C. The Forensic Framework of Justification
C. The Forensic Framework of Justification
Forensic justification is crucial to Vermigli’s doctrine. In the very first paragraph of his Romans locus (before his Hebrew lexicography and discussion on the role of the Holy Spirit), he raises a question that indicates the trajectory of what will follow. “Are men justified by works or by faith?”302 The binary nature of this question, as we shall see, is significant for the conclusion that Martyr will eventually reach.
Since there are two meanings of “to justify,” namely, in fact or in judgment or estimation, and since the same God is author of both, which of the two should we follow in the proposed discussion? The latter, in fact, because the renewal imputed by the Spirit of God and our righteousness, that is, the way of life acquired by good works, are still imperfect and incomplete. . . . Besides that, when debating the matter, Paul was influenced by the testimony of the history of Abraham in Genesis and by the authority of David; he used the verb “to be reckoned,” and, with proper understanding, reasons in light of our present concern and question.303
Vermigli thus concludes the prolegomena of his locus by choosing imputation over spiritual renewal as the primary and fundamental ground of justification. In addition to providing readers with a synopsis of his position, the above also reveals the fundamental presupposition that undergirds his doctrine of justification: the sinfulness of humanity.304 For instance, as an example of how the problem of sin impacts humanity, Martyr points to the transgression of Adam in Romans 5 where one observes “the cause of so great an evil.”305 Following from the first man’s disobedience, humanity, including infants, is “lost and condemned.”306 Later in his locus, Vermigli asserts this point rather explicitly, “The works of unregenerate men are sins.”307 In other words, the unregenerate are incapable of producing works that are acceptable to God. Therefore, the basis of justification cannot possibly rest on human effort. Such logic is particularly clear where Martyr comments on Romans 10:3.
Being ignorant of the righteousness that comes from God, and seeking to establish their own righteousness, they did not submit to the righteousness of God.” These words mean nothing else but that those who attribute too much to their own righteousness, namely to works, depart from God’s righteousness. So great is the contrast between grace and works that the effect that proceeds from the one cannot proceed from the other.308
The above line of reasoning, with its binary contrast between grace and works, is predicated on Vermigli’s anthropology, a view that James has labeled “intensive Augustinianism.”309 According to James, “It is [Martyr’s] profound conviction that the Adamic fall rendered all of humanity legally guilty before the divine judge and morally corrupt in their souls, thus bringing alienation and condemnation from God.”310 This conviction, perhaps more than any other, appears to be the driving force behind Vermigli’s vehement opposition to what he perceives as the “Pelagianism” of his interlocutors.311
A clear focus on the problem of human guilt inherited from Adam, in turn, eventually leads Vermigli to affirm the concept of imputation (imputatio), which he understands as a judicial transference of righteousness to the sinner.312 Simply put, God “confers” the righteousness of Christ upon a man so that he is considered or reckoned to be righteous coram deo.313 Vermigli stresses that this only happens by divine initiative. Commenting on Romans 4:1–4, Martyr explains how “imputation” is entirely of grace, effectively undermining what he regards as the notion of merit. Paul postulates imputation, he argues, “as an antithesis to merit or debt, so that he to whom something is imputed neither deserves it nor receives it as debt.”314 Furthermore, this imputation is two-fold in the sense that the sinner receives the attribution of Christ’s righteousness and also the non-imputation of his own sins.315 Martyr recognizes such imputation as essential to a biblical understanding of justification.
For Vermigli, imputation is extra nos in that it addresses one’s legal status, and not a form of iustitia in nobis, which affects the soul. Contrary to medieval Catholic theology, Martyr asserts that justifying righteousness, “does not adhere [inhaere] to our souls, but is imputed by God.”316 Moreover, Martyr also articulates a reverse imputation in which the sinner’s guilt is put upon Christ. Writing about the suffering servant of Isaiah 53, Martyr elucidates this point. “[Christ] also in a sense justifies those that he takes on himself and bears their iniquities.” 317
In his analysis of the diachronic development of Vermigli’s doctrine of justification, James points out that, in his Romans locus, Vermigli specifically employs the term forense for the first time (even though the concept had appeared in previous loci). 318 James suggests that such terminology was probably invoked to draw more explicit continuity with the teaching of the continental Reformers.319 This conceptual development is related to an even more novel feature of Martyr’s work on Romans—his postulation of an inaugurated eschatology. Vermigli describes the virtuous works of the regenerate as demonstrating their “participation in eternal life”320 and justification as “eternal life already begun in us now.”321 Accordingly, one’s identification with Christ—resulting in two-fold imputation (Christ takes the sinner’s guilt and offers his perfect righteousness) and the empowering presence of the Spirit—indicates that justification has been brought forward to the present.
Our final consideration of forensic imputation, before examining Martyr’s view of faith, concerns two particular results of such justification for the sinner, starting with the guarantee of absolution.322 This grace falls into the inaugurated eschatology schema mentioned above, in which a believer is fully and decisively forgiven by the non-imputation of his guilt and the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.323 In one sense, forgiveness has “already” occurred, but the delayed “not yet” dimension can be seen in the need for the justified to appeal to God for the forgiveness of ongoing sins while also pursuing a greater apprehension of love.324
Along with God’s forgiveness, Martyr also sees forensic justification resulting in Dei favor.325 Combining the previous consequence with this one, he writes: “Moreover, as to the remission of sins, a blessing promised to us, we should remember that the chief and principal point consists in this, that we are received into favor by God and our sins forgiven us.”326 He elucidates this notion in his explanation of God’s providential choice of Jacob over Esau, in which God had mercy on the former over the latter. “The forgiveness of sins, in as much as men are received back into favor,” Vermigli explains, “does not depend on their works, but on the pure and favorable good-will of God.”327 With such favor, a positive relationship is established between the defendant and the judge, resulting in the former’s acceptance. This forgiveness is a singular event, already realized by the justified, and, at the same time, it is gradually apprehended in one’s moral life. James helpfully explains:
To [Vermigli’s] mind, “forgiveness” is more than a simple, single, judicial act. Forensic justification is like a pebble dropped in a pond; it creates ripples throughout the lifetime of a sinner. Certainly, it does address decisively the legal matter of guilt derived from Adam. However, even after the judicial acquittal, there remains a moral need for the justified sinner continually to seek forgiveness for subsequent sins. . . . It is this ongoing need for forgiveness, even after justification has been pronounced, that requires a necessary relationship with sanctification.328