Chapter 3: On the Triple Primacy of the First Principle
Chapter 3 On the Triple Primacy of the First Principle1 24. (2) Lord our God, you have declared yourself to be the first and the last.2
Teach your servant to show by reason what he holds by most certain faith: that you are the First Efficient, the Most Eminent, and the Final End.
(3) I would like to focus on three of the six types of essential orders dis cussed above, namely, the two orders of extrinsic causality and the one order of eminence, and—if you grant it—to demonstrate that one and the same nature is simply the first in each of these three orders. I say "one nature" because in this third chapter the three firsts just mentioned are shown to pertain not to a unique or numerically one individual, but rather to a unique quiddity3 or nature. However, there will be discussion later about the numer ical oneness of this one nature.4
The Primacy of Efficiency 25. (4) Theorem 3.1: Among beings, some nature can produce an effect.
(5) This is shown: something can be produced; therefore, something can produce an effect. The consequence is clear by the nature of correlatives. The antecedent is proved in this way: first, something is contingent; therefore, it is possible for it to exist after not existing; but then it does not exist due to itself, nor due to nothing—since, either way, a being would exist due to a non-being—and therefore it is producible by another. Second, some nature can undergo move ment or change, since it is possible for it to lack some perfection it is possible for it to have; therefore, the result of a change can begin to exist, and so be produced.
26. (6) I could phrase Theorem 3.1, as with some theorems that follow, so as to be about actual things, like this: some nature is effective, since something
1. The heading of Chapter 3 belongs to the Latin text. It is numbered as paragraph 1 in Wolter's edition.
2. Isaiah 41:4, 44:6, 48:12; Revelation 1:8, 1:17.
3. Literally, whatness or what-it-is-ness.
4. 4.94(87)–97(93) below.
Translation is effected, since something begins to exist, since something is the result of a change and is contingent. But I prefer to advance theorems and premises about possible things. If the theorems and premises about actual things are granted, those about the possible are granted, too—but not conversely. Also, the former are contingent (even if they are sufficiently obvious) whereas the latter are necessary. Again, the former concern existent being, while the latter can pertain to being considered in its very nature. The actual existence of that nature will indeed be shown later;5 for now, its ability to produce an effect will be shown.
27. (7) Theorem 3.2: Something able to produce an effect is simply first— that is, it cannot be produced, and it can produce its effect without the power of anything else.
(8) This is proved from Theorem 3.1. Something—call it A—can produce an effect. If A is first in the sense under discussion, we have our conclusion right away. If A is not first, then it is posterior, either because it can be produced by another, or because it can produce its effect only by the power of something else. (If the negation is denied, the affirmation is affirmed.) Given this other thing, call it B. The same reasoning about A will apply to B. But then, either there will be an infinite series of things able to produce an effect, such that each one, with respect to its immediate prior, will be a second; or, the series will stop at something that has no prior. But an ascending infinite series is impossible. Therefore, since that which does not have a prior is in no way posterior to anything posterior to it—for a circle of causes was ruled out by Theorem 2.2—a first is necessary.
28. (9) There is an objection here, that according to the philosophers an ascending infinite series is indeed possible, as they posited infinite genera tors of which none is the first but each is second to another; and they hold this without positing a causal circle. In rejecting this objection I say that the philosophers did not posit the possibility of an infinity of essentially ordered causes, but only accidentally ordered causes, as is clear in Avicenna, Metaphys ics 6.5,6 where he speaks of an infinity of individuals within a species.
(10) Here I explain what essentially ordered causes are, and what acci dentally ordered causes are, in order to show the theorem. It must be known that it is one thing to speak of per se causes and per accidens causes, and another thing to speak of per se ordered causes (that is, essentially ordered causes) and per accidens ordered causes. For in the first pair there is only a comparison of 5. 3.33(18) below.
6. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.5.22 (Marmura, 226).
