Philosophic “Madness”
15
Insanity, Inspiration or Intellect
Paul’s Madness in Acts 26:24–25
However Festus intends Paul’s “madness” within the narrative, Luke’s audience could construe the claim favorably. Festus’s charge, conjoined with his acknowledgment of Paul’s education, probably reinforces Luke’s portrayal of Paul as a genuinely wise and bold sage.
The Charge that Paul is “Insane” (26:24)
Like Paul, Luke knows that the Christian message is difficult for those schooled in Greek philosophy (Acts 17:32; 1 Cor 1:21–25). Festus’s retort to Paul may reflect a typical elite response to Paul’s person and message. That Paul’s speech is interrupted here fits a pattern in some other speech contexts in Acts (e.g., 2:37; 7:57; 22:22; probably 17:32) that keeps the narrative moving quickly: when the speaker has finished what needs to be said, the speech is interrupted, even if the speaker is still continuing or barely past the narratio.¹¹⁹³
Nevertheless, Luke’s portrayal of interruptions imitates social reality. Interruptions occurred in other speech settings (e.g., Livy 3.40.5), often from hecklers.¹¹⁹⁴ More relevantly here, judges could interrupt witnesses or the defendant to ask questions,¹¹⁹⁵ sometimes in a hostile manner.¹¹⁹⁶ Thus an emperor might keep interrupting a speaker’s defense of himself with comments and questions (Philostratus Vit. soph. 2.30.623).
That Festus calls Paul insane could be an example of this kind of interruption. Festus may not mean Paul is insane literally, but the remark would be meaningless if it did not evoke some characteristics often associated in antiquity with insanity. The question is what kind of madness Festus attributes to Paul; perhaps multiple ancient associations of madness (discussed below) are involved.
Paul acts based on visions of Jesus (Acts 26:8, 13–20), which Festus might attribute to madness, mixed with rhetorical, inspired, and philosophic madness. As suggested below, Festus’s citation of Paul’s “learning” might evoke especially the element of philosophic madness (see comment below). Luke might accentuate the forms of madness associated with inspiration and philosophy; in his portrayal, Paul, like philosophers, then replaces the charge of madness with the correct interpretation, namely that he is thinking soundly.
Although Festus does not seem hostile toward Paul (cf. 26:31), charges of madness often denigrated those so charged.¹¹⁹⁷ A later source depicts the emperor in a judicial setting charging a man named Appianus with having lost his mind and Appianus denying it.¹¹⁹⁸ The close similarities with Luke’s account of Paul here might reflect dependence on Acts 26, but it is also possible that both scenes simply recall earlier Jewish martyr stories. In some of these earlier accounts, oppressors accused Jewish pietists of insanity (4 Macc 8:5; 10:13). More generally, some ridiculed the righteous as insane, but would eventually learn that it was the mockers themselves who were foolish (Wis 5:4). The claim of insanity could be used as a legal defense,¹¹⁹⁹ but that is far from Luke’s point here. For Luke, the only negative form of madness Paul exhibited was his preconversion persecution of Christians (Acts 26:11, the verb’s only other appearance in Acts except for 12:15).
The “Madness” of Inspiration
Although not the aspect that I will emphasize below, one positive form of “madness” in ancient sources is the madness of inspiration, which may also be relevant here. Of the four forms of ecstasy surveyed by Plato, one of the most important involved inspiration (Phaedr. 265B). Prophetic inspiration was sometimes pejoratively associated with madness in ancient Israel (2 Kgs 9:11; Jer 29:26 [LXX 36:26]; Hos 9:7–8).¹²⁰⁰ Outsiders apparently could view early Christian inspiration similarly as a form of madness (1 Cor 14:23; 2 Cor 5:13; cf. 12:2–4).¹²⁰¹ In Acts, too, those speaking under inspiration could be deemed drunk (Acts 2:13), inviting Peter’s retort just as Festus’s verdict of insanity invites Paul’s retort in 26:25. Elsewhere in Acts, other speech attesting extraordinary divine acts also appeared to outsiders as madness (12:15, one of Luke’s three uses of the verb mainomai).
