but an equivalent ofthe definition of the practical dpdvnats given
ETHICS Both for Clement and for Philo the Mosaic law was nothing but (b) AvBpeta. A definit the expression of the divine Logos; for both, moreover, a spark
| second book of the Strom . ve = ¢ i r% is fi of this universal Logos was present in the human mind.
This ; Se is the reason why Clement, speaking about the practical ¢pdvy- !
Strot. T19) BGS EG de ASE TEAR . s defini i emoripny Sewav cai resorts to the Stoic terms which he employs in the definiein oe i CIS TESOL LO TOO ee Ame fn ey and reason | pev dvOpela 7} re Urropo tions of vduos: since dpovnars is the activity of reason, and rea :
| ndasiealane @upenend comes directly from the divine Logos, which is also vopos, the practical function of dpdvnois_can_be defined a" the: terms
That these definitions ar which are usually applied to vépos. The same view 1s shared by | SVF iii. 262 and 266. T Philo: exactly as Clement does, he defines dpdvqors (which oe
(Strom. ii. 79. 5, Vol. ii. him has only a practical role, see p. 74 above) in a way which i dpoatn, peyadopuyia, a reminds us of the definitions he gives of vépos: Aoyropod re by Arnim in his SVF (ii éorw emornpn dv re det Tovey dv re pn (Leg. Alleg. 1. 70, vol. i.
M source. But Philo also, 79. 18-19), 7) pev dpdvnors rept rd zroprea Opous avrors riBeioa | terms as those which w (Leg. Alleg. i. 65, vol. i. 78. 7-8).
| kaprepia given by Cleme A similar definition of the practical dpdovnas is given by } as Albinus, 7) pev 51) dpovnais éorw émoripyn ayabay Kal KaK@v Kab q Leg. Alleg. i. 65 (i. 78. odderépwr, Did. 182. 23-4, cf. Apuleius, De Plat, ii. 228, prudentiam i iil. ae eras vero scientiam esse intelligendorum bonorum et malorum, eorum etiam quae
68 (i. 79etsy Paes BNE. tah gu Se d I d Witt oby dropeveréwr Kal o dia dicuntur. This definition is Stoic, as both Praechter an i i} L é aa ca : dk \ iochus ;3 that it is nothing | De spec. Leg. iv. 145 ( have shown,? and is also adopted by Antiochus ; ; sein 76. Sewd. mpayparevopé but an equivalent ofthe definition of the practical dpdvnats given by Clement is proved by SVF iii. 262 (= Stob. Eel. ii. 594W i | The same Stoic definiti '
. ppdvnow elvar emoripny Gv mounréov Kal od Troureor Kat ovderépw i a Middle Platonic phil h emoriny dyabdy Kal Kaxdv kat odderépwv. A further corre following definition of spondence can be observed between Clement, Philo, and AlbiHense) : SetAla roivuv ear , nus in the conception of the practical ¢pdvnots: Albinus, just as odSerdpey.?
Clement and Philo do, brings ¢pévyjors into close connection | eo.
. r MY. dt» & SE Bobds Adyos amd oviaews yiveTa.
| occurs also in Aristotle, who co with the épéds Adyos: 6 dé dpHds Aoyos $povr} "
24-6. It must not be forgotten Did. 183. 5-6.4 the Aristotelian doctrine of vi i 8p06s Stoic and Aristotelian el Clement has been noticed by Merk, 46 n. 2 and 50 n. 5, by Stihlin, app. crit.,
© The correspondence betw vol. i. as: and: by: Eleinischi, 097: i and by Philo has been observe 1 Se hapieh {, pp. 17-18 and 19-20 above.
