Chapter 2 of 31

CHAPTER II – The General Nature of any Purpose

CHAPTER II – The General Nature of any Purpose

CHAPTER II – The General Nature of any Purpose Of the nature of an end in general, and some distinctions about it.

I. The Distinction between End and Means The end of anything is what the agent intends to accomplish by an operation that is proper to the nature of that end, and that is applied to it. It is what anyone aims at and designs to attain. It is a thing that is good and desirable to that person in his state and condition. So Noah's end in building the ark was to preserve himself and others. According to the will of God, he made an ark to preserve himself and his family from the flood: "He did it according to all that God commanded him," Gen. 6:22. What the agent does or applies himself to within the scope of his proposed end is called the means. In free intellectual agents, these two things, end and means, complete the whole reason for working. I speak only of those who work according to choice or election. So Absalom, intending a revolt against his father, and to procure the crown and kingdom for himself, "prepared horses and chariots, and fifty men to run before him," 2Sam. 15:1. Further, by attractive words and misleading acquiescence, "he stole the hearts of the men of Israel" verse 6. He then pretends a sacrifice at Hebron, where he establishes a strong conspiracy, verse 12. All of which were the means he used to attain his end.

II. The Relation of End to Means There is a such a relationship between end and means that (in various ways) they are mutual causes of one another. The end is the first, principal, moving cause of the whole. That is, the whole work is for the sake of the end. No agent applies himself to action without an end in mind; and were he not determined to produce some certain effect, he would not choose to do one thing more than another. The inhabitants of the old world, intending to produce unity and a common habitat, and perhaps to provide for their safety against a second storm, cry, "Go to, let us build us a city, and a tower whose top may reach to heaven; and let us make a name for ourselves, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth," Gen. 9:4. First, they lay

out their aim and design, and then they determine the means that are conducive to attaining it. It is manifest, then, that the reasoning and method a wise worker or agent uses, and executes according to a plan of action, is taken from the end that he aims at. That is, the beginning of that work, in his intention and methodology, is its end.

Now, the means are all those things which are used to attain the end proposed, such as meat to preserve life, sailing in a ship to pass over the sea, or laws to quietly continue human society. They are the procuring cause of the end, in one kind or another. They exist for the end's sake, and the end is motivated by them. The end follows them either morally as their desert, or naturally as their fruit and product.

First, in a moral sense. When the action and the end are to be measured or considered in reference to a moral rule, or a law that is prescribed to the agent, then the means are the deserving or meritorious cause of the end. If Adam had continued in his innocence, and done all things according to the law given to him, then the end procured by his obedience would have been a blessed life to eternity, just as now the end of any sinful act is death, the curse of the law.

Secondly, when the means are considered only in their natural relation, then they are the efficient instrumental cause of the end. So Joab, intending the death of Abner, "smote him with his spear under the fifth rib, so that he died," 2Sam. 3:27. And when Benaiah, by the command of Solomon, fell on Shimei, the wounds he gave him were the efficient and instrumental cause of his death, 1Kings 2:46. In this regard, there is no difference between murdering an innocent man and executing an offender. But under a moral consideration, their ends will only follow what they deserve with regard to their conformity to the rule. And so there is chasma megas [a large gap] between them.

III. The Ends are either of the Work, or of the Worker Considering what has been said, and the defect and perverseness of some agents, there is a twofold end of things. First, there is what the work itself produces (the act), and, secondly, there is the intent of the workman (the actor). When the means chosen are not fit to attain the end, according to the

rule that the agent is to work by, then it is inevitable that he will aim at one thing and attain another (with regard to the morality of the work). So it was when Adam was enticed by his desire to be like God. He made that his aim.

To effect it, he ate the forbidden fruit. That contracted a guilt that he did not aim at. But when the agent acts rightly, as he should, and he aims at a proper end according to his condition, and he works by means that are fit and suitable to the end proposed, then the end of the work and the intent of the workman are one and the same. When Abel intended to worship the Lord, he offered a sacrifice through faith, which was acceptable to the Lord.

A man desiring salvation through Christ, applies himself to gain an interest in him. Now, the sole reason for this diversity between the act and the actor is that secondary agents, which men are, have an end assigned to their actions by God. It gives them an external rule or law to work by. This rule always attends their work, whether they want it to or not. God's will and good pleasure is the sole rule of all those works which outwardly belong to him. Therefore, only God can never deviate in his actions, nor have any end accompany or follow his acts that he does not precisely intend.

IV. The End is either the Benefit, or the Beneficiary Again, the end of every free agent is either what he effects, or for whose sake he effects it. When an agent builds a house to sell or rent, what he effects is the house; what moves him to do it is his love of gain. The physician cures the patient, and is moved to do it by his reward. The end which Judas Iscariot aimed at by going to the priests, bargaining with them, conducting the soldiers to the garden, and kissing Christ, was to betray his

Master; but the end that motivated the whole undertaking was obtaining thirty pieces of silver for himself: "What will you give me if I deliver him?"

(Matt. 26:15). The end which God effected by the death of Christ was to satisfy his justice: the end for whose sake he did it was either primarily his own glory, or subordinately our glory with him.

V. Means are either innately good, or they are conducive to the end Means are of two sorts:

First, there are means which are truly good in themselves, without reference to any further purpose; though we do not consider them so when we use them only as a means to an end. No means, as a means, is considered good in itself. It is good only as it is conducive to a further end. It is repugnant to the nature of means to consider them as good in themselves. Study is the most noble employment of the soul; but if we are aiming at wisdom or knowledge, we consider it good only if it conducts us to that end.

Otherwise, it merely "wearies the flesh," Eccl. 12:12.

Secondly, there are means which have no good at all, considered in themselves. They are good merely only as they are conducive to the end which they are fit to attain. They receive all their goodness (which is a relative assessment) from what they are appointed to do, though in themselves they are not desirable in any way. For example: cutting off a leg or an arm to preserve life, taking a bitter potion for health's sake, or throwing corn and cargo into the sea to prevent a shipwreck. This is the nature of the death of Christ, as we will declare afterward.

VI. Applying the Propositions These things being generally proposed, our next task must be to accommodate them to the present business in hand. We will do this in order by presenting the agent working, the means employed, and the end effected in the great work of our redemption. These three must be considered distinctly and in order, so that we may rightly apprehend the whole.

Concerning the first of these, sun theo [with God], we introduce the third chapter.

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