Chapter 2: The Relations Between the Types of Essential Order
Chapter 2 The Relations Between the Types of Essential Order 9. (1) This chapter proceeds with arguments about those four divisions of essential order that are to be presented, and the correlatives of those orders that are to be compared.
Description of Essential Order (2) Lord our God, who infallibly taught the venerable doctor Augustine when he wrote about you, the Triune, in On the Trinity 1, saying, "Nothing whatsoever births itself into being,"1 have you not impressed upon us with equal certitude the following similar truth?
Theorem 2.1: Nothing whatsoever is essentially ordered to itself.
(3) For in the order of eminence what is more impossible than that the same thing excel itself with respect to an essential perfection? And in the sense of "dependence" outlined above, in any of the other six types of essential order, what is more impossible than that the same thing essentially depend on itself, or can exist without itself?
(4) This, too, harmonizes with the truth:
Theorem 2.2: In any essential order a circle is impossible.
(5) This is because whatever is prior to the prior, is prior to the posterior.
Something opposed to Theorem 2.1 follows from the denial of Theorem 2.2; if Theorem 2.2 is denied, one and the same thing will be essentially prior and posterior to itself, and thus more and less perfect than itself, or dependent on and independent of itself, all of which are a long way from the truth. In Posterior Analytics 1, Aristotle excludes such a circle from demonstrations,2 and it is no less impossible among things.
1. Augustine, On the Trinity 1.1.1 (McKenna, 4).
2. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b25 (Barnes, 1:117).
Translation (6) There is a third theorem that, like Theorem 2.2, can be proved from, and is sufficiently contained in, Theorem 2.1; I make it explicit because I will make use of it below.
Theorem 2.3: What is not posterior to the prior, is not posterior to the posterior.
(7) This theorem follows from what has already been affirmed. And it follows from it that what does not depend on the prior, does not depend on the posterior. It also follows that what is not caused by the prior cause, is not caused by the posterior cause, because the posterior depends, in its causing, on the causal activity of the prior.
The Fourth Division of Essential Order Four Orders of Causal Dependence 10. (8) Now, God, with you as our guide, let us compare these six orders to each other, beginning with the four orders of cause to caused thing. However, I refrain from describing the differences between these orders or the sufficiency of their division, because enough is known already. Indeed, it might be wordy and beside the point to do so. I will merely compare—in six theorems—these orders with respect to the connections or logical relations they have to each other on account of what is caused.
11. (9) Theorem 2.4: What is not ordered to an end, is not an effect.
(10) [First proof ] It is proved first in this way: what is not from a per se efficient cause, is not an effect. What is not for the sake of an end, is not from a per se efficient cause. Therefore, etc.
The major premise is proved in this way: the per accidens is not first in any genus, as Aristotle explains adequately in Physics 2,3 where he says that nature and intellect, as per se causes in a given genus of cause, are necessarily prior to chance and fortune, which are merely causes per accidens. But what is not from a first, is not from what is posterior to the first, by Theorem 2.3. (I speak of positive things, which alone properly speaking can be effects.) The major premise is therefore clear. The minor premise is proved in this way: Every per se agent acts for the sake of an end because it does not act in vain, as Aristotle, in Physics 2,4 concludes about nature, concerning which it is less clear that it
3. Aristotle, Physics 2.6.198a5–13 (Barnes, 1:338).
4. Aristotle, Physics 2.5.196b17–22 (Barnes, 1:335).
Chapter 2 acts for the sake of an end than it is in the case of intellect. Therefore, a per se agent does not efficiently cause anything except for the sake of an end.
(11) [Second proof ] Theorem 2.4 is proved, secondly, in this way: the end is the first cause in causing; that is why Avicenna calls it the cause of causes.5
This is also proved by reason, since the end moves metaphorically insofar as it is loved, in such a way that the efficient cause brings about form in matter. But it is not the case that the end moves insofar as it is loved due to some other cause causing it. Therefore, the end is essentially the first cause in causing.
[Third proof ] It is also proved in this way: Aristotle shows that the end is a cause in Metaphysics 5,6 because it furnishes the answer to the question,
"On account of what?"—a question that seeks a cause. Therefore, since the first answer to this question is given by the end, it will be the first cause. The assumption is clear because if the question is asked, "Why does it produce an effect?" the reply is, "Because it loves or intends the end." But the converse does not hold: it does not love the end because it produces an effect.
(13) From the primacy of the end with respect to the effect, now triply proved, Theorem 2.4 follows, since, according to Theorem 2.3, what has no prior cause has no posterior cause.
