II. The Pelagian and Augustinian Doctrines of Sin and Grace
Index; Scott, The Nicene Theology, pp. 209–219; McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, cf. Index under Sin; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 182–192; Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 17–46; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, I, pp. 109–161; Sheldon,
History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp. 104–110.
II. The Pelagian and Augustinian Doctrines of Sin and Grace
1. AUGUSTINE AND PELAGIUS
Augustine's view of sin and grace was moulded to some extent by his deep religious experiences, in which he passed through great spiritual struggles and finally emerged into the full light of the Gospel. He tells us in his Confessions that he wandered far from the path of morality and religion, sought escape in Manichaeism and almost fell into its snares, but finally turned to Christ. He was never quite at rest during the years of his wanderings, and Ambrose was instrumental in winning him back to the faith. His conversion took place in a garden at Milan after deep agitation, weeping, and prayer.
He was baptized in 387, and became bishop of Hippo in 395. Some find traces of a Manichaean influence in his gloomy view of human nature as fundamentally evil, and in his denial of the freedom of the will. It is more likely, however, that it was exactly his sense of inherent evil and spiritual bondage that caused him to turn to Manichaeism temporarily, for he combats the Manichaeans on the very points in question, holding that human nature was not originally and necessarily evil, and insisting on a measure of freedom as a basis for human responsibility.
Pelagius was a man of an entirely different type. In comparing the two Wiggers says: "Their characters were diametrically opposite.
Pelagius was a quiet man, as free from mysticism as from aspiring ambition; and in this respect, his mode of thought and of action must
have been wholly different from that of Augustine … Both therefore thought differently, according to their totally different spiritual physiognomy; and both, moreover, must have come into conflict just as soon as an external occasion should be presented."
Augustinianism and Pelagianism, p. 47. Pelagius was a British monk, a man of austere life, of a blameless character, and of an even temper, and perhaps partly for that very reason a stranger to those conflicts of the soul, those struggles with sin, and those deep experiences of an all-renewing grace, which had such profound influence in moulding Augustine's thought.
The question is sometimes raised, whether Augustinianism was not simply a reaction against Pelagianism and therefore largely determined by its antipode. It may be said, however, that in their original form the two views were developed independently before the authors became acquainted with each other's teachings. At the same time it cannot be denied that, when the two engaged in mortal combat, the formal statement of Augustinianism was determined in some of its details by Pelagianism and vice versa. Both represented elements that were already present in the writings of the early
Church Fathers.
2. THE PELAGIAN VIEW OF SIN AND GRACE
The most important questions in debate between Pelagius and Augustine were those of free will and original sin. According to Pelagius Adam, as he was created by God, was not endowed with positive holiness. His original condition was one of neutrality, neither holy nor sinful, but with a capacity for both good and evil. He had a free and entirely, undetermined will, which enabled him to choose with equal facility either one of these alternatives. He could either sin or refrain from sinning, as he saw fit. His mortality could not depend on his choice, for he was created mortal in the sense that he was already subject to the law of death. Without any antecedent evil in his nature, which might in any way determine the course of his life, he chose to sin. His fall in sin injured no one but himself, and
left human nature unimpaired for good. There is no hereditary transmission of a sinful nature or of guilt, and consequently no such thing as original sin. Man is still born in the same condition in which Adam was before the fall. Not only is he free from guilt but also from pollution. There are no evil tendencies and desires in his nature which inevitably result in sin. The only difference between him and Adam is that he has the evil example before him. Sin does not consist in wrong affections or desires, but only in the separate acts of the will. It depends in every case on the voluntary choice of man. As a matter of fact man need not sin. He is, like Adam, endowed with perfect freedom of the will, with a liberty of choice or of indifference, so that he can, at any given moment, choose either good or evil. And the very fact that God commands man to do what is good is proof positive that he is able to do it. His responsibility is the measure of his ability. If notwithstanding this sin is universal—and Pelagius admits that it is—this is due only to wrong education, to bad example, and to a long established habit of sinning. In turning from evil to good man is not dependent on the grace of God, though its operation is undoubtedly an advantage and will help him to overcome evil in his life. But the grace of which Pelagius speaks in this connection does not consist in an inward-working divine energy or, in other words, in the influence of the Holy Spirit, inclining the will and empowering man to do that which is good, but only in external gifts and natural endowments, such as man's rational nature, the revelation of God in Scripture, and the example of Jesus
Christ. Though there would hardly seem to be any place for the baptism of infants in such a system, Pelagius holds that they should be baptized, but regards their baptism merely as a rite of consecration or an anticipation of future forgiveness. Rather illogically, he takes the position that children are excluded from the Kingdom of Heaven, though not from a lower state of blessedness, which is called eternal life.