Chapter 3 how one thing, a cause, is related to another thing, its effect; in this sense a per se cause is that which causes with respect to what belongs to its nature and not with respect to something accidental to it. But in the second pair there is a comparison of how two causes are related to each other, precisely insofar as an effect comes from them.
(11) And essentially and per se ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes in three ways. The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second depends, in its causing, on the first; in per accidens ordered causes it does not depend on the first in this way—although it may well depend on it for existence or in some other way. The second difference is that in per se ordered causes the causality is of a different nature and order, since the higher cause is more perfect; in accidentally ordered causes this is not the case. And this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends, for its causing, on a cause of the same nature as itself, since just one cause of a given kind suffices for the causation of anything requiring a cause of that kind. The third difference follows, namely that all per se ordered causes necessarily and simultaneously are required for causing their effect; other wise some per se causality would be lacking for the effect. But accidentally ordered causes are not simultaneously required.
29. (12) From the following three propositions, Theorem 3.2 is shown:
(A) an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible; and (B) an infin ity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless an essentially ordered series comes to an end; therefore an infinity of essentially ordered causes is totally impossible. (C) Even if essential order is denied, an infinite series of causes is impossible; either way, therefore, there is something simply first that can produce an effect.
Here there are three assumed propositions. For brevity's sake call the first A, the second B, and the third C.
(13) The proof of these. First, A is proved.
[First proof of A] First, the totality of essentially ordered caused things is itself caused; therefore it comes from some cause that itself is not a member of that totality—otherwise it would be the cause of itself. For the totality of dependent things is itself dependent, and it does not depend on anything whatsoever that belongs to that totality.
[Second proof of A] Second, an infinity of essentially ordered causes would exist simultaneously in actuality (from the third difference, explained above7)—a conclusion no philosopher accepts.
7. 3.28(11) above.
Translation [Third proof of A] Third, the prior is nearer to a beginning (from Meta physics 5);8 therefore where there is no beginning, there is nothing essentially prior.
[Fourth proof of A] Fourth, the higher is more perfect in its causing (from the second difference explained above9); therefore the infinitely higher is infinitely more perfect and so is infinitely perfect in its causing; it therefore does not cause by anything else's power, because anything that causes in this way causes imperfectly, since it is dependent in its causing.
[Fifth proof of A] Fifth, being able to produce an effect does not as such necessarily convey any imperfection, as is clear from Theorem 2.8; therefore, the ability to produce an effect can exist without imperfection in a nature.
But if there is nothing that is not dependent on a prior, then nothing would have, without imperfection, the ability to produce an effect. Therefore the ability to produce an effect independently can belong to some nature; such a nature is simply first; therefore it is possible for something to have the ability to produce an effect and be simply first. This is enough for now, since later on it will be established that such a thing exists in reality. Thus, from these five arguments, A is clear.
30. (14) B is proved. Assuming an infinite series of accidentally ordered causes, such a series is not simultaneous, obviously, but only successive—one thing after another—such that a second, although it might have come to exist from what is prior to it, does not depend on the prior in its causing, for it can cause its effect even if the prior is non-existent, as a son procreates whether his father be dead or living. An infinite series like this is impossible, except by some infinitely enduring nature, on which the whole series and each of its members depends. For changes of form do not occur except by virtue of something enduring, not itself a member of the succession of things changing form (since all members of the succession are of the same nature); but something is essentially prior to the succession, because everything in the succession depends on it, and in a different order from that in which each depends on its proximate cause, which itself is a member of the succession.
Therefore B is clear.
31. (15) C is proved. From Theorem 3.1, some nature can produce an effect; if an essential order of things able to produce an effect is denied, then that one nature does not cause anything by another's power. And even if that nature, in some individual, is assumed to be caused, still, in some other indi vidual the nature is uncaused—which is just what is proposed concerning
8. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9–11 (Barnes, 2:1608).
9. 3.28(11) above.
