QUESTION ONE
Question One The Predestination of Christ and His Mother
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary
DE PREDESTINATIONE CHRISTI
EIUSQUE MATRIS1
Tertium quaero, utrum Christus praedestinatus sit esse Filius Dei.
[Argumenta Pro et Contra] Quod non:
Quia non secundum quod Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, quia non praecessit eius esse praedestinatio, et praedes tinatio dicit praecessionem ad illud quod praedestinatur; neque se cundum quod homo, quia secundum quod aliquid praedestinatur esse aliquale, secundum hoc est esse Filius Dei, secundum quod homo praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, secundum quod homo est
Filius Dei, quod est falsum.
Contra:
Romans 1:3-4: "Factus est ex semine David qui praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei in virtute."
[Corpus Questionis] Respondeo: Cum praedestinatio sit praeordinatio alicuius ad gloriam principaliter et ad alia in ordine ad gloriam, et huic na turae humanae in Christo praeordinata sit gloria, et unio ista in Verbo in ordine ad gloriam, quia non tanta gloria fuisset sibi con ferenda, si non esset unita, sicut modo collata est; quemadmodum igitur merita cadunt sub praedestinatione, sine quibus non ordi naretur de congruo quis ad tantam gloriam sine eis sicut cum eis, ita videtur ista unio ordinari ad tantam gloriam de congruo, licet non tamquam meritum cecidisset sub praedestinatione; et ita sicut praedestinatum est hanc naturam uniri Verbo, ita praedestinatum est Verbum esse hominem, et hunc hominem esse Verbum. Conse quentiae probantur per simile, sicut dictum est de factione passiva.
1 Ordinatio III, dist. 7, q. 3 (from the text edited by C. Balić, O.F.M. in Ioannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Mariani Theologiae Marianae Elementa
(Sibenici, 1933), 1-10.
Question One
THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST
AND HIS MOTHER
I ask: Was Christ predestined to be the Son of God?
[Arguments Pro and Con] Negative view:
Not as Son of God was he predestined to be the Son of God, for predestination must be prior to the event predestined, and there was no predestination prior to the existence of the Son of God. Nei ther is he predestined as man, for if as something one is predes tined to be a certain kind of thing, then as such one is that kind of thing. Consequently, if as man he is predestined to be the Son of God, in so far as he is a man he is the Son of God, which is false.
[Positive view]:
On the contrary: Romans 1:3-4: "He who was born of the seed of David...was predestined the Son of God in power."
[Body of the Question] I reply: Predestination consists in foreordaining someone first of all to glory and then to other things which are ordered to glory.
Now the human nature in Christ was predestined to be glorified, and in order to be glorified, it was predestined to be united to the Word, in as much as such glory as it was granted would never have been conferred on this nature had it not been so united. Now if it would not be fitting to ordain one to such glory if certain merits were absent, whereas it would be fitting if they were present, then such merits are included in the predestination. And so it would seem that this union by way of fitness is ordered to this glory, al though it is not exactly as merit that it falls under this predesti nation. And just as it is foreordained that this nature be united to the Word, so it is predestined that the Word be man and that this man be the Word. The validity of these last two inferences may be established as we did [in the previous question where we proved that since the hypostatic union did not always exist, it is correct to say both that "God became man" and "And man became God"].
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Et si dicas, quod predestinatio primo respicit personam, et ita oportet hic primo invenire aliquam personam cui primo Deus praedestinavit gloriam et istam unionem in ordine ad gloriam; nulli autem personae divinae praedestinavit istam unionem: non personae Verbi, ut Verbi, patet; non autem illi personae ut subsis tenti in natura humana quia sic includitur illa unio.
Respondeo: Potest negari illa propositio quod praedestinatio respicit solam personam; sicut enim Deus potest omne bonum ali ud a se diligere, non tantum suppositum sed naturam, ita etiam potest alii a se praeoptare vel praeordinare bonum illi conveniens, et ita naturae et non tantum personae praeoptare gloriam et unio nem in ordine ad gloriam. Verum est tamen quod in omnibus aliis ab isto, praedestinatio respicit personam, quia in nullo alio praeor dinavit Deus bonum naturae nisi praeordinando bonum personae, quia nulla natura est nisi in persona creata, cui ita potest bonum praeordinari. Non sic in proposito.
Sed hic sunt duo dubia: Primum, utrum ista praedestinatio praeexigat necessario lapsum naturae humanae, quod videntur so nare multae auctoritates, quae sonant Filium Dei numquam fuisse incarnatum, si homo non cecidisset.
Sine praeiudicio potest dici quod, cum praedestinati cuius cumque ad gloriam praecedat ex parte obiecti naturaliter prae scientiam peccati vel damnationis cuiuscumque, secundum opin ionem ultimam dictam dist. 41 primi libri,2 multo magis est hoc verum de praedestinatione illius animae quae praedestinabatur ad summam gloriam; universaliter enim ordinate volens prius vi detur velle hoc quod est fini propinquius, et ita sicut prius vult glo riam alicui quem gratiam, ita etiam inter praedestinatos, quibus vult gloriam, ordinate prius videtur velle gloriam illi, quem vult esse proximum fini, et ita huic animae prius vult gloriam quam alicui alteri animae velit gloriam, et prius cuilibet alteri gloriam et gratiam quam praevideat illi opposita istorum habituum.