3. THE AUGUSTINIAN VIEW OF SIN AND GRACE. Augustine's view of sin and grace was undoubtedly influenced somewhat by his early religious experiences and by its opposite in the Pelagian
system, but was primarily determined by his careful study of the Epistle to the Romans and by his general conception of the soul's relation to God. He regarded man, even in his unfallen state, as absolutely dependent on God for the realization of his destiny. a. His View of Sin. In opposition to the Manichaeans Augustine strongly emphasizes the voluntary character of sin. At the same time he believes that the act of sin by which the soul cut loose from God brought it under an evil necessity. As a result of the entrance of sin into the world man can no more will the true good, which is rooted in the love of God, nor realize his true destiny, but sinks ever deeper into bondage. This does not mean that he has lost all sense of God for, as a matter of fact, he continues to sigh after Him.
Augustine does not regard sin as something positive, but as a negation or privation. It is not a substantial evil added to man, but a privatio boni, a privation of good. He finds the root principle of sin in that self-love which is substituted for the love of God. The general result of man's defection is seen in concupiscence, in the inordinate power of sensuous desires, as opposed to the law of reason, in the soul. From sin and the disturbance it introduced death resulted. Man was created immortal, which does not mean that he was impervious to death, but that he had the capacity of bodily immortality. Had he proved obedient, he would have been confirmed in holiness. From the state of the posse non peccare et mori (the ability not to sin and die) he would have passed to the state of the non posse peccare et mori (the inability to sin and die). But he sinned, and consequently entered the state of the non posse non peccare et mori (the inability not to sin and die).
Through the organic connection between Adam and his descendants, the former transmits his fallen nature, with the guilt and corruption attaching to it, to his posterity. Augustine conceives of the unity of the human race, not federally, but realistically. The whole human race was germinally present in the first man, and therefore also actually sinned in him. The race is not constituted individually, that
is, of a large number of relatively independent individuals, but organically, that is, of a large number of individualizations which are organic parts of that generic human nature that was present in Adam. And therefore the sin of the human nature was the sin of all its individualizations.
As the result of sin man is totally depraved and unable to do any spiritual good. Augustine does not deny that the will still has a certain natural freedom. It is still capable of acts that are civilly good, and from a lower standpoint even praiseworthy. At the same time he maintains that man, separated from God, burdened with guilt, and under the dominion of evil, cannot will that which is good in the sight of God. As he sees it, that only is good in the sight of God which springs from the motive of love to God. b. His View of Grace. The will of man stands in need of renewal, and this is exclusively a work of God from start to finish—a work of divine grace. It is necessary to guard against a possible misunderstanding here. When Augustine ascribes the renewal of man to divine grace only, and in this connection speaks of "irresistible grace," he does not mean to intimate that divine grace forces the will, contrary to the nature of man as a free agent, but rather that it so changes the will that man voluntarily chooses that which is good. The will of man is renewed and thus restored to its true freedom. God can and does so operate on the will that man of his own free choice turns to virtue and holiness. In this way the grace of God becomes the source of all good in man.
From what was said it follows that Augustine's doctrine of regeneration is entirely monergistic. The operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, not merely for the purpose of supplying a deficiency, but for the complete renewal of the inner disposition of man, so that he is brought into spiritual conformity to the law. Says Shedd: "Grace is imparted to sinful man, not because he believes, but in order that he may believe; for faith itself is the gift of God." The divine efficiency in regeneration results in the conversion of the sinner, in
which man may be said to co-operate. Augustine distinguishes several stages in the work of divine grace, which he calls "prevenient grace", "operative grace", and "co-operative grace'. In the first the Holy Spirit employs the law to produce the sense of sin and guilt; in the second He uses the Gospel for the production of that faith in Christ and His atoning work which issues in justification and peace with God; and in the third the renewed will of man co-operates with Him in the life-long work of sanctification. The work of grace includes the entire renewal of man in the image of God and the spiritual transformation of the sinner into a saint. It is hardly in line with his main thought when he also represents the Church as a more or less independent dispenser of divine grace, and speaks of baptismal regeneration.
Augustine's representation of the grace of God as the efficient cause of salvation led on to his doctrine of predestination. What God does in time for the gracious renewal of the sinner, He willed to do in His eternal plan. At first Augustine, manifested a tendency to consider predestination as contingent on divine foreknowledge, and to represent God as electing those of whom He knew that they would believe. This really makes predestination conditional on the foreseen free action of man. He soon saw, however, that consistency and a fair interpretation of the relevant passages of Scripture, demanded that he should consider man's choice of the good and his faith in Christ as themselves the effect of divine grace; and therefore modified his doctrine of predestination accordingly.
He usually views predestination in connection with the sinner's salvation, and even held that it might be called this salvation viewed sub specie aeternitatis (from the point of view of eternity). With reference to the non-elect, he conceives of the decree of God as one of pretermission only. Reprobation differs from election in this that it is not accompanied with any direct divine efficiency to secure the result intended. But while Augustine is a strict predestinarian, there is also here an element in his teachings that is foreign to his main thought, namely, the idea that the grace of regeneration can again be lost. He holds that only those who are regenerated and persevere, or in
whom, after loss, the grace of regeneration is restored, are finally saved. There is a redeeming feature, however, in his assertion that the elect never die in an unregenerate condition.
