1. Historiography

History is much more than simply memorizing names and dates. Some of its inclusive aspects involve various sorts of theories about the nature of past events, analyzing trends, and the actual process of gathering evidence in order to ascertain what happened. A cognate discipline, philosophy of history, investigates the theoretical underpinnings of the discipline of history itself. In this chapter we will begin with a preliminary notion of history. Then we will provide a critique of those who question the amount of objective knowledge that can be gained from this discipline. Lastly, we will give an overview of the method of historical investigation.

A Concept of History

The term “history” is used variously by different scholars. No uniform definition is agreed upon by everyone, while numerous approaches and interpretations are commonly utilized.

It is not our purpose to treat these contemporary notions. Still, there is at least some general agreement concerning the concept of history.

Historians generally recognize that their subject includes at least two major factors — the actual events in particular and the recording of these events. So this discipline is chiefly concerned with what has happened and how these events have been annotated and interpreted. This conception comprises the core understanding of history as it will be used in this book. Other elements are certainly involved, but these two major ideas are essential and recur most often, composing the foundation of historiography.

A couple of other factors are relevant to this discussion and should also be mentioned briefly. First, there is always a subjective factor involved whenever history is recorded. To give just one example, the historian must select the material that she will (and will not) present. The historical event itself is objective — generally we speak in terms of it occurring or not occurring. But the recording and interpreting of the event introduces various subjective factors.

For W.H. Walsh, the subjectivity of the writer is certainly present, but it does not keep us from obtaining historical truth. This subjectivity must be allowed for, but its effects can be offset.

Our approach towards history ought to be one of caution, since we need to recognize this subjective bias and then make the proper allowances for it.

Perhaps an example of this subjective factor would be helpful. In ancient history, the writings of Tacitus provide a case in point. It is known that this Roman historian was prejudiced in his writing, presenting an “aristocratic bias” and being convicted that moralizing was the “highest function” of history. Other times inaccuracies tarnish his text, as when he credits speeches to people who never gave them or incorrectly reports details in battle accounts. Moses Hadas maintains that the interpretations of Tacitus “must often be challenged” since he “could see only through his own lenses which were strongly colored.”

Does this mean that Tacitus must be rejected as a trustworthy source for ancient Roman history? Do these subjective elements found in his writings invalidate the information that he seeks to impart to his readers? As strange as it may seem, Hadas paradoxically states that Tacitus was Rome’s greatest historian.

Then he explains:

One may well ask how trustworthy the resultant history is. A modern historian guilty of such faults would surely lose all credit. . . . With allowance made for rhetorical embellishment customary in his day, and within the limits of distortion which his own views of morality and politics make inevitable, Tacitus never consciously sacrifices historical truth.

Michael Grant illustrates how Tacitus is not an isolated case in ancient times. The Greek Herodotus blended legends and anecdotal material into his histories, while another Roman, Livy, allowed for the operation of omens. Even worse, both Livy and Tacitus are examples of ancient historians who wrote about events that took place long before their time, sometimes as much as five centuries earlier. The results indicate frequent inconsistencies and contradictions in these ancient writings.

But modern historians do not despair about reconstructing ancient times. As Hadas explained, scholars can make allowance not only for the subjective facets involved in the recording and interpretation of events, but even for incorrect data. The reconstructing of ancient history relies on the ability of the scholar to determine the facts of the past in spite of these deterrents.

We employed some of these same principles when we investigated the resurrection of Jesus in the above chapters. Although the events occurred many centuries ago, historical investigation is still capable of ascertaining objective data.

Second, history cannot reach a point where it is positive of its findings in all instances. As with physics, medicine, and other inductive disciplines, there is also a certain amount of dependence on probability in history, as well.

Ernest Nagel, for example, concedes that his deterministic view of history opposes the almost unanimous convictions of contemporary physicists. Such scientific conclusions have had an effect on historians, for the accepted scientific view against a deterministic universe has helped to turn historians in the same direction.

Nagel tabulates five primary reasons for the general rejection of historical determinism by so many historians today. First, there are no developmental laws or patterns in history. No principles or precepts exist that would determine certain outcomes in advance of their occurrence. Second, history cannot be predicted, in spite of frequently-repeated ideas to the contrary. Past events or other such data do not determine the future. The third argument concerns the appearance of novel events and configurations of new ideas that recur throughout history.

Fourth, unexpected or chance events outside the ordinary are also a part of history. The fifth argument is the conflicting results that occur when one attempts to apply the concept of a deterministic world to the freedom and moral duty of human beings. Such freedom requires a creative aspect in history arising from human choice.