* Hicrax defines Sela also 2 Pracchter, Grundr. der Gesch. der Philos., 544, and Witt, 89. It is worth observing : re mépt xai pw}, loc. cit. (on both that the same Stoic definitions of ¢pdimous adopted by Clement, Philo, and Albinus
} Hermes 41 (1906), 600-1). Alb occur also in [Plato], "Opor 411d, dpdvnas... marian dyabav kai Kaxdv... it évspou awrnpla rept r00 Sewo Sidears Kal? Hv xplvopev rh mpaxréov Kal ri ov mpaxtéov.
| said in the Republic: see Rep. iv. 4
3 Cicero, De Fin. v. 67: prudentia in delectu bonorum et malorum: cf. Strache, Ekl.
Grundr. 544). Between the Plat des Ant.
Ask, 48, and Witt, 89 n. 4.
; substantial difference; the Pla + Since Albjaus defines the practical ¢pdvqas in Stoic terms, the ép8és Ayos } as can be seen from Cicero, which he mentions together with it can be of Stoic origin (cf. Praechter, Grundr.
; ce rebus quae formidulosae viden 544, Witt, go n.
1); Praechter, however, rightly points out that the ép@ds Adyos | relerence see Witt, 8g n. 5.
(c) Swepoodvy. Two passages of the Stromateis are particularly :
Arius Didymus (= Sto .
' rey a1 mune ~ important for Clement's conception of cwdpoatyy: rah mabe by pas La ee res > | elvat ovre Tov Kabdm Strom. ii. 79. 5 (ii. 154. 18-19): THY 5é cwdpoovyny Ew ev aipéoer Kat i a oe A res CS eked reese?
Loovh , 'es rov € péaov ToUTwY. duyh odlovaay 7a Tis Ppovycews Kplwara.
¢ i ee er ey URN cemene , , « Albinus, Did. 182. 24Strom. iy. 151.
1 (ii, 315. 15-16): emt Se rH emBupig tdrrerae 7 eur ae ge , ,~ RNAI & , bi kat ras dpeters Kal TH owdpoovvn.
8 etn adv 76 Noyaruxdv : eat .
Apuleius, De Plat. ii.
The first definition, belonging to the same context in which that dane a bstinenti .
A asa cui necessario abstinentia of dv8peta appears, is of Stoic origin, as the comparison with SVF ii, pie intra ec = . np :
> um, iii. 262 and 266 again shows. But, just as in the case of dvdpeia, ii g x '
: ierax in Stob. Anth. ve meet very similar Stoic terms in Philo, Leg.
65, 1) ' hmy Boers a we mee ry s at rms ly:
HHOGo eeeEBe es ONT Nevroperny dperhy emo 5€ cwdpoatyy Tois atpereos [sc. épous rietoa = SVF iii. 263], cf.
I Philo al he f rs ~ a a" a 'or also S o De Virt. 14, swdhpootvyn, owrnpiav tO dpovodvr. TOv ev Hyiv ; paisa poles ine funct dmepyalopern.! and passions, which ha As to the second passage, it can be traced back to the Platonic yeu ern ut such p : i i $ .
; Alles. i. 69 (i. 79. 7-0 ¢ and Aristotelian doctrine according to which the main task of } 7 & a 19 (1. 79 : g a .
, 29, Alleg. i. 71 (i. 80. 3— awpoatvn is to control desires and pleasures, as can be seen, } PAGS AEERe ae IE Mt > for instance, from Plato, Rep. iv. 430 ¢ 6-7 and Laws i. 647 d
(te TE0,.20 1), Le 36,2 and Aristotle, Top. 136°13-14, 138°4-5, EN 1107°4-6 and iar te Ast 1); De Agr.
(d) Atkatoodvyn, In t But this doctrine also has become part of a school-tradition, nent we notice at Paik:
. e F elements: since it occurs in Antiochus, in Arius Didymus, and in some exeat ponents of Middle Platonism, as can be seen from the following
(i. 127. evidence: éorly drrovepnreKn.
Cicero, De Fin. v. 67: temperantia in praetermittendis voluptatibus.* | puyis jpepav.
, 1 'The correspondence between Clement and Philo in the doctrine of cwppoovvy The first definition, the has been pointed out by Heinisch, 279. from the c atic ' esi .