Chapter 3 the First Nature. The reason is that, assuming the nature to be caused in each individual, denying essential order entails a contradiction, since (from B) one cannot posit that any nature is caused in a given thing in such a way that there is an accidental order under that nature without an essential order to some other nature.
32. (16) Theorem 3.3: That which can produce an effect in a way that is simply first is uncausable, because it cannot be the effect of anything else and it can produce an effect independent of anything else.
(17) This is clear from Theorem 3.2 because, if it could be produced by another thing, or could be a cause only by another's power, then either there would be an infinite series of causes, or a circle of causes, or the series would stop at something not able to be the effect of anything else and able to pro duce an effect independent of anything else. That thing I call first, and it is clear from what you have granted that no other thing is first.
Additionally, it is established that if the first cannot be the effect of any thing else, then it is uncausable, because it cannot be ordered to an end
(by Theorem 2.5), or be made of matter (by Theorem 2.6), or have form (by Theorem 2.7), or be composed of form and matter together (by Theorem 2.8).
33. (18) Theorem 3.4: Something able to produce an effect in a way that is simply first exists in actuality, and some actually existing nature can produce an effect in this way.
(19) Proof. Anything the nature of which is repugnant with being able to exist by another, can exist of itself if it can exist at all. The nature of that which can produce an effect in a way that is simply first is repugnant with being able to exist by another (by Theorem 3.3). But it can exist (by Theorem 3.2).
Indeed, the fifth proof of A, which would appear to establish less than the other proofs, establishes this.
The other arguments10 can be treated as dealing with existence, in which case they have contingent (but evident) premises; or they can be treated as dealing with nature, essence, and possibility, and therefore as having neces sarily true premises.
Therefore something able to produce an effect in a way that is simply first can exist of itself. What does not exist of itself cannot exist of itself; other wise a non-being would produce something existent, which is impossible; moreover it would then be the cause of itself, and so would not be completely uncausable.
10. Probably, the other arguments for A, B, and C offered in 3.29(13)–31(15).
Translation Another way to show Theorem 3.4 is that it would be unfitting for the universe to be missing the highest possible degree of being.
(20) Note a corollary of Theorem 3.4: not only is the first among things able to produce an effect, prior to all others, but it is contradictory that any thing be prior to it. Thus, insofar as it is first, it exists. This is proved in the same way as Theorem 3.4 was proved, for that nature maximally includes being uncausable; therefore if it can exist (because it does not contradict being) then it can exist of itself, and so exists of itself.
34. (21) Theorem 3.5: What is uncausable exists necessarily from itself.
(22) This is proved: by excluding every cause of existence other than itself (both intrinsic and extrinsic causes), it is shown that it is impossible for it not to exist from itself.
Proof. No nature can fail to exist unless something else can exist that is incompatible with that nature—incompatible either in the positive sense
[i.e., that its existence rules out the other's existence] or in the privative sense
[i.e., that its non-existence rules out the other's existence]—because one or the other of a pair of contradictories is always true. Nothing incompatible positively or privatively with the uncausable nature can exist, for it would exist either [i] from itself or [ii] from another; but not [i] from itself, because then it would in fact exist from itself (by Theorem 3.4) and thus incompati ble things would exist simultaneously and, for the very same reason, neither would exist, for you concede that given the incompatible thing, the uncaus able thing would not exist, but the converse also follows. And neither [ii] from another, because nothing that is caused has a more vigorous or powerful existence by its cause, than the uncausable thing has just of itself, since the caused thing is dependent in its existence, whereas the uncausable is not.
Likewise, the possible existence of the causable thing does not necessarily imply its actual existence, as it does for the uncausable thing. But nothing incompatible with something already existing can exist from any cause unless it receives from its cause a more vigorous or more powerful existence than the existence of the being with which it is incompatible.
35. (23) Theorem 3.6: Existing necessarily from itself pertains to only one nature.
