the proper instrument by which justifying grace is appropriated:
Therefore, in this matter of justification, although there are many other works of the Holy Spirit in our hearts, yet none except faith leads to justification. Thus the apostle concludes, “neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love.”423
At the same time, Vermigli addresses Pighius’s doctrine of original sin and preparatory works, as Calvin did, opposing what he regards as Pighian “Pelagianism.”424 Summarizing the logic of Pighius’s position, Vermigli explains how the Dutchman was fond of using John 1:12, “God gave them power to become sons of God,” to argue that one must exercise his will in the application of this divine empowerment in order to be justified. Such human effort, in Martyr’s view, amounted to works righteousness. Thus, it was Pighius’s insistence on these preparatory works and his failure to subordinate iustitia operum (operative righteousness) to the iustitia fidei (righteousness of faith) that roused Vermigli’s ire against him.425
When Claus Sturm argues for Vermigli’s Reformkatholik orientation, he emphasizes the Italian Reformer’s close theological proximity to the Spirituali, especially to Contarini, Seripando, and Gropper, and to the notion of duplex iustitia espoused by the Colloquy of Regensburg.426 At this point, James protests, describing Sturms’s association of Vermigli with the duplex iustitia as an “interpretive problem,” precisely because Vermigli placed Pighius in the crosshairs of his justification polemic. Since James labels Pighius a “moderate,”427 who was present at Regensburg supporting Gropper and Contarini, the logical deduction is that Vermigli must have moved away from the duplex iustitia. The implication seems to be that by moving away from two-fold righteousness, Vermigli became less Catholic and more Protestant.
There are four reasons to question whether Vermigli did in fact move away from a doctrine of duplex iustitia. First, it is reasonable to doubt whether Pighius was indeed a “moderate” Catholic of Contarini’s ilk. Edward Yarnold explains that while Pighius acknowledges one’s dependence upon imputed justice, it was, for him, “more a matter of vocabulary than of theology.”428 Contrary to Pighius, the Catholics at Regensburg, in their second draft, asserted that the ungodly are “justified freely without any preceding merit and without works of the law.”429 Such a view is out of step with Pighius’s position, which recognizes in human volition the ability to secure justifying grace.430 Furthermore, the Catholic Church also had reservations about Pighius’s orthodoxy, especially his explanation of original sin, as evidenced in the Council of Trent’s rejection of his doctrine.431 The Council’s opposition to semi-Pelagianism rendered Pighius’s formulation untenable, and the Spanish Inquisition eventually put his De libero hominis arbitrio on the Index of forbidden books.432 Pighius may have attended Regensburg, but his ideas on the efficacy of grace were at odds with moderate Catholics.433
Second, some of the Catholics at Regensburg were apparently extending themselves in ecumenical solidarity with Protestants beyond the point of their actual belief. An account of this is found in the work of Brian Lugioyo. In his overview of the various drafts through which Article 5 passed before reaching its final version, Lugioyo describes the Catholic edition written by Gropper, submitted on April 29, which omitted the phrase per fidem and emphasized the role of works as the primary ground upon which the ungodly are justified.434 With this strong dependence upon works, the draft reflects what would become a more conservative Catholic position, as evidenced in just a few years by the Canons of Trent and the anti-Protestant polemics of Pighius.
Third, there is consensus on the compatibility of Bucer’s and Calvin’s doctrine of justification with the duplex iustitia.435 It must be remembered that Bucer co-authored the so-called Regensburg Book with Gropper.436 His duplex iustificatio included the remission of sins by imputation and an impartation of righteousness by the Spirit,437 elements that are consistent with Vermigli’s position.438 On account of the Holy Spirit, those who are justified by faith (prima iustificatio) will also be “justified” by works (secundaria iustificatio).439 These are different words to describe the essence of Peter Martyr’s position.440 Since Martyr’s doctrine of justification was in principle in line with Bucer’s, and Bucer’s position remained compatible with Article 5, there is a logical harmony between Vermigli’s doctrine of justification and the duplex iustitia.
Like Bucer’s formulation, Calvin’s doctrine of justification evinces the same general agreement to duplex iustitia, as Calvin’s own statement to Farel confirms.441 On this point, Lane sheds direct light:
How does this doctrine of duplex iustitia compare with Calvin’s teaching? The idea is fundamental to Calvin’s theology of salvation although the actual term he used only in a negative sense, when opposing Osiander’s teaching on justification (Inst. 3:11:11f. [1559]). The idea of duplex iustitia, in the sense that it is understood in Article 5, is found in his references to a duplex gratia, referring to justification and sanctification (Inst. 3:11:1 [1539], 6 [1559]).442
Fourthly and finally, we find the doctrine of duplex iustitia in Vermigli’s theological offspring, men such as John Jewel and Richard Hooker.443 Jewel served as Vermigli’s notary during the Oxford disputation, and then, following Mary’s ascension to the English throne, he found refuge in the home of Martyr in Strasbourg and Zürich.444 Like Vermigli, Bucer, and other Reformed thinkers, Jewel recognizes the need for twofold righteousness in the doctrine of justification. Quoting Thomas Aquinas, Jewel affirms “works are said to justify, not as justification is the procuring of righteousness, but in that it is an exercise or a shewing or a perfecting of righteousness. For we say a thing is done, when it is perfected or known to be done.”445
Jewel’s protégé, Richard Hooker, continued in this same trajectory.446 Identifying one of the greatest merits of Hooker’s soteriology, Corneliu C. Simuţ points to “the synthesis between justification and sanctification,” which he credits to the influence of Martin Bucer and his theory of double justification.447 In Hooker’s words,
Which thing being attentively marked, sheweth plainly how the faith of true believers cannot be divorced from hope and love; how faith is part of sanctification, and yet unto justification necessary; how faith is perfected by good works, and yet not works of ours good without faith: finally, how our fathers might hold, we are justified by faith alone, and yet hold truly that without good works we are not justified.448
Lee Gibbs, in his analysis of Hooker’s Discourse of Justification, explains that, for Hooker, the gift of the indwelling Spirit includes the righteousness of sanctification (faith, hope, and love) and the forensic righteousness of Christ by imputation in tempore, that is, “at one and the same time.”449 Both of these gifts are understood to be an outgrowth of the believer’s union with Christ.450 With those who have ears to hear, the reverberation of this theological complex echoes backward in time, even before Peter Martyr in Switzerland or Oxford, to the theological conventicles of Naples, Viterbo, and Venice.
Although Vermigli never uses the nomenclature of duplex iustitia to describe his doctrine of justification, it nevertheless serves as an accurate summary of his position; that is, assuming imputation is clearly designated as the formal cause. It must be noted however that because this designation was not always clearly explicated in theological discourse (i.e., the fundamental role of imputation in causing justification),451 Vermigli regarded the duplex iustitia with suspicion and, at some points, he even criticized it. For instance, he writes in his Genesis commentary, “that [the duplex iustitia] view is wholly overthrown which says that we are justified by grace, yet in such a way that it attributes a role to works, since together with faith they actually lead to justification. I show that this is false.”452 In this vein, Sturm is correct that Vermigli avoided the position “in order to categorically avoid relativizing Christ’s righteousness appropriated in faith, which God imputes for forgiveness of sins and to admit only one ‘causa’ for justification: the mercy of God.”453 In other words, Vermigli would not risk confusing his position with a variety of duplex iustitia that failed to clearly define the formal cause in terms of imputation. Nevertheless, with this formal cause properly designated, the doctrine of duplex iustitia is a helpful way to account for Martyr’s inclusion of the Spirit’s cultivation of actual righteousness in the broader conception of his doctrine of justification.