> comparison w , 2 It should, however, not be forgotten that in the Republic owdpootvy is not Antiochus (D . ig related only to the émOupyrucéy but is also the virtue owing to which the two inAntiochus (De
Fin. v. 6 ferior parts of the soul (namely the Gyzoedés and the émBupyrxédr) recognize the Tnthis a . any oe '
' this passage of Alt bestehende Einigkeit dariiber, wer zu herrschen ist' (Praechter, Grundr. der Gesch.
Aincrmmanioihendccnine sau der Philos. 273): see Rep. iv. 432 a 6-8 and 442¢ 10-d 15 the same idea appears iy MgO 69 aad Lous t bar in one of the definitions of cwspoavyy given in [Plato],
"Opo: 411 ¢, ovndavia bie Shea and The Tek A Joys npbs 76 dpyew xal dpyeoBat. On Plato's ewfpoowy sec also Zeller, Die Philos. to reason, which is expounded der Griech. ii/1 (Leipzig, 1889), footnote 2 on pp. 884-5. footnote 2, p. 78 above) 3 Vilker, 291, is therefore wrong in maintaining that Clement's conception of 4 On the doceine of-eedpoo cwpoovrn has no close parallel in Greck philosophy. He says the same about dogm, Platonis? di Apuleio, 8 f dpévnors (loc. cit). On the Aristotelian doctrine of cwppoodvy see Zeller, ii/2.
} 3 CF-Poacchise, Havmas ae 658-61, and Pracchter, Grundr. der Gesch. der Phil. 390. The first definition of 4 Wee Bitoni hoe c awdpoatvn which occurs in [Plato], "Opor 411 €, perpedrns: ris yuxis mept ras ev and in Opif. M. 81 (i.
28 s aor} xara diow ywonévas emOuztas, may be of Peripatetic origin (but sce also Stob. R&iiiana5 Plato, Rep. iv. 430
So die Seas 4 Cf. Strache, Ekl. des Ant. v. Ask. 51, and footnote 6on the same page.
ETHICS | Philo, Leg. Alleg. i. 65 (i. 78. 9), 7) 5€ Stxaroodvy Trois drovepnr ois, the belly or liver respecti i. 87 (i. 84. 2-3), dre dmovepytixh) TOv Kar' agiav éori 1) Sixacoodyn
{ in each of the four author (= SVFiii, 263), and i. 87 (i. 84. 7-8), 7) Sexacoodvy . « . drrovejer } That, for Clement, the 76 Kar' aflay Exdorw mpdypatt.!
; sented by the head, where As to the second definition, it shows at once its origin from the { | places of the @ypoedds and fourth book of Plato's Republic: justice is considered by Plato q ing evidence: e har , a different parts of the soul (443 d 6— i | .
; as the harmony betw ay the ¢ Pe i p93 (443 " ys ) Paed. i. 5. 2 (i 92. 17): vvappdcavra Tpla OvTa, brrdtenlc opous THs BROT EAS arexvas) poe
| eyxedddy. it is the virtue through which each part of the state or of the \ Paid: $094.39 G, 1a7sg human soul is given a particular function and accomplishes it
) yidoas bxd péOns éxi 7 without interfering with that of the others: cai ravrn apa 7p ; durqSoviay Kai Tov Oopdv # 708 otxelov Te Kal éavrod eéis Te Kal mpatis Sicaoodyn dv dpodoi yotro (Rep. iv. 433 € 12-434 a 1).2 But the same idea, expressed !
. in the same terms as in Clement, can be found in Philo, Leg.
; Strom. v. 94. 4 (ii. 388. 1
Alleg. iy ve (i. 80. 7-8), TOTE ObV ylverar; 6rav Ta tpla pep TNS NYE PLOVLKOV iSpicbar Ady h lav é} ' in Albi Did.
