II. The Soteriology of the Scholastic Period
understood as intellectual assent to the truth? Do the early Fathers relate faith to justification? Have they a proper conception of this relation? Do they regard good works merely as the fruits of faith, or as meritorious performances? How do they conceive of the forgiveness of sins after baptism? What did Cyprian mean, when he wrote, "There can be no salvation to any except in the Church"? In how far does Augustine regard divine grace as operating in a purely monergistic manner? Did he consider regeneration as a sure sign of election? Did he regard it as possible that some of the elect are finally lost?
Literature: Means, Faith, An Historical Study, pp. 80–176; Scott, The Nicene Theology, Lecture IV; Buchanan, The Doctrine of Justification, pp. 77–98; Swete, The Forgiveness of Sins, pp. 87–116;
Bavinck, Gereformeerde Dogmatiek, III, pp. 573–586; Wiggers, Augustinianism and Pelagianism, pp. 177–228; Otten, Manual of the History of Dogmas, I, pp. 89–98, 180–189, 368–381; Sheldon,
History of Christian Doctrines, I, pp. 125–132, 258–267; Crippen, History of Christian Doctrine, pp. 146–153; Seeberg, History of Doctrines, I, cf.
Index under "grace,"
"faith," justification," "baptism," "penance," "good works," and so forth.
II. The Soteriology of the Scholastic Period When we come to the scholastic period, we meet with a variety of opinions respecting the main elements of the saving process, such as grace, faith, justification, merit, and good works. On the whole the position of the Church was that of a mild Augustinianism. though there appears in the Schoolmen a drift in the direction of SemiPelagianism. We shall briefly consider some of the main concepts.
1. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF GRACE. There was one point on which the prevailing opinion among the Scholastics was in agreement with Augustinianism rather than with Pelagianism and
Semi-Pelagianism. While the latter asserted that it lay in the power of the natural man to originate and increase faith, the Scholastics generally maintained that man could not do this without the aid of sufficient grace. But this is about as far as the agreement with Augustine went. And even here the agreement was not complete, for Augustine asserted the necessity of efficient grace. There was no general agreement on the subject of grace among the Schoolmen.
The views of Peter the Lombard, which show an unmistakable affinity with those of Augustine, were rather widely accepted. He considered it difficult to define the exact nature of grace, but preferred to think of it as a supernatural quality or power wrought in man, and distinguished between a gratia operans, which enables man to turn to God in faith, and a gratia co-operans, which cooperates with the will and is effective in bringing about the desired result. Only the former, and this merely as it is first bestowed on man, is wrought in him without any action on his part, and is purely a gift of gratuitous mercy. All further communication of grace to man is dependent on the active consent and co-operation of the will. The free will of man acts, but divine grace assists it as a co-operating principle, and thus secures the desired effect.
The representation of Alexander of Hales is in general agreement with that of Peter the Lombard, but he introduced another division, which is characteristic of scholastic theology, when he spoke of a gratia gratis dans, a grace giving freely (referring to the gracious activity of God), a gratia gratis data, a grace given freely (designating all actual graces and infused virtues), and a gratia gratum faciens, a grace making gracious (grace as a permanent quality of the soul, making it well-pleasing to God). Thomas Aquinas uses these terms in a somewhat different sense, and thereby determined their later usage. While he employs the term gratia gratum faciens as a designation of all the supernatural helps intended for the recipient's own sanctification, he restricts the term gratia gratis data to those gratuitous gifts that aim at the good of others rather than at that of the recipient. In connection with the gratia gratum faciens he distinguishes between prevenient or operating and subsequent or co-
operating grace. The former renews the will, and the latter assists it in its operations; the former may be called sufficient and the latter efficacious.
2. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF FAITH. There was a general tendency in the scholastic period to distinguish between faith as a form of knowledge, a mere assent to the truth, and faith as a spiritual affection, productive of good works. Peter the Lombard makes a threefold distinction here, namely, Deum credere, Deo credere, and in Deum or Christum credere. The first two mean practically the same thing, that is, to accept as true what God says; but the last denotes faith in a deeper sense, by which we enter into communion with God. He says that it is one thing to believe God, to believe that what He says is true, and quite another to believe in God, that is, to believe so as to love Him, to go to Him, to cleave to Him, and to be joined to the members of the body of Christ. He also makes a distinction between the faith which is believed, that is, the creed or dogma, and the faith by which one believes and is justified.
After his day it became customary to distinguish between a fides informis, consisting in a mere intellectual assent to the truth, and a fides formata (charitate), a faith which is augmented, vivified, and determined by the power of love, and of which love is therefore the formative principle. Moreover, it was emphatically declared that, while the fides informis was one of the preparations for justification, only the fides formata, which includes the right inward disposition and works by love, is the faith that justifies. At the same time the priesthood considered it advantageous to stress the idea that unquestioning submission to the authority of the Church was the main characteristic of faith, and some of the theologians rather encouraged that notion.
