Question Four
Question Four The Maternity of the Mother of God
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary
DE MATERNITATE
B. VIRGINIS MARIAE1
Circa distinctionem quartam quaero, utrum beata Virgo fuerit vere mater Dei et hominis.
[Argumenta Pro et Contra] Quod non:
1. Quia opposita contraria non possunt inesse simul eidem eti am per potentiam divinam, quia tunc Deus possset facere contra dictoria simul. Consequenti probatur per Philosophum, IV Meta physicae V,2 ubi probat quod si contraria essent in eodem, quod etiam contradictoria essent simul de eodem vera; sed virginitas et maternitas sunt opposita contraria, ergo, etc.
2. Praeterea, Damascenus, cap. 58:3 "Genetricem Christi nequaquam dicimus beatam Virginem."
3. Praeterea, mater se habet active in generatione prolis, quia si tantum passive, Adam esset mater Evae, et limus esset mater
Adae; sed beata Virgo non se habuit active in generatione ista, quia haec generatio fuit in instanti; virtus creata non operatur in in stanti ad illud quod natum est fieri in tempore.
4. Praeterea, activum et passivum sunt correlativa mutua, ex V Metaphysicae.4 Mater se habet ad patrem sicut passivum ad ac tivum, secundum Philosophum XV De animalibus;5 igitur mutuo correlativa sunt pater et mater; sed nullus est pater Christi homi nis: ergo nulla mater.
5. Praeterea, omni generatione generatur aliquod supposi tum, VII Metaphysica.6 Non sic ista, quia hic non fuit suppositum nisi increatum; illud non generabatur, quia non fuit in tempore actu generationis. Quod si dicas quod generabatur in natura creata
1 Ordinatio III, dist. 4, q. unica (from the text edited by C. Balić, O.F.M. in Ioannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Mariani Theologiae Marianae Elementa
(Sibenici, 1933), 80-112).
2 Aristotle, Metaphysica III, c. 3-4, 1005b 19-21; 1006a-5.
3 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 56, n. 5 (Buytaert edition, 210:
"Christi genitricem non dicimus Virginem ..."
4 Arist., Metaphysica III, ch. 15, 1020b 29-31.
5 Arist., De animalium generatione I, c. 21, 729b 12–14.
6 Arist., Metaphysica VI, ch. 7, 1032a 13-14.
Question Four
THE MATERNITY
OF THE MOTHER OF GOD
Regarding this fourth distinction I ask: Was the Blessed Virgin truly the mother of God and of man?
[Arguments Pro and Con] [For the negative]:
1. She was not, because contraries cannot exist simultaneously in the same thing, even by divine power, for then God could pro duce contradictions at the same time. The implication is proved through the Philosopher in IV Metaphysics, where he proves that if contraries were in the same thing, contradictions would also be true at the same time; but virginity and maternity are contrary opposites; therefore, etc.
2. Furthermore, Damascene, ch. 58: "We never call the Blessed Virgin 'Mother of Christ.'"
3. Furthermore, a mother plays an active role in the generation of offspring, for if she were only passive, Adam would be the mother of Eve, and clay would be the mother of Adam; but the Blessed Vir gin did not play an active role in this generation, because this took place in an instant; a created power does not act in an instant with respect to what by nature requires some time to come into being.1
4. Furthermore, active and passive are mutual correlatives, ac cording to V Metaphysics. But according to the Philosopher in XV The Generation of Animals, the mother is related to the father as the passive to the active; therefore , father and mother are correla tives with respect to one another; but there is no father of Christ the man; hence neither is there any mother.
5. Furthermore, some supposit2 [or person] is begotten in every generation, according to VII Metaphysics. But this does not occur here, because there is only an uncreated person; and that person was not generated, because it was not in time by an act of genera tion. And if you say, that it is a created nature that is generated,
1 See note 16 infra.
2 'Supposit' = an individual autonomous subject or substance; if that subject has a rational nature, the supposit is technically a person. The word itself is a Latin transliteration of the Greek term "hypostasis," mean ing "person."
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary —contra, primus terminus generationis est per se ens; Verbum homo non est per se ens, quia nec per se unum: ergo, etc. Quod si dicas quod est ibi unitas unionis—contra, relatio non est formalis ratio terminandi generationem; ista unio est relatio: ergo, etc.
6. Praeterea, si generavit Deum hominem, hoc non fuit nisi ra tione naturae humanae terminantis generationem, in qua natura
Verbum subsistebat; sed hoc non videtur ponendum, quia tunc il lud esset hic non primus terminus sed quasi formalis acquisitio primo termino, in aliis autem est primus terminus. Nec potest poni differentia, quod in aliis illa natura est persona, hic non, quia hoc tantum est in aliis propter negationem duplicis dependentiae; ne gatio non est ratio terminandi generationem.
Contra:
Luca 1:31: Concipies in utero et paries filium. Et Mattheus, 1.
[Corpus Quaestionis] Respondeo: In ista quaestione conclusio est certa, sicut pa tet per Damascenum, cap. 58:7 "Dei genitricem vere sanctam
Mariam praedicamus. Sicut enim Deus vere ex ipsa genitus est, ita ipsa vere Dei genitrix dicitur. Deum enim aimus ex ipsa ge nitum esse, non ut deitate Verbi principium essendi accipiente ex ipsa, sed Dei Verbo ex ipsa incarnato et genito. Non enim homi nem nudum genuit sancta Virgo, sed Deum verum, non nudum sed incarnatum." Ubi videtur dicere, quod genuit suppositum, si cut ipse determinat, infra cap. 838 quod generatio est hypostasis;
7 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 56, n. 1 (Buytaert edition, 207-08).
8 Ibid., n. 3, 209.
Question Four to the contrary: the first term of generation is a per se being; the Word-man is not a per se being, because it is not per se one; there fore, etc.
6. Furthermore, if she had generated a God-man, this would only have been because the human nature, in which nature the Word [or person] subsisted, was the term of the generation. But it does not seem that this should be assumed, because then that [i.e., the person] would not be the primary term here, but as it were a formal acquisition to the primary term [i.e., the nature]. In other cases, however, it [the person] is the primary term. Neither can one assume there is a difference here, because in other cases that [human] nature is a person, whereas here it is not, because in the former cases a [human] person is there because of the double nega tion of dependence.3 However, a negation is not formally the term of generation.
[For the Affirmative]:
On the contrary: Luke 1:31: "You shall conceive and bear a son." See also Matthew, ch. 1.4
[Body of the Question] In this question the conclusion is certain, as is evident from Damascene, ch. 58: "We proclaim the Blessed Virgin to be truly the Mother of God. For just as God is truly born of her, so she is truly called the mother of God. For we say God was born of her, not in the sense that the divinity of the Word received the beginning of its ex istence from her, but in the sense that the Word of God became in carnate and was born of her. For the holy Virgin did not give birth to just a man, but to true God, but not to God in an unqualified sense, but to God incarnate." Here he seems to say that she begot a supposit [or person], as he states categorically, later in chapter
83, that the generation pertains to a hypostasis [or person], but she begot this person, not according to his divine nature but his human nature.
3 This is a reference to Scotus's theory of what constitutes a human person, namely an individual complete rational nature that has neither a need to be assumed by another nor is it assumed by another [i.e., a higher or divine person]. Cf. A. B. Wolter, "John Duns Scotus on the Primacy and Personality of Christ," Franciscan Christology, ed. D. McElrath (St. Bo naventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1980), 139-82.
4 Matt 1:23: "The virgin shall be with child and give birth to a son."
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary sed genuit illud suppositum, non secundum naturam divinam sed humanam.
[Problema I.—Quomodo potest esse vera mater?] Contra quod videntur esse duo argumenta facta ad istam par tem. [1] Sed de eo propter quod aliqua dicitur mater et [2] quomodo posset salvari in proposito, dubium est.
[Articulus I. Quare aliqua dicitur mater?] 1. Pater est activus, mater passiva] Opinio est quod solus pater habet rationem activi; et mater rationem passivi, ita quod ipsa tantum ministrat materiam prolis, et in solo semine partis est vis activa et formativa prolis. Haec vi detur opinio Philosophi, XV De animalibus,9 comparantis virtutem in semine patris artifici, et materiam ministratam a matre, ligno de quo artifex facit scamnum.
