CHAPTER VII – The Satisfaction of Christ
CHAPTER VII – The Satisfaction of Christ Of the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, with related arguments.
ARGUMENT XIII.
Third:
Christ's Satisfaction was not Universal.
A third way by which the death of Christ for sinners is expressed is satisfaction, namely, that by his death he satisfied the justice of God for the sins of those for whom he died, so that they might go free. It is true that the word satisfaction is not found in the Latin or English Bible as applied to the death of Christ. In the New Testament it is not found at all, and in the Old it is found but twice, in Num. 35:31, 32. But what is intended by that word is everywhere ascribed to the death of our Savior. There are also other words in the original languages that are equivalent to what we mean by satisfaction. Now as far as I know, all who outwardly call themselves
Christians confess that Christ thus made satisfaction for the sins of all those for whom he died, except the wretched Socinians, whom we will not address at this time. Let us, then, first see what this satisfaction is, and then how inconsistent it is with universal redemption.
The Nature of Legal Satisfaction Satisfaction is a term borrowed from the law. It is properly applied to things, and from there it is translated to persons. It is a full compensation of the creditor from the debtor. The one to whom anything is due from someone else is that man's creditor; and the one owing is his debtor. The debtor has an obligation to pay or restore what is due from him, until he is freed by a lawful breaking of that obligation, making the debt null and void.
This must be done by satisfying what his creditor can require by virtue of that obligation. For example, if I owe a man a hundred pounds, I am his debtor by virtue of the bond by which I am bound. I remain so until something is done to recompense him, and moves him to cancel the bond.
This is called satisfaction. Thus, from real things, it is translated to personal things. Personal debts are injuries and faults which, when committed, makes a man liable to punishment. The one who inflicts that punishment, or
who sees that it is done, is the creditor. He must do so unless satisfaction is made. Now, there may be a twofold satisfaction:
First, satisfaction may be made by paying exactly what is owed By a just solution, or by paying the very thing that is in the obligation. It is paid either by the party who is bound, or by another in his stead. If I owe a man twenty pounds, and my friend pays it, then my creditor is fully satisfied. This is solutio ejusdem.
Secondly, satisfaction may be made by substituting an acceptable value By a tantamount solution, or by paying the extent of it in another kind, not the kind that is in the obligation. By the creditor's acceptance, it stands in lieu of it. And upon presentation, freedom from the obligation also follows, not necessarily, but by virtue of an act of favor. This is solutio tantidem.
The Nature of Christ's Satisfaction In the business in hand, First, the debtor is man; he owes the ten thousand talents, Matt. 28:24.
Secondly, The debt is sin; "Forgive us our debts," Matt. 6:12.
Thirdly, what will satisfy is death; What is required in lieu of that, to make satisfaction for it, is death: "In the day that you eat of it, you shall surely die," Gen. 2:17; "The wages of sin is death," Rom. 6:23.
Fourthly, the obligation is obedience to the law; The obligation by which the debtor is tied and bound is the law, "Cursed is every one," etc., Gal. 3:10; Deut. 27:26; the justice of God, Rom. 1:32; and the truth of God, Gen. 3:3.
Fifthly, the creditor is God; The creditor that requires this of us is God, considered as the offended party, severe Judge, and supreme Lord of all things.
Sixthly, what intervenes is the ransom paid by Christ's Death;
What intervenes to destroy the obligation is the ransom paid by Christ:
Rom. 3:25, "God set him forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood."
I will not go into any long discourse on the satisfaction made by Christ, but only so far as necessary to give light to the matter in hand. To this end,
Two things must be cleared:
First, that Christ made the required satisfaction.
Second, that an act of God ought to follow that satisfaction.
First, that Christ made the required satisfaction.
For the first, I told you that the word "satisfaction" does not occur in the Scripture, but the thing most frequently signified by it does. This is a compensation made to God by Christ for our debts. To make satisfaction to God for our sins, it is required only that he undergo the punishment due to those sins, for that is the satisfaction required where sin is the debt. Now,
Christ has certainly effected this satisfaction, for he "himself bore our sins in his body on the tree," 1Pet, 2:24. "By his knowledge shall my righteous servant justify many, for he shall bear their iniquities," Isa. 53:11. The Hebrew word for "bear" is nasa (OT:5375), also in verse 12. It argues that the punishment of sin is taken from us and transferred to him. It signifies all that we mean by the word "satisfaction." So does anaphero (NT:399), used by Peter in place of that word.
