_ : he Passage is rightly refer
ETHICS way to achieve this is, in Clement's opinion, to impose a rule ¥ Strom. vi. 136. 2 (ii. 500 over the irrational 7d, to heal them, since they are the worst
| desire' means that tho disease of the soul. This result can only be attained by the Logos, q but command over it.! the divine being which is present all over the universe as well
5) Ox. the Logos:as v ' a pe :
; i E N (b) On the Li v as in the human mind. The different ways in which He manifests i (2) aj Himself—the law of nature, the ten commandments, the cupiaxal | Protr. 121. 1 (i. 85. 18-21) éyroAaé of the Old Testament and the teaching of Christ during | of men... He, after yo His stay on earth—have one and the same aim: the healing of ) man geminal pe th the zd@y, and consequently also the restoration of the harmony
Paed. WM. 53- "; (i. 266. in the soul. It will be convenient to produce first some evidence on me ey ree eles sducator, who, drawing for the occurrence of these topics in Clement and then to show ualvationitne Hokies nr :
' salva e horse: how the fundamental idea of this stage of his ethics—namely } which becomes wild un A .
K . the nneee: of the necessity of AMPOsINg the control of meee a Strom. ii. 51. 6 (ii. 141. 5 over the man and the irrational parts of the soul—can be related
' if it remains unshaken both to Philo and to Middle Platonism. fee ~ (a) On the Logos moderating and healing the man: a Strom. v. 52. 5 (ii. 362. 4 and impulsive passion w Paed. i. 1. 2 (i. go. 8-9): The consolatory Logos heals passions. dase 'oat 'i Paed. i. 3.
1 (i. gt. 3): The consequence of this is the healing of q iy peices : dies i | chariot and abandoned BVaS ye za ste ia Strom. v. 53. 1 (ii. 362. 7
Paed.i. 3.3 (i.91.11-19) : As those whose body isill needa physician, } soul' on that on f so those whose soul is weak need an educator who is able to heal i | "evel iar hove s our passions revolting horse (viz. th 'Pas . i] divided into two parts, Paed. i. 6. 1 (i. 93. 11-13): Only the Logos of the Father is the F parts, physician who heals the human illness and the holy enchanter
| (c) On the two tables of the ill soul. y | ments:
Paed. i. 6. 2 (i. 93. 18-19): The physician who heals the whole of i, mankind heals both the body and the soul of man. a Strom. vi. 134.
Paed. i. 6. 4. (i. 93. 23-4): .
. . the Logos heals the soul by means of i.
Loy [ y commands and favours. i Maken. pate 7 - very ep aaa. q »mes to speak about the sovere neees i, 51.1 (i, 120, 21~2):
The Logos . . . heals passions.
! of reason over the irrational part Paed. iii. 98. 2 (i. 289. 30-1) : Jesus .
. who heals both our body and f iv. 441 € and 442d. our soul.
; my j aon aoe has bsensrigttly Strom. i. 159. 3 (ii. 100. 17-19) : Reason is the ruling principle of the ii hin, Chas te ' haedrus 246 b. passions of the soul, which we master by means of virtue: it
[J 5 Phe mene the «universal: Logo I statis a ig eecita set Mau i i j he passage is derived from impresses self-control, temperance, an piety [upon the soul]. i Sages the jjpioxos represents the m Strom. vi. 136.
1 (ii. 500. 26-7): The authoritative principle reigns q By or The reference given by as soon as it succeeds in mastering desires.
{ nae Agr. 82 the dvaBdrns repre i) faa ii. 9g the knight (i7evs) f t Exactly the same expression (iacis r@v rabdv) is used by the Valentinians in M on : free from the +d0y: the dif the description of the function of Jesus, who is sent out of the pleroma of the acons jiue himself, who in Leg. Alleg. in order to free Zodéa from passions: see Iren. Adv. Haer. i. 4. 5 and Exc. ex Theod.
; ee the dvaBdrns and the imz 45. The close correspondence between these two passages, which both contain the i _ : he Passage is rightly refer expression facts rv 7a0Gy, has been pointed out by O. Dibelius,
ETHICS are written in a twofold way for two secre spirits, pamely ee q irrational parts of the s 'itative princi er which is ordinate to th P '
% puchoeisative principle and the other which is subo ' and considers the two t 'ormer. ae ¥elated .
; P snts as related to Strom. vi. 136. 4 (ii. 501. 1-3): It is therefore reasonable to say ctonninee as this ethic that the two tables indicate the commandments which, before I 7 . the coming of the law, were imparted to the two spirits.