12. (14) Theorem 2.5: What is not an effect, is not ordered to an end.
(15) Proof: the end is not a cause except insofar as the existence of the thing ordered to the end essentially depends on it, as on what is prior to it. This is clear because any cause, insofar as it is a cause, is prior in this way.
But the thing ordered to the end does not depend on the end for its existence in this way except insofar as the end as loved moves the efficient cause to give existence to it: the efficient cause would not give existence in its genus of causality unless the end were causing in its causality. Therefore the end causes nothing except what is effected by the efficient cause for the love of the end.
(16) [First corollary] Here follows a corollary. Not to be left unmentioned is that false opinion about the end, that the final cause of a being is the last operation or object that is attained through that operation. If it is held that this as such is the final cause, this is false, because the last operation exists only after the thing ordered to the end already exists and therefore the thing ordered to the end does not essentially depend on it as such. Instead, because the effect of an efficient cause is ordered to something loved, the final cause is precisely that out of love for which the efficient cause makes something
5. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.5.30 (Marmura, 229).
6. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.2.1013a33–35 (Barnes, 2:1600).
Translation else exist. That loved thing—just insofar as it is loved—is the final cause of what was made.
Sometimes it may well be that the object of the last operation is the very thing that is loved and is therefore the final cause—but this is not because it is the completion of the operation of such a nature, but rather because it is loved by that which causes that nature. Nevertheless, the last operation of a thing, or that which is attained through it, is sometimes called its end, because it is the last and in some sense the best, and thus meets some of the conditions of being a final cause.
(17) Aristotle would not hold, therefore, that properly speaking the Intel ligences have a final cause but not an efficient cause,7 unless he were to take
"end" in an extended sense as the object of the best operation. Also, while he might grant that properly speaking the Intelligences do have an efficient cause, he would definitely not hold that it produces them through motion or change. This is because in metaphysics the four causes are considered in abstraction from those features that make them part of the subject matter of physics. If Aristotle takes these Intelligences to be sempiternal and necessary, he would not grant that an efficient cause first gave them existence after they did not exist—taking "after," that is, in the sense of duration rather than the sense in which Avicenna takes it in Metaphysics 6.2, that is, in the sense of an order of nature, the sense in which "after" applies to creation.8 The claim here is not weakened whether or not the thing caused is repugnant with necessity. Even if some efficient cause could cause simply and necessarily, and some end could move an efficient cause to act for its sake necessarily instead of contingently, still, any caused thing whatsoever is not only possible in the sense that is opposed to the impossible, but also in the sense that is opposed to whatever has its necessity from itself. This is because any caused thing is the object or endpoint of a power of its cause. But—according to the philosophers, anyway—the thing caused would not be possible in the sense that is opposed to all necessity whatsoever, since they would deny that there is contingency of this sort in the separate substances.
(18) [Second corollary] Another corollary is clear, namely that the end is the final cause of the effect of the efficient cause, and is not the final cause of the efficient cause itself. Thus, in the saying, "An agent acts because of the end," "end" should not be understood to refer to the end of the agent, but rather the agent's effect.
7. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7.1072b1–4 (Barnes, 2:1694); 12.8.1073a22–39 (Barnes,
2:1696).
8. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.2.9 (Marmura, 203).
Chapter 2 13. (19) Theorem 2.6: What is not an effect, is not made of matter.
(20) Proof: matter of itself is in contradictory potency to form, so it is not from itself actualized by form. Thus it is actualized through something else bringing that potency to actuality, namely, the efficient cause of the compos ite (since to produce a composite just is to bring about the actualization of matter by form).
The first consequence9 is clear, because merely passive and contradictory potency does not bring itself to actuality. If you say that form brings it to actuality, this is true formally. But since form and matter are first understood to be non-united—that is, prior to the subsequent formal actualization— therefore that by which they are united has the character of an efficient cause.
(21) A second proof of the theorem: the efficient cause is immediately proximate to the final cause and is therefore prior to the material cause.
Whatever has no prior cause likewise has no cause posterior to that prior cause. The first proposition is here proved, for the causal activity of the end is, metaphorically, to move insofar as it is loved; in this manner it moves the efficient cause and no other cause.
(22) A third proof: the composite is truly one; therefore it has some one entity that is the entity neither of the matter nor of the form. And that one entity is not caused principally by these two entities, because nothing one comes from many except by the power of something one; nor is it caused principally by either one of these two entities, because each of these is lesser than the total entity of the composite. Therefore it is caused by one extrinsic cause.