159 For to bear iniquity, in the Scripture language, is to undergo the punishment that is due because of it, Lev. 5:1.
And this is what we call "making satisfaction" for it. This is further illustrated by a declaration of how he bore our sins by being "wounded for our transgressions, and bruised for our iniquities," Isa. 53:5. At the end of that verse, this is added: "the chastisement of our peace was upon him."
Every chastisement is either for instruction, or for punishment and correction. The first can have no place with regard to our Savior. The Son of God had no need to be taught with such thorns and briers. It must therefore be for punishment and correction; and that was because our sins were then upon him. By his punishment, our peace or freedom from punishment was procured.
Moreover, in the New Testament there are various words and expressions concerning the death of our Savior which represent what we mean by
satisfaction. For example, it is termed prosphora in Eph. 5:2 (NT:4376 offering). He gave himself up as an offering and a sacrifice, or a sacrifice of expiation, as it would appear by the type of sacrifice with which it is compared (Heb. 9:13, 14). The same can be applied to the Hebrew word
'asham, Isa. 53:10; Lev. 7:2 (OT:0817 - offering). "He made his soul an offering for sin," – an atoning sacrifice to remove the sin. The apostle abundantly clarifies this in saying that Christ was made sin itself, 2Cor.
5:21. Sin is put there as the adjunct for punishment, i.e. the punishment due to sin. He is also termed "propitiation" in 1John 2:2. This reflects the Hebrew chata' (OT:2398), used in Gen. 31:39, "I bear the debt," which is to undergo the debt, and to make compensation for it. This was the office of the one who was to be Job's "redeemer" (OT:1350 ga'al), Job 19:25.
160 All of these and various other words, which will be considered in part later, declare the very same thing that we mean by satisfaction. Specifically, it means taking upon himself the whole punishment due to sin. In offering himself, he was doing what God (the one offended) was more delighted and pleased by, than what he himself was displeased and offended by, which was the sins of all those for whom he suffered, and for whom he offered himself. And there can be no more complete satisfaction made to anyone than by doing what he is more contented with, rather than by relieving what discontents and troubles him and for which he must be satisfied. God was more pleased with the obedience, offering, and sacrifice of his Son, than he was displeased with the sins and rebellions of all the elect.
It is as if a good king has a group of his subjects rebel against him. He is thereby moved to destroy them because they will not have him reign over them. But the only son of that king puts in for their pardon. He tenders to his father some excellent conquest recently achieved by him, begging him to accept it, and to be pleased with his poor subjects, and to receive them into favor again. Or, what is nearer, it is as if he offered himself to undergo the punishment which his father's justice has allotted for the rebels, and he accordingly suffered that punishment. He properly makes satisfaction for their offense, and in strict justice, they ought to be pardoned. This was
Christ, acting as the sent-away goat 161 that bore all the sins of the people of God, and carried them away. He fell under them himself, though with assurance to break all the bonds of death, and to live forever.
Was the satisfaction of Christ solutio ejusdem, or solutio tantidem?
Now, I said that there is a twofold satisfaction by which the debtor is freed from the obligation that is upon him. The one is solutio ejusdem, which is paying the same thing that is in the obligation. The other is solutio tantidem, which is paying what is not the same, nor equivalent to what is due, but is graciously accepted by the creditor anyway. It is worth inquiring as to which of these our Savior performed.
Arguments against solutio ejusdem, by Grotius 162 who is esteemed by many to have handled this argument with most exactness, denies that the payment made for us by Christ was solutio ejusdem. That is, he denies that the payment of the debt of sin is the same as undergoing the punishment due to that sin. He gives these reasons:
Grotius, First, because if it were the same, then such a solution, satisfaction, or payment, would be accompanied by actual freedom from the obligation.
Secondly, where such a solution is made, and there is freedom from the obligation, there is no room left for remission or pardon.
"It is true," he says, "deliverance follows it; but this deliverance cannot be by gracious pardon, for no such interceding act of grace is needed. But if satisfaction is made by offering something other than what was in the obligation, then it may be accepted or refused as the creditor pleases. And if it is accepted by the creditor, then it is accepted by an act of grace. Such was the satisfaction made by Christ."
Truly, neither of these reasons seems persuasive to me.
Arguments for solutio ejusdem, refuting Grotius:
First, the reason rests upon something that cannot be granted, namely, that actual freedom from the obligation does not follow the satisfaction made by Christ.