} but kept by t ne Logos w j limits established by nat As Galen tells us in the fifth book of his De Placitis Hippocratis et pevars peer, pndev drre Platonis, it was Chrysippus who had regarded maQos as a disease
| 7 Wapa vow, év0a Td AL of the soul and pointed out the parallelism existing between the | Strom. ii. 109. 1 (ii. 172. illness of the body and that of the soul" and consequently also
| views better than the t between the healing of the body and that of the soul.2 This ex- | and Philo employ for th plains why he called one of his works Oepazrevrixdy tOv wabGv
3-4) Clement, speaking BiB\ov.3 Both Posidonius and Galen, though criticizing Chrysipment, maintains that i pus' psychology and his theory of the origin of wa8os, had apmoderation of passions proved and adopted the image of dos as a disease of the soul.4
— Aaron who is able to Clement therefore, when speaking, especially at the beginning | reason (Leg. Alleg. iii. 12 of the Paedagogus, of the healing of d6os, expounds a Chrysippean perpiomdBera: add'
6 ye and Posidonian conception.s In the use of this Stoic topic he mdbeav, ws ednv, aoxet found, however, a predecessor in Philo. The agreement between of perpiomdBeva at which the two authors is perfect in every respect. Like Clement, Philo eT ee ee , : z hict Ba led bythe Loree 6 ) dppyry, OjAecav 5é tiv émBuplav. regards maQos as a disease which must pe 1ealed by 8s 5) tween the sexes of the two ho resorts to the Platonic images of the jrloyos and xuBepyyrns always shows a strong inclinat fi > . intimately connected with ato@ ~! y fr 7 stresses the necessity of keeping the two Tota ' extremely frequently, SSeS y ping * See, for instance, Leg. Allleg.
, | De Agr. 17, 58, and 88, De Plant « De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. v, c. 2 (vol. v Kiihn, p. 438. 6ff.), cf. Be 438. 14ff, Tt
| 2 See Quis rer. divin. Her. 16 should not be forgotten, however, that Plato also regards the 7dOn and kaka vi. 134.
1 and 136. 4 on this pa (i.e. the attempt of the irrational parts of the soul to overthrow the rule of reason) .| ad loc., and by Heinisch, 273.
F as an illness of the soul: see, for instance, Rep. iv. 439 d 1-2, 444d 13-¢ 2 and > It is this kind ofethics that Timaeus 86 b 5-7. f : ing a multitude of prescription
2 De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. v, 6. 2 (v Kahn, p. 437. 11 ff.). q books I and III): the Christia 3 De Plac. Hipp. atid Jats iv, c. 5 (v397: 7): a a ' excess.
The occurrence of the 4 De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. v, c. 2 (v. 433. 11 ff.), ovppeperat pévrot 7H Apuolmmq Kal Pp. 64 above) is not accidental. atrés [sc. Posidonius] cs vooety re xal Aéyew vi boxy dmavras Tous gavrous.
/ especially pp. 42-50, 95-108, a Posidonius was also fond of the image of the charioteer and of the two horses, Entr. Hardt iii. 183-200. As to as can be seen from De Plac. Hipp. et Plat. v, ¢. 5 (¥. 466. 19-4678) (this passage
Aéyor of Musonius Rufus in th is quoted also by Schmekel, 272 n. 3).
; q sia Musonianae (Berlin, 1886) 3 — Ee eyyee . ee ree: linet D sim: 67 and 180; Dan fj Senin, gro I only wish to See, for instance, De Post.
46, 72, and 74, Quod 0.
» 67 | 182, 14> Stole diatribe were very commo Alleg. ii. 79, iii, 118, 124, 129 and 177,Cie eeTAB De See pigane es y frequently in Philo (see We 112, Quaest. in Gen. ii. 23 and 29, ane38 and 397 ional 2 Quis rer. div.
23s es Plutarch s Moralia, whi I shall mention only some passages: Leg. Alleg. i. 72 and 73, ii, 104, iii. 80, Sether with the Aéyor of Muson 118, 123, 127, 128, 136, and 1373 De Sacr. Ab. et C. 49 and 513 Quod det. pot. as * See Rep. iv. 431 ¢ 5-7. K. sol. 23 and 141, Quod bax sit imm. 129, De Agr. 70, 73; 88, ant 94. The passage a | Pes of the Republic, namel De Agr. 73, immor pev odv emBupla Kal Ovpds etow, o wer appyy, 7) O¢ 6j\eva, shoul
' ing idea of this last passage be compared with Clement, Strom. iii. 93.