14. (23) Theorem 2.7: What is not composed of matter, is not composed of form; and what is not composed of form, is not composed of matter.
(24) Proof: what is not made of matter, is not composed of essential parts.
This is because in everything that is composed in this way and is essentially one, one of its parts is potential, since nothing becomes one per se except from potency and act—see Metaphysics 7 and 8.10 Therefore whatever does not have a part that is potential per se, is not a composite; and therefore neither is it composed of form, because something composed of form is a composite, which has form as one of its parts. (As it is argued concerning
9. "Consequence" here and throughout translates consequentia, a technical term that refers to the relationship between two statements when one follows from the other.
10. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8.1033b16–19 (Barnes, 2:1632); 8.6.1045b19–21 (Barnes,
2:1651).
Translation matter and form, it may also be argued in the same way concerning subject and accident.) (25) The above proof is confirmed by that bit of Aristotle in Metaphysics
7:11 if something were to exist from just one element, it would be nothing but that element—or, rather, it would not be an element, by Theorem 2.1.
Thus, similarly, if something has just one essential part, it is nothing but that part—or, rather, it is neither a part nor a cause, according to Theorem 2.1.
Therefore everything that is caused from some intrinsic cause also has some other intrinsic cause, and so Theorem 2.7 is clear.
15. (26) Theorem 2.8: What is not caused by extrinsic causes, is not caused by intrinsic causes.
(27) This is clear enough from the preceding four theorems. Nevertheless it has its own special proofs.
[First proof ] First, the causalities of extrinsic causes express a perfection to which no imperfection is necessarily joined, whereas intrinsic causes have an imperfection necessarily joined to them. Thus extrinsic causes are prior to intrinsic causes in their causing, as the perfect is prior to the imperfect. Add
Theorem 2.3 as a premise and Theorem 2.8 follows.
(28) [Second proof ] The second is this: the intrinsic causes in themselves can be caused by the extrinsic causes. Therefore the former are posterior to the extrinsic causes in their causing. The antecedent is clear concerning form, and clear concerning matter insofar as matter is a part—concerning matter in itself, too, as will be shown, below.12
16. (29) Theorem 2.9: The four types of causes are essentially ordered in their causing of one and the same thing.
(30) This is clear from the preceding five theorems.
[First proof ] But it can be seen to be reasonable in its own right that several things, on which one and the same thing essentially depends, them selves have an order, according to which the one thing depends on these several things so ordered. For every group of several things, which is not also itself something one—either in the sense that it is not composed of act and potency, or in the sense there is no unity of order among the members of the group—does not essentially cause one and the same thing. Therefore, if the four types of causes are neither parts of some one thing composed of them as of act and potency, nor have unity in their causing, how then would they cause something itself one? Therefore, they do have a unity of order insofar
11. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.17.1041b11–25 (Barnes, 2:1644).
12. 2.16(32) below.
Chapter 2 as they cause the thing they cause, and by virtue of this order they themselves are one, one with respect to some third thing, namely, their causing; and this is similar to the way in which the many things in the universe, through order, are one in being.
(31) [Second proof ] How there can be an ordering of the types of causes is clear from what was already said about the final and efficient causes, both the order they have among themselves—according to the second proof of Theorem 2.4 and the second proof of Theorem 2.6—and the order they have to other causes—according to the same proofs and also Theorem 2.8.
(32) But here I do not want to pursue an inquiry about how the intrinsic causes are ordered among themselves; I have little use for them in what fol lows. Nevertheless, it seems that matter is prior according to independence, because the contingent and informing seems to depend on the permanent and informed, since being formable is understood as prior to informing. In this way some explain Augustine's remarks in Confessions about the priority of matter with respect to form.13 And if you seek the order in which it is prior, I reply that it is prior as a caused thing that is closer than some other caused thing to the same remote cause, closer in the sense that necessarily, according to that order, form is caused after the matter is caused. Never theless form is prior to matter according to eminence because it is more perfect. Aristotle takes this for granted in Metaphysics 7,14 where he compares them, although it is possible to prove this from things he says elsewhere, in Metaphysics 9,15 concerning act and potency.
17. (33) But understand that it is one thing for causes to be essentially ordered in their causing, or according to causation, and it is another thing for the things that are causes to be essentially ordered, as is clear in Avicenna,
Metaphysics 6.5.16 For the first is true and has been shown to be true; if it were false, the following would be false: "Because it loves the end, it produces its effect," and, "Because it produces an effect, form informs and matter receives form." But these are widely admitted to be true. But the second is false, for that which is the end is not a cause of that which is the efficient cause, nor is the converse ever true. Also, normally that which is the efficient cause is not the cause of the matter but presupposes the matter.