164 By death, Christ did actually deliver us from death, as the elect are said to die and rise with him.
165 By death, he did actually deliver us from the curse by being made a curse for us.
166 And the whole written obligation that was against us, was taken out of the way and nailed to his cross.
167 It is true that all those for whom he did this do not instantly actually apprehend and perceive it. That is impossible. Yet that does not keep them from having all the fruits of his death in actual right, even though not in actual possession. They cannot have that until it is at least made known to them. It is as if a man paid a ransom for a prisoner
detained in a foreign country. From the very day of the payment and its acceptance, the prisoner has a right to his liberty. However, he cannot enjoy that liberty until tidings of it are brought to him, and a warrant is produced for his delivery.
Secondly, The satisfaction of Christ, by the payment of the same thing that was required in the obligation, is no way prejudicial to that free, gracious forgiveness of sin so often mentioned. God's gracious pardoning of sin comprises the whole dispensation of grace towards us in Christ, of which there are two parts:
First, The laying of our sin on Christ, or making him to be sin for us; which was merely and purely an act of free grace, which he did for his own sake.
Secondly, The gracious imputation of the righteousness of Christ to us, or making us the righteousness of God in him. This is no less of grace and mercy, and that is because the very merit of Christ himself has its foundation in a free compact and covenant. However, that remission, grace, and pardon, which is in God for sinners, is not opposed to Christ's merits, but to our merits. He pardons everything for us, but he did not spare his only Son; he did not subtract one penny from him.
The freedom of pardon, then, does not have its foundation in any defect of the merit or satisfaction of Christ, but in three other things:
First, the will of God in freely appointing this satisfaction by Christ, John 3:16; Rom. 5:8; 1Jn. 4:9.
Secondly, in graciously accepting that decreed satisfaction in our steads, for just so many, and no more.
Thirdly, in freely applying the death of Christ to us.
Remission, then, does not exclude a full satisfaction by the very thing in the obligation, but only the satisfaction by the one to whom pardon and remission are granted. So that, notwithstanding anything said to the contrary, the death of Christ made satisfaction in the very thing that was required in the obligation. He took away the curse, by "being made a curse," Gal. 3:13, He delivered us from sin, being "made sin," 2Cor. 5:21.
He underwent death that we might be delivered from death. All our debt was in the curse of the law which he wholly underwent. Nor do we read of
any relaxation of the punishment in the Scripture, but only a commutation of the person. This being done, "God condemned sin in the flesh of his
Son," Rom. 8:3. Christ stood in our stead, and so reparation was made to God, and satisfaction was given for all the detriment that might accrue to him by the sin and rebellion of those for whom this satisfaction was made.
His justice was violated, and he "provides Christ to be a propitiation" for our sins, "that he might be just, and the justifier of the one who believes in Jesus," Rom. 3:25, 26. Never was his justice more clearly demonstrated than in causing "the iniquity of us all to meet upon him." His law was broken. Therefore Christ comes to be "the end of the law for righteousness," Rom. 10:4. Our offense and disobedience was distasteful to him; but in the obedience of Christ he took full pleasure, Rom. 5:17; Matt.
3:16.
Conclusion: Christ's satisfaction was solutio ejusdem for those he represented.
Now, to clear up the nature of the satisfaction made by Christ. This much appears to be evident: it was a full, valuable compensation, made to satisfy the justice of God for all the sins of all those for whom he made that satisfaction. He satisfied it by undergoing the same punishment that they themselves were bound to undergo because of the obligation that was placed upon them. When I say that, I mean it was essentially the same in weight and pressure, though not in all the accidents of duration and the like.
For it was impossible to detain him by death. Now, we will inquire whether the justice of God would permit anyone to perish eternally if Jesus Christ made so full, perfect, and complete a satisfaction for him. This is the first thing that we are to consider.
Secondly, what response God ought to have to this satisfaction.
We must look at what act of God is exercised either towards us or towards our Savior in this business. Everyone admits that God in the whole is the party who is offended by our sins. It is his law that is broken, his glory that is impaired, and his honor that is abased by our sin: "If I am a father," he says, "where is my Honor?" Malachi 1:6. Now, the law of nature and universal right requires that the party offended be recompensed in whatever he is injured by the fault of another. Being offended, God is considered in two ways:
First, with regard to us, he is considered a creditor;
We are all miserable debtors; we owe him "ten thousand talents," Matt.
18:24. And our Savior has taught us to call our sins our "debts," Matt.
6:12; the Lord requires and exacts of us the payment of this debt.