(ii, 238. 29-30), Oupov pev dppeva Headry = ETHICS i represents the moral standard of the Old Academy," Aristotle This kind of ethics is and the Lyceum, Middle Stoicism,3 and Antiochus.*
\ A striking agreement ca © See Ae, Post. i. 38: cumque perturbationes animi illi ex homine non tollerent naturaque Plutarch, Albinus, Calvi et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri lactitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent
| Plutarch the task of rea in angustumque deducerent, Ac. Post. i, 39: cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse } moderation of the 7d0n dicerent, and Ac. Pr. ii. 135% mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem j . i volebant esse quendam modum. The exponents of the Old Academy also followed the | De V art, m. 443 C: For maxim 'to live according to nature': see Ac. Post. i. 19: ac primam partem illi bene
| stroying passion (this vivendi a natura repetebant eique parendum esse dicebant neque ulla alia in re nisi in natura y a limit and a rule up quaerendum esse illud summum bonum quo omnia referrentur, Ac. Pr, ii. 131 honeste autem q which are not based vivere, fruentem rebus eis, quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Acadaemia censuit, sepa a ut indicant scripta Polemonis quem Antiochus probat maxime, and the passage of Strom. ii. moderauon, ARG:
OF, t 133. 4 concerning Speusippus: Enedounmds Te... THY eddaycovlay dnoly ew elvat De Virt. m. HH b:... i redelay éy rots Kara vow éxovew. Antiochus was strongly influenced by this doc- ), so that passions may | trine of the Old Academy, as the passage of Ac. Pr. ii. 131 clearly shows. beyond Geta Hetnfer 2 Owing to the doctrine of virtue as the right mean between the two extremes.
De Virl. m b-c: Th 'This is also the idea which underlies Arius Didymus' exposition of Peripatetic | e Virl. m. 444 b-c: ethics, in Stob. Ecl., vol. ii, p. 116, 19 ff.
; practical reason, to 3 See Schmekel, 219, on Panaetius (cf. footnote 1 on the same page) and i and the faults. pp. 272-3 on Posidonius (cf. also footnote 3 on p. 272)5 Gronau, 254 (on Posii
De Virt. m. 449 b: They donius); Zeller, iii/1. 586 (on Panactius);Praechter, Grundr. 477 (on Panactius) ) and HOE absence ot | and 480 (on Posidonius) ; Pohlenz, Die Stoa i. 199 and 202 (on Panactius) and 236 scene.
SR thers (on Posidonius).
| terms, for the innoc 4 Ithinkit very likely that Antiochus was in favourof perpiomdBeva and entirely i destroy completely p agree with Strache on this point (Ekl. 31-7). Here also Antiochus must have folupon it. lowed the antiqui, The passage of Ac. Post. i, 38 which expounds the doctrine of rt De Virt. m. ante:
} . m.451 ¢: The perptord8ea in the Old Academy can also be regarded as expressing Antiochus'
/ wher: ea the effe view. Antiochus considered emotions as quite natural to a certain extent (see i yhen, under the effe De Fin. v. 62-4) and consequently does not seem to have condemned them as the i given fairness and mod Old Porch had done. From Ac. Pr. ti.135-6, however, where Antiochusis reproached j De sera Num. Vind. 551 c by Cicero for having denied that the sapiens can feel any kind of emotion, it j and moderation of em might be inferred that he adopted rather drdOeva than perpiondbea. This is the al I d interpretation which Pohlenz has given of the passage (sce Hermes 41 (1906),
4n order to represent t '
338 n. 3, his review of Strache's dissertation on Arius Didumus, BPAW 31 (1911), i irrational part of the soul 1499-1500, and Die Stoa i. 252). Whereas A, Liider thinks that it is not possible to if Posidonius, resorts to the , reach a definite conclusion on this question (p. 49), Luck (pp. 48, 50, and 67) and , Bn, acest a Witt (Albinus . .., 90) are inclined to share Pohlenz's view. If this view is correct,
| worep ebijviov Opéupa Ka :
2,90) p sesieavdad erence oF : b. cf m4 it must also be admitted that Antiochus has consciously abandoned the teaching 445 b, cf. 445 ¢, ofov 6 of the Old Academy, of the Lyceum, and of Middle Stoicism to which he is
{ Smotvyia, rod yei; pl usually greatly indebted and of which he aims at being the follower. This seems (ih os NEEDORGS TP to me to be hardly believable. A different interpretation can be given of the pas- } Wie res Svarapdrrovros. f Ac.
135.As we have sce . 69 above), Antiochus hasinherited both ALDI , i sage o Ae, Pr. ii. 135 s we have seen (p. 69 above), Antiochus has inherited bo h | »inus considers the from the Academy and from the Porch the doctrine of the adrdpxeca of virtue, the a stays in the middle betw possession of which makes the wise man happy even in the greatest misfortunes.
Y the rmabire (Di. bet In this way, it is very likely that he would have given a picture of the sapiens ] eS (Did. 184. 23similar to that given by the Stoics. It was probably such a picture that led Cicero
} can be inferred from the to believe, in Ac. Pr. ii. 135, that Antiochus had adopted the dad@ea of the Old iq nities Porch, Most probably, however, the doctrine of the adrdpxea of virtue did not q Bue at 5 aBea and declares h contrast, in Antiochus' opinion, with that of the moderation of emotions: the L the PI 1¢ same time, adopts t sapiens can be happy in every circumstance, provided that he succeeds in keeping
Star Se and Stoic picture the 7d0y under the strict control of reason; their complete destruction is not necesohn ot his life (see p. 70 abov sary. A very clear instance, in this respect, is provided by Albinus: he openly
| HeTpomdbeca, that he regarde t u