(24) [First proof ] This is proved in this way: if two natures could exist necessarily from themselves, then necessary existence would be a common feature. Therefore there would be some essence on account of which these two natures have that common feature, and from which that common feature would be received, as though it were their genus; moreover, the two natures would be distinguished from each other due to their ultimate actual formal features.
Chapter 3 Two impossibilities follow from this. First, each will be necessarily exis tent primarily due to a common nature, which has less actuality, and not due to a distinguishing nature, which has greater actuality; for if it has necessary existence formally from its distinguishing nature, then it will have necessary existence twice, since the distinguishing nature does not formally include the common nature, just as a difference does not include its genus. But it seems impossible that what has less actuality would be primarily the reason that something is necessary, and what has more actuality would be neither primarily nor essentially the reason that something is necessary.
The second impossibility is that neither would have necessary existence through the common nature that is posited to be primarily that through which both have necessary existence, since neither exists completely through that nature. Indeed, any nature is the very nature it is through its ultimate formal feature. But that through which something has necessary existence
(disregarding all of its other features) is that whereby it necessarily exists.
If you say that the common nature suffices for existence on its own, apart from further distinguishing natures, then that common nature of itself exists actually yet indistinctly, and consequently it is indistinguishable, since neces sary existence that already exists is not in potency to existence as such—yet a genus's existence in a species is the only existence a genus has.
(25) [Second proof ] Again, two natures falling under the same common nature do not have an equal degree of perfection. This is shown through the various differences dividing up a genus. If these differences are unequal, then, for two things belonging to the same genus but of two different species, the existence of the thing of one species will be more perfect than the existence of the thing of the other species. But no existence is more perfect than nec essary existence of itself.
36. (26) [Third proof ] Again, if there were two natures that exist necessarily of themselves, neither would depend on the other for its existence; therefore they would not be essentially ordered to each other. Therefore one of them would not be a member of this universe, since there is nothing in the universe that is not essentially ordered to other beings in the universe, since what makes this universe one universe just is the order among its parts.
Here it is objected that since each would have an order of eminence to the parts of the universe, this would suffice for the unity of the universe. But to the contrary, neither would be in an order of eminence with respect to the other, because the more eminent nature more perfectly exists, yet nothing is more perfect than necessary existence from itself. Also, one of these would be in no order with respect to the parts of the universe, because there is just one order for one universe, and one order is ordered to one first. Proof: if it is pos ited that there are two first natures, then the nature immediately posterior to
Translation the first would not have a unique order or dependence to a unique first, but two orders to two firsts, and likewise there would be two orders to it, and so on for each lower nature. In the whole universe, then, there will be two orders to a first, and so two universes. Alternatively, there would be an order to just one necessary being, and not to the other.
37. Proceeding reasonably, however, nothing should be posited in the uni verse unless there is some evident need for it, that is, unless some order to other things that manifestly do exist proves its existence—after all, a plu rality is not to be posited without necessity (from Physics 1).11 A necessarily existing thing is revealed to be part of the universe by considering what is uncausable, and the uncausable is revealed by considering the first cause, and the first cause is revealed by considering what is caused. But in considering what is caused there appears to be no need to posit a plurality of natures that are first causes. Indeed this is impossible, as shown later in Theorem 3.15.
Therefore there is no need to posit a plurality of natures that are uncaused or necessarily exist. Reasonably, then, these are not posited.
The Primacy of Finality 38. (27) I now set forth four theorems about the final cause, similar to the theorems in the first part of this chapter about the ability to produce an effect, and shown to be true through similar arguments. The first is:
Theorem 3.7: There is some nature among beings such that it can be an end.
(28) Proof: something can be ordered to an end. Proof: since something can be produced (from the proof of Theorem 3.1), something can be ordered to an end. The consequence is clear from Theorem 2.4. Being able to be ordered to an end is even more clearly an instance of essential order than being able to produce an effect (see Theorem 2.16).