Pro hoc etiam ad propositum videtur esse Augustinus X Super Genesium,10 ubi dicit Christum non descendisse ex parentibus secun dum rationem seminalem; sed si beata Virgo fuisset activa respectu
9 Arist., De animalium generatione I, c. 21, 730b 22-25.
10 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, c. 20 (PL 34, 424).
Question Four This appears to answer two arguments made for the negative portion.5
[First Problem: How can Mary be a true mother?] But in view of the reason why anyone is called a mother, there is a doubt just how it could be justified in the present case.6
[Article I What is essential to Motherhood?
1. The father is active, the mother passive] [Aristotle's opinion] There is the opinion that only the father has an active role and the mother a passive one, so that she pro vides only the material for the child, and in the seed of the father alone is there any active and formative power in regard to the off spring. This seems to be the opinion of the Philosopher in Bk. XV On the Generation of Animals. He compares the virtue of the seed of the father to the carpenter and the matter provided by the moth er to the wood from which the carpenter makes the bench.
Relevant here is also Augustine's remark in Bk. X in On Gen esis, where he says Christ did not descend from parents on seminal grounds; but if the Blessed Virgin was active with respect to the 5 This seems to refer to the last two initial arguments for the nega tive, namely that Mary did not beget a person, but at best only a complete human nature.
6 This is the first of two problems Scotus raises in the body of ques tion. In his Paris lectures Scotus devoted a distinct question to each. The first asked: "Was Mary vera mater (i.e., a true mother)? The second was less important. "Was she naturaliter mater (i.e, naturally a mother)? The first question or problem was the most difficult one to answer simply, since it stemmed from several distinct theological, philosophical and scientific conceptions current at the time. Scotus spends most of his time untan gling them and gives only brief attention to the second problem at the close of the corpus. The reason the initial doubt arose is because Mary's conception of Christ was not only miraculous, but involved an incarna tion of a divine person. How could the theological theories of what this involved be reconciled with the biological views of what motherhood en tailed essentially? Further complicating the question were two basically different philosophical theories of matter, one pure Aristotelian; the oth er a variation that involved the Augustinian theory of seminal reasons.
Still another difficulty arose from the fact that Mary had to cooperate with God and according to Aristotle, God acts instantaneously whereas a
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary formationis corporis Filli sui, videretur illud corpus formatum esse secundum rationem seminalem.
[2. Mater etiam est causa activa] Sed contra istud arguitur quadrupliciter:
1. Primo, de aliis matribus, quia formas eiusdem speciei con sequuntur potentiae naturales eiusdem speciei; sed mas et fe mina sunt eiusdem speciei, X Metaphysicae,11 ergo formas eorum consequitur potentia eiusdem rationis; igitur si formam unius consequitur naturaliter vegetativa activa, similiter et alterius.
11 Arist., Metaphysicas IX, ch. 9 1058a29-34; see also De animalium generatione I, c. 23 731a 1-2.
Question Four formation of the body of her son, it would seem that this body was formed according to a seminal reason.7
[2. The mother is also active] [Refutation] But against this there is a fourfold argument:
1. First, as regards other mothers, because natural powers of the same species are a consequence of forms of the same species, but a man and a woman are of the same species (X Metaphysics).
Therefore, a power of the same sort follows from their forms; hence if the active vegetative power follows naturally from the form of the one, it likewise follows from the form of the other. creature can only act in time and through a temporal process. How could
Mary be a true mother if she was unable to cooperate actively with God?
7 To understand why this remark of Augustine was used to prove Mary did not play an active but a purely passive role in the conception of her son, we must keep two medieval theories in mind, one theological concerning the incarnation, the other philosophical concerning matter as potency.—[1] As we noted in the Introduction, medieval theologians dis tinguished the earlier "conception of the seed" from the "conception of the human being" some time later when the rational soul was created and infused into the developing fetus. This latter "conception" was also called the "birth within the womb" (in utero) to distinguish from actual birth (ex utero). Theologians had also worked out the biological and philosophical implications of this assumption for their theandric Christology. Though
Mary's son had both a divine nature and a human nature, Jesus was no human person but the Son of God himself. This implied that the Word or Second Person of the Trinity had personally assumed not only the ratio nal soul but also the human body of Mary's baby. But, some theologians argued, if Mary's conception took place by the "overshadowing of the Holy
Spirit" and was unlike the natural conception of a child, then also the normal intervening pre-human stages between a conception of the seed and the animation by the spiritual or rational soul did not occur in the case of Mary's child. Otherwise the Word or Son of God would have to unite himself personally with a humanoid organism in the process of be coming human, that is, reaching that stage of natural fetal development where it could support a spiritual or rational soul. Hence they argued that in case of Christ's conception, his body miraculously formed from Mary's
"most pure blood," was fully human and was immediately informed with a rational soul; conception in short coincided with nativity in the womb, and human infant was hypostatically united with the Word. Scotus seems to think one could admit some fetal development prior to the incarnation which would be purely natural and due to Mary's active procreativity. He does, however, accept the common theological view that the incarnation takes place only when the body is fully organized and infused with a spiri-
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Confirmatur ratio, quia alias vegetativa huius et illius different sicut activa et passiva, et ita essent potentiae omnino alterius ra tionis.
2. Praeterea, pater naturaliter plus diligit filium suum quam econverso, sicut unusquisque naturaliter plus diligit opus suum quam econverso, ex VIII Ethicorum et IX,12 et tenet ratio pro hoc quod benefaciens plus afficitur beneficiato quam econverso; sed mater plus diligit filium suum quam pater, sicut patet per eum
VIII Ethicorum: Ergo videtur quod aliquo modo filius eius sit opus eius.13
3. Praeterea, filius quandoque magis assimilatur matri quam patri: ergo et in matre est aliqua virtus activa. Consequentia pro batur, quia agens intendit assimilare sibi effectum ita quod effec tus nulli assimilatur, nisi propter aliquam actionem eius.
12 Aristotle, VII Ethica Nicomachea, c. 8 (1241b 4-5).
13 Ibid., 1241b 8-10.
Question Four This reason is confirmed, because otherwise the vegetative power8 of this one and that would differ as active and passive and thus they would be potencies of an entirely different sort.
2. Furthermore, the father naturally loves his son more than a son loves the father for each man naturally loves the opus he produces more than vice versa, according to Bks. VIII and IX of the Ethics,9 and this argument holds on the grounds that the benefac tor is more fond of the benefited than vice versa; but a mother loves the son more than the father does, as is evident from him [Aristo tle] in Bk. VIII of the Ethics; therefore it seems that in some way her son is her work.
3. What is more, the son at times is more like the mother than the father; therefore in the mother there is some active power. The implication is proved, because an agent intends to make its effect like itself, so that the effect resembles it only because of some ac tion on its part. tual soul (see note 20 infra). What he did not accept, however, was the second point, namely, the modified Aristotelian conception of matter, de veloped by the so-called "Augustinians" like St. Bonaventure.—[2] Wish ing for theological reasons to retain certain important insights of St. Au gustine, Bonaventure reinterpreted Aristotle's hylomorphic theory in the light of St. Augustine's "theory of seminal reason." Regarding more details of this theory see my translation of his "Theory of Seminal Reasons" in J. F. Wippel and A. B. Wolter, Medieval Philosophy: From St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa (New York: Free Press, 1969), 318-20. On this rein terpretation, even if the mother only contributes the matter from which the fetus is formed, she is no less active normally than the father in the growth process that precedes the infusion of the human soul. In the case of the miraculous formation of Christ's body, however, this preliminary stage where the active potencies or seminal reasons function is eliminated. To say that Mary was active in this way, consequently seems to deny the aforesaid incarnational thesis.
8 The reproductive functions, as germinative, are considered to be part of the vegetative portion of the human soul or life principle.