2 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, dist. 41, q. unica (Vatican ed., VI, 312-39).
Question One But you may object that primarily predestination regards the person and hence one must first find some person to whom God predestined (1) the glory and then (2) this union with reference to the glory. Now you will find no divine Person to whom God pre destined this union [as a means of glory]. Obviously he did not do so to the Word in so far as he is the Word. Neither was this union predestined as a means of glory to the Word as subsisting in a hu man nature, because to the extent that he subsists in this way, the union is already included.
I reply: we can deny that predestination concerns persons only, for if God can love a good other than himself, not only when it is a person, but also when it is a nature, then for its sake he can also se lect and ordain in advance some good suitable to it. Consequently, he can choose (1) glory and (2) the union as a means of glory, not only for the person, but also for some nature. It is true, however, that in all cases other than this, predestination does concern the person, for in no other instance has God foreordained a good to a [human] nature without by that very fact foreordaining it also to some person, for the simple reason that no other human nature subsists save in a created person to whom the good can be foreor dained. But in our case this is not so.
At this point, however, two doubts arise. First, does this predes tination depend necessarily upon the fall of human nature? Many authorities seem to say as much when they declare the Son of God would never have become incarnate had man not fallen.
Without passing judgment it can be said that so far as priority of objects intended by God is concerned, the predestination of any one to glory is prior by nature to the prevision of the sin or damna tion of anyone (according to the final opinion given in distinction forty-one of the first book).
So much the more then is this true of the predestination of that soul which was destined beforehand to possess the very high est glory possible. For it seems to be universally true that one who wills ordinately, and not inordinately, first intends what is nearer the end, and just as he first intends one to have glory before grace, so among those to whom he has foreordained glory, he who wills ordinately, would seem to intend first the glory of the one he wishes to be nearest the end, and therefore he intends glory to this soul [of Christ] before he wills glory to any other soul, and to every other soul he wills glory before taking into account the opposite of these habits [namely, the sin or damnation of anyone].
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary Omnes autem auctoritates possunt exponi sic, scilicet quod
Christus non venisset ut redemptor, nisi homo cecidisset, nec forte ut passibilis, quia non fuit aliqua necessitas ut illa anima a prin cipio gloriosa, cui Deus praeoptavit non tantum summam gloriam, sed etiam coevam illi animae, quod unita fuisset corpori passibili.
Sed nec fuisset redemptio, nisi homo peccasset, facienda; sed non propter illam solam videtur Deus praedestinasse illam animam ad tantam gloriam, cum illa redemptio sive gloria animae redimen dae non sit tantum bonum, quantum est illa gloria animae Christi; nec est verisimile tam summum bonum in entibus esse tantum occasionatum propter minus bonum solum, nec est verisimile ip sum prius praeordinasse Adam ad tantum bonum quam Christum, quod tamen sequeretur. Immo et absurdius ulterius sequeretur, scilicet quod praedestinando Adam ad gloriam, prius praevidisset ipsum casurum in peccatum quam praedestinasset Christum ad gloriam, si praedestinatio illius animae tantum esset pro redemp tione aliorum.
Potest igitur dici quod prius natura quam aliquid praevideba tur circa peccatorem sive de peccato sive de poena, Deus praeelegit ad illam curiam caelestem omnes quod voluit habere angelos et homines, in certis et determinatis gradibus, et nullus est praedes tinatus tantum, quia alius praevisus est casurus, ut ita nullum oporteat gaudere de lapsu alterius.
Secundum dubium est, an prius praevidebatur huic naturae unio eius ad Verbum vel ordo ad gloriam.
Potest dici quod, cum in actione artificis sit contrarius proces sus in exequendo ei, qui est in intendendo, et Deus prius natura or dine executionis univit sibi naturam humanam quam contulit sibi gratiam summam vel gloriam, econverso posset poni in intenden do, ut sit Deus primo volens aliquam naturam non summam ha bere summam gloriam, ostendens quia non oporteret eum conferre gloriam secundum ordinem naturarum et quasi secundo voluit il lam naturam esse in persona Verbi, ut sic angelus non ponatur subesse homini.
Question One Authorities to the contrary can all be explained in the sense that Christ would not have come as redeemer, if man had not sinned. Perhaps, too, he would not have been able to suffer, since there would have been no need of a union with a passible body for this soul glorified from its first moment of existence, to which God chose to give not only the highest glory but also willed that it be always present. If man had not sinned, of course, there would have been no need of a redemption. Still it does not seem to be solely because of the redemption that God predestined this soul to such glory, since the redemption or the glory of the souls to be redeemed is not comparable to the glory of the soul of Christ. Neither is it likely that the highest good in the whole of creation is something that merely chanced to take place, and that only because of some lesser good. Nor is it probable that God predestined Adam to such a good before he predestined Christ. Yet all this would follow, yes, and even something more absurd. If the predestination of Christ's soul was for the sole purpose of redeeming others, it would follow that in foreordaining Adam to glory God would have had to fore see him as having fallen into sin before he could have predestined
Christ to glory.