Such associations were no less clear in the wider Greco-Roman context of early Christianity.¹²⁰² Even when associated with deities, madness could be negative there, including as punishment for insulting the gods.¹²⁰³ When associated with inspiration, however, ecstasy (potentially viewed as insanity) was normally positive. The form of madness normally sent by the gods was better than sanity (Aelius Aristides Defense of Oratory 53, §17D). The Jewish philosopher Philo spoke of a positive madness associated with ecstasy or divine possession.¹²⁰⁴ In such a state, the mind is caught up in God;¹²⁰⁵ at the peak of ecstasy, one’s understanding departs.¹²⁰⁶
Paul’s designation in Acts 26:25 for his own speech applies to inspired speech in 2:4 (but cf. 2:14), so it is possible that Luke understands Festus as construing Paul’s speech inspired because of its content or form.¹²⁰⁷ Some forms of rhetoric valued intense passion or forcefulness in speaking,¹²⁰⁸ though Stoics and other philosophers most respectable in this period usually rejected this rhetorical approach.¹²⁰⁹ More likely, however, any association with inspiration involves Paul’s recent mention of his visionary experiences (26:13–16, as noted above). This would fit Philo’s and others’ association of positive madness with revelatory experiences. Luke’s audience, which would value divine visions (see especially 2:17), could understand a charge of inspired madness positively.¹²¹⁰
Philosophic “Madness”
Luke has elsewhere portrayed Paul as a sage (17:22–31; 19:9; 24:24–26), and Festus’s remark about Paul’s level of “learning” reinforces that portrayal for Luke’s audience in 26:24.¹²¹¹ (The grammata in 26:24 also contrasts Festus’s verdict about Paul with the Jerusalem rulers’ verdict about Peter and John as agrammatoi in 4:13. Although I believe that Luke appreciated the Jerusalem apostles’ ministry, he recognized Paul’s greater ability to gain a hearing among gentile elites.)
Festus’s association of education with “madness” may evoke wider ancient associations of the two concepts.¹²¹² Thus, for example, Dio Chrysostom notes that the Cynic Diogenes was insane by the standards of the masses (Or. 6.3.82; 8.36; 9.8; 34.2); yet Dio Chrysostom warned that truth appears as madness to the misinformed (Or. 12.8).¹²¹³ Philostratus later claims that others viewed the Pythagorean sage Apollonius as insane for a true prediction (Vit. Apoll. 8.26).
Although philosophers’ detractors characterized them as insane, philosophers held the opposite view. Thus Lucian depicts a new convert to philosophy as drunk and “divinely possessed” by philosophy (Lucian Nigr. 5); his companion, by contrast, corrects this verdict by calling his state sobriety (sôphronein, Nigr. 6). In fact, philosophers (especially Stoics) viewed not themselves but the untrained masses as “insane.”¹²¹⁴ Stoics viewed any foolish person (i.e., nonphilosophers) as insane.¹²¹⁵ (Although they divided humanity into ideal types, however, they recognized that in practice most people fell between the two extremes of wisdom and folly.)¹²¹⁶ The philosophically inclined orator Dio Chrysostom warns that some might think him insane for challenging the vices of the Alexandrians (Or. 32.24), but he charges that the Alexandrians themselves are the ones who act insane in their foolish pursuit of entertainment and immoral pleasures (Or. 32.41–42, 65, 91).¹²¹⁷
The apparent madness of inspiration and the apparent madness of philosophy were not incompatible, so that outsiders might in principle confuse them. Thus in Dio Chrysostom Or. 34.4 the masses might view philosophic madness as analogous to inspired madness. At least as early as Philo (and probably not derived specifically from him), Middle Platonist philosophers sought inspired visions of the divine.¹²¹⁸ Although Stoicism remained the dominant philosophic school in the first century, it is possible that Festus and Luke’s audience could associate Paul’s earlier mentioned visionary experiences with philosophic learning.
Festus’s recognition that Paul is educated—perhaps especially in the documents of the Jewish tradition (the Scriptures; Acts 26:22)—is a positive evaluation of the sort that could prejudice judges in favor of defendants who might belong to their own social class. His verdict of madness is more ambiguous, however, although, associated with his learning, it would reinforce Paul’s positive status for Luke’s audience. Paul, like other sages, might seem insane to outsiders, but his alleged insanity is consistent with, and here associated with, his learning. Although some considered mainstream philosophers such as Stoics eccentric, most intellectuals respected them (except where rivalries among philosophic schools were factors). Luke reinforces this positive depiction of Paul’s wisdom by Paul’s response in 26:25.
Paul’s Sound Mind (26:25)
As was considered prudent when responding even to a court’s challenge,¹²¹⁹ Paul responds respectfully in 26:25. He defends his own sanity, but does not denigrate that of Festus or others, and even appeals to Agrippa to verify Paul’s consistency with the prophets (26:27).