Pe pois ouppviay éxm, and in Albinus, basa pak | The Platonic partition T CL.
Sucasoodyy cori cuppuvia TAS TOUT URC ee de ay tite ko ae a well.2 The attribution of Ka nv dporoyet Kat oupduwvel pos adAnva Ta Tpia Ep? TIS pouyfs.3 i It is now interesting to notice another point on which Clement,
\ ! The attribution of the singl :
] sery' ially i . iv.
> perfect agreement: all of them ] observed especially in Rep. iv.
Philo, Albinus, and Apuleius show perfect ag that Plato prefers to use cod¢ia adopt the Platonic partition of the soul into Royrorixdy, Oupoedes,
| wG quay Novierc@-s:coogiy 440 and émOupnricdy (Rep. iv. 436 a) and, according to the Platonic i év air) and gives a more genera - % ae.
A sy fe . f footnote2, p. 78 above). as se r s d— 70 d-e, locate each mn €2, p. 78 teaching as set forth a Timaeus 69 d-70 a, 7 ,
\ 2 Paed. iii. 1. 2 (i. 236. 4-8), S of these parts in a particular part of the body; moreover, they (ii. 379. 25-6). Daskalakis, 68-9, ascribe a particular virtue to each part of the soul, thus forming
| giving any indication about the ° .
: i he soul as consisting only of two a ere \ ined the same through- } ig only a eae of coherent doctrine which rema * i :
| prehends, however, both the @v ' out Middle Platonism and was also adopted, without any notice- , | Strom. iv. 9. 4 (ii. 252. 12.) and able variation, even by exponents of Neoplatonism such as of the soul occurs in Antiochus ke
* . as well as in Middle Platonism:
S Pi r ccor his doctrine, dpdvnats is ol :
Plotinus and Porphyry. According to this « » Ppovn ob and a0yrexév and considers the allotted to the Aoyortxdv, which is located in the head, whereas
} latter, Did, 173. 9ff. (cf. Clement dvSpela and cwdpoovvy are the virtues peculiar to the dvproedes } De Virt. m. 441d and 442 a. Phi '
(v. 80, 21-2), Quis rer. div. Her. 13 é are > breast or heart and in i MS , + and emiBupentexdy which are located in the brez : iW The reference to Strom. v. 52. 2 g i Clement adopts the distinction t On the presence in Philo of the same Stoic definition of dxacoodvy which is j soul is wrong, since in this pas adopted by Clement sce also Volker, 291 n. 1. Heinisch, 278-9, has not mentioned stated. Daskalakis' words, "Diese this farther correspondence between Philo and Clement. The Stoic definition of ee auch nennt, vergleicht er mit Suxatoovvn occurs also in the "Opor, 411 e, eis Stavepyrexy) ro Kar" dflav éxdory. ag und rAaa8év enthalten' (loc 2 See also [Plato], "Opor 411 d-e, Sixaoovvy... edragia réiv rijs oyxfjs pepav
} ia Strom. vi. 134. 1 (ii. 499. 28-3 side Aidgidve nel ON DOHA.
| ais does not bother to mention 3 The correspondence between the twodefinitions of .xaoovvy given by Clement q .
Pe 134. 2 (ii. 500. 1-5) an and Albinus has been noticed by Frichtel, BPhW 57 (1937), 592. As to the agree- ] but its Stoic origin (see his quota ment between Clement and Philo in this respect see also Volker, 291. q "antaining that Clement added if 8267001 j
ETHICS } inferred from the definition of cwdpocvvn quoted above (p. 78) Did.
182. 19-23: Since and from the close connection between ¢pévyats and Aoytopds or rational part are diff \dyos ép6és which we have already observed (pp. 74-5 above). i "a mi e fi s :
. a i pooriar, tbri yf the rational part 'ollowing sections of the Legum Allegoriarum libri ¢ : t As to Philo, - fo'
; e 'oe ° that of the concupisci are arly w noticing :
: are particularly worth } Apuleius, De Plat. i. 20
Leg. Alleg. i. 70 (i. 79. 13-20): It must be remembered that our } rationabilem, id est ment soul is composed ofthree parts, namely the rational, the irascible, lenere, irascentiam vero and the concupiscible; the seat and the dwelling-place of the esse.