Some examples of Nagel’s five points might be helpful. Who could have predicted the wide dissemination of views brought about by a novel culture from a war-like community in third century BC Macedonia? Or who could have anticipated the creative civilization that would grow from a barbaric people situated on the banks of the Tiber River that would finally emerge in the first century BC? These and other similar findings have convinced many historians to reject the deterministic view of history. Again, Nagel asserts that the opposition to determinism in modern physics has also been a key factor, exercising a direct influence on most historians.

So historians generally recognize the necessity of couching conclusions in probabilistic terms. Wand points out that we cannot be as sure of historical investigation as some have thought in the past. Our judgments must be made according to which facts are most likely in terms of the historical evidence.

However, we must carefully note a critical detail of special importance. The concept of probability does not preclude our achieving certainty in matters of well-established historical findings. Events that are validated by careful historical research (and especially those established for long periods of time) in the absence of viable contrary findings are proven facts. The best-established historical events are those that are confirmed by careful research into the relevant data, especially when it has repeatedly withstood the eye of critical scrutiny. The possibility of future reevaluation does not preclude present certainty. After all, we cannot hold in abeyance all of history, science, or other inductive areas of study, in the constant fear that something may be challenged!

If additional data do cast doubt on an event, it might be necessary to reopen the investigation. But precluding such contrary material, the fact may be viewed as certain, or as provisional proof. For instance, we need not doubt the death of Julius Caesar by assassination, Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, or the election of Abraham Lincoln as the sixteenth president of the United States of America. These facts are well-established at this time and thus proven to be certain.

In this sense, the historian may achieve objective data when he has accurately performed his investigation, applied the appropriate standards of criticism, and determined the outcome according to the canons of reliability. The scholar also needs to be open to additional challenges, entailing further defense and/or adjustment.

It has not been our purpose to deal exhaustively with the concept of history.

Yet, a contemporary treatment of the subject ought to include at least these components. We will refer to history as both the occurrence of past events, as well as the recording and interpreting of them. Recognizing the inevitable influence of a subjective element when history is written, allowance must be made for it in order for objective data to be obtained. Realizing also that history deals with probabilities, we need to ascertain as nearly as possible those facts that best fit the data.

As is the case with probabilities and uncertainties, any event is possible. Such is the nature of inductive studies. Therefore, events ought not be ruled out (either scientifically or historically) before they are researched. A thorough investigation of the evidence is required. Events that are firmly established by historical investigation may be regarded as certain, proven by the available data.

Historical Analysis and Objectivity

But some scholars have downplayed the objective element, preferring to emphasize the more subjective role of the historian. This was especially the case with certain trends from the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth centuries. W.H. Walsh enumerates some of these subjective factors, dividing them into four categories: the personal preferences of the researcher, group prejudices, differing concepts of historical interpretation, and worldview conflicts.

More in agreement with this emphasis, Charles Beard produces similar reasons.

But since the middle of this century, most historians have preferred a synthesis of the objective and subjective outlooks. These scholars both pursue past facts by utilizing the more objective tools of historical research, while still attempting to take seriously the limitations imposed by various sorts of subjective factors. In brief, though various outside influences are admitted, we still have at our disposal significant historical means of researching the past and deciding what occurred.

There are numerous reasons why so many contemporary scholars opt for this synthesis between discovering objective facts in spite of subjective limitations. Personal biases can distort the interpretation of data and thereby affect one’s conclusions. However, to hold that these factors cannot be overcome and are so serious that they must necessarily nullify all historical conclusions is to stumble into a host of errors. Recent historians and philosophers who study this subject have noted numerous problems with relativistic hypotheses, which have accounted for the fact that this outlook has “suffered a decline in status.”

1. Self-contradiction

First, and quite devastating to relativistic claims, the statement that all historical knowledge is relative is self-contradictory. Nagel argues that when such a claim is made, at least one objective conclusion is known, so there could well be others.

Christopher Blake explains the criticism in slightly different terms: “either Relativism is wrong or, if it is correct, then it is itself only a relative verdict . . . .”

Amazingly, even Charles Beard (frequently recognized as the “foremost spokesman” for historical relativism

) fully admits this problem. In fact, it could scarcely be stated in any stronger or more forceful terms than his:

Contemporary criticism shows that the apostle of relativity is destined to be destroyed by the child of his own brain. If all historical conceptions are merely relative to passing events . . . then the conception of relativity is itself relative. When absolutes in history are rejected the absolutism of relativity is also rejected. . . . the conception of relativity will also pass, as previous conceptions and interpretations of events have passed. . . . the skeptic of relativity will disappear in due course. . . . the apostle of relativity will surely be executed by his own logic.

2. Logical fallacy

Second, to assert that subjective biases must nullify or overcome objective procedures is to argue in a non-sequitur manner. Morton White insists that, “The mere fact that historians are biased is no argument against the existence of impersonal standards . . . .” To hold that bias nullifies all historical knowledge is fallacious, just as it would be to declare that a physician’s feelings about her patient’s sickness prevents her from making a proper diagnosis.