9 In chapter 8 of his Ethica Nicomachea VII, Aristotle is explaining why "benefactors are more fond of the benefited than the benefited of their benefactors." He accounts for it on the ground that the benefactor is active whereas the benefited is passive. "There is the same relation between the effect and the activity, the benefited being as it were an effect or creation of the benefactor. Hence in animals their strong feeling for their children, both in begetting them and in preserving them afterwards. And so fathers love their children—and still more mothers—more than they are loved by them. And these again love their own children more than their parents, because nothing is so good as activity; in fact, mothers love more than fathers because they think the children to be more their own creation."
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Dicitur quod semen maris principaliter intendit assimilare prolem patri, et secundo propter inobedientiam materiae deficit ab eo quod intendit, et facit quod potest, et ita cum transmutatio non fiat in quodlibet, sed in oppositum, assimilatur opposito, et ita matri.
Contra, igitur callidum impeditum et propter impedimentum non potens perfecte sibi assimilare effectum, assimilabit eum frigido, quod videtur impossibile, quia ipsum impeditum tantum non assimilabit eum sibi: ergo si assimilatur frigido, hoc est ab alio agente, non tantum a callido impedito. Sic in proposito, ex impedi mento resistente virtuti activae patris, tantum habetur ista nega tio quod proles non assimilatur patri, tamen non assimilabitur alii, nisi ex aliqua causa activa alia; et si sic detur in proposito ex parte matris, habetur propositum.
4. Praeterea, matrem tantum esse quasi vas, in quo sicut in loco conveniente generationi generatur proles, et de aliquo eius, ut materia generatur, non videtur plus dare matri quam terrae in generatione minerae, si de aliquo eius generetur minera; et ipsa terra continens illud aliquid corruptum, sicut locus conveniens generationi talis corporis, erit mater eius; immo, non videtur dare plus quam homini respectu generationis vermis ex eo, qui genera tur ex aliquo humore putrefacto, et hoc in loco conveniente gen erationi suae, et ita nihil deficeret quin esset mater illius vermis, nisi quod vermis non est eiusdem speciei, sed hoc forte non tollit, si equus dicatur pater mulae, et asina mater.
5. Praeterea, istud in proposito de hac matre improbatur per illud Damasceni 48:14 "Virtutem tribuens susceptivam, simul et generativam," sed si ipsa tantum esset principium passivum, non videretur quare copularet virtuti susceptivae simul autem et gen erativam.
14 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 46, n. 2 (Buytaert edition, 171).
Question Four [Objection] It is said that the seed of the man principally in tends to make the offspring like the father and secondly because of the recalcitrancy or failure of the matter to obey, it fails to achieve what was intended, and makes what it can, and thus since the change does not result in just anything, but in its opposite, the offspring is made like its opposite and thus resembles the mother.
[Reply] To the contrary, on this theory if heat is impeded and because of the impedance is unable produce an effect perfectly like itself, its effect will be positively cold, which seems impossible. For its impedance will only prevent heat from heating. Therefore, if its effect is chilled, this stems from another active cause, and not just from a heating agent that was impeded. So in the case at hand, from the impediment that is resisting the active power of the fa ther, one only gets this negation that the offspring will not be like the father; however, it will only become like the mother because of some other active cause; and if this activity in the case at hand is because of the mother, my thesis is admitted.
4. Furthermore, a mother would only be a kind of vessel, a con venient place to beget a child, and if there is something that comes from her such as the material from which the child is formed, her contribution seems to be no more than that of the earth in which minerals are produced, if the earth contributes anything to their production. And the earth itself, inasmuch as it holds the material that perishes in a place suited to generate such a body, will be its mother. Furthermore, she seems to contribute no more to a human being in the way of procreation than she does to a maggot that is generated from some putrefied bodily secretion and this in a place suited to its generation,10 and thus there is nothing to prevent her being the mother of that maggot, except that it is not of the same species. But even this, perhaps, would not prevent such, if a horse can be called the father of a mule and jackass its mother.
5. Besides, this situation in the case of this mother is refuted by that statement of Damascene, ch. 48: "[The Holy Spirit] gave her at once both the power to receive [the divinity of the Word] and to beget." But if she were only a passive principle, it would not seem that the generative power was joined to the power to receive.
10 The generation of the maggots that developed in decaying organic material was commonly attributed to the causal activity of the sun or its heat. Physicians like Avicenna, who was even more famed for his medical writings than his philosophical works, associates this phenomena with the menstrual fluid in women and seemed to think the womb or vagina
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary [Articulus II. Quare Maria est mater?] Si autem teneatur alia opinio quod mater15 quaecumque cum patre est causa activa respectu formationis corporis prolis, tamen minus principalis et secundaria, et cum patre integrans unam causam totalem—tunc videtur difficilius salvare quomodo Maria fuit mater, quam ponendo aliam opinionem. Patet enim, quod ipsa ministravit materiam etiam totam corpori Christi; sed non ita pa tet, quomodo potuit cooperari Spiritui sancto ad formationem is tius corporis.
[1. Opinio Bonaventurae] Ad hoc dicitur sic:16 quod ipsa ministravit materiam, in qua erat vis activa, sed illa vis non habuit actionem aliquam, quia actionem eius praevenit Spiritus sanctus subito for mans corpus illud de materia sibi ministrata. Erat igitur Vir go mater, tenendo opinionem de actione matris pro eo quod praebuit materiam, et quantum est ex parte sui, erat unde ageret, licet aliud agens fortius praevenerit illud in agendo.
15 Galen, De usu partium corporis humani, De semine mulieris, I. I (Opera omnia II 331. Venetiis, 1586); James Forliniensis, De generatione embrionis, q. 4 (Papiae, 1479); Avicenna, IX De animalibus, c. 2 (Venetiis,
1508), fol. 41.
16 St. Bonaventure, Sent. III, dist. 4, art. 3, q. 1 (III, 112).
Question Four [Article II. Why Mary is truly a mother] But what if one holds the other opinion that the mother to gether with the father plays an active though secondary and sub ordinate role in the formation of the body so that together they form a single integral agent of procreation? Would it not seem more difficult to explain how Mary was mother, than it would if one as sumed the first opinion. For while it is evident she provides all the material for Christ's body, it is not clear how she could have actively cooperated with the Holy Spirit to form this body.11
[1. The opinion of St. Bonaventure] [Explanation] To this one master replies in this way:12 She contributed the matter in which there was active power, but this power did not produce any action, because the Holy Spirit prevent ed its action by forming instantly that body from the matter she provided. Hence, the Virgin was a mother,—if you hold the view that a mother's action consists in providing matter that so far as it was concerned could have acted [gradually to form the body], al though another stronger agent prevented it from acting in this way. a suitable location for its occurrence. In his Lectura completa III, dist. 4, q. unica (C. Balić, Theologiae Marianae Elementa, 273) Scotus words this ar gument as follows: "Praeterea, vermis, si generaretur in corpore matris in convenienti loco suae generationi, non diceretur esse filius. Et secundum
Avicennam bufones generantur in matricibus mulierum, quia ibi est locus conveniens generationi eorum, et materia; igitur si dicatur mater, quia ad ministrat tantum materiam, esset similiter mater vermis et bufonis, nisi impediat tantum, quia est alterius speciei." Hence, the argument seems to be: If a woman is a mother only because she provides the material and location for procreation, why is she not called the mother of all life forms that develop in her body through the activity of agents other than herself?
11 If the formation of Christ's body in the womb was instantaneous, this not only eliminated the activity of seminal reasons mentioned above
(note 7) but also posed another difficulty, namely, how can a creature whose activity is always temporal cooperate with God who acts instantaneously or outside of time?
12 This is the view of St. Bonaventure, Sent. III, dist. 4, art. 3, q. 1 in Opera omnia (Ad Claras Aquas, 1882-1902), tom. III, 112). He holds a ver sion of the Augustinian theory of "seminal reasons" according to which matter is not simply inert but contains certain God-given active potentiali ties that will germinate in the proper environment to produce flower and fruit.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Exemplificatur: virgae Aaron data est fecunditas, per quam pos set active produxisse successive flores et fructus; sed non produxit, quid illam fecunditatem praeventi virtus divina subito producens illa.