. cupidinem atq rational part is the head, that of the irascible the breast, that of fernas abdominis sedes t 'scible the belly.
To each of these parts a suitable | leversoria nequitiae atque the concupiscible the belly. To each of these parts a s dever q que virtue has been closely attached: to the rational part has been
Idem, De Plat. ii. 228-9 allotted prudence, to the irascible courage, to the concupiscible } illam virlutem, quae rat temperance. rerum, prudentiam dicit Leg. Alleg. i. 71
(i. 79. 24-80. 5): Of virtues, the first is prudence, q iracundior habeatur, forti which is concerned with the first part of the soul, namely the mentis est cupidinum et rational, and which dwells in the head, the first part of the body; est, quam vult esse serv the second is courage, because it is concerned with the second pravaque sunt in homine.* part of the soul, namely the seat ofanger, and dwells in the breast, y .
Te the second part of the body; the third is temperance, because ; Anot her doctrine whic a it is active in the belly, which is the third part of the body, and Platonism and with Phi in the concupiscible part of the soul, which is the third.
{ (dvraxoAovOia) between t r iow | man cannot be separated As to Albinus and Apuleius, attention should be drawn to the following passages:
; Strom. ii 45. 1 Gi. 1136. a "
, at aperat, TL xp Aéyew pers .
> gods] placed the ¥ ie oni Albinus, Did. 173. 5 6; 9 me maid be the gos] ae ee ia Strom. ii, 80. 2 (il. 154. 2 siithenita rive Park of the oY a a ne t lates« thay placed Strom. ii. 80. 3 (ii. 155. 3 a rational part, which also ave Bes" ~ —_ - 5 tie Pla it dyee 5:8 why ducucolonb > ; a r % a Ss S = seat of passions:
. ae ' below the part of the sou cern is ithe ach Strom. iv. 59. 2 (ii. 275. irasci vas irascible part was allotted to the heart, t Pp Troviev cal Sixarootvyn « belly.
A OR 2a Fee Theses it fi 2 rd al part] to the wa Oe & Did. 176, 12-13: They ene : fie. He esa sai bi q Tpiav dperav ... e; }-18:
They z > irascible part to the hear *) vas par head .
. 16-18: They allotted 5 as Be the middl areca Strom. viii. 30. 2 (iii. 99. the concupiscible to that seat which stays 1 xwpiobvar Sid thy dvra the navel and the head ..
., — Chat this doctrine is Sto Sia wri mpooywopevoy aylov mvevparo:
VT» 3, vdixard atdawe mvetjiariedy and 788 aerens FEN that Philo ad hi SVF i, 199 and iii. 295 ff. xapaxrnporixéy (S{wya. It must, however, be remembered that Philo adopts the : have , we same Stoic partition in Opif. M. 117, Leg. Alleg. i. 11, Quod det. pot. ins. sol. 168, lave seen a direct influe De Agr. 30, Quis rer. div. Her. 232, De mut. Nom. 110, Quaest. in Gen. i. 75 and ii. ao a hese passages, only the first is mentioned by Daskalakis, 71 (he is wrong in '
On the presence of the sa Of these passages, y E , as a adding the reference, according to Mangey's edition, to Opif. M. 27).
+2. tand Porphyry, Sent. xxii.
1 Albinus' words év 7@ pera£d téme Tod ze mpds Tv Sppaddy pov Kal r&v dpevdv * This doctrine can, however, go directly back to Plato, Timaeus 70 e, ets 76 peragd Gv re dpevrdv Kal 708 mpds instance, Protag, 329 € 4 (on the rav éupaddy Spou. and 882-3) and EN 1145#2-3. q