Ernest Nagel concurs: “the bare fact that inquiry is selective [is] no valid ground for doubting the objectively warranted character of its conclusions . . . .”

3. Inconsistency

Third, another indication of the inadequacy of relativistic approaches to historiography is that these historians fail to carry out the skepticism of their own position, perhaps because there would be no history to write. So, in spite of their relativism, they pursue the writing of the actual occurrences of history. White criticizes Beard’s skeptical approach, in that it did not affect Beard’s “own scientific work” on “the essence of history.”

For instance, Beard considered his own work on an economic understanding of the Constitution

to be “objective and factual.”

Meyerhoff also recognizes this problem, stating that “Beard never reached a satisfactory middle ground” between the objective and subjective elements in his own historiography.

4. Correcting subjectivity

Fourth, bias can be allowed for, recognized, and dealt with. Nagel declares: “The very fact that biased thinking may be detected and its sources investigated shows that the case for objective explanations in history is not necessarily hopeless.”

Historians can avoid the damaging effects of partiality. Even though various prejudices can never be completely uprooted, Walsh reminds us that “every reputable historian acknowledges the need for some sort of objectivity and impartiality in his work” in order to separate facts from propaganda, feelings, and personal preconceptions.

5. Historical Facts

Fifth, the inductive measures that are normally applied in historiography yield knowable conclusions. Even though he reaches a moderate conclusion on the issue, Walsh explains: “Historical conclusions must be backed by evidence just as scientific conclusions must.”

Beard even agrees here: “The historian . . . . sees the doctrine of relativity crumble in the cold light of historical knowledge.”

Perhaps surprisingly, historians who are often categorized as relativists actually agree on the ability to obtain past knowledge.

Karl Mannheim, identified by Gardiner as “[p]erhaps the most forthright proponent of historical relativism in recent times,”

agrees that the presence of subjective concerns “does not imply renunciation of the postulate of objectivity and the possibility of arriving at decisions in factual disputes.”

Supporting a case for objective facts, Blake comments that there is a large amount of historical research that is accepted by the entire historical community.

For reasons such as these, we may conclude that attempts to treat historiography in a relativistic manner are confronted by numerous problems, including more than we have presented here,

and have failed. Granted, there are undoubtedly subjective factors that often influence the historian’s work. This is not doubted by those who defend the objectivity of historical inquiry.

But objectivity is also possible in the sense defined above, the result of an accurate investigation of data, followed by an application of the appropriate standards of criticism, including entertaining alternative theses, all within the standards of probability. Any additional challenges need to be answered, entailing further defense and/or adjustment.

Historical Research and Investigation

How does one actually do the work of the historian? How is such research to be conducted?

The occurrence of past events can usually be discovered (within a certain probability) by a careful investigation of the facts. These former events are only accessible by a study of the available historical evidence. Although the historian usually did not personally participate in what he is studying (assuming he wasn’t originally there), he can inspect the relevant data such as the eyewitnesses, written documents, and various other records, structures, and archaeological finds. Upon such confirmation the historian must build his case. Such tools comprise the working principles of historical research.

Of course, what the existing data reveal is not automatically accepted as true, especially if there are conflicts in the testimony. The historian has the job of critically investigating the available sources in order to ascertain as closely as possible their accuracy. Results can be obtained by determining which conclusions best fit the evidence. The historian builds on such groundwork.

We therefore decide on the evidence at hand — choosing the most probable conclusion.

Historical data must be available if the historian is to investigate the past in such a manner. These sources are often divided into two types: primary and secondary. Primary sources “are underived, firsthand, or contemporary with the event,” and are much more crucial.

They may consist of eyewitness testimony given in various forms.

Secondary material witnesses to primary sources, directed to past persons and events. These may take the form of works like textbooks, monographs, edited volumes, and syllabi. As such, they help elucidate and expand the previously existing materials.

Primary sources consist of both literary and non-literary remains. The former include written documents, either official or unofficial. Pliny the Younger’s famous correspondence, penned while he was a Roman governor in Asia Minor during the early second century AD, is an example of writings composed by a state official or representative. An unofficial primary document would include informal works of a firsthand nature, such as books, newspapers, journals, or periodicals. Julius Caesar’s accounts of his battles in Gaul, written before his rule in first century BC Rome, is an example.

Documents written by eyewitnesses or that reflect their influence are, of course, extremely important in historical study, whenever they are available. Examples of such eyewitness sources are provided by American interest in the 1950s and 60s in published interviews with still-living Civil War veterans.

Literary remains in the form of inscriptions on stone, metal, or other materials (termed epigraphy) are also available in some cases.