Contra: si ignis esset perfectissime activus, et haberet passum, ut lignum approximatum, tamen praeveniretur ab aliquo agente fortiore calefaciente lignum, nullo modo ignis esset causa agens respectu illius caloris; sed si ignem gignere calorem, est ignem esse patrem caloris: ergo nullo modo ignis ille esset pater illius caloris.
Sic similiter in proposito, propter solam virtutem activam, si erat praeventa ne ageret, non diceretur mater, si mater est causa agens.
Confirmatur hoc in exemplo eorum: si enim arbor diceretur pa ter vel mater illius fructus, quem producit, illa tamen virga, licet fuisset fecunda, potens producere fructum, et non producens, non tamen fuisset pater vel mater istius fructus.
Hoc etiam probatur in proposito: nullus enim homo fuit pater istius filii, etsi aliquis habuit virtutem activam secundum quam potuit egisse ad formationem huius corporis, ut pater, et non egit
Spiritu sancto praeveniente.
[2. Opinio Guilielmi Guarrae] Aliter dicitur, quod collata sibi fuit vis supernaturalis, secun dum quam potuit cooperari Spiritu sancto in instanti.
Contra:
1. Ista vis supernaturalis esset accidens et accidens per acci dens huius naturae; sed si mater solo isto accidente egit ad for mationem corporis Christi: ergo non ita per se et vere et natu raliter egit ad formationem huius corporis, sicut aliae matres, quae ex natura sua agunt ad formationem corporum suae prolis.
Question Four An example of how this occurred: the staff of Aaron was given fe cundity, through which it could have actively produced flowers and fruit, but it did not produce such, because the divine power pre vented such fecundity by instantly causing it to flower.
[Refutation] On the contrary: If fire were most perfectly active and had something on which to act, like an adjacent piece of wood, but were prevented by some stronger heating agent, the fire would in no way be the cause of the heat; but fire is the father of heat only if the fire begets heat; hence, in no way is fire the father of that heat produced by the stronger agent. Similarly, in the case at hand; if a mother is an active cause, no one is called a mother because she has the active power to produce, if she is prevented from acting.
Their example confirms this: for if a tree can be called the fa ther or mother of the fruit it produces, and that staff (though it was fertile in the sense of being able to produce fruit) failed to do so, then it would not have been the father or mother of the fruit
[miraculously produced in it].
This is also proved in the present case, for no man was father of this son, although someone13 did have active power according to which he could have acted in the formation of this body as father and he did not act, the Holy Spirit forestalling it.
[2. The opinion of William of Ware] Another opinion says that she was given a supernatural power by which she could have cooperated with the Holy Spirit in an in stant.14
To the contrary:
1. This supernatural virtue or power would be an accident that is only incidental [i.e., not something necessarily associated with this nature]. Now if his mother solely by virtue of this accident cooperated actively to form the body of Christ, she would not truly have been a per se or natural agent in its formation, as are other mothers, who of their very nature actively form the body of their
13 Namely, Joseph, the husband of Mary.
14 This seems to be the opinion of William of Ware, Sent. III, Merton College (Oxford), codex 103, fol. 152vb: "Cum ergo in proposito materia illa corporis fuit disposita opere Spiritus sancti, qui est agens infinitae virtutis, potuit beata Virgo cooperari sibi in inductione formae substan tialis corporis quamvis esset finitae virtutis." ["Since in the case at hand this bodily matter was disposed by the operation of the Holy Spirit, who is an agent of infinite power, the Blessed Virgin, even though her power was finite, could have cooperated with Him in inducing the substantial form of the body."]
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Non enim ita vere convenit lapidi disgregare, quod convenit ei per albedinem, quae est ei accidens per accidens, sicut convenit ei de scendere deorsum, quod convenit ei per naturam suam vel sicut accidens naturale.
2. Similiter, in quo erit istud accidens supernaturle? Si in intel lectu vel voluntate, non videtur esse ratio agendi ad generationem filii, quae actio principaliter competit virtuti vegetativae; si autem ponatur in virtute vegetativa, mirum videtur quomodo illa vis sit capax accidentis supernaturalis.
3. Praeterea tertio, quomodo poterit ista vis, ex quo est creata cooperari vel esse ratio cooperandi in instanti Spiritui sancto, si tamen hoc non potest aliquid, quod est in natura matris?
4. Praeterea, quomodo accidens erit ratio formalis producendi substantiam quae sit terminus generationis? Quod si dicatur vir tutem istam supernaturalem esse tamquam perfectionem intrin secam collatam virtuti vegetativae matris—hoc videtur mirabile, quomodo ista vis facta fuerit intensior, quam esset si naturaliter genuisset, quia tunc esset plus quam mater.
Question Four child. For it is only in an incidental way that a stone scatters light by reason of its whiteness, since this is a purely incidental acci dent, and not like its downward descent that is a natural accident that pertains to a stone by reason of its nature.
2. Similarly, in what will that supernatural accident inhere? If it is in the intellect or in the will, there seems to be no reason why it should be active in the generation of a son, since this action per tains principally to the vegetative [or genital] power.15 But if it is presumed to reside in the vegetative power, one wonders how this power is able to support a supernatural accident.
3. Also, thirdly, how could this power, since it is created, be co operating with the Holy Spirit instantaneously or be the reason for cooperating in this fashion? But if it is this sort of thing, then this power cannot be something pertaining to the nature of the mother.16
4. Furthermore, how will any accident be the formal reason for producing a substance, which is the term of generation. If one says that this supernatural power is like an intrinsic perfection connected with the vegetative power of the mother, then it seems amazing how this power could be made more intense than if it would be if it had generated naturally, because then it would be more than mother.17 Likewise, why could only the intense force act in an instant, whereas the less intense force could not? For as long as forms are of the same sort, even though one be more perfect than another, they seem to be similar as regards whether they act instantaneously or only over a period of time, although one may produce something more perfect than another. This is clear in the case of light, for whether it be more perfect or less perfect, light always produces its illumination instantaneously, even though it be more perfect in one case than in another.
15 See note 8 supra.
16 According to Aristotle, a finite [or created] agent cannot act in an instant; only an infinite power could act instantaneously.
17 The argument seems to be that since a substance is more perfect than any accident, no accidental power could produce a substance; and if that power were increased so that a substance was produced, then that operation would be something so superior as to transcend anything that might be called motherhood.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary [3. Opinio propria Scoti] Potest dici quod si ad matrem pertineat agere sicut ad causam minus principalem, Maria vere fuit mater, quia tota illa actio sibi competebat, quae matri debetur.
[Quare aliqua est mater] Ad quod intelligendum, sciendum est quod in formatione corporis nostri praecedit motus localis de loco ipsius corporis corrumpendi, ad locum convenientem generationi corporis organici ex eo. Hunc motum localem sequitur figuratio il lius corporis transmutati, quae figuratio non est sine motu locali.
Tertio, sequitur condensatio ipsius corporis corrumpendi quae est quaedam alteratio praecedens generationem corporis densioris ex isto corpore rariore, et ista alteratio non est sine loci muta tione, qua non acquiritur novus locus sed occupatur minor locus.
In ultimo instanti istius alterationis inducitur forma, qua corpus est complete organicum, sive illa secundum ali quod sit anima intellectiva, sive secundum alios sit forma alia
Question Four [3. Scotus's personal opinion] It can be said that if to act pertains to the mother as a second ary cause, Mary was truly a mother, for the total action that is due to the mother pertained to her.
[Why anyone is a mother] To understand this, keep in mind that in the formation of our body [first] there is a prior movement from the place where the material that will be transformed is lo cated to a suitable place where an organic body can be produced from it; [second] after this change of place a reconfiguration or re shaping of bodily material occurs, and this reorganization itself involves additional spatial movement; thirdly, the substantial pro duction of the denser body from the more rarified body is preceded by a certain condensation or compacting of the bodily material that alters its qualities, and this alteration itself requires further spa tial change, not that the material is moved to a new location but it does come to occupy a smaller amount of space.