3. THE SCHOLASTIC CONCEPTION OF JUSTIFICATION AND
MERIT. Augustine's confusion of justification and sanctification was not rectified but rather intensified by the Schoolmen. Their common teaching is that justification is effected through the infusion of
sanctifying grace into the soul by God. It includes on the part of God the infusion of sanctifying grace and the forgiveness of sins, and on the part of man the turning of his free will to God through faith and contrition. Naturally, the last elements are not included in the case of infants, for in them justification is entirely the work of God, and as such comprises only the infusion of grace and the remission of original sin.
The Scholastics were generally agreed as to what was included in justification, and never conceived of it as a mere imputation of the righteousness of Christ to the sinner. They differed, however, in their determination of the logical order of the various elements in justification. According to Thomas Aquinas there is first of all the infusion of grace, then the turning of the free will to God, next the turning of the free will against sin, and, finally, the remission of guilt.
Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, however, contend for a different order, namely, attrition or turning from sin, infusion of grace, remission or expulsion of sin, and the turning of the free will to God. The moment grace is infused, however, attrition becomes contrition, and then sin is expelled by grace.
Duns Scotus has an altogether different opinion. He conceives of justification as consisting of two divine operations, namely, the forgiveness of sins and the renovation of the soul through sanctifying grace. While the two are simultaneous in time, in the order of nature the forgiveness of sin precedes the infusion of grace.
The Scholastics speak of justification as an instantaneous act, but the Council of Trent makes mention of a progressive increase of justification. With respect to the assurance of possessing the grace of justification, Aquinas maintains that this is not the common privilege of believers in general. These must be satisfied with a reasonable conjecture, based upon the signs of grace. Absolute assurance is given only to those who have accomplished or suffered much for the sake of religion, and then by means of a special revelation.
Alongside of the doctrine of free grace, and in connection with that of justification, the doctrine of merit came to the foreground. The meritoriousness of virtue, especially as expressed in good works, was generally taught in the Middle Ages, and was hardly opposed by any scholastic theologian of note. Thomas Aquinas distinguished between two kinds of merit, namely, "merit of condignity," which in strict justice deserves reward and belongs to Christ alone, and "merit of congruity", which is fit to be rewarded and can be acquired by men. However, his followers, the Thomists, went so far as to assert that after justification a man may by the and of divine grace acquire a merit of condignity, that is, can do something that gives him a claim on God. The followers of Duns Scotus denied this, but maintained that good works done before justification might obtain a merit of congruity and on this basis receive an increase of grace. They held that the perfection of the divine character would impel God to bestow on man the grace thus merited.
The Roman Catholic doctrine of the application and appropriation of divine grace finally assumed the following form. Children born within the pale of the Church receive the grace of regeneration, including an infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, in baptism.
Others, however, who come under the influence of the Gospel in later years, receive sufficient grace, that is, an illumination of the understanding and a strengthening of the will by the Holy Spirit.
They can resist but also yield to this work of God and follow the promptings of the Spirit. By yielding to it and co-operating with God they prepare themselves for the grace of justification (gratia infusa).
This preparation consists of the following seven elements: (a) Assent to the truth taught by the Church; (b) insight into one's sinful condition; (c) hope in the mercy of God; (d) the beginnings of love to God; (e) an abhorrence of sin; (f) a resolution to obey the commandments of God; and (g) a desire for baptism.
It is quite evident that faith does not occupy a central place here, but is co-ordinated with the other preparations. It is merely an intellectual assent to the doctrines of the Church (fides informis),
and acquires its justifying power only through the love that is imparted in the gratia infusa, by which it becomes a fides caritate formata. It can be called justifying grace only in the sense that it is the first of the seven preparations, and in that sense the basis and root of justification.
After this sevenfold preparation justification itself follows in baptism. It consists in the infusion of grace, (supernatural virtues), followed by the forgiveness of sins. The measure of this forgiveness is commensurate with the degree in which sin is actually overcome. It is given freely and is not merited by the preceding preparations. And it is preserved by obeying the commandments and by doing good works. In the gratia infusa man receives the supernatural strength to do such works, and thus to merit with a merit of condignity all following grace and everlasting life. The grace of God, therefore, serves the purpose of enabling man once more to merit salvation.
But it is not certain that the precious gift of justification will be retained. It may be lost, not only through unbelief, but by any mortal sin. It may be regained, however, by the sacrament of penance, consisting in contrition (or attrition), confession, together with absolution, and works of satisfaction. Both the guilt of sin and eternal punishment may be removed by absolution, but the temporal penalties of sin can only be cancelled on the basis of works of satisfaction.
Questions for Further Study: What factors contributed to the externalization of religion in the Middle Ages? Did the Scholastics emphasize external or internal grace? What was their conception of divine grace, and how does their view compare with that of Augustine? How did their representations of the gratia gratis dans differ? How does Aquinas' use of the terms gratia gratis data and gratia gratum faciens differ from that of the earlier Scholastics?
What was the most prevalent conception of faith in the scholastic period? Did they conceive of faith as excluding merit? Did they have the Pauline conception of justification by faith? What did justification include? How is faith related to justification in the