(29) Theorem 3.8: Something that can be an end is simply first, that is, it cannot be ordered to some other end, and not by any thing else's power is it the end of other things.
(30) This is proved by five arguments similar to those offered for Theorem 3.2.
11. Aristotle, Physics 1.4.188a17 (Barnes, 1:321); also Theorem 2.15.
Chapter 3 (31) Theorem 3.9: The first among beings that can be an end, is itself uncausable.
(32) Proof: it cannot be ordered to an end; otherwise, it would not be the first. Moreover, it therefore cannot be an effect of any efficient cause (from Theorem 2.4). Additionally, see the above proof for Theorem 3.3.
(33) Theorem 3.10: The first among beings that can be an end, actually exists, and this primacy belongs to some actually existing nature.
(34) The proof is just like the proof for Theorem 3.4. A corollary is that it is first in such a way that it is impossible for anything to be prior to it, and this is proved just like the corollary of the above proof for Theorem 3.4.
The Primacy of Eminence 39. (35) Having just advanced four theorems each about the orders of extrin sic causality, I likewise offer four theorems about the order of eminence. The first of these:
Theorem 3.11: Among the natures of beings there is something that excels.
(36) Proof: something is ordered to an end (from Theorem 3.7); therefore, it is excelled (from Theorem 2.16).
(37) Theorem 3.12: Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection.
(38) This is clear from one of the features of essential order, namely pri ority and posteriority. According to Aristotle in Metaphysics 8,12 forms are related to each other as numbers are related to each other. Any essential order comes to a stopping point, as is proved in the five arguments offered above for Theorem 3.2.
(39) Theorem 3.13: The Supreme Nature is uncausable.
(40) [First proof ] Proof: it cannot be ordered to an end (from Theorem 2.16); therefore it cannot be an effect (from Theorem 2.4); and it cannot be caused by any other type of cause, as is clear from the above proof for The orem 3.3.
[Second proof ] Likewise, that the Supreme Nature cannot be an effect is proved from the section establishing proposition B in the proof of Theorem
3.2, since everything that can be an effect has some cause to which it is essentially ordered.
12. Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33–1044a14 (Barnes, 2:1648).
Translation (41) Theorem 3.14: The Supreme Nature is something actually existing.
(42) This is proved in the same way as Theorem 3.4. A corollary is that it is contradictory to assert that something else is more perfect than, or is superior to, it, and this is proved in the same way as the corollary in the proof of Theorem 3.4.
The Triple Primacy 40. (43) Theorem 3.15: To one and the same unique and actually existing nature belongs the triple primacy within the three types of essential orders discussed in this chapter, namely, efficiency, finality, and eminence.
(44) [First proof ] This fifteenth theorem is the fruit of this chapter. From what has already been shown it follows clearly, thus: if necessary existence from itself belongs to just one nature (by Theorem 3.6), and whatever pos sesses any of the three primacies has necessary existence from itself—by Theorems 3.5 and 3.3 for the first primacy, Theorems 3.5 and 3.9 for the sec ond primacy, and Theorems 3.5 and 3.13 for the third primacy—then each of these primacies belongs to a single nature. Also, any nature that possesses one of these primacies possesses the others. For each of them is in some nature; but it is not the case that one of them is in one nature and another one in another nature (by Theorems 3.4, 3.10, and 3.14). Therefore, they all belong to one and the same nature. The proof of the minor premise is that otherwise several natures would exist necessarily (from the second premise of the argument just given).
[Second proof ] Again, Theorem 3.15 is proved through the nature of the uncausable, since that is uniquely first. But each of the primacies mentioned here is uncausable. Therefore Theorem 3.15 follows. The major premise is proved in this way: how will a multitude exist of itself?
The Uniqueness of the First Nature 41. (45) Theorem 3.15 is intensely pregnant, for in its power it contains six additional conclusions, three about the unity of the nature to which each of these aforementioned primacies belongs; and three about the identity of the nature that is first with respect to one type of primacy with the nature that is first with respect to the other type of primacies.