Consequently, we can say that God selected for his heavenly choir all the angels and men he wished to have with their varied degrees of perfection, and all this before considering either the sin or the punishment of the sinner. No one therefore is predestined simply because God foresaw another would fall, lest anyone have reason to rejoice at the misfortune of another.
Our second doubt is this. Which did God intend first, the union of this nature with the Word, or its ordination to glory? Now the sequence in which the creative artist evolves his plan is the very opposite of the way he puts it into execution. One can say, however, that in the order of execution. God's union with a human nature is naturally prior to his granting it the greatest grace and glory.
We could presume, then, that it was in the reverse order that he intended them, so that God would first intend that some nature, not the highest, should receive the highest glory, proving thereby he was not constrained to grant glory in the same measure as he bestowed natural perfection. Then secondly, as it were, he willed that this nature should subsist in the Person of the Word, so that the angel might not be subject to a [mere] man.
John Duns Scotus: Four Questions on Mary [Ad Argumentum Contra] Ad argumentum potest concedi quod secundum quod homo, praedestinatus est esse Filius Dei, prout ly "secundum quod" di cit formalem rationem, secundum quam extremum determinate accipitur in se. Formaliter enim ille homo est Deus, et illum ho minem, id est personam ut existentem in natura humana, prae cessit praedestinatio ut esset Deus, sic ille homo Deus factus est.
Si autem ly "secundum quod" accipitur proprie ut nota reduplica tionis, ita scilicet quod dicat causam inhaerentiae praedicati ipsi subiecto; hoc modo, non secundum quod homo est Deus, quia non humanitate est Deus.
Alio modo potest distingui maior, cum dicitur quod praedes tinatus est esse Deus secundum hoc est Deus, quia scilicet ly "se cundum quod" potest determinare actum praedestinandi sub hoc sensu secundum hoc quod praedestinatus secundum hoc est Deus; vel terminum praedestinationis sic, secundum quod est Deus se cundum hoc est Deus. Primo modo est maior falsa et sic minor vera; secundo maior est vera et minor falsa.
Tertio modo potest dici et forte realius, quod neque secundum quod homo neque secundum quod Deus, praedestinatus est esse
Filius Dei, quia hoc quod est praedestinari esse Filius Dei, includit duo: quorum alterum requirit in termino aliquid temporale, puta praedestinari; alterum requirit idem esse aeternum, puta hoc quod est esse Filium Dei. Nunc autem nihil idem est ratio istorum am borum in termino, licet enim in termino concurrant duo: unum temporale quod potest esse terminus praedestinationis; alterum aeternum, propter quod conveniat sibi istud esse Filium Dei; ta men non propter aliquam unam naturam conveniunt sibi ambo ista. Si autem concederetur aliud "secundum quod" respectu totius praedicati notaretur esse causa respectu amborum in praedicato.
Et ideo proprie logice loquendo neque secundum quod homo, neque secundum quod Deus vel Filius Dei praedestinatus est esse Deus vel Filius Dei.
Question One [Reply to the Initial Argument] As for the argument [for the negative view], one could concede he is predestined to be the Son of God "as man" to the extent that "as" designates the formal aspect under which the predicate is af firmed of him in a restricted sense. For formally speaking, this man is God, and the predestination to be God precedes this man, i.e., the Person as existing in a human nature. And in consequence of this predestination, this man becomes God. But if you understand the word "as" properly as indicating reduplication, so that it expresses the precise reason why the predicate is true of the subject, then it is not correct to say "As man, he is God" because it is not by reason of his humanity that he is God.
Another way the argument could be solved would be to distin guish the major where it says; "If as something one is predestined to be God, then as such one is God." For "as something" can qualify either the act of predestination or its term. In the first case the meaning would be: "If one is predestined as a man, he is thereby
God," in which case the major is false whereas the minor [viz., "As man he is predestined to be the Son of God"] is true. In the second case the meaning would be: "As the man who is God, as such he is
God," in which case the major is true but the minor [viz., "In so far as he is a man, he is the Son of God"] is false.
Or we can say, thirdly–and this perhaps is the real answer– neither as man nor as God is he predestined to be the Son of God.
For that which is predestined to be the Son of God, includes two el ements, one of which implies temporality in the terms, namely "to be predestined"; whereas the other implies that the same term is eternal, namely, that this thing which is exists as Son of God. One and the same thing, however, cannot be the basis for both char acteristics in the term. For even though two things concur in the term, one temporal which can be the terminus of predestination, the other eternal by reason of which "to be the Son of God" can be predicated of it, still both do not pertain to the term by reason of the same nature. To speak properly, therefore, from the standpoint of logic, neither as man, nor as God or Son of God is he predestined to be God or Son of God.