V. Anthropological Views of Post-Reformation Times
misconceptions to which his view might lead, while the Synod of Charenton in 1645 rejected the theory of Placaeus. In opposition to both the Formula Consensus Helvetica was drawn up by Heidegger,
Turretin, and Geneler, which gave a clear statement of the Reformed position and was for a time honoured in Switzerland as an official standard. The Articles bearing on the position of Amyraldus and Placaeus are quoted by Shedd, History of Doctrine II, pp. 472, 473.
Questions for Further Study: How do Calvin and Luther differ with respect to the doctrine of predestination? What advantage has the covenant idea in the explanation of original sin? Is the total depravity taught by the Reformers the same as absolute depravity? What is the Arminian view of sin and grace? Does it differ in any way from SemiPelagianism? How do the Wesleyan Arminians differ from the original Arminians on these doctrines? Does the position of the Synod of Dort differ from that of the Heidelberg Catechism on these points? What objections are there to the position of Amyraldus?
What is the difference between mediate and immediate imputation?
Literature: Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Books II and III; Luther, The Bondage of the Will; Canons of Dort; Cunningham,
The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, pp. 413–470; Koest-lin, The Theology of Luther, cf. Index; Dorner, History of Protestant Theology, 2 vols., cf. Index; Cunningham, Historical
Theology, II, pp. 371–513; Seeberg, History of Doctrine, II, pp. 227– 272, 398–408; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 117–
133; Neander, History of Christian Dogma, II, pp. 653–660; Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 111–196.
V. Anthropological Views of Post-Reformation Times It is not necessary to discuss the anthropology of the PostReformation period at length. There have been no controversies that brought new elements to the foreground, and no Synods or Councils
that formulated new dogmas. It may be well, however, to notice a couple of divergenges from the teachings of the Reformation, and to give a brief description of the most important theories of sin that were advanced by individual theologians during the last two centuries.
1. DIVERGENT VIEWS. There are especially two that deserve consideration. a. A Modification of the Arminian View in Wesleyan Arminianism. It is a well known fact that Arminius himself did not depart as far from Scripture truth and from the teachings of the Reformers as did his followers at the time of the Synod of Dort. Moses Stuart even thought it possible to prove that Arminius was not an Arminian. Now
Wesleyan Arminianism. which originated in the middle of the eighteenth century, claims the parentage of Arminius himself rather than that of later Arminianism, though it differs in some respects even from Arminius. "Its theology", says Sheldon, "was shapen by a warm evangelical piety, and hears the impress at once of a deep sense of dependence upon God, and of an earnest, practical regard for human freedom and responsibility." History of Christian
Doctrine II, p. 263. It differs from the doctrine of sin and grace of the earlier Arminians in the following points: (1) It stresses the fact that original sin is not merely a disease or a pollution of nature, which cannot be called sin in the strict sense of the word, but is really and truly sin and renders man guilty in the sight of God. The guilt of Adam's sin is indeed imputed to his descendants. But at the same time it holds that this original guilt was cancelled by the justification of all men in Christ. This means that the idea of original guilt has after all only a theoretical place in this system, since its cancellation is one of the universal benefits of the atonement. (2) It denies that man, as he is by nature, has any ability whatsoever to co-operate with the grace of God, and admits his entire moral depravity, so that he is absolutely dependent on the grace of God for salvation. But at the same time it holds that no man actually exists in that state of inability. In view of the universal bearing of the redemption through
Christ God graciously endows every man with sufficient enabling grace, so that he can turn to God in faith and repentance. The original Arminians held that it was only just that God should thus enable men to believe and repent, since they could not be held accountable without some spiritual ability. The Wesleyan Arminians, however, regard this as a matter of free grace on the part of God. b. A Modification of the Reformed Views in New England, The anthropology of the New England theologians differs in some respects from that of the Reformers and of the Reformed Churches in general. The most important of these departures are the following:
(1) That on the Relation of God's will to the fall of man. Jonathan Edwards ruled out the category of efficiency from God's connection with the fall of man, and used the ordinary Calvinistic phraseology.