Secondly, with regard to Christ, he is considered supreme Lord and Lawgiver; God was pleased to lay the punishment of us all on Christ, to make our iniquity be settled upon him. He did not spare him, but required the debt at his hands to the last penny. And so, God is considered the supreme Lord and Governor of all, the only Lawgiver. He alone had the power to relax his own law so far as to have the name of a surety put into the obligation, which was not there before, and then to require the whole debt of that surety. For he alone has the power of life and death, James 4:12.
Therefore, two acts are eminent in God's response to Christ's Death:
First, an act of Justice – This is an act of severe justice, like a creditor exacting the payment of the debt at the hands of the debtor. Where sin is the debt, the payment is punishment, as was declared earlier: the justice of God is thereby repaired in whatever it was previously violated.
Secondly, an act of Sovereignty – This is an act of sovereignty or supreme dominion, in translating the punishment from the principal debtor to the surety whom he had given and bestowed on the debtor by his free grace:
"He spared not his own Son, but delivered him up to death for us all"
(Rom. 8:32).
Hence, observe these two things:
1. An Act of Justice – Challenges and Answers God accepts the punishment of Christ just as a creditor accepts his due debt.
He does not spare the debtor, but requires the last penny (Matt. 5:26). When the debt is punishment, it is true that there is no creditor. For, "Delicta puniri publice interest" [the offense is punished for the public good]. But because this punishment is also considered as a price, as in 1Cor. 6:20, it must be paid into the hands of some creditor, just as it was paid into the hands of God. From this, Christ is said to come to do God's will, Heb. 10:9, and to satisfy him, as in John 6:38.
And the arguments that some have used to prove that God cannot inflict punishment as a creditor, nor by virtue of his supreme dominion, do not seem to me to have any great weight.
Arguments against this Act of Justice, by Grotius:
I find various arguments urged by Grotius. His great skill in the law, and use of terms, might well give him sanctuary from such weak examiners as myself, if this was an issue of law. But the one who has so foully betrayed the truth of God in other things, and corrupted his word,
168 does not deserve our assent in anything except what is extorted by evidence of reason. Let us, then, see what there is of reason in this which we now have in hand:
First, Punishment is not the right of a Creditor.
Grotius tells us that "The right of punishing that exists in the rector or lawgiver can neither be a right of absolute dominion, nor a right of a creditor. That is because these rights of dominion and crediting belong to the one who has them, and are exercised for his own sake; but the right of punishing is for the good of community."
ANSWER:
When we refer to God as the creditor in this argument, which is what Grotius intends, his reasoning has no value. For we deny that there is anything in him, or that is done by him, which is primarily for the good of anyone but himself. His AUTARKEIA, or self-sufficiency, will not allow for doing anything with an ultimate respect to anything but himself.
169 And where Grotius says that the right of punishing is for the good of community, we answer, that "bonum universi," the good of community, is the glory of God, and only the glory of God. So these things cannot be distinguished in him.
Secondly, Punishment is not desirable in and of itself.
Grotius adds, "Punishment is not desirable in and for itself, but only for the community's sake. Now, the right of dominion and the right of a creditor are things that are worthy and desirable in themselves, without considering any public aim."
ANSWER:
First, The comparison ought not to be between punishment and the right of dominion, but between the right of punishment and the right of dominion; the fact of one is not to be compared with the right of the other.
Secondly, God desires nothing unless it is for himself. To suppose that there is a good which is desirable to God for its own sake is intolerable.
Thirdly, There are some acts of supreme dominion, in themselves and for their own sake, that are as little desirable as any act of punishment: for example, the annihilation of an innocent creature. Grotius will not deny that God may do this nonetheless.
Thirdly, God cannot omit punishing the impenitent.
He proceeds, "Anyone may, without any wrong, waive the right of supreme dominion or creditorship. But the Lord cannot omit punishment for some sins, such as those of the impenitent."
ANSWER:
First, God, by virtue of his supreme dominion, may omit punishment without any wrong or prejudice to his justice. It is as great a thing to impute sin where it is not found, and to inflict punishment as a result of that imputation, as it is not to impute sin where it is found, and to omit punishment because it has not been imputed. Now, God did the first of these things to Christ. Therefore, he may do the latter to us.
Secondly, The wrong or injustice of not punishing any sin or sins does not arise from any natural obligation, but from an affirmative and positive act of God's will, by which he has purposed that he will do it.
Fourthly, Exercising a right to punish is not the same as being just.
He adds, "No one can be called just for exercising his own right or lordship; but God is called just for punishing or for not forgiving sin,"
Rev. 16:5.
ANSWER:
First, However it may be in other causes, in this cause God may certainly be said to be just in exacting his debt or using his dominion. That is because his own will is the only rule of justice.