Paul claims to speak with sôphrosunê, which (as commentators often note) ancient speakers sometimes contrasted with insanity.¹²²⁰ Although ecstasy could include irrational behavior (as noted above), Dio Chrysostom praises even an inspired person who spoke with such self-control (Dio Chrysostom Or. 1.56); inspiration did not need to transgress sanity.
Many writers praised this virtue.¹²²¹ It could apply to the virtue of young men avoiding excesses such as sexual misbehavior and extravagant banquets.¹²²² Likewise, it applied to virtues of women, including their modesty and sexual self-control.¹²²³ One could apply it to farmers with an emphasis on their hard work.¹²²⁴ Some applied it even to restraint in laughter, thus displaying dignity.¹²²⁵ One who led a life of such self-control would be difficult to convict in court (Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. rom. 7.58.2).
Although Paul mentions the virtue here only briefly, it appears at much greater length in other ancient speeches. It was one of the virtues that orators often included in encomia.¹²²⁶ Indeed, its role as one of the cardinal virtues rendered it a particularly useful topic for development in speeches.¹²²⁷ These could include model speeches for praising leaders or friends.¹²²⁸
Given Festus’s remark about Paul’s learning, however, the virtue’s association with philosophic sages might be particularly relevant. The term appears so widely in antiquity that we cannot arbitrarily restrict its sense to this usage, but if Luke elsewhere depicts Paul as a wise sage, the claim here will support that characterization. (This observation is especially relevant given its linkage with “truth” here.)¹²²⁹
Philosophers praised this virtue of self-control.¹²³⁰ In Plato’s dialogues, Socrates extols this virtue;¹²³¹ Plato connected it with self-knowledge¹²³² and moderation related to self-knowledge.¹²³³ It appears also among Pythagoreans¹²³⁴ and even among Epicureans.¹²³⁵ Prominently, it was one of Aristotle’s four influential cardinal virtues, though this classification of virtues probably did not originate with Aristotle.¹²³⁶ The dominant philosophy in the first century was Stoicism, which retained sôphrosunê as one of the central virtues, including among Roman Stoics such as Musonius.¹²³⁷
Stoics apply the term and its cognates to self-control over the passions, the baser emotions.¹²³⁸ Thus they applied it against, for example, sexual indulgence,¹²³⁹ gluttony¹²⁴⁰ and even grief.¹²⁴¹ Its semantic range overlaps with that of egkrateia,¹²⁴² a virtue that Paul elaborates in Acts 24:25 (to the discomfort of Festus’s predecessor Felix). The virtue should characterize philosophers.¹²⁴³ Although nonphilosophers might question the sobriety of a person who left everything else to pursue philosophy, Dio Chrysostom pronounced such a person genuinely wise (Dio Chrysostom Or. 80.1).
Jewish thinkers writing in Greek show a similar range of usage. It appears among the four cardinal virtues in Wisdom of Solomon (8:7), 4 Maccabees (1:6, 18; 2:23; 15:10), and abundantly in Philo.¹²⁴⁴ Fourth Maccabees, influenced by Stoicism, praises the virtue’s ability to subdue harmful passions (4 Macc 1:30–31; 2:18; 3:17, 19; 5:23), including gluttony (4 Macc 1:3) and lust (1:3; 2:2, 16; see also T. Jos. 4:1–2). Its occurrence in Acts is not therefore surprising, regardless of whether we reconstruct Luke’s audience as primarily Jewish, primarily gentile, or mixed.
Conclusion
Luke’s audience might well hear nuances in Festus’s interruption of Paul in Acts 26:24, and Paul’s response to Festus in 26:25, that modern readers usually miss. Sometimes in antiquity “madness” characterized an outsider’s view of ecstatic inspiration, which some could associate with Paul’s possibly visionary experiences noted in 26:13–19. The charge of madness associated with learning (as it is explicitly in 26:24) might associate Paul with philosophers, in this case probably an inspired philosopher. Because the popular masses sometimes derided philosophers or prophets with the label of insanity, those who respected philosophers or prophets could view Paul’s treatment here as fitting expectations for him as inspired and/or as a sage. Sages themselves, however, often explicitly reversed the evaluation, considering themselves sane and the masses insane; Paul reverses the evaluation of himself here (without denigrating Festus as insane).
Festus is not ridiculing Paul here; the exchange remains respectful. Nevertheless, the exchanged words support Luke’s portrayal of Paul as an intellectual with quick wit and the ability to speak to Romans of respected social strata. A reader today might add that this depiction generally fits the kind of person that Paul must have been to dictate the letters we know that he produced and to reach the people of influence (e.g., Rom 16:23) that he reached in Corinth and elsewhere.