At the final instant of this alteration a [substantial] form is induced that makes the body completely organic.18 Some hold this last form is the intellective soul.19 Others claim another form
18 One of the great theological controversies in the last quarter of the thirteenth century had to do with the question: Is there one or several substantial forms in man? See T. Crowley, O.F.M., The Problem of the Soul in His Philosophical Commentaries (Louvain, 1950); R. Zavalloni, O.F.M.,
Richard of Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes (Phi losophes médiévaux 2; Louvain, 1956). Scotus lists four different theories here. The first is that of unicity, the next three are various interpretations of pluriformism. Scotus does not decide which is more probable though he seems to favor the last, at least in this discussion, since it maximizes the active role Mary would have played in the natural biological processes involved in the formation of Christ's body. See the following note.
19 This would be the view of Thomas Aquinas, whose revolutionary theory that the rational soul is joined immediately to primary matter rather than to an organism with its own material substantial form, was regarded as theologically suspect for many decades. D. A. Callus, "The Problem of Plurality of Forms in the Thirteenth Century. The Thomist
Innovation," L'Hommme et son destin d'après les penseurs du moyen-âge (Louvain, 1960); The Condemnation of St. Thomas at Oxford (Aquinas Pa pers 5; Oxford, 1946). As the Dominican Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of England, Robert Kilwardby pointed out, it is unintelligible that the specific form of the composite performs the activities of all the
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary praecedens illam, et hoc secundum istos secundos, sive ipsa sit una totius corporis organici et partium heterogenearum, sive sit alia totius ab illis, quae sunt propriae et substantiales partium hetero genearum; sive tertio modo, nulla sit forma totius corporis organici alia a formis particularibus partium heterogenearum; et secun dum hoc tertium membrum, corpus esse complete organicum, esset omnes formas partiales esse complete inductas. Et licet secundum tertium membrum istorum posset poni non omnes partiales simul induci, sed una prius ad quam sufficeret alteratio brevior, et alia posterius ad quam sequitur ulterius alteratio prolixior, tamen se cundum omnia tria membra aliquid est in ultimo instanti quod non praefuit, et sine quo non est corpus complete organicum.
[Applicatio ad Mariam] Ad propositum applicando dubium vi detur, utrum tribus motibus praedictis correspondebant in Maria tres motus breviores tamquam in nobis, et si in illis tribus moti bus egerit Maria sicut causa secunda, et Spiritus sanctus ut causa principalis.
Question Four precedes this,20 and according to the latter, either [a] this is a single form for the organic body and its heterogeneous parts as a whole or [b] it is a form that is other than those forms that are proper and substantial to each of the heterogeneous parts, or [c] thirdly there is no form for the body as a whole other than the particular forms of the individual heterogeneous parts; and according to this third view for a body to become fully organic all the partial forms would have to be completely induced. Now one could assume in the case of [c] that not all of these partial forms are induced simulta neously; but even in the first case [a] there is brief alteration that precedes and in the case of [b] this alteration is protracted even longer. Nevertheless, according to all three accounts a state exists at the final moment that did not exist earlier; without this no body is completely organic.
[Application to Mary] When we apply this to the case at hand the question arises: Did the three briefer movements that corre spond to the three changes mentioned above occur in Mary as they do with us, and if so, did Mary act as their secondary cause in con sort with the Holy Spirit as principal cause? forms, and at its presence they all pass away. This theory, he said, is false and against sense experience, faith and morals. The true unity of forms consists essentially in the aggregate of all incomplete forms, essentially different but coordinated, each performing its proper function, and thus constituting with the complete form one composite. Archbishop John Peck ham, his Franciscan successor, claimed it was impossible to safeguard the Catholic teaching on the Incarnation, the Eucharist, the resurrection of the body and other articles of faith. See D. A. Callus, "Forms, Unicity and plurality of," in New Catholic Encyclopedia vol. 5, 1024-1027.
20 Scotus holds the more common theory that in addition to the ra tional soul in man, some purely material substantial form or forms are needed. In regard to the present problem, however, he does not seem too concerned whether or not there is one substantial form of the cadaver in addition to the partial substantial forms of the individual organs.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Si enim hoc ponatur, nec ponetur aliquid quod postea fuit as sumptum a Verbo, aliquando praefuisse in supposito creato, sed tantum quod illud corrumperetur in aliquid assumendum a Verbo; nec poneretur in illis, quae alibi requirunt successionem, hic fuisse sine successione et subito et in istis Mariam in instanti coopera tam fuisse Spiritui sancto, quia licet in instanti cooperata fuerit
Spiritui sancto quantum ad inductionem formae organicae ultimae disponentis ad animam intellectivam non tamen quantum ad il los tres motus primos: quae enim in nobis requirunt successionem sunt illi tres motus et non ipsa ultima inductio formae substantia lis corporis organici.
Si autem negentur17 ibi fuisse illi tres motus, et quod totum fuerit in instanti uno, puta quod in aliquo uno tempore fuerint san guines dispersi in corpore Mariae et numquam in tempore moti ad matricem, nec sic figurati et condensati, sed in ultimo instanti illius temporis erat in loco isto corpus figuratum et densum, sicut est in termino illorum trium motuum, si fuissent tres praeceden tes—adhuc dico quod beata Virgo potuit cooperari Spiritui sancto in ista actione instantanea, et quantum ad formam substantialem istius termini, et quantum ad figuram et densitatem, licet subito inductas.
17 Peter Lombard, Sent. III, dist. 2, c. 3; dist. 3, c. 4 in Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae tom. II (Grottaferrata/Romae: Editiones Collegii S. Bo naventurae Ad Clares Aquas, 1981) 30–31, 35–37.
Question Four For if we assume these three briefer movements did occur, without presuming however either [i] that there was something first present in the created subject that was afterwards assumed by the Word21—or [ii] that those changes that elsewhere would have needed time, here [in Mary's case] took place in a flash with out any succession, and in that instant Mary was cooperating with the Holy Spirit,—[if I say we assume all this] then it follows that even though she would have been cooperating with the Holy Spirit as regards the instantaneous induction of the organic form that finally completes the preparation needed for the reception of the intellective soul, Mary would still be acting on her own [and not by the Holy Spirit] as regards those three first movements. For what in us requires temporal succession are those three movements and not the induction of the organic body's substantial form.
On the other hand, if we deny [in Mary's case] that these three movements where present, and claim the whole event took place in a single instant (for example, her blood substances were not progressively moved to her womb where they were only gradually configured or condensed, but at one moment they were scattered throughout Mary's body, and suddenly at the next moment a dense configured body was in that place where it would have been had those three movements preceded), I still say that the Blessed Vir gin could have cooperated with the Holy Spirit in that instanta neous action and could have done so both [a] as regards the sub stantial form that was the result of the action, and [b] as regards the figure and density, even though both of these were instanta neously induced.
21 Scotus wants to hold that some natural fetal development could have taken place without getting into the theologically suspect notion that the incarnation antedated the advent of the rational soul in Christ's body
(see note 7 above). As he explained in one of his Parisian lectures, even if one holds the indubitable doctrine that all the partial forms of Christ's body are induced in an instant, Mary could have cooperated in that instant just as she could have in the gradual fetal development that preceded.
"Tenendum est igitur indubitanter, quod omnes formae partiales corpo ris Christi inducuntur in instanti, ita quod nulla pars illius corporis as sumenda a Verbo fuit, in aliquod supposito creato, sed pars corrupta ante formationem corporis praefuit in supposito, non, quia ante aliam partem corporis Christi fuit generata prius duratione non pars corporis Christi, quia talis numquam fuit, nisi in supposito increato. Tunc igitur si beata
Virgo habuit operationem in illa actione, cuius terminus fuit organizatio corporis, operabatur in instanti cum operatione Spiritus sancti." Reporta tio Barcinonesis, ed. cit., 266-67.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Hoc probo: quia si non potuisset cooperari, hoc fuisset ex una trium causarum, videlicet:
[1] aut quia non habuit causalitatem activam minus princi palem respectu termini inducti, vel respectu terminorum induc torum; [2] aut quia non potuit secundum illam vim activam agere ad terminos hoc modo inductos; [3] aut tertio modo, quia etsi potuit, tamen praeventa fuit a virtute maiore totum et totaliter operante.
Primum improbatur, quia ipsa habuit virtutem activam sicut aliae matres; ergo ad eosdem terminos, ad quod et aliae; sed aliae matres habent vim activam minus principalem respectu figurae, condensationis et formae substantialis.