Primary non-literary remains include material such as recordings obtained directly from eyewitness interviews, oral tradition, photographs, and archaeological artifacts. Eyewitness testimony using recorded interviews obviously cannot extend much over 100 years, at the most. Tradition, whether oral or written, sometimes reaches back into antiquity, with sources such as reports, legends, heroic stories, and ballads. Reliable traditions grounded in eyewitness testimony would be an important source. On the other hand, Americans are acquainted with George Washington and the cherry tree or the exploits of Davy Crockett. The weakness with this sort of tradition is that it must be trustworthy and not simply hearsay or storytelling.

Archaeological artifacts can be quite valuable as witnesses to our past. Remains like architecture, monuments, grave sites, burial chambers, furniture, artwork, clothes, coins, tools, or other implements can often help determine both historical backgrounds and events. For example, Jewish burial chambers have actually revealed very specific data concerning burial customs, human physical characteristics, and varieties of death inflicted by enemies. Excavations of Qumran near the Dead Sea have uncovered not only the scrolls themselves, but also numerous facts from about the time of Jesus regarding the ascetic and communal lifestyle of the sectarian Essenes. Uncovering Greek cities such as Athens, Corinth, and Ephesus have provided invaluable evidence concerning the art, religious beliefs, and lifestyle of these ancient cultures.

The gathering of the primary and secondary sources does not complete the study; neither does the historian automatically conclude that such a collection of data is synonymous with the facts themselves. Rather, these sources must be organized and subjected to criticism before conclusions can be drawn.

In the case of written documents, for example, both external and internal historical criticism is implemented.

External criticism is applied for the purpose of checking the writing itself and is divided into two parts. Higher criticism assesses the authenticity of the document regarding elements such as its background, authorship, date of writing, place of composition, the audience, and reason for writing. Further, is the text reliable? Does it bear signs of corresponding to fact? Lower criticism concerns the question of whether we essentially have the text as it was originally composed. It involves questions of manuscript evidence: the dates of existing copies, their comparison to the original, and the presence of any documentary interpolations or omissions.

Internal factors are also helpful in assessing a document’s reliability. They include the competence and character of the author, as well as his ability to separate facts from feeling, opinion, or other subjective distortion.

If the sources are unwritten, criticism could take such forms as the use of dating methods, other scientific testing procedures such as chemical analysis, and comparisons to relevant written accounts. The testing of eyewitness interviews and oral tradition would follow lines of criticism closer to those used for documentary sources, complete with external and internal phases, including authorship, the date of the testimony, its credibility, and whether it has been modified by time or circumstances.

After the historian gathers his materials, organizes them, and applies external and internal criticism, he is ready to prepare and formulate his conclusions. The results should conform to all the known data and provide the most comprehensive and probable judgment on the issues. The outcome is then open to careful scrutiny from other scholars, which should prompt the cautious historian to be able to defend the results, based on the factual data available.

Summary and Conclusion

We began by maintaining that a concept of history includes at least the events themselves and the records of these occurrences. Additionally, there is always a subjective element in reporting the past and conclusions from this discipline must be couched in probabilistic terms. But when proper procedures are followed, the objective data of history can be uncovered within these parameters. Those who have argued against the historian’s ability to uncover objective facts are opposed by numerous difficulties.

We also outlined how the historian’s methods and tools, especially the use of primary sources, are still able to achieve accurate knowledge of the past. Most historians agree with this conclusion. Cairns summarizes as follows:

Through scientific study of his artifacts and documents, the historian can be reasonably certain concerning an event . . . . There is a surprising amount of consensus among historians on the basic facts and on many conclusions about the past.

It is within these parameters that we have sought in this volume to address the historicity of Jesus. We have especially endeavored to ascertain the facts surrounding his death and resurrection.

Why Believe? God Exists!

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,

Philosophy of History

Christianity,

The Complete Works of Tacitus,

Jesus: An Historian’s Review,

Jesus: An Historian’s Review.

Christianity,

Philosophical Analysis and History

Christianity,

The Simon Greenleaf Review of Law and Religion,

God and Man in Time

The Philosophy of History in Our Time

The Varieties of History

Philosophy of History,

Theories of History

Part II

Philosophical Analysis and History.

(Philosophy of History,

Theories,

Historian’s Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought

Philosophy of History,

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution

Philosophy of History,

Philosophy,

Philosophy of History,

Philosophical Analysis,

Theories,

Fallacies,

Philosophical Analysis,

Theories,

Philosophy of History,

Theories,

Philosophy of History,

Essays in the Philosophy of History,

Philosophy of History,

An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,

Philosophy of History,

The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers

Theories,

means

Fallacies,

Philosophy of History,

Theories,

Philosophy of History,

Philosophy,

Makers of Modern Strategy

Philosophy,

God and Man,

Eyewitness: The Civil War as We Lived It

God and Man,

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