13. Augustine, Confessions 12.3–4 (Chadwick, 247).
14. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3.1029a4–6 (Barnes, 2:1625).
15. Aristotle Metaphysics 9.8.1049b4–5 (Barnes, 2:1657).
16. Avicenna, The Metaphysics of "The Healing" 6.5.28 (Marmura, 228).
Translation The Third Division of Essential Order Two Orders of Non-Causal Dependence 18. (34) Having laid out the relationships between the members of the fourth division, I cover the third division only briefly, since it is clear how the things falling under this division are repugnant to each other and how they exhaust the thing divided. So:
Theorem 2.10: When two things are related to the same cause, that cause is either proximate or remote.
The Second Division of Essential Order Causal and Non-Causal Dependence (35) Concerning the second division I propose two theorems. The first con cerns the distinction of its members:
Theorem 2.11: It is not the case that each thing [B] more proximately caused by a cause [C] is itself a cause of a more remote thing [A] caused by that same cause [C]. Therefore, it [B] is something caused prior [to A], but it is not causally prior [to A].
(36) The antecedent of this theorem is proved by example and by reason.
Here is the example: quantity is a more proximate caused thing than quality, but is not a cause of quality. This is clear by considering the types of causes.
This is proved also by reason.17
19. (37) The second theorem concerns the sufficiency of the second division:
Theorem 2.12: A thing essentially depends only on a cause or on something caused that is more proximate to some cause.
(38) Proof: if a thing depends on something other than a cause, let that other thing be A and the dependent thing be B. If A does not exist, then
B will not exist.18 But, A not existing, all the essential causes of B can still concur, and also, all the things more proximate than B, which are caused by 17. The text does not include whatever argument Scotus had in mind.
18. At 1.6(13)–(14), Scotus introduced A as the posterior and B as the prior, and that is the meaning I assigned the symbols both in the translation and the commentary up to 2.18(35). Here at 2.19(38)–(40), and also at 2.22(48), Scotus switches the order: A is the prior and B is the posterior. This switch does not affect Scotus's overall meaning or argument, but I note it here to prevent confusion.
Chapter 2 these causes, can still be caused. Now, supposing these causes do concur and these more proximate things caused by these causes do exist, still, by your assumption, none of these is A and therefore B will not exist. Thus all these essential causes are not sufficient causes [of B], even if all the more proximate things have been caused. The consequence is clear, since if it is granted that causes are sufficient for causing more proximate things, then these causes can cause more remote things.
(39) [First objection and reply] It is futile to say that the argument does not establish that they cannot cause, but only that they do not cause. For accord ing to your assumption, if A is not granted existence, then B cannot exist.
Granting everything on the part of all the causes and the prior things caused by those causes, A cannot exist by means of them, because it is neither one among them nor something that can be caused by them. Therefore B cannot exist by means of them, either: for if B cannot exist except by that without which it is impossible [namely, A], then whatever cannot bring about A cannot bring about B, either.
(40) [Second objection and reply] There is no strength in the objection that a composite substance can exist through a natural agent, even though that agent cannot produce the matter the composite needs in order to exist. This is because a natural agent is not the total cause of the composite—that is, it is not the sort of cause that, excluding everything else, could still produce the composite. I bring this up because if I join together every cause in every type of causes ordered to B, and if all their effects that are more proximate to B have been produced, still, by means of all of these together A cannot exist, because it is not numbered either among the causes nor among the things caused by them. But without A, B cannot exist. Therefore through all these joined together at once, B cannot exist. Therefore all these joined together at once are not totally the cause of B—which is the opposite of your initial assumption.
The First Division of Essential Order Eminence and Dependence 20. (41) Concerning the first division I propose two similar theorems. The first is that its members are distinguished from each other:
Theorem 2.13: Not everything that is excelled essentially depends on that which is more eminent than it. Therefore the first member of the first division does not entail the second member.
Translation (42) Proof of the antecedent: The nobler species is eminent with respect to a less noble, as a contrary is with respect to a lesser contrary. And it is clear inductively that the more noble is not a cause of the less noble, and neither is it a thing more proximately caused by something that is a cause both of it and the less noble, because the causality of a common cause is not essentially ordered to them as caused things. Were it so ordered, it could not cause that which is excelled unless it first caused the more eminent, which is clearly false, for each and every type of cause. Consider that if the lesser contrary is produced by this cause, while the nobler contrary has been produced by no cause, then these are not together essentially ordered to any cause.