Et si dicas, secundum unum istorum trium membrorum, quod in toto sunt multae formae substantiales specie differentes par tium heterogenearum, ad quas simul inducendas, non habet aliqua mater viam activam sufficientem, sed opportet unam prius tem pore induci quam aliam, et ita hic.
Contra, activum non habens terminum adaequatum, potest simul agere respectu alterius; ideo enim tantum in unum potest simul, quia illud est terminus adaequatus virtuti eius, et maxime potest simul in plura non adaequata, si illa includantur in primo adaequato sibi, sed nulla forma partialis est terminus adaequatus huic potentiae, sed forma totius corporis organici alias non pos set in formam totius: igitur cum omnes illae formae partiales in cludantur in toto quod est terminus adaequatus, in omnes illas simul potest.
Secundum membrum improbatur, quia aliqua media sunt necessario media virtuti imperfectiori, quae non sunt necessario media virtuti perfectiori. Agens enim naturale necesse est pro cedere per media determinata, quia subest illi ordini, nam ille praefixus est ab agente superiore; sed agens supremum, quod non subest isti ordini in agendo per ista media. Ex hoc arguo:
Question Four [Proof] This I prove: for if she had been unable to cooperate it would have been for one of three reasons, namely:
[1] either because she had no active secondary causality as re gards the term or terms induced; [2] or because she could not have acted according to this active power on the terms induced in this fashion;
[3] or, thirdly, because she was prevented from acting, even though she could have done so, by reason of a greater force which performed the whole operation.
The first is disproved, because she had the same active power other mothers did; therefore, her power would have had the same results as in the case of the others; but other mothers have a sec ondary active role as regards to the figure, the compacting and the substantial form [of the fetus].
[Objection and Reply] But you may object that according to one of these three possibilities, each of the many heterogeneous parts in the whole has its own specifically different substantial form, and that no mother has sufficient active power to induce all of these at once; rather she must sequentially induce first one form, then another; and that is the way it is here.
To the contrary, if the end result or term [at any stage of the process] is not adequate or equal to all the agent can do, then it can act simultaneously with respect to another term. The only reason it can act on only one thing simultaneously is if that term or end result is equal to all it can do, and especially it can act simultane ously on several things less than adequate if these are included in the end result of what is primarily its adequate term. Now no partial form, but only the form of the organic body as a whole, is the adequate term of this generative power; otherwise that partial form could not exist in the form of the whole; therefore since all these partial forms are included in the whole that is the adequate term, her power extends to all these at once.
The second possibility is disproved, because some means that a less perfect power requires are unnecessary as means for a more perfect power. For a natural agent has to proceed by means of spe cific stages, because it is subject to an order imposed upon it by a higher agent [i.e., by its Creator]; but the Supreme Agent who is not subject to this order in acting, because he imposed this volun tarily [on his creatures], has no need in acting to proceed to by way of these intermediate stages. From this I argue: the Holy Spirit
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Spiritus sanctus et Maria sunt agens perfectius quam pater crea tus et ipsa mater fuissent; ergo ista media, per quae necesse fuis set actionem patris naturalis et Mariae processisse. Si concepisset ex viro, non fuerunt necessaria in illa actione Spiritus sancti et
Mariae.
Quod si dicas, quod ista non necessitas mediorum tantum est propter infinitatem virtutis Spiritus sancti, sed semper remanet aequalis necessitas mediorum respectu virtutis creatae, ut ipsa non possit agere respectu termini, nisi procederet per media sibi necessaria.
Contra hoc, si per media ista deventum fuisset ad terminum, agens non produceret terminum ratione mediorum, quia media tunc non sunt; ergo praecise tunc produceret, quia tunc habet vir tutem activam respectu istius termini; igitur si aliqua virtus facit quod non procedatur per media, sed quod subito agens se habeat ad terminum, sicut se haberet in termino, si processisset per me dia, eodem modo potest idem agens agere quod non transivit per media, sicut si transisset; sed Spiritus sanctus posset facere quod hic non esset transitus per ista media, sicut probat ratio praedicta, et cum hoc stare potest quod virtus activa matris eadem fuisset, quae fuisset inter media talis transitus: ergo per illam virtutem activam potest aeque agere in termino praetermissis mediis, sicut si ante actionem in terminum transisset per media.
Tertium membrum improbatur, quia Spiritus sanctus libere agit; ergo non necessario agit secundum ultimum suae potentiae; igitur potest ad aliquid se extendere causalitate causae secundae cooperante secum, et ita potest supplere virtutem patris naturalis, vel etiam efficacius operari quam pater, si esset. Et poterit Maria cooperari secundum causalitatem suam, quia nihil ab ea auferetur per hoc quod Spiritus sanctus habet causationem suam, qui non eam tollit praeveniendo, licet suppleat eminenter causalitatem al terius causae cum qua posset concausare.
Question Four and Mary together are a more perfect agent than a created father and this mother would have been; therefore these intermediate stages that would have been needed for the action to proceed if Mary had conceived with the cooperation of a natural father, were unnecessary in that co-action of Mary and the Holy Spirit.
[Objection and Reply] Suppose you say it is only because the Holy Spirit's power is infinite that there is no need to make use of intermediary stages, but that necessity always remains where a created power is concerned, so that it can never act with respect to the final term or end result unless it has gone through the neces sary steps.
On the contrary: if it were by such means that the final result came about, the agent would still not produce that last effect by reason of those means, because then [at the end of the process] they no longer exist. Hence, the agent would produce precisely then, because at that moment it did have active power with re spect to this end result. Hence, if some virtue brought it about that [this agent] did not proceed through the intermediary steps, but suddenly found itself at the end, in the same condition as it would have been had it arrived there by way of intermediary stages, it could act in the same way that it could have if such a passage through the media had occurred. Hence, through her active power she could act equally well in the end without having gone through the intermediate stages as she could have had she passed through them before acting.
The third possibility is disproved, because the Holy Spirit acts freely; and hence he does not have to act to the fullest measure of his power. Consequently, he can extend the causal action of a secondary cause cooperating with him in effecting something, and thus can supply the virtue of a natural father, or even to act more efficaciously than a father could had there been such. And Mary could have cooperated in her causal role, because nothing was tak en from her causation by the fact that the Holy Spirit exercised his causality in a way that stole nothing from hers preventively, though it did supply in a more splendid fashion the causality of the other agent with which she could have cooperated causally.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Ex istis tribus membris improbatis potest formari ratio talis:
Omnis causa activa habens virtutem respectu alicuius effec tus, et non praeventa ab alio totaliter causante illum effectum, in illo instanti in quo producitur, potest agere ad productionem eius;
Maria fuit talis, si aliae matres sunt tales, et hoc ut causa activa non principalis: ergo, etc.
Istud declaratur per auctoritatem Damasceni, 4818 quod Spiri tus sanctus dedit ei potentiam susceptivam, simul autem et gen erativam, non quod miraculose dederit ei illam fecunditatem, qua cooperabatur; sed illam habuit naturaliter, quia non fuit sterilis, et secundum eam potuisset naturaliter cooperari ad productio nem filii, si pater naturalis genuisset; sed potentia activa causae inferioris est remota, quando causa superior non agit, ita quod numquam est causa inferior in potentia propinqua ad effectum, nisi superiore causa agente, quia illa superior primo determinatur, et ipsa determinata inferior necessario cooperatur, si inferior sit causa naturalis. Secundum autem communem ordinem, vis activa matris nata est subordinari vi activae patris, et ita a patre conferri matri potentia propinqua ad generandum, non autem illa remota matris, quae est actus eius primus, quo ipsa dicitur fecunda. Haec potentia propinqua non conferebatur Mariae ex tali causa, sed tan tum immediate a Spiritu sancto habente vim principalis causae; et ideo Spiritus sanctus dedit ei vim generativam, hoc est potentiam generandi propinquam secundum illam vim naturalem, qua ipsa erat naturaliter fecunda, sed susceptivam dedit ei inquantum erat generativa Verbi. Sicut enim natura, ad quam ut ad formalem ter minum erat ista generatio, tantum erat in potentia obedientalem, ut esset mater Verbi, quia Verbum subsistebat in natura sibi unita.