4. PELAGIAN AND SEMI-PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES. In the
Pelagian controversy the views of Augustine on sin and grace were put to the test. Small wonder that his views met with opposition, since the problems involved had never yet been discussed in a thorough manner. The Eastern Church preferably emphasized the element of freedom in human nature, in opposition to the pagan idea of fate or destiny. It was admitted that the human will was corrupt, and had become subject to Satan, to sensuous temptations, and to death; and that the new life was communicated in baptism. On the whole the Greek Fathers were content with placing the grace of God and free will side by side.
In view of all this it was perfectly natural that Augustine's deriving everything, free will included, from divine grace, collided wtih the opposite tendency, as represented in Pelagius. The two systems were absolute antipodes. Pelagius advanced his views first at Rome from 409 to 411 A. D. His system was introduced into the North African
Church by his pupil Coelestius. At the same time Pelagius went to Palestine to propagate his views. The matter of his departure from the generally accepted teachings of the Church was brought up in several Councils. In 412 Coelestius was adjudged heretical at Carthage, and was excommunicated when he refused to retract his opinions. Pelagius himself was accused of heresy before the Synods of Jerusalem and Diospolis (also in Palestine), but by specious explanations and by qualifying several of his statements succeeded in satisfying his judges, and was acquitted, 414–416 A. D. In the year
416 Pelagianism was condemned as a heresy by the Synods of Mileve and Carthage, and this decision was finally endorsed by the vaccilating bishop of Rome, Zozimus, who had first handed Pelagius a certificate of orthodoxy, 418 A. D. Finally, in. 431 A. D. the Council of Ephesus, which condemned Nestorianism, also passed a sentence of condemnation on Pelagianism.
Between the extremes of Augustinianism and Pelagianism a mediating movement arose, which is known in history as SemiPelagianism. As a matter of fact that halfway position served to bring out clearly—as nothing else could have done—that only a system like the Augustinian, with its strong logical coherence, could maintain its ground successfully against the onslaughts of Pelagius. SemiPelagianism made the futile attempt to steer clear of all difficulties by giving a place to both divine grace and human will as co-ordinate factors in the renewal of man, and by basing predestination on foreseen faith and obedience. It did not deny human corruption, but regarded the nature of man as weakened or diseased rather than as fatally injured by the fall. Fallen human nature retains an element of freedom, in virtue of which it can co-operate with divine grace.
Regeneration is the joint product of both factors, but it is really man and not God that begins the work.
Semi-Pelagian views spread especially in Gaul. Their chief representative was Cassian, abbot of Massilia (Marseilles). It found able defenders also in Faustus of Rhegium and Gennadius of Massilia. But it lacked internal coherence, and could not hold out in debate against such a close-knit and compact system as Augustinianism. The system was condemned at the important
Council of Orange, which vindicated a moderate Augustinianism.
Augustine's doctrine of sin and grace was adopted as the anthropology of the Western Church, though its acceptance was never general even there. Influential men, like Leo and Gregory,
Bede and Alcuin, adhered to it, though they were not as strong as Augustine in asserting the preterition and reprobation of the lost.
They placed great emphasis on the enslavement of the human will, and on the absolute need of divine grace in renewal. It may be said that the most important leaders of the Church remained true to the most practical part of Augustinian anthropology for two or three centuries after Augustine. And the Synod of Orange adopted a moderate Augustinianism as the doctrine of the Church. Pelagianism and Semi-Pelagianism were both condemned as contrary to the
orthodox faith. The Augustinian doctrine of salvation by grace only was victorious, but the doctrine of the irresistible grace of predestination was supplanted by that of the sacramental grace of baptism.
And the doctrine of a double predestination— predestination also to evil—was abandoned in 529 A. D. Gradually the general decline in the Roman Catholic Church led to a drift in the direction of Semi-Pelagianism, which had long before secured a rather sure footing in the East. In course of time the Latin Church adopted the anthropology of the Greek Church and adhered to it ever since.
Questions for Further Study: In what respect did the anthropology of the East differ from that of the West? Were the Pelagian and Augustinian tenets new in the Church? What was the fundamental error of Pelagius? How did his doctrine of free will affect the doctrines of sin and grace? Why did he stress the free will of man? Is his doctrine of free will psychologically tenable? Why is his explanation of the universality of sin insufficient? How did he conceive of the grace of God? What value did he ascribe to it? Did he altogether deny grace as an inward spiritual energy? What Scriptural basis did he have for his doctrine? How did Augustine conceive of the freedom of willing before and after the fall? Did he ascribe a voluntary character to sin or not? Did he regard concupiscence as sin or not? How do you account for his emphasis on sin as privation?
Did his doctrine of original sin go beyond that of the earlier Fathers?
If so, how? How did he conceive of the transmission of sin? How did his doctrine of sin and grace lead him to his doctrine of predestination? What was his conception of the decree of reprobation?
Literature: Wiggers, Augustinianism and Pelagianism; Cunningham, St. Austin; Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 47–140; Cunningham,
Historical Theology, I, pp. 321–358; Harnack, History of Dogma, V, pp. 61–261; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, I, pp. 328–381; Loofs,
Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 183–238; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, I, pp. 437–557; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp. 345–