But some of his followers were not so careful, and either implied or stated explicitly that there is a divine efficiency in connection with the production of evil. Hopkins seems to imply this in some of his statements, and Emmons teaches it explicitly. In later New England or New Haven theology, represented by such men as Timothy Dwight and N. W. Taylor, there was a strong tendency to reduce the divine connection with the entrance of sin into the world to the lowest possible point consistent with an all-inclusive providence. The general view seems to be that God's determination to create a moral universe naturally included the creation of free moral agents with the power of contrary choice, and thus rendered sin possible, but hardly certain. At the same time sin is also regarded as "necessarily incidental to the best system."
(2) That in Connection with the Free Will of Man. Jonathan Edwards somewhat over-emphasized the determinate character of the will, and thus exposed himself to the charge of determinism. He was perfectly right, however, in emphasizing the fact that freedom has its laws, known to God, and that in view of this fact it is perfectly consistent with certainty. Man as he was created by God possessed moral freedom and possesses it still; and it was in the exercise of this
freedom that he brought sin into the world. He also possessed real freedom, however, that is, his will was determined in the direction of goodness and holiness by the original constitution of his nature. This real freedom he lost by sin. Later New England theologians stressed the fact that the power of contrary choice must be predicated of a free and responsible moral being. They approached the Arminian standpoint, but yet subscribed to the theory that given antecedents will be followed by given consequents, that the power to vary the result is never used, and that the divine foreknowledge is dependent on this variable, but non-necessitated succession of consequents from antecedents.
(3) That Respecting the Transmission of Sin. Edwards adopted the realistic theory. We are connected with Adam as the branches are with a tree, and consequently his sin is also our sin and is imputed to us as such. This theory is not peculiar to him, however. It finds great favor among the Lutherans, and is also advocated by such Reformed scholars as H. B. Smith and Wm. T. Shedd. Some New England theologians, such as Woods and Tyler, defended the Placaean theory of mediate imputation. Through his natural connection with Adam man inherits moral depravity, and this is imputed to him as guilt and makes him worthy of condemnation.
2. SOME MODERN THEORIES OF SIN
a. Philosophical. Some prominent philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries expressed themselves on the nature and origin of sin, and in a measure influenced theological thought. Leibnitz looked upon the evil of the world as something metaphysical rather than ethical, regarding it as the simple and nature result of the necessary limitation of the creature. Kant struck a discordant note in his day by postulating a radical evil in man, a fundamental inclination to evil that cannot be eradicated by man. It precedes all empirical acts, but is nevertheless rooted in an autonomous will, and therefore involves guilt. He does not identify this "radical evil" with what is generally called original sin, for he rejects the historical
account of the origin of sin and also the idea of its physical inheritance. To him sin is something that defies explanation. Hegel regarded sin as a necessary step in the evolution of man as a selfconscious spirit. The original condition of man was one of naive innocence—a state almost resembling that of the brute—in which he knew nothing of good or evil, and merely existed in unity with nature. That state, however natural for animals, was not natural for man, and was therefore not ideal. Man was destined to separate himself from it and to become a self-conscious spirit. The transition from the natural to the moral state was effected by knowledge. The eating of the tree of knowledge caused man to fall out of his state of paradisaical bliss. With the awakening of the self-conscious life, the beginning of the ego-sense, man involuntarily begins to follow his natural desires and makes the new found self the center of these, that is, he becomes selfish and thus evil. This is a stage, however, through which he must necessarily pass in his self-development. While this selfishness is sinful, it cannot really be ascribed to man as guilt until he wilfully chooses it even after he has awakened to the consciousness that he must rise above it, and that the selfish man is not what he ought to be. The struggle against this selfishness is the path to virtue. b. Theological. Schleiermacher regards sin as the necessary product of man's sensuous nature—a result of the soul's connection with a physical organism. It is found where the bodily appetites prevent the determining power of the spirit from performing its proper function, and the sensuous nature exercises a dominating influence. He denies the objective reality of sin, however, and ascribes to it only a subjective existence, that is, he regards it as existing only in our consciousness. The sense of sin, the consciousness of strife within man is due to the inadequacy of his God-consciousness as long as the sensuous nature predominates. God has so ordained that man should ascribe guilt to this feeling of deficiency, not because it is really sin, but so that there might be occasion for redemption.