18 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 46, n. 2 (Buytaert edition, 171).
Question Four From the refutation of these three alternatives an argument of the following sort can be constructed.
Every active cause having virtue as regards some effect, and not prevented totally from causing it, at that instant in which it is produced, can act cooperatively to produce it. Mary was such, if other mothers are such, and this in the role of a secondary active cause; therefore, etc.
This is what that citation from Damascene 48 declares to be so, viz., "the Holy Spirit gave her at once both the power to re ceive [i.e., the divinity of the Word] and to beget,"—not that he gave her that fecundity whereby she cooperated in a miraculous manner, since she possessed that naturally, because she was not sterile. Now by reason of that power she could have cooperated naturally in the production of a son, if a natural father had begot ten it. But the potency of the lesser active cause is remote when a superior cause fails to act, so that the secondary cause is never in proximate potency to produce the effect unless the superior cause is acting. According to the common order of things, however, the active power of the mother is suited by nature to be subordinated to the active power of the father, and thus the immediate ability to beget is conferred on the mother by the father, but not the mother's remote power which is the first act22 whereby she is said to be fer tile. This proximate power was not conferred on Mary by such a cause [i.e., by a natural father], but only immediately by the Holy
Spirit having the power of the primary cause; therefore the Holy Spirit "gave her the power to beget," i.e., the proximate potency to use this native power in virtue of which she was naturally fertile.
He "gave her the power to receive," however, insofar as she begot the Word. For just as the nature, which was the formal term of this generation, was only in obediential potency23 to be united with the Word, so that its mother only had the obediential potency to be the mother of the Word, because the Word subsisted in the nature that was united to itself.
22 By "first act" Scotus refers to the soul or substantial form which in forms body and makes it a complete human nature with all its generative properties. Scotus's point here is that the generative power is part of her nature, something she had by reason of the first act or substantial form, not by reason of the presence and cooperation of the other essential agent of procreation.
23 Obediential potency means the potentiality any created thing has to be subject to special divine intervention.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary [Dubium ejusque resolutio] Sed hic est unum dubium, quia si, secundum dicta in quaestione de rationibus seminalibus,19 ratio seminalis non est principium agendi in generatione, quia tunc non manet, sicut nec substantia quam consequitur, sed tantum est ra tio agendi in alteratione praecedente generationem, et hic nulla paecessit generationem: sequitur quod hic ex parte matris nulla fuit actio per rationem seminalem, et ita nec per ullam vim acti vam in materia ministrata.
Hoc concedendum esset secundum illa, sed tamen ipsa mater potuit immediate operari in ipso instanti generationis, quia ipsa immediate fuit praesens, et habuit vim activam generativam re spectu termini actionis. Et ita forte est in aliis matribus, quod non tantum per vim activam in materiam ministratam agunt, sed eti am ipsae, corrupta illa vi activa in semine in instanti generationis, sicut substantia in qua est, immediate agunt ad terminum genera tionis producendum; quod videtur probabile, quia posito illo cor pore sic alterato in illo instanti per potentiam divinam extra ma tricem, non fieret generatio, et tamen idem passum esset, et eadem agentia essent approximata, ut videtur, nisi de sola matre. Et tunc si ponatur semen patris corrumpi in illo instanti, puta quia est pars prolis, verius mater agit quam pater, quia ipsa immediate in instanti generationis et pater non, sed tantum in alteratione prae via per illam vim activam, quae fuit in semine patris; vel si ponatur semen patris manere in instanti generationis,et vim activam ma nere in eo, nec illud semen converti in corpus prolis, sed post for mationem corporis resolvi in aliud, adhuc in instanti generationis mater poterit agere et pater per illam vim dimissam in semine. Nec videtur istud multum inconveniens, attribuere tantam actionem matri, quia facta decisione seminis patris, tota sequens formatio usque ad partum videtur principaliter sequi conditiones matris: si habeat matricem calidam est bene dispositam, etc.
19 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d 18, q. unica (ed. Vivès, XIII, 85-86, XIII, 85-86).
Question Four [A doubt and its solution] But here a doubt occurs. According to what was said in the question about seminal reasons, a seminal reason is not a principle of acting in generation because it no lon ger remains at that time like the material substance in which it is rooted. It is only a source of action in the alteration that precedes the generation, and here no such alteration precedes this genera tion. It follows that here on the mother's part, no seminal reason or any active virtue in the matter was involved in her action.
True, on this score one would have to admit this. However, the mother herself could have operated immediately in that moment of generation, for she was immediately present and had an active generative power with respect to the term of the action. And thus perhaps it is in other mothers that they not only act through the active power in the matter they provide, but also they themselves continue to act to bring the generation to term, once the active power semen had at the instant of generation has perished, just as that substance itself has. And this seems probable, because granted that the body outside the womb was altered in such an in stantaneous way by divine power, generation would not take place, and nevertheless the same patient would be there and the same agents would be present except the mother. And then if one as sumes the father's semen perishes at that moment, for instance, since it is part of the child, the mother acts even more truly than the father does. For she acts immediately at the moment of concep tion, whereas the father does not. He is only active in the previous alteration through that active power which was in his seed. Or if one assumes that the father's semen together with its active power remains until the moment of generation, and is not converted into the body of the child until after the formation of the body, it is still true that at the instant of generation or conception the mother could act together with the residual power in the father's seed. Nei ther does it seem unfitting to attribute such action to the mother, for once the seed has fallen from the father, the whole formation that follows up to birth seems to be conditioned by the mother; for instance, if the womb is warm and well disposed, etc.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary [Problema II: Fuitne Maria naturaliter mater?]
Sed estne concedendum, quod Maria fuit naturalis mater Christi, vel miraculose generavit Christum?
Respondeo: Anselmus, De conceptu virginali, cap. 11,20 di cit hanc generationem fuisse miraculosam, et hoc quidem verum est quantum ad modum reducendi potentiam naturalem activam
Mariae ad actum, quae naturaliter non reducitur ad actum nisi a causa activa determinata naturali, scilicet vi activa patris natu ralis. Fuit etiam miraculosa quantum ad modum procedendi in ista generatione, quia vel erat omnino subita, qualis non est processus naturalis in generatione hominis, vel si successiva illi motus qui praecesserunt generationem erant in ita brevi tempore,in quanto non sunt nati fieri naturaliter. Sed ex parte ipsius potentiae acti vae Mariae erat naturalitas, quia ista potentia erat ei naturalis, secundum quam erat naturaliter fecunda, et potuisset concepisse a patri naturali, et naturaliter egisse ad productionem prolis, et propter istam potentiam activam naturalem, qua operabatur po test dici naturalis mater Christi, et tamen propter modum exse quendi actum huius potentiae duplicem non naturalem, potest dici non naturaliter, sed miraculose genuisse.
[Ad Argumenta Contra] Ad primum—dico quod virgo et mater non opponuntur aliqua oppositione formali, nec ut privativa, nec ut contraria; virgini tas enim tantum privat actionem causae naturalis superioris ad causam activam matris; maternitas autem non necessario ponit actionem illius causae superioris, sed tantum illam communiter concomitatur ista actio; sed si alius suppleat actionem illam cau sae naturalis potest esse maternitas secundum totam suam ra tionem, et tamen cum privatione actionis causae superioris, et ita cum virginitate; et ita fuit hic.
Exemplum: Obiectum creatum, natum est concausare cum intellectu meo intellectionem; intellectum igitur concipere noti tiam communiter requirit obiectum creatum movere intellectum, sed non requirit hoc ex per se ratione sua; si enim Deus suppleat
Question Four [Second Problem: How natural was Mary's motherhood?] But do we have to concede that Mary was the natural mother of Christ, or did she miraculously generate Christ?