Also, Theorem 3.15, pregnant in this way, has been shown through Theorem 3.6 alone, as though it were a major premise.
Chapter 3 It is befitting to state the proper major premises for these six additional conclusions just mentioned, if they can be found.
42. (46) For the first two of these six conclusions to be shown, I offer this theorem:
Theorem 3.16. It is impossible for one and the same thing to depend essen tially on two things in such a way that its dependence termi nates wholly in each.
(47) This is proved. If one cause totally causes something in one type of causality, it is impossible for another cause, in the same type of causality, to cause the very same thing as that first cause; otherwise the same thing would be caused twice, or neither cause would be its total cause; or similarly, then something would be a cause, but if it were not causing, the same effect would come about anyway—which is absurd. So too it is impossible, in any type of dependence, for one and the same thing to depend on two things, where one of the two terminates the whole of the dependent thing's dependence. If, in such a circumstance, the dependent thing were to depend on one of the two, then the other does not after all completely terminate the dependent thing's dependence. Similarly, then, that dependent thing would depend on some thing such that, if it turned out not to exist, the dependent thing would still exist in the very same order of being—but it would be contrary to the nature of dependence to think that it would still exist in the same order of being.
43. (48) Theorem 3.16 having been shown, I now advance the first conclu sions included together in Theorem 3.15, thus:
Theorem 3.17: To only one nature belongs each primacy of any type of extrinsic cause.
(49) [First proof ] This is proved, because if such a primacy were to belong to several things, they would be first either with respect to the same poste rior things, or to different posterior things. Not to the same posteriors, from Theorem 3.16; also, in each posterior thing there would be two dependencies of the same type, since there is not one dependence on two first causes. The consequent is unfitting. Neither to different posteriors, since if there were another first cause, of other things, there will be a different universe compris ing those things, since those things and these things will be ordered neither to each other nor to the same thing. Without unity of order there is not a unity of the universe. Aristotle holds that the chief goodness of the universe is in its one end.13 And since there is one order for one highest thing, it is
13. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10.1075a11–19 (Barnes, 2:1699).
Translation enough for me to speak of only one universe, not inventing another when I have no reason to do so; indeed, the conclusion is untenable.
44. (50) Probable proofs are added. [Second proof ] In an ascending essential order there is advancement toward unity and paucity; therefore such an order is brought to rest in one thing.
(51) [Third proof ] Again, the causality of a higher cause extends itself to more things; thus, the higher up a causal series, the fewer causes suffice.
Therefore, etc. This clarifies the previous proof.
(52) [Fourth proof ] Again, it seems obvious that there can be only one most eminent nature: given that it is impossible for two natures not to be ordered with respect to eminence, where one does not excel the other (since in this ordering natures are like numbers14), it is all the more impossible for two natures to occupy the same highest degree of eminence.
(53) [Fifth proof ] Again, concerning the end: if there were not a single final end, then there would be no end in which everything else comes to rest.
Since this is unintelligible, it follows as before, that it is impossible for two natures to be the first final cause.
(54) [Sixth proof ] Again, if more than one nature has any of the three pri macies, no nature would virtually contain the perfection of all other natures; but it cannot be thought without contradiction that there should be no most perfect nature.
45. (55) There are also special proofs for the three other conclusions.15 For:
Theorem 3.18: The First Nature that can produce an effect is most actu al because it virtually contains every possible actuality. The first in finality is the best, virtually containing every possible good. The first in eminence is most perfect, eminently con taining every possible perfection.
(56) These three primacies cannot be separated, because if one were in one nature, and another in another, it could not be determined which of these would be preeminent. Hence, these three primacies seem to express three necessarily concurring aspects of the highest goodness, which are the highest communicability, the highest lovability, and the highest integrity or whole ness. For the good and the perfect are the same (Metaphysics 5)16 and the 14. A reference back to 3.39(38).