"Original sin" is simply an acquired habit that has gradually been formed, and that is now the source of all actual sin.
Julius Mueller, a disciple of Kant and a representative of the Mediating School, wrote an important monograph on the doctrine of sin. He agrees with Kant in regarding sin as a free act of the will in disobedience to the moral law. He went beyond Kant, however, in an attempt to explain the origin of sin. The Koenigsberg philosopher found it impossible to shed any light on this. Mueller saw that the "radical evil" of which Kant spoke was present in human nature from birth, or at least prior to any conscious decision of the will, apart from which there is no sin. Since he could not discover the origin of sin in time, he sought it in a non-temporal or pre-temporal determination of the will. In some previous existence the choice was made, and therefore man is born guilty and depraved. This theory is so extremely speculative and so utterly beyond the possibility of verification that it has found little acceptance.
Ritschl agrees with Hegel in regarding sin as a species of ignorance and as a necessary stage in man's moral development. Like
Schleiermacher he holds that man knows sin only from the point of view of the religious consciousness. Man must seek the Kingdom of God as the highest good, but in his ignorance of the perfect good does the opposite. Actual sin—and this is the only sin which Ritschl recognizes—sets itself in opposition to the Kingdom of God.
Increasing knowledge of the ideal carries with it the consciousness of sin, which man imputes to himself as guilt. In reality, however, as Orr says, "The guilt attaching to these acts is but a feeling in the sinner's own consciousness, separating him from God, which the revelation of God's fatherly love in the Gospel enables him to overcome." The Christian View of God and the World, p. 179. God does not impute sin as guilt because of the ignorance in which, we now live. It is purely imaginary to think that He is angry with the sinner.
Tennant in his Hulsean Lectures on "The Origin and Propagation of Sin" develops the doctrine of sin from the point of view of the evolutionary theory. He denies that the impulses, desires, and qualities which man inherited from the brute can be called sinful.
These constitute only the material sin, and do not become actual sin until they are indulged in contrary to ethical sanctions. In the course of his development man gradually became an ethical being with an indeterminate will (Tennant does not explain how such a will is possible in a being subject to the law of evolution), and this will is the only cause of sin. Sin is defined as "an activity of the will expressed in thought, word or deed contrary to the individual's conscience, to his notion of what is good and right, his knowledge of the moral law and the will of God." In the measure in which the race develops the ethical standards become more exacting and the heinousness of sin increases, Tennant recognizes the universality of sin, And admits that our nature and environment are of such a kind that they make the realization of our better self a "stupendously difficult task."
Questions for Further Study: What theories were advanced respecting the origin of the human soul? In what circles is traducianism favored? Why do the Reformed Churches favor creationism? Was the covenant idea generally utilized to account for the transmission of sin? Where do you meet with a realistic explanation? What extremes do we meet in New England respecting
God's connection with the fall? Can we conceive of sin as a necessity in human life, and yet maintain man's responsibility? What objections are there to the view that the guilt of sin is merely a matter of our subjective consciousness? Does the doctrine of evolution allow for a fall of man? Can it consistently find a place for sin as guilt?
Literature: Girardeau, Calvinism and Evangelical Arminianism; Boardman, New England Theology, pp. 61–130; Foster, History of New England Theology, cf. Index; Taylor, Moral Government, I, pp.
302–325; Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin, pp. 119–147; Moxon, The Doctrine of Sin, pp. 176–219; Orchard, Modem Theories of Sin, pp. 30–46, 49–58, 65–88, 94–103; Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, especially Lecture III; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, II, pp. 324–347; Fisher, History of Christian
Doctrine, pp. 381–423, 502–528.