I reply: Anselm in De conceptu virginali, ch. 11, claims this gen eration was miraculous, and this indeed is true so far as the man ner in which Mary's potentially active power was made to function, for naturally such power is only made to act by a specific active natural cause, namely the active power of a natural father. It was also miraculous as regards the time-span required for this gen eration to take place, because either it was wholly instantaneous, which is not the natural procedure in the human generation; or, if it was a successive process, those changes which precede genera tion occurred in a period of time too brief to be characteristic of any natural process. But there was something naturalistic about Mary's active potency, since it was something she had by nature and on the basis of which she was naturally fertile, and could have conceived by way of a natural father and produced a child natu rally. And she can be called the natural mother of Christ in virtue of this natural active power by which she functioned. But because of the doubly peculiar manner in which this power was exercised, it was not something natural, and she can be said to have begotten not naturally but miraculously.
[To the Arguments to the Contrary] To the first, I say that "virgin" and "mother" are not formally opposed to one another, neither as contraries nor in the sense that one is a privation of the other. For virginity only implies a privation of any [genital] action of a higher natural cause [i.e., of a man] with the mother as active cause. Maternity, however, does not necessar ily require the action of such a higher cause; rather this action only accompanies maternity as a general rule. But if another supplies for that [genital] action of the natural cause, maternity in all its es sentials can coexist with the privation of any [genital] action of the higher [i.e., the male] cause, and thus maternity can coexist with virginity; and so it is here.
For example: a created object is suited by nature to cooperate causally with my intellect. For the intellect to conceive a notion, it is commonly required that some created object move the intellect.
But this is not something essential that is required per se for the mind to conceive of something, for if God, by moving the intellect,
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary actionem obiecti movendo intellectum, potest intellectus eandem notitiam concipere, quam conciperet obiecto movente. Et ita, si in tellectus, Deo movente illum terminum, non moveretur ab obiecto creato, et designaretur per nomen virginitatis vel incorruptibilita tis vel impassibilitatis, non repugnaret aliquo modo formaliter et intellectum concipere et virginem esse; ita est hic.
Sed si obiicias de parere, quia clausa non potest parere—re spondeo, ibi fuit miraculum, quod corpus simul fuit cum alio corpo re, et forte novum miraculum aliud ab illo, quo Virgo concepit sine actione causae naturalis superioris; sed de partu satis communiter conceditur tamquam non difficile, quod ibi operabatur quidquid aliae matres, sicut et in fovendo, conservando et nutriendo fetum in utero. Et tamen ibi forte posset fieri difficultas specialis, quod nulla esset vis activa in matre potens movere corpus prolis locali ter ad exeundum, et maxime ad essendum simul cum alio corpore, quia nulla virtus creata potest movere localiter corpus ad aliquod ubi, nisi expellat aliud corpus, item hoc verum est non loquendo de corpore glorioso.
Ad secundum—dico quod Damascenus non negat eam absolute esse matrem Christi, sed contra Nestorium, qui sub illo vocabulo voluit eam negare esse matrem Dei, ponendo quod peperit purum hominem. Unde post illam auctoritatem subdit:21 "In destructione eius quae Dei Genitricis vocis, nequam Nestorius, solius naturae honorificatae super omnem creaturam Dei Genitricis, etsi ipse cor rumpatur cum impio satana, adinvenit ut reprobatum"; non ergo negavit illud, sed noluit cum haeretico illo in sermone communi care, qui sub vocabulo illo occultabat suum venenum.
21 Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, c. 56, n. 5 (Buytaert edition, 210-11).
Question Four were to supply for the action of the object, the intellect could con ceive the same notion, that it could if the object were moving it.
And so, if we were to designate an intellect, as moved by God to form that notion without being moved by an created object, by the name "virginal" or "undefiled" or "untouched," there would be noth ing repugnant about an intellect formally being both virginal and conceiving. And so it is here.
And if you object about "to give birth," because one who is closed24 cannot give birth, I say: here there was a miracle, that one body could coexist simultaneously with another body, and perhaps it is a new miracle other than that by which the Virgin conceived without the action of a natural higher cause. But as for the birth, it is commonly conceded that it was not difficult, because here she performed whatever other mothers did in fostering, conserving and nourishing the fetus in the womb. But perhaps there could still be a special difficulty here, because there would be no active force in the mother able to locally move or push the body of the child to the outside, especially if it has to pass through space occupied by another body, because no created power can locally move a body to some place unless it expels another body, at least this is true if one is not speaking of a glorified body.
To the second, I say that Damascene did not deny categorically that she was the mother of Christ, but he wanted to contradict
Nestorius, who used this designation to deny she was the mother of God by stating she begot a mere human. Consequently, after mak ing this statement, Damascene adds: "It was to do away with her title 'Mother of God,' that Nestorius, corrupted by unholy Satan, invented this epithet as an insult to her who alone is truly worthy of honor above all creation." Therefore, Damascene did not deny
[Mary was the mother of Christ], but had no wish to share the lan guage of this heretic, who used this designation to hide his venom.
24 That is, whose hymen (or seal of virginity) is unbroken.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Ad aliud—dico quod omne activum et passivum in communi necessario ad invicem referuntur. Non tamen ita necessarium est esse de hoc activo et hoc passivo, quia aliud activum vicem huius activi supplere potest. Ita in proposito, pater dicit tale activum spe ciale, et eius actio supplebatur hic ab alio agente.
Ad ultimum—conceditur quod si aliae matres agant, et ista egit ad hanc generationem.
Cum arguitur de instanti patet responsio ex solutione quaes tionis; quia in toto tempore preaecedente cooperata fuisset, bene concederetur in ultimo instanti potuisse cooperari ad formam in ducibilem in illo instanti, sed non fuisset tunc cooperata in instanti per operationem in tempore, quia illa tunc non fuisset; ergo tantum per virtutem activam, quam habuisset, hanc eamdem habuit, licet non egerit ad illa intermedia, quae in tempore causarentur.
Ad illa pro opinione prima"
Ad Philosophum—exponitur quod mater non est causa princi palis agens; ipsa enim principalius ministrat materiam, quia plus corpus prolis formatur de materia ministrata a matre quam de ma teria ministrata a patre, et si aliter intelligat Philosophus, negatur quia Galens22 sentit oppositum, sicut recitat Avincenna,23 et in istis magis credendum est expertis.
Ad Augustinum, X Super Genesim—dico quod solus ille effec tus producitur secundum rationes seminales, ad cuius productio nem vis activa creata concurrit ut totalis causa; non sic erat in proposito, quia etsi Maria per vim naturalem egerit, non tamen totalis causa erat causa naturalis, sed principalior erat Spiritus
Sanctus.
22 Galen, De usu partium corporis humani, De semine mulieris, liber I (Opera omnia II [Venetiis, 1586], 331.
23 Avicenna, IX De animalibus, cap. 2 (Venetiis, 1508) fol. 41.
Question Four To the other [n. 4] I say that generally speaking [in the case of human generation] the active and passive factors are related to one another necessarily. But this need not be so with what is ac tive and what is passive in a particular instance, since something else can replace what is normally active. And in the present case a father is said to be the one particularly active in such a way, and his action was supplied by another agent.
To the last [n. 3],25 we concede that if other mothers function actively so too did this woman in this particular generation.—And when it is argued that this action was instantaneous, the answer is clear from the solution to the question. For if she would have been cooperating during the entire preceding period of time, at the last instant she could admittedly have cooperated with a form that could be induced instantaneously. But she would not have cooper ated at that moment by some operation that took time, since such did not exist then. Therefore, solely through the active power which a woman would have had [at that instant], this person actually did have, although she would not have been acting in regard to those intermediate operations, which would have required time.
[To the arguments for the first opinion] To the Philosopher: his citation is interpreted as meaning that the mother is not the prin cipal active cause; for she primarily provides the matter, because the body of the child is formed more from the material provided by the mother than that given by the father. And if the Philosopher may have thought otherwise, then what he claims is denied, be cause Galen held the opposite as Avicenna records, and in these matters we should give more credence to the experts.
As for Augustine in Bk. X On Genesis, I say seminal reasons only produce an effect where some active cause concurs; but it was not this way in the case at hand, because even though Mary acted through her natural power, this natural cause was not the total cause, but the Holy Spirit played the major causal role.
25 Since Scotus has just replied to argument 4 and considers 5 and 6 to have been answered by his interpretation of St. John Damascene in the body of the question supra), only argument 3 remains to be answered.