15. The second three conclusions of the six mentioned in 3.41(45).
16. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16.1021b14–22 (Barnes, 2:1613).
Chapter 3 perfect and the whole are the same (Physics 3).17 Moreover, concerning the good, it is clear that it is desirable (Ethics 1)18 and communicative (Avicenna,
Metaphysics 6).19 For nothing perfectly communicates unless it communi cates out of generosity, and this truly pertains to the highest good, since it does not look for something in exchange for its communication—and this is the mark of the one who is generous, according to Avicenna in chapter 5 of the same book.20
Everything Is Ordered 46. (57) Theorem 3.19: One actually existing nature is first in the three aforementioned orders with respect to any other nature, such that any other nature is posterior to that First Nature in these three ways.
(58) [Objection] Some impudent person, holding Theorem 3.15, could say that there are many natures besides this one, which indeed are not first, but are not posterior to that First Nature in one of the aforesaid orders; or are not posterior in all the orders, but only in eminence, or in eminence and finality, but not in efficiency—as some say Aristotle thought was the case for the intelligences posterior to the First Nature, and possibly for prime matter as well. Although this can be refuted from what has already been said, still it warrants explanation.
(59) [First reply] First, this view is certainly disproved at least by Theorem 3.6, since if necessary existence from itself belongs to just one nature, and whatever is not posterior in whichever of the three orders has necessary exis tence of itself, then only one nature is not posterior in any sort of posteriority.
Therefore, anything else is posterior in three ways. The second premise of this argument is clear from Theorems 3.3, 3.9, and 3.13—just add Theorem 3.6 to each of them.
47. (60) [Second reply] Second, this view is disproved for each type of order.
What is neither an end nor ordered to some end, exists in vain. Among beings, nothing exists in vain. Therefore every nature other than the first end is ordered to an end—and if to some end, then to the first (from Theorem 2.3).
17. Aristotle, Physics 3.6.207a13 (Barnes, 1:352).
18. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.1094a1–3 (Barnes, 2:1729).
19. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.5.45 (Marmura, 233).
20. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.5.48 (Marmura, 234).
Translation [Third reply] Similarly it is disproved for the eminent. What is neither the highest nor excelled by something, has no degree of eminence; but such a thing is nothing at all; therefore, everything that is not the highest is excelled by something—therefore by the highest (from Theorem 2.3).
(61) [Fourth reply] From these, it is also disproved for efficiency, which some think Aristotle denies. Each thing is either the first end or something ordered to an end (from what was just said above); therefore each thing is either the first efficient cause or an effect, since the disjuncts of the latter disjunction can be converted with the disjuncts of the former. The convert ibility of the disjuncts about posteriority is clear from Theorems 2.4 and 2.5; the convertibility of the disjuncts about the First Nature is clear from Theorem 3.18.
(62) [Fifth reply] It is similarly disproved through eminence. If everything is either the highest nature or excelled by the highest, then everything is either the first efficient cause or an effect, since these disjuncts are also con verted (from Theorems 2.15, 2.16, and 3.15).
[Sixth reply] Also, the belief that there is some being having no order is extremely irrational, as shown obliquely by the second reason for Theorem 3.6 and the proof for Theorem 3.17.
48. (63) Truly, Lord, in wisdom you have made everything in an ordered way, so that it is evident to any reasonable intellect that every being is ordered well. Hence it was absurd for the philosophers to deny order of some beings.
But from this general principle, every being is ordered, it follows that it is not the case that every being is posterior, and it is not the case that every being is prior. Both follow because their contradictories entail either that something is ordered to itself or that there is a circle in an order. There is, therefore, some being that is prior and not posterior, and so first; and something that is posterior and not prior; but nothing that is neither prior nor posterior.
You are the one and only first, and everything else is posterior to you, even in a triple order, as I have shown as well as I can.