Secondly, We do not say that punishing is an act of dominion, but an act of exacting a due debt. Requiring this of Christ in our stead presupposes an intervening act of supreme dominion.
Fifthly, Punishment is not an act of exacting a debt.
His last reason is, "Because the virtue by which one waives his dominion or remits a debt is liberality; but that virtue by which a man abstains from punishing someone is clemency. Thus punishment cannot be an act of exacting a debt or exercising dominion."
ANSWER:
The virtue by which a man waives the exacting of what is due, universally considered, is not always liberality. For, as Grotius himself confesses, a debt may arise and accrue to someone by the injury of his fame, credit, or name, by a lie, slander, or otherwise. Now, the virtue which moves a man not to exact payment by way of reparation, is not in this case liberality. It is either clemency, or that grace of the gospel for which moralists have no name. And so it is with every offended party that has a right of requiring punishment from his offender, yet does not exercise it. Notwithstanding these exceptions, what is notably seen in this business of satisfaction is that God, as a creditor, requires payment of the debt by punishment.
2. An act of Supreme Sovereignty.
The second notable thing in this is an act of supreme sovereignty and dominion, requiring the punishment of Christ. For a complete answer to the obligation and fulfilling of the law, we have Rom. 8:3, 10:4.
"For what the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God did by sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, on account of sin: He condemned sin in the flesh, so that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit."
"For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes."
These things are unfolded at large. We may see, in brief, some natural inferences that accompany them as they are laid down:
First, the debt was paid in full.
The full and due debt of all those for whom Jesus Christ was responsible was fully paid to God, and to the furthest extent of the obligation.
Secondly, having been paid, the debt should be cancelled by the creditor.
The Lord, who is a just creditor, in all equity ought to cancel the bond, to stop all suits, actions, and punishments against the debtors, because full payment has been made to him for the debt.
Thirdly, the debt was all the sins of those for whom the payment was made.
The debt was not paid for this or that sin, but for all the sins of all those for whom this payment was made, 1Jn. 1:7, as demonstrated before.
Fourthly, a second payment is not required.
Requiring a second payment of a debt that is already paid, is not in accordance with the justice which God demonstrated in sending Christ to be a propitiation for our sins, Rom. 3:25.
Fifthly, the debt having been paid, the Judge should discharge it.
Receiving a discharge from further trouble is what is equitably due to a debtor who has his debt paid. The Lord has accepted payment from Christ in the stead of all those for whom he died. In justice, and according to that obligation which he undertook in free grace, the Judge ought to grant them a discharge.
Sixthly, Christ's satisfaction is the same as if the debtors had paid it.
There was a relaxation of the law effected by the supreme power of the lawgiver in regard to the persons who were to suffer the required punishment. The actual satisfaction of that punishment has been made.
Therefore, it can no more be laid to the charge of those for whom Christ died than if they had actually fulfilled the obedience it required, Rom.
8:32-34.
A Comparison of these inferences with Universal Redemption Now it is easily discernible whether these things are consistent with universal redemption or not, because they are evident in themselves. We can clearly follow the doctrine of Christ's satisfaction, as declared before.
For, First, if the debt is fully paid, why do some still owe it?
If the full debt of all is paid to the furthest extent of the obligation, how can it be that so many are imprisoned till eternity, never freed from their debts?
Secondly, if the debt ought to be cancelled, why is God's wrath on some?
If the Lord, as a just creditor, ought to cancel all obligations and cease all suits against those who have their debts paid, why is it that his wrath smokes against some to all eternity? Let no one tell me it is because they do not walk worthy of the benefit bestowed; for not walking worthy is part of the debt which is fully paid, and the debt fully paid is all our sins.
Thirdly, if the debt is fully paid, why is a second payment needed?
Is it probable that God calls any to a second payment, and requires satisfaction of those for whom, by his own acknowledgment, Christ has
made what is full and sufficient? Has he an after-reckoning that he did not think of? He did not spare his own Son for what was before him,
Rom. 8:32.
Fourthly, if the debt is paid, why is it not discharged for so many?
How can it be that God never gives a discharge to countless souls, though their debts are paid?
Fifthly, if the debt is fully satisfied, why is anyone still condemned?
Why is it that anyone lives and dies under the condemning power of the law, never being released, if that debt is fully satisfied in his behalf as if he himself had done whatever was required?
175 I have already discussed the poor beggarly distinctions by which it is attempted. And so much for satisfaction.
Let those who can, reconcile these things. I am no Oedipus for them.