Chapter Xiii On The Error Of Those Who Say That God And The Angels Do Not Have A Knowledge Of Singulars
CHAPTER XIII
ON THE ERROR OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT GOD AND THE ANGELS DO NOT HAVE A KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS
67. But not only did some thinkers err concerning the substance and the order of spiritual substances, judging of them after the manner of lower beings, but some of them also fell into error concerning the knowledge and the providence of these substances. For in wanting to judge of the intelligence and the operation of spiritual substances after the manner of human intelligence and operation, they held that God and the other immaterial substances did not have a knowledge of singulars, nor did they exercise a providence over any lower beings and especially human acts.195
For, since in our own case, it is the sense that deals with singulars whereas the intellect, because of its immateriality, deals not with singulars but with universals, as a consequence, they thought that the intellects of spiritual substances which are much more simple than our intellect, could not grasp singulars. Now since they axe completely incorporeal, there is in spiritual substances no sense, whose operation cannot take place without a body. Accordingly, they thought that it was impossible for spiritual “substances to have any knowledge of singulars.196
68. Further, proceeding to a greater folly, they thought that God knew only Himself by His intellect. For thus in our own case, we see that to understand is the perfection and the act of the one understanding, for it is thus that the intellect becomes actively understanding. Now nothing other than God is nobler than He so that it can be His perfection. Therefore, they hold that it necessarily follows that God understands only His own essence.197 Further, that which proceeds from the providence of any one cannot be by chance. If, therefore, all things that happen in this world proceed from the divine providence, there is no fortune or chance in things.198
They likewise use an argument of Aristotle in the sixth book of the Metaphysics,199 where he proves that if we posit that every effect has an essential cause and that, given any cause whatsoever, its effect must necessarily be posited, it will follow that all futures will happen of necessity, since any future effect will be reduced to some preceding cause, and that to another and so on, until we come to the cause which already is or already was. But this cause is now posited because it is in the present or it was in the past. If, therefore, to posit the cause means necessarily for the effect to be posited, then all future effects will follow of necessity. But if all things that are in the world, are subject to the divine providence, the cause of all things is not only present or past but has preceded them from eternity. But it is not possible that when this cause is posited, its effect will not follow. For the divine providence on which no defect falls, is not thwarted either through ignorance or through the impotence of the one providing. Therefore if follows that all things come about of necessity.200
69. Further, if God is the good itself, the order of His providence must necessarily proceed according to the nature of the good. Therefore either divine providence is inefficacious or it completely excludes evil from things. We see, however, many evils occurring among singular, generable, and corruptible things, and especially among men in whom, in addition to physical evils which are natural defects and corruptions common to them and to other corruptible things, there are added also the evils of vices and of disorderly happenings, as when numerous evils befall the just, and good things happen to the unjust. On this account, therefore, some people have thought that divine providence extends only to immaterial substances and the incorruptible and heavenly bodies, in which they saw no evil. But the lower beings, according to them, were subject to the providence of ‘God in genus but not individually nor to other spiritual substances.