Moreover, if the eminent thing is neither a cause with respect to that which is excelled, nor a thing more proximately caused by a cause both of it and that which is excelled, then the excelled does not essentially depend on the eminent thing. This consequence is clear from what was just shown in Theorem 2.12 and its proof.
(43) Out of a sense of abundance I tack on the converse of Theorem 2.13:
Theorem 2.14: Not every dependent thing is excelled by that on which it depends.
(44) This is clearly seen in the case of a composite substance, which depends on matter, while it itself is much more perfect than matter. Similarly, form perhaps depends on matter—as was touched on in Theorem 2.9—but form is more perfect, according to Metaphysics 7.19 In cases of orderly change, that which is posterior in generation depends on the prior, because the prior is a more proximate effect of their common cause; nevertheless, the posterior is more perfect, according to Metaphysics 9.20
21. (45) In order to show the sufficiency of the first division, I here postulate a third theorem, a general statement familiar enough from Aristotle:
Theorem 2.15: Plurality is never to be posited without necessity.
(46) Since there appears to be no need to posit more essential orders in the first division than the two already discussed, these are the only two.
Theorem 2.15 also shows that there are only six essential orders, as many as have already been shown, and there appears to be no need to posit others.
22. (47) Having compared the members of the first division to each other in a general way, now in particular I compare the posterior of this order, namely, that which is excelled, with two posteriors of the second order, namely, the 19. Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.3.1029a4–6 (Barnes, 2:1625).
20. Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8.1050a4–6 (Barnes, 2:1658).
Chapter 2 effect of an efficient cause and that which is ordered to an end. Here I pos tulate one theorem, as follows:
Theorem 2.16: Everything ordered to an end is excelled.
(48) [First proof ] The proof is that the end is better than that which is for its sake. And the proof of this in turn is that an end [A], insofar as it is loved, moves the efficient cause to cause its effect [B]. Therefore A is neither less good than B, nor equally as good; therefore it is better. The second part of the antecedent [namely, that A is not equally as good as B] is proved by consid ering that, if A and B were equally good, then, for whatever reason A moves the efficient cause to produce B for the sake of A, for the same reason B could move its efficient cause to produce B for B's sake—by our assumption it is equally lovable and desirable as A—and thus B would be the final cause of itself, which is contrary to Theorem 2.1. From this we can also conclude that A is not less good than B.
(49) [Second proof ] Again, nature acts for the sake of an end as art would act if it acted naturally. But the end of works of art provides the principle of artisanal know-how, and whatever is ordered to the end follows from the principle, as a conclusion from premises, as it says in Physics 2.21 But the principle is truer than the conclusion; therefore the end, which includes that truth virtually, is more perfect than the subject of the conclusion (that is, whatever is ordered to the end).
23. (50) You object that some will causes something for the sake of some lesser good that is loved; therefore, in such a case, the end is excelled. The antecedent is clear in every action that is good by reason of its kind but bad by reason of its end, because such an action is ordered by the agent to some thing inferior to the agent itself.
I respond that Theorem 2.16 goes through for any end that is due to the nature of a thing, the sort of end that is always the end of a nature and the end of a rightly ordered will. But the example of a disordered will does not destroy the conclusion, because such a will is not the first cause of an effect.
Therefore, even if such a will is ordered to an end that is not more per fect than itself, still it is ordered by some superior cause to something else, more perfect than itself—otherwise that superior cause would not be wellordered, as the proof of Theorem 2.16 shows. But if it has an end more perfect than itself (owing to the superior cause that produced it), then there really is something more perfect than itself to which it is ordered. Hence everything ordered to an end is excelled by some end to which it is ordered—even if 21. Aristotle, Physics 2.8.199a9–15 (Barnes, 1:340); 2.9.200a15–200b14 (Barnes, 1:
341–42).
Translation in some cases a thing is not excelled by that immediate end on account of which, insofar as a disordered agent loves it, that agent causes it.
It might also be said that that inferior end is the disordered agent's end only in a qualified way. But this response is not satisfactory, because even when an efficient cause is the cause of something inferior, it is still unqual ifiedly an efficient cause. Therefore, so long as it does not produce its effect completely because it is being moved—such as a staff or rod in motion, where action for the sake of an end does not truly correspond to this sort of efficient cause, because it is not properly an agent but more like a more proximate effect—to repeat, so long as an efficient cause does not produce its effect in this way, then its end is an end unqualifiedly, because for every efficient